Security

report:-deepseek’s-chat-histories-and-internal-data-were-publicly-exposed

Report: DeepSeek’s chat histories and internal data were publicly exposed

AI, clickhouse, DeepSeek, deepseek R1, openai, OpenAI o1, Security / /

A cloud security firm found a publicly accessible, fully controllable database belonging to DeepSeek, the Chinese firm that has recently shaken up the AI world, “within minutes” of examining DeepSeek’s security, according to a blog post by Wiz.

An analytical ClickHouse database tied to DeepSeek, “completely open and unauthenticated,” contained more than 1 million instances of “chat history, backend data, and sensitive information, including log streams, API secrets, and operational details,” according to Wiz. An open web interface also allowed for full database control and privilege escalation, with internal API endpoints and keys available through the interface and common URL parameters.

“While much of the attention around AI security is focused on futuristic threats, the real dangers often come from basic risks—like accidental external exposure of databases,” writes Gal Nagli at Wiz’s blog. “As organizations rush to adopt AI tools and services from a growing number of startups and providers, it’s essential to remember that by doing so, we’re entrusting these companies with sensitive data. The rapid pace of adoption often leads to overlooking security, but protecting customer data must remain the top priority.”

Ars has contacted DeepSeek for comment and will update this post with any response. Wiz noted that it did not receive a response from DeepSeek regarding its findings, but after contacting every DeepSeek email and LinkedIn profile Wiz could find on Wednesday, the company protected the databases Wiz had previously accessed within half an hour.

Report: DeepSeek’s chat histories and internal data were publicly exposed Read More »

apple-chips-can-be-hacked-to-leak-secrets-from-gmail,-icloud,-and-more

Apple chips can be hacked to leak secrets from Gmail, iCloud, and more

a-series chips, Apple, Biz & IT, m-series chips, Security, side channels, speculative execution / /

MEET FLOP AND ITS CLOSE RELATIVE, SLAP

Side channel gives unauthenticated remote attackers access they should never have.

Apple is introducing three M3 performance tiers at the same time. Credit: Apple

Apple-designed chips powering Macs, iPhones, and iPads contain two newly discovered vulnerabilities that leak credit card information, locations, and other sensitive data from the Chrome and Safari browsers as they visit sites such as iCloud Calendar, Google Maps, and Proton Mail.

The vulnerabilities, affecting the CPUs in later generations of Apple A- and M-series chip sets, open them to side channel attacks, a class of exploit that infers secrets by measuring manifestations such as timing, sound, and power consumption. Both side channels are the result of the chips’ use of speculative execution, a performance optimization that improves speed by predicting the control flow the CPUs should take and following that path, rather than the instruction order in the program.

A new direction

The Apple silicon affected takes speculative execution in new directions. Besides predicting control flow CPUs should take, it also predicts the data flow, such as which memory address to load from and what value will be returned from memory.

The most powerful of the two side-channel attacks is named FLOP. It exploits a form of speculative execution implemented in the chips’ load value predictor (LVP), which predicts the contents of memory when they’re not immediately available. By inducing the LVP to forward values from malformed data, an attacker can read memory contents that would normally be off-limits. The attack can be leveraged to steal a target’s location history from Google Maps, inbox content from Proton Mail, and events stored in iCloud Calendar.

SLAP, meanwhile, abuses the load address predictor (LAP). Whereas LVP predicts the values of memory content, LAP predicts the memory locations where instruction data can be accessed. SLAP forces the LAP to predict the wrong memory addresses. Specifically, the value at an older load instruction’s predicted address is forwarded to younger arbitrary instructions. When Safari has one tab open on a targeted website such as Gmail, and another open tab on an attacker site, the latter can access sensitive strings of JavaScript code of the former, making it possible to read email contents.

“There are hardware and software measures to ensure that two open webpages are isolated from each other, preventing one of them from (maliciously) reading the other’s contents,” the researchers wrote on an informational site describing the attacks and hosting the academic papers for each one. “SLAP and FLOP break these protections, allowing attacker pages to read sensitive login-protected data from target webpages. In our work, we show that this data ranges from location history to credit card information.”

There are two reasons FLOP is more powerful than SLAP. The first is that it can read any memory address in the browser process’s address space. Second, it works against both Safari and Chrome. SLAP, by contrast, is limited to reading strings belonging to another webpage that are allocated adjacently to the attacker’s own strings. Further, it works only against Safari. The following Apple devices are affected by one or both of the attacks:

• All Mac laptops from 2022–present (MacBook Air, MacBook Pro)

• All Mac desktops from 2023–present (Mac Mini, iMac, Mac Studio, Mac Pro)

• All iPad Pro, Air, and Mini models from September 2021–present (Pro 6th and 7th generation, Air 6th gen., Mini 6th gen.)

• All iPhones from September 2021–present (All 13, 14, 15, and 16 models, SE 3rd gen.)

Attacking LVP with FLOP

After reverse-engineering the LVP, which was introduced in the M3 and A17 generations, the researchers found that it behaved unexpectedly. When it sees the same data value being repeatedly returned from memory for the same load instruction, it will try to predict the load’s outcome the next time the instruction is executed, “even if the memory accessed by the load now contains a completely different value!” the researchers explained. “Therefore, using the LVP, we can trick the CPU into computing on incorrect data values.” They continued:

“If the LVP guesses wrong, the CPU can perform arbitrary computations on incorrect data under speculative execution. This can cause critical checks in program logic for memory safety to be bypassed, opening attack surfaces for leaking secrets stored in memory. We demonstrate the LVP’s dangers by orchestrating these attacks on both the Safari and Chrome web browsers in the form of arbitrary memory read primitives, recovering location history, calendar events, and credit card information.”

FLOP requires a target to be logged in to a site such as Gmail or iCloud in one tab and the attacker site in another for a duration of five to 10 minutes. When the target uses Safari, FLOP sends the browser “training data” in the form of JavaScript to determine the computations needed. With those computations in hand, the attacker can then run code reserved for one data structure on another data structure. The result is a means to read chosen 64-bit addresses.

When a target moves the mouse pointer anywhere on the attacker webpage, FLOP opens the URL of the target page address in the same space allocated for the attacker site. To ensure that the data from the target site contains specific secrets of value to the attacker, FLOP relies on behavior in Apple’s WebKit browser engine that expands its heap at certain addresses and aligns memory addresses of data structures to multiples of 16 bytes. Overall, this reduces the entropy enough to brute-force guess 16-bit search spaces.

Illustration of FLOP attack recovering data from Google Maps Timeline (Top), a Proton Mail inbox (Middle), and iCloud Calendar (Bottom). Credit: Kim et al.

When a target browses with Chrome, FLOP targets internal data structures the browser uses to call WebAssembly functions. These structures first must vet the signature of each function. FLOP abuses the LVP in a way that allows the attacker to run functions with the wrong argument—for instance, a memory pointer rather than an integer. The end result is a mechanism for reading chosen memory addresses.

To enforce site isolation, Chrome allows two or more webpages to share address space only if their extended top-level domain and the prefix before this extension (for instance, www.square.com) are identical. This restriction prevents one Chrome process from rendering URLs with attacker.square.com and target.square.com, or as attacker.org and target.org. Chrome further restricts roughly 15,000 domains included in the public suffix list from sharing address space.

To bypass these rules, FLOP must meet three conditions:

  1. It cannot target any domain specified in the list such that attacker.site.tld can share an address space with target.site.tld
  2. The webpage must allow users to host their own JavaScript and WebAssembly on the attacker.site.tld,
  3. The target.site.tld must render secrets

Here, the researchers show how such an attack can steal credit card information stored on a user-created Square storefront such as storename.square.site. The attackers host malicious code on their own account located at attacker.square.site. When both are open, attacker.square.site inserts malicious JavaScript and WebAssembly into it. The researchers explained:

“This allows the attacker storefront to be co-rendered in Chrome with other store-front domains by calling window.open with their URLs, as demonstrated by prior work. One such domain is the customer accounts page, which shows the target user’s saved credit card information and address if they are authenticated into the target storefront. As such, we recover the page’s data.”

Left: UI elements from Square’s customer account page for a storefront. Right: Recovered last four credit card number digits, expiration date, and billing address via FLOP-Control. Credit: Kim et al.

SLAPping LAP silly

SLAP abuses the LAP feature found in newer Apple silicon to perform a similar data-theft attack. By forcing LAP to predict the wrong memory address, SLAP can perform attacker-chosen computations on data stored in separate Safari processes. The researchers demonstrate how an unprivileged remote attacker can then recover secrets stored in Gmail, Amazon, and Reddit when the target is authenticated.

Top: Email subject and sender name shown as part of Gmail’s browser DOM. Bottom: Recovered strings from this page. Credit: Kim et al.

Top Left: A listing for coffee pods from Amazon’s ‘Buy Again’ page. Bottom Left: Recovered item name from Amazon. Top Right: A comment on a Reddit post. Bottom Right: the recovered text. Credit: Kim et al.

“The LAP can issue loads to addresses that have never been accessed architecturally and transiently forward the values to younger instructions in an unprecedentedly large window,” the researchers wrote. “We demonstrate that, despite their benefits to performance, LAPs open new attack surfaces that are exploitable in the real world by an adversary. That is, they allow broad out-of-bounds reads, disrupt control flow under speculation, disclose the ASLR slide, and even compromise the security of Safari.”

SLAP affects Apple CPUs starting with the M2/A15, which were the first to feature LAP. The researchers said that they suspect chips from other manufacturers also use LVP and LAP and may be vulnerable to similar attacks. They also said they don’t know if browsers such as Firefox are affected because they weren’t tested in the research.

An academic report for FLOP is scheduled to appear at the 2025 USENIX Security Symposium. The SLAP research will be presented at the 2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. The researchers behind both papers are:

• Jason Kim, Georgia Institute of Technology

• Jalen Chuang, Georgia Institute of Technology

• Daniel Genkin, Georgia Institute of Technology

• Yuval Yarom, Ruhr University Bochum

The researchers published a list of mitigations they believe will address the vulnerabilities allowing both the FLOP and SLAP attacks. They said that Apple officials have indicated privately to them that they plan to release patches.

In an email, an Apple representative declined to say if any such plans exist. “We want to thank the researchers for their collaboration as this proof of concept advances our understanding of these types of threats,” the spokesperson wrote. “Based on our analysis, we do not believe this issue poses an immediate risk to our users.”

Photo of Dan Goodin

Dan Goodin is Senior Security Editor at Ars Technica, where he oversees coverage of malware, computer espionage, botnets, hardware hacking, encryption, and passwords. In his spare time, he enjoys gardening, cooking, and following the independent music scene. Dan is based in San Francisco. Follow him at here on Mastodon and here on Bluesky. Contact him on Signal at DanArs.82.

Apple chips can be hacked to leak secrets from Gmail, iCloud, and more Read More »

backdoor-infecting-vpns-used-“magic-packets”-for-stealth-and-security

Backdoor infecting VPNs used “magic packets” for stealth and security

backdoors, Biz & IT, juniper, magic packets, Security, vpns / /

When threat actors use backdoor malware to gain access to a network, they want to make sure all their hard work can’t be leveraged by competing groups or detected by defenders. One countermeasure is to equip the backdoor with a passive agent that remains dormant until it receives what’s known in the business as a “magic packet.” On Thursday, researchers revealed that a never-before-seen backdoor that quietly took hold of dozens of enterprise VPNs running Juniper Network’s Junos OS has been doing just that.

J-Magic, the tracking name for the backdoor, goes one step further to prevent unauthorized access. After receiving a magic packet hidden in the normal flow of TCP traffic, it relays a challenge to the device that sent it. The challenge comes in the form of a string of text that’s encrypted using the public portion of an RSA key. The initiating party must then respond with the corresponding plaintext, proving it has access to the secret key.

Open sesame

The lightweight backdoor is also notable because it resided only in memory, a trait that makes detection harder for defenders. The combination prompted researchers at Lumin Technology’s Black Lotus Lab to sit up and take notice.

“While this is not the first discovery of magic packet malware, there have only been a handful of campaigns in recent years,” the researchers wrote. “The combination of targeting Junos OS routers that serve as a VPN gateway and deploying a passive listening in-memory only agent, makes this an interesting confluence of tradecraft worthy of further observation.”

The researchers found J-Magic on VirusTotal and determined that it had run inside the networks of 36 organizations. They still don’t know how the backdoor got installed. Here’s how the magic packet worked:

The passive agent is deployed to quietly observe all TCP traffic sent to the device. It discreetly analyzes the incoming packets and watches for one of five specific sets of data contained in them. The conditions are obscure enough to blend in with the normal flow of traffic that network defense products won’t detect a threat. At the same time, they’re unusual enough that they’re not likely to be found in normal traffic.

Backdoor infecting VPNs used “magic packets” for stealth and security Read More »

trump-admin-fires-security-board-investigating-chinese-hack-of-large-isps

Trump admin fires security board investigating Chinese hack of large ISPs

Cyber Safety Review Board, Policy, salt typhoon, Security, Trump / /

“Effective immediately, the Department of Homeland Security will no longer tolerate any advisory committee[s] which push agendas that attempt to undermine its national security mission, the President’s agenda or Constitutional rights of Americans,” the DHS statement said.

The Cyber Safety Review Board operates under the DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which has been criticized by Republican lawmakers for allegedly trying to “surveil and censor Americans’ speech on social media.”

Democrat: Board will be stacked with Trump loyalists

A Democratic lawmaker said that Trump appears ready to stack the Cyber Safety Review Board with “loyalists.” House Committee on Homeland Security Ranking Member Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.) made the criticism in his opening statement at a hearing today.

“Before I close, I would also like to express my concern regarding the dismissal of the non-government members of advisory committees inside the Department, including the Cyber Safety Review Board and the CISA Advisory Committee,” Thompson’s statement reads. “The CSRB is in the process of investigating the Salt Typhoon hack of nine major telecommunications companies, and it is a national security imperative that the investigation be completed expeditiously. I am troubled that the President’s attempt to stack the CSRB with loyalists may cause its important work on the Salt Typhoon campaign to be delayed.”

Thompson said Republicans have been trying to shut down CISA over “false allegations and conspiracy theories.” The conservative Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 alleged that “CISA has devolved into an unconstitutional censoring and election engineering apparatus of the political Left.”

The DHS memo dismissing board members was published yesterday by freelance cybersecurity reporter Eric Geller, who quoted an anonymous source as saying the Cyber Safety Review Board’s review of Salt Typhoon is “dead.” Geller wrote that other advisory boards affected by the mass dismissal include the Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security Board, the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, the National Infrastructure Advisory Council, and the Secret Service’s Cyber Investigations Advisory Board.

“The CSRB was ‘less than halfway’ done with its Salt Typhoon investigation, according to a now-former member,” Geller wrote. The former member was also quoted as saying, “There are still professional staff for the CSRB and I hope they will continue some of the work in the interim.”

House Committee on Homeland Security Chairman Mark Green (R-Tenn.) told Nextgov/FCW that “President Trump’s new DHS leadership should have the opportunity to decide the future of the Board. This could include appointing new members, reviewing its structure, or deciding if the Board is the best way to examine cyber intrusions.”

Trump admin fires security board investigating Chinese hack of large ISPs Read More »

fbi-forces-chinese-malware-to-delete-itself-from-thousands-of-us-computers

FBI forces Chinese malware to delete itself from thousands of US computers

chinese malware, plugx, Policy, Security / /

The FBI said today that it removed Chinese malware from 4,258 US-based computers and networks by sending commands that forced the malware to use its “self-delete” function.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) government paid the Mustang Panda group to develop a version of PlugX malware used to infect, control, and steal information from victim computers, the FBI said. “Since at least 2014, Mustang Panda hackers then infiltrated thousands of computer systems in campaigns targeting US victims, as well as European and Asian governments and businesses, and Chinese dissident groups,” the FBI said.

The malware has been known for years but many Windows computers were still infected while their owners were unaware. The FBI learned of a method to remotely remove the malware from a French law enforcement agency, which had gained access to a command-and-control server that could send commands to infected computers.

“When a computer infected with this variant of PlugX malware is connected to the Internet, the PlugX malware can send a request to communicate with a command-and-control (‘C2’) server, whose IP address is hard-coded in the malware. In reply, the C2 server can send several possible commands to the PlugX malware on the victim computer,” stated an FBI affidavit that was made on December 20 and unsealed today.

As it turns out, the “PlugX malware variant’s native functionality includes a command from a C2 server to ‘self-delete.'” This deletes the application, files created by the malware, and registry keys used to automatically run the PlugX application when the victim computer is started.

FBI forces Chinese malware to delete itself from thousands of US computers Read More »

microsoft-sues-service-for-creating-illicit-content-with-its-ai-platform

Microsoft sues service for creating illicit content with its AI platform

AI, Artificial Intelligence, Biz & IT, generative ai, microsoft, Policy, Security / /

Microsoft and others forbid using their generative AI systems to create various content. Content that is off limits includes materials that feature or promote sexual exploitation or abuse, is erotic or pornographic, or attacks, denigrates, or excludes people based on race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, age, disability status, or similar traits. It also doesn’t allow the creation of content containing threats, intimidation, promotion of physical harm, or other abusive behavior.

Besides expressly banning such usage of its platform, Microsoft has also developed guardrails that inspect both prompts inputted by users and the resulting output for signs the content requested violates any of these terms. These code-based restrictions have been repeatedly bypassed in recent years through hacks, some benign and performed by researchers and others by malicious threat actors.

Microsoft didn’t outline precisely how the defendants’ software was allegedly designed to bypass the guardrails the company had created.

Masada wrote:

Microsoft’s AI services deploy strong safety measures, including built-in safety mitigations at the AI model, platform, and application levels. As alleged in our court filings unsealed today, Microsoft has observed a foreign-based threat–actor group develop sophisticated software that exploited exposed customer credentials scraped from public websites. In doing so, they sought to identify and unlawfully access accounts with certain generative AI services and purposely alter the capabilities of those services. Cybercriminals then used these services and resold access to other malicious actors with detailed instructions on how to use these custom tools to generate harmful and illicit content. Upon discovery, Microsoft revoked cybercriminal access, put in place countermeasures, and enhanced its safeguards to further block such malicious activity in the future.

The lawsuit alleges the defendants’ service violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the Lanham Act, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and constitutes wire fraud, access device fraud, common law trespass, and tortious interference. The complaint seeks an injunction enjoining the defendants from engaging in “any activity herein.”

Microsoft sues service for creating illicit content with its AI platform Read More »

ongoing-attacks-on-ivanti-vpns-install-a-ton-of-sneaky,-well-written-malware

Ongoing attacks on Ivanti VPNs install a ton of sneaky, well-written malware

Biz & IT, Security / /

Networks protected by Ivanti VPNs are under active attack by well-resourced hackers who are exploiting a critical vulnerability that gives them complete control over the network-connected devices.

Hardware maker Ivanti disclosed the vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-0283, on Wednesday and warned that it was under active exploitation against some customers. The vulnerability, which is being exploited to allow hackers to execute malicious code with no authentication required, is present in the company’s Connect Secure VPN, and Policy Secure & ZTA Gateways. Ivanti released a security patch at the same time. It upgrades Connect Secure devices to version 22.7R2.5.

Well-written, multifaceted

According to Google-owned security provider Mandiant, the vulnerability has been actively exploited against “multiple compromised Ivanti Connect Secure appliances” since December, a month before the then zero-day came to light. After exploiting the vulnerability, the attackers go on to install two never-before-seen malware packages, tracked under the names DRYHOOK and PHASEJAM on some of the compromised devices.

PHASEJAM is a well-written and multifaceted bash shell script. It first installs a web shell that gives the remote hackers privileged control of devices. It then injects a function into the Connect Secure update mechanism that’s intended to simulate the upgrading process.

“If the ICS administrator attempts an upgrade, the function displays a visually convincing upgrade process that shows each of the steps along with various numbers of dots to mimic a running process,” Mandiant said. The company continued:

PHASEJAM injects a malicious function into the /home/perl/DSUpgrade.pm file named processUpgradeDisplay(). The functionality is intended to simulate an upgrading process that involves 13 steps, with each of those taking a predefined amount of time. If the ICS administrator attempts an upgrade, the function displays a visually convincing upgrade process that shows each of the steps along with various numbers of dots to mimic a running process. Further details are provided in the System Upgrade Persistence section.

The attackers are also using a previously seen piece of malware tracked as SPAWNANT on some devices. One of its functions is to disable an integrity checker tool (ICT) Ivanti has built into recent VPN versions that is designed to inspect device files for unauthorized additions. SpawnAnt does this by replacing the expected SHA256 cryptographic hash of a core file with the hash of it after it has been infected. As a result, when the tool is run on compromised devices, admins see the following screen:

Ongoing attacks on Ivanti VPNs install a ton of sneaky, well-written malware Read More »

here’s-how-hucksters-are-manipulating-google-to-promote-shady-chrome-extensions

Here’s how hucksters are manipulating Google to promote shady Chrome extensions

abuse, Biz & IT, Chrome Web Store, extensions, Google, Security, spam / /

The people overseeing the security of Google’s Chrome browser explicitly forbid third-party extension developers from trying to manipulate how the browser extensions they submit are presented in the Chrome Web Store. The policy specifically calls out search-manipulating techniques such as listing multiple extensions that provide the same experience or plastering extension descriptions with loosely related or unrelated keywords.

On Wednesday, security and privacy researcher Wladimir Palant revealed that developers are flagrantly violating those terms in hundreds of extensions currently available for download from Google. As a result, searches for a particular term or terms can return extensions that are unrelated, inferior knockoffs, or carry out abusive tasks such as surreptitiously monetizing web searches, something Google expressly forbids.

Not looking? Don’t care? Both?

A search Wednesday morning in California for Norton Password Manager, for example, returned not only the official extension but three others, all of which are unrelated at best and potentially abusive at worst. The results may look different for searches at other times or from different locations.

Search results for Norton Password Manager.

It’s unclear why someone who uses a password manager would be interested in spoofing their time zone or boosting the audio volume. Yes, they’re all extensions for tweaking or otherwise extending the Chrome browsing experience, but isn’t every extension? The Chrome Web Store doesn’t want extension users to get pigeonholed or to see the list of offerings as limited, so it doesn’t just return the title searched for. Instead, it draws inferences from descriptions of other extensions in an attempt to promote ones that may also be of interest.

In many cases, developers are exploiting Google’s eagerness to promote potentially related extensions in campaigns that foist offerings that are irrelevant or abusive. But wait, Chrome security people have put developers on notice that they’re not permitted to engage in keyword spam and other search-manipulating techniques. So, how is this happening?

Here’s how hucksters are manipulating Google to promote shady Chrome extensions Read More »

misconfigured-license-plate-readers-are-leaking-data-and-video-in-real-time

Misconfigured license plate readers are leaking data and video in real time

law enforcement, license plate readers, Policy, Security, syndication / /

In just 20 minutes this morning, an automated license-plate-recognition (ALPR) system in Nashville, Tennessee, captured photographs and detailed information from nearly 1,000 vehicles as they passed by. Among them: eight black Jeep Wranglers, six Honda Accords, an ambulance, and a yellow Ford Fiesta with a vanity plate.

This trove of real-time vehicle data, collected by one of Motorola’s ALPR systems, is meant to be accessible by law enforcement. However, a flaw discovered by a security researcher has exposed live video feeds and detailed records of passing vehicles, revealing the staggering scale of surveillance enabled by this widespread technology.

More than 150 Motorola ALPR cameras have exposed their video feeds and leaking data in recent months, according to security researcher Matt Brown, who first publicized the issues in a series of YouTube videos after buying an ALPR camera on eBay and reverse engineering it.

As well as broadcasting live footage accessible to anyone on the Internet, the misconfigured cameras also exposed data they have collected, including photos of cars and logs of license plates. The real-time video and data feeds don’t require any usernames or passwords to access.

Alongside other technologists, WIRED has reviewed video feeds from several of the cameras, confirming vehicle data—including makes, models, and colors of cars—have been accidentally exposed. Motorola confirmed the exposures, telling WIRED it was working with its customers to close the access.

Over the last decade, thousands of ALPR cameras have appeared in towns and cities across the US. The cameras, which are manufactured by companies such as Motorola and Flock Safety, automatically take pictures when they detect a car passing by. The cameras and databases of collected data are frequently used by police to search for suspects. ALPR cameras can be placed along roads, on the dashboards of cop cars, and even in trucks. These cameras capture billions of photos of cars—including occasionally bumper stickers, lawn signs, and T-shirts.

“Every one of them that I found exposed was in a fixed location over some roadway,” Brown, who runs cybersecurity company Brown Fine Security, tells WIRED. The exposed video feeds each cover a single lane of traffic, with cars driving through the camera’s view. In some streams, snow is falling. Brown found two streams for each exposed camera system, one in color and another in infrared.

Misconfigured license plate readers are leaking data and video in real time Read More »

time-to-check-if-you-ran-any-of-these-33-malicious-chrome-extensions

Time to check if you ran any of these 33 malicious Chrome extensions

Biz & IT, Browsers, chrome, extensions, privacy, Security / /

Screenshot showing the phishing email sent to Cyberhaven extension developers. Credit: Amit Assaraf

A link in the email led to a Google consent screen requesting access permission for an OAuth application named Privacy Policy Extension. A Cyberhaven developer granted the permission and, in the process, unknowingly gave the attacker the ability to upload new versions of Cyberhaven’s Chrome extension to the Chrome Web Store. The attacker then used the permission to push out the malicious version 24.10.4.

Screenshot showing the Google permission request. Credit: Amit Assaraf

As word of the attack spread in the early hours of December 25, developers and researchers discovered that other extensions were targeted, in many cases successfully, by the same spear phishing campaign. John Tuckner, founder of Secure Annex, a browser extension analysis and management firm, said that as of Thursday afternoon, he knew of 19 other Chrome extensions that were similarly compromised. In every case, the attacker used spear phishing to push a new malicious version and custom, look-alike domains to issue payloads and receive authentication credentials. Collectively, the 20 extensions had 1.46 million downloads.

“For many I talk to, managing browser extensions can be a lower priority item in their security program,” Tuckner wrote in an email. “Folks know they can present a threat, but rarely are teams taking action on them. We’ve often seen in security [that] one or two incidents can cause a reevaluation of an organization’s security posture. Incidents like this often result in teams scrambling to find a way to gain visibility and understanding of impact to their organizations.”

The earliest compromise occurred in May 2024. Tuckner provided the following spreadsheet:

Name ID Version Patch Available Users Start End
VPNCity nnpnnpemnckcfdebeekibpiijlicmpom 2.0.1 FALSE 10,000 12/12/24 12/31/24
Parrot Talks kkodiihpgodmdankclfibbiphjkfdenh 1.16.2 TRUE 40,000 12/25/24 12/31/24
Uvoice oaikpkmjciadfpddlpjjdapglcihgdle 1.0.12 TRUE 40,000 12/26/24 12/31/24
Internxt VPN dpggmcodlahmljkhlmpgpdcffdaoccni 1.1.1 1.2.0 TRUE 10,000 12/25/24 12/29/24
Bookmark Favicon Changer acmfnomgphggonodopogfbmkneepfgnh 4.00 TRUE 40,000 12/25/24 12/31/24
Castorus mnhffkhmpnefgklngfmlndmkimimbphc 4.40 4.41 TRUE 50,000 12/26/24 12/27/24
Wayin AI cedgndijpacnfbdggppddacngjfdkaca 0.0.11 TRUE 40,000 12/19/24 12/31/24
Search Copilot AI Assistant for Chrome bbdnohkpnbkdkmnkddobeafboooinpla 1.0.1 TRUE 20,000 7/17/24 12/31/24
VidHelper – Video Downloader egmennebgadmncfjafcemlecimkepcle 2.2.7 TRUE 20,000 12/26/24 12/31/24
AI Assistant – ChatGPT and Gemini for Chrome bibjgkidgpfbblifamdlkdlhgihmfohh 0.1.3 FALSE 4,000 5/31/24 10/25/24
TinaMind – The GPT-4o-powered AI Assistant! befflofjcniongenjmbkgkoljhgliihe 2.13.0 2.14.0 TRUE 40,000 12/15/24 12/20/24
Bard AI chat pkgciiiancapdlpcbppfkmeaieppikkk 1.3.7 FALSE 100,000 9/5/24 10/22/24
Reader Mode llimhhconnjiflfimocjggfjdlmlhblm 1.5.7 FALSE 300,000 12/18/24 12/19/24
Primus (prev. PADO) oeiomhmbaapihbilkfkhmlajkeegnjhe 3.18.0 3.20.0 TRUE 40,000 12/18/24 12/25/24
Cyberhaven security extension V3 pajkjnmeojmbapicmbpliphjmcekeaac 24.10.4 24.10.5 TRUE 400,000 12/24/24 12/26/24
GraphQL Network Inspector ndlbedplllcgconngcnfmkadhokfaaln 2.22.6 2.22.7 TRUE 80,000 12/29/24 12/30/24
GPT 4 Summary with OpenAI epdjhgbipjpbbhoccdeipghoihibnfja 1.4 FALSE 10,000 5/31/24 9/29/24
Vidnoz Flex – Video recorder & Video share cplhlgabfijoiabgkigdafklbhhdkahj 1.0.161 FALSE 6,000 12/25/24 12/29/24
YesCaptcha assistant jiofmdifioeejeilfkpegipdjiopiekl 1.1.61 TRUE 200,000 12/29/24 12/31/24
Proxy SwitchyOmega (V3) hihblcmlaaademjlakdpicchbjnnnkbo 3.0.2 TRUE 10,000 12/30/24 12/31/24

But wait, there’s more

One of the compromised extensions is called Reader Mode. Further analysis showed it had been compromised not just in the campaign targeting the other 19 extensions but in a separate campaign that started no later than April 2023. Tuckner said the source of the compromise appears to be a code library developers can use to monetize their extensions. The code library collects details about each web visit a browser makes. In exchange for incorporating the library into the extensions, developers receive a commission from the library creator.

Time to check if you ran any of these 33 malicious Chrome extensions Read More »