Security – Page 3

Why Signal’s post-quantum makeover is an amazing engineering achievement

Biz & IT, diffie-hellman elliptic curve, Features, ML-KEM, Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism, post-quantum encryption, Security, signal messenger / Mike M. / October 13, 2025

COMING TO A PHONE NEAR YOU

New design sets a high standard for post-quantum readiness.

Credit: Aurich Lawson | Getty Images

The encryption protecting communications against criminal and nation-state snooping is under threat. As private industry and governments get closer to building useful quantum computers, the algorithms protecting Bitcoin wallets, encrypted web visits, and other sensitive secrets will be useless. No one doubts the day will come, but as the now-common joke in cryptography circles observes, experts have been forecasting this cryptocalypse will arrive in the next 15 to 30 years for the past 30 years.

The uncertainty has created something of an existential dilemma: Should network architects spend the billions of dollars required to wean themselves off quantum-vulnerable algorithms now, or should they prioritize their limited security budgets fighting more immediate threats such as ransomware and espionage attacks? Given the expense and no clear deadline, it’s little wonder that less than half of all TLS connections made inside the Cloudflare network and only 18 percent of Fortune 500 networks support quantum-resistant TLS connections. It’s all but certain that many fewer organizations still are supporting quantum-ready encryption in less prominent protocols.

Triumph of the cypherpunks

One exception to the industry-wide lethargy is the engineering team that designs the Signal Protocol, the open source engine that powers the world’s most robust and resilient form of end-to-end encryption for multiple private chat apps, most notably the Signal Messenger. Eleven days ago, the nonprofit entity that develops the protocol, Signal Messenger LLC, published a 5,900-word write-up describing its latest updates that make Signal fully quantum-resistant.

The complexity and problem-solving required for making the Signal Protocol quantum safe are as daunting as just about any in modern-day engineering. The original Signal Protocol already resembled the inside of a fine Swiss timepiece, with countless gears, wheels, springs, hands, and other parts all interoperating in an intricate way. In less adept hands, mucking about with an instrument as complex as the Signal protocol could have led to shortcuts or unintended consequences that hurt performance, undoing what would otherwise be a perfectly running watch. Yet this latest post-quantum upgrade (the first one came in 2023) is nothing short of a triumph.

“This appears to be a solid, thoughtful improvement to the existing Signal Protocol,” said Brian LaMacchia, a cryptography engineer who oversaw Microsoft’s post-quantum transition from 2015 to 2022 and now works at Farcaster Consulting Group. “As part of this work, Signal has done some interesting optimization under the hood so as to minimize the network performance impact of adding the post-quantum feature.”

Of the multiple hurdles to clear, the most challenging was accounting for the much larger key sizes that quantum-resistant algorithms require. The overhaul here adds protections based on ML-KEM-768, an implementation of the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm that was selected in 2022 and formalized last year by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. ML-KEM is short for Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism, but most of the time, cryptographers refer to it simply as KEM.

Ratchets, ping-pong, and asynchrony

Like the Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol that Signal has used since its start, KEM is a key encapsulation mechanism. Also known as a key agreement mechanism, it provides the means for two parties who have never met to securely agree on one or more shared secrets in the presence of an adversary who is monitoring the parties’ connection. RSA, ECDH, and other encapsulation algorithms have long been used to negotiate symmetric keys (almost always AES keys) in protocols including TLS, SSH, and IKE. Unlike ECDH and RSA, however, the much newer KEM is quantum-safe.

Key agreement in a protocol like TLS is relatively straightforward. That’s because devices connecting over TLS negotiate a key over a single handshake that occurs at the beginning of a session. The agreed-upon AES key is then used throughout the session. The Signal Protocol is different. Unlike TLS sessions, Signal sessions are protected by forward secrecy, a cryptographic property that ensures the compromise of a key used to encrypt a recent set of messages can’t be used to decrypt an earlier set of messages. The protocol also offers Post-Compromise Security, which protects future messages from past key compromises. While a TLS uses the same key throughout a session, keys within a Signal session constantly evolve.

To provide these confidentiality guarantees, the Signal Protocol updates secret key material each time a message party hits the send button or receives a message, and at other points, such as in graphical indicators that a party is currently typing and in the sending of read receipts. The mechanism that has made this constant key evolution possible over the past decade is what protocol developers call a “double ratchet.” Just as a traditional ratchet allows a gear to rotate in one direction but not in the other, the Signal ratchets allow messaging parties to create new keys based on a combination of preceding and newly agreed-upon secrets. The ratchets work in a single direction, the sending and receiving of future messages. Even if an adversary compromises a newly created secret, messages encrypted using older secrets can’t be decrypted.

The starting point is a handshake that performs three or four ECDH agreements that mix long- and short-term secrets to establish a shared secret. The creation of this “root key” allows the Double Ratchet to begin. Until 2023, the key agreement used X3DH. The handshake now uses PQXDH to make the handshake quantum-resistant.

The first layer of the Double Ratchet, the Symmetric Ratchet, derives an AES key from the root key and advances it for every message sent. This allows every message to be encrypted with a new secret key. Consequently, if attackers compromise one party’s device, they won’t be able to learn anything about the keys that came earlier. Even then, though, the attackers would still be able to compute the keys used in future messages. That’s where the second, “Diffie-Hellman ratchet” comes in.

The Diffie-Hellman ratchet incorporates a new ECDH public key into each message sent. Using Alice and Bob, the fictional characters often referred to when explaining asymmetric encryption, when Alice sends Bob a message, she creates a new ratchet keypair and computes the ECDH agreement between this key and the last ratchet public key Bob sent. This gives her a new secret, and she knows that once Bob gets her new public key, he will know this secret, too (because, as mentioned earlier, Bob previously sent that other key). With that, Alice can mix the new secret with her old root key to get a new root key and start fresh. The result: Attackers who learn her old secrets won’t be able to tell the difference between her new ratchet keys and random noise.

The result is what Signal developers describe as “ping-pong” behavior, as the parties to a discussion take turns replacing ratchet key pairs one at a time. The effect: An eavesdropper who compromises one of the parties might recover a current ratchet private key, but soon enough, that private key will be replaced with a new, uncompromised one, and in a way that keeps it free from the prying eyes of the attacker.

The objective of the newly generated keys is to limit the number of messages that can be decrypted if an adversary recovers key material at some point in an ongoing chat. Messages sent prior to and after the compromise will remain off limits.

A major challenge designers of the Signal Protocol face is the need to make the ratchets work in an asynchronous environment. Asynchronous messages occur when parties send or receive them at different times—such as while one is offline and the other is active, or vice versa—without either needing to be present or respond immediately. The entire Signal Protocol must work within this asynchronous environment. What’s more, it must work reliably over unstable networks and networks controlled by adversaries, such as a government that forces a telecom or cloud service to spy on the traffic.

Shor’s algorithm lurking

By all accounts, Signal’s double ratchet design is state-of-the-art. That said, it’s wide open to an inevitable if not immediate threat: quantum computing. That’s because an adversary capable of monitoring traffic passing from two or more messenger users can capture that data and feed it into a quantum computer—once one of sufficient power is viable—and calculate the ephemeral keys generated in the second ratchet.

In classical computing, it’s infeasible, if not impossible, for such an adversary to calculate the key. Like all asymmetric encryption algorithms, ECDH is based on a mathematical, one-way function. Also known as trapdoor functions, these problems are trivial to compute in one direction and substantially harder to compute in reverse. In elliptic curve cryptography, this one-way function is based on the Discrete Logarithm problem in mathematics. The key parameters are based on specific points in an elliptic curve over the field of integers modulo some prime P.

On average, an adversary equipped with only a classical computer would spend billions of years guessing integers before arriving at the right ones. A quantum computer, by contrast, would be able to calculate the correct integers in a matter of hours or days. A formula known as Shor’s algorithm—which runs only on a quantum computer—reverts this one-way discrete logarithm equation to a two-way one. Shor’s Algorithm can similarly make quick work of solving the one-way function that’s the basis for the RSA algorithm.

As noted earlier, the Signal Protocol received its first post-quantum makeover in 2023. This update added PQXDH—a Signal-specific implementation that combined the key agreements from elliptic curves used in X3DH (specifically X25519) and the quantum-safe KEM—in the initial protocol handshake. (X3DH was then put out to pasture as a standalone implementation.)

The move foreclosed the possibility of a quantum attack being able to recover the symmetric key used to start the ratchets, but the ephemeral keys established in the ping-ponging second ratchet remained vulnerable to a quantum attack. Signal’s latest update adds quantum resistance to these keys, ensuring that forward secrecy and post-compromise security are safe from Shor’s algorithm as well.

Even though the ping-ponging keys are vulnerable to future quantum attacks, they are broadly believed to be secure against today’s attacks from classical computers. The Signal Protocol developers didn’t want to remove them or the battle-tested code that produces them. That led to their decision to add quantum resistance by adding a third ratchet. This one uses a quantum-safe KEM to produce new secrets much like the Diffie-Hellman ratchet did before, ensuring quantum-safe, post-compromise security.

The technical challenges were anything but easy. Elliptic curve keys generated in the X25519 implementation are about 32 bytes long, small enough to be added to each message without creating a burden on already constrained bandwidths or computing resources. A ML-KEM 768 key, by contrast, is 1,000 bytes. Additionally, Signal’s design requires sending both an encryption key and a ciphertext, making the total size 2272 bytes.

And then there were three

To handle the 71x increase, Signal developers considered a variety of options. One was to send the 2272-byte KEM key less often—say every 50th message or once every week—rather than every message. That idea was nixed because it doesn’t work well in asynchronous or adversarial messaging environments. Signal Protocol developers Graeme Connell and Rolfe Schmidt explained:

Consider the case of “send a key if you haven’t sent one in a week”. If Bob has been offline for 2 weeks, what does Alice do when she wants to send a message? What happens if we can lose messages, and we lose the one in fifty that contains a new key? Or, what happens if there’s an attacker in the middle that wants to stop us from generating new secrets, and can look for messages that are [many] bytes larger than the others and drop them, only allowing keyless messages through?

Another option Signal engineers considered was breaking the 2272-byte key into smaller chunks, say 71 of them that are 32 bytes each. Breaking up the KEM key into smaller chunks and putting one in each message sounds like a viable approach at first, but once again, the asynchronous environment of messaging made it unworkable. What happens, for example, when data loss causes one of the chunks to be dropped? The protocol could deal with this scenario by just repeat-sending chunks again after sending all 71 previously. But then an adversary monitoring the traffic could simply cause packet 3 to be dropped each time, preventing Alice and Bob from completing the key exchange.

Signal developers ultimately went with a solution that used this multiple-chunks approach.

Sneaking an elephant through the cat door

To manage the asynchrony challenges, the developers turned to “erasure codes,” a method of breaking up larger data into smaller pieces such that the original can be reconstructed using any sufficiently sized subset of chunks.

Charlie Jacomme, a researcher at INRIA Nancy on the Pesto team who focuses on formal verification and secure messaging, said this design accounts for packet loss by building redundancy into the chunked material. Instead of all x number of chunks having to be successfully received to reconstruct the key, the model requires only x-y chunks to be received, where y is the acceptable number of packets lost. As long as that threshold is met, the new key can be established even when packet loss occurs.

The other part of the design was to split the KEM computations into smaller steps. These KEM computations are distinct from the KEM key material.

As Jacomme explained it:

Essentially, a small part of the public key is enough to start computing and sending a bigger part of the ciphertext, so you can quickly send in parallel the rest of the public key and the beginning of the ciphertext. Essentially, the final computations are equal to the standard, but some stuff was parallelized.

All this in fact plays a role in the end security guarantees, because by optimizing the fact that KEM computations are done faster, you introduce in your key derivation fresh secrets more frequently.

Signal’s post 10 days ago included several images that illustrate this design:

While the design solved the asynchronous messaging problem, it created a new complication of its own: This new quantum-safe ratchet advanced so quickly that it couldn’t be kept synchronized with the Diffie-Hellman ratchet. Ultimately, the architects settled on a creative solution. Rather than bolt KEM onto the existing double ratchet, they allowed it to remain more or less the same as it had been. Then they used the new quantum-safe ratchet to implement a parallel secure messaging system.

Now, when the protocol encrypts a message, it sources encryption keys from both the classic Double Ratchet and the new ratchet. It then mixes the two keys together (using a cryptographic key derivation function) to get a new encryption key that has all of the security of the classical Double Ratchet but now has quantum security, too.

The Signal engineers have given this third ratchet the formal name: Sparse Post Quantum Ratchet, or SPQR for short. The third ratchet was designed in collaboration with PQShield, AIST, and New York University. The developers presented the erasure-code-based chunking and the high-level Triple Ratchet design at the Eurocrypt 2025 conference. At the Usenix 25 conference, they discussed the six options they considered for adding quantum-safe forward secrecy and post-compromise security and why SPQR and one other stood out. Presentations at the NIST PQC Standardization Conference and the Cryptographic Applications Workshop explain the details of chunking, the design challenges, and how the protocol had to be adapted to use the standardized ML-KEM.

Jacomme further observed:

The final thing interesting for the triple ratchet is that it nicely combines the best of both worlds. Between two users, you have a classical DH-based ratchet going on one side, and fully independently, a KEM-based ratchet is going on. Then, whenever you need to encrypt something, you get a key from both, and mix it up to get the actual encryption key. So, even if one ratchet is fully broken, be it because there is now a quantum computer, or because somebody manages to break either elliptic curves or ML-KEM, or because the implementation of one is flawed, or…, the Signal message will still be protected by the second ratchet. In a sense, this update can be seen, of course simplifying, as doubling the security of the ratchet part of Signal, and is a cool thing even for people that don’t care about quantum computers.

As both Signal and Jacomme noted, users of Signal and other messengers relying on the Signal Protocol need not concern themselves with any of these new designs. To paraphrase a certain device maker, it just works.

In the coming weeks or months, various messaging apps and app versions will be updated to add the triple ratchet. Until then, apps will simply rely on the double ratchet as they always did. Once apps receive the update, they’ll behave exactly as they did before upgrading.

For those who care about the internal workings of their Signal-based apps, though, the architects have documented in great depth the design of this new ratchet and how it behaves. Among other things, the work includes a mathematical proof verifying that the updated Signal protocol provides the claimed security properties.

Outside researchers are applauding the work.

“If the normal encrypted messages we use are cats, then post-quantum ciphertexts are elephants,” Matt Green, a cryptography expert at Johns Hopkins University, wrote in an interview. “So the problem here is to sneak an elephant through a tunnel designed for cats. And that’s an amazing engineering achievement. But it also makes me wish we didn’t have to deal with elephants.”

Dan Goodin is Senior Security Editor at Ars Technica, where he oversees coverage of malware, computer espionage, botnets, hardware hacking, encryption, and passwords. In his spare time, he enjoys gardening, cooking, and following the independent music scene. Dan is based in San Francisco. Follow him at here on Mastodon and here on Bluesky. Contact him on Signal at DanArs.82.

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Apple ups the reward for finding major exploits to $2 million

Apple, bug bounty, Security, syndication / Kris Guyer / October 11, 2025

Since launching its bug bounty program nearly a decade ago, Apple has always touted notable maximum payouts—$200,000 in 2016 and $1 million in 2019. Now the company is upping the stakes again. At the Hexacon offensive security conference in Paris on Friday, Apple vice president of security engineering and architecture Ivan Krstić announced a new maximum payout of $2 million for a chain of software exploits that could be abused for spyware.

The move reflects how valuable exploitable vulnerabilities can be within Apple’s highly protected mobile environment—and the lengths the company will go to to keep such discoveries from falling into the wrong hands. In addition to individual payouts, the company’s bug bounty also includes a bonus structure, adding additional awards for exploits that can bypass its extra secure Lockdown Mode as well as those discovered while Apple software is still in its beta testing phase. Taken together, the maximum award for what would otherwise be a potentially catastrophic exploit chain will now be $5 million. The changes take effect next month.

“We are lining up to pay many millions of dollars here, and there’s a reason,” Krstić tells WIRED. “We want to make sure that for the hardest categories, the hardest problems, the things that most closely mirror the kinds of attacks that we see with mercenary spyware—that the researchers who have those skills and abilities and put in that effort and time can get a tremendous reward.”

Apple says that there are more than 2.35 billion of its devices active around the world. The company’s bug bounty was originally an invite-only program for prominent researchers, but since opening to the public in 2020, Apple says that it has awarded more than $35 million to more than 800 security researchers. Top-dollar payouts are very rare, but Krstić says that the company has made multiple $500,000 payouts in recent years.

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Microsoft warns of new “Payroll Pirate” scam stealing employees’ direct deposits

Biz & IT, mfa, multi factor authentication, phishing, Security / Kris Guyer / October 10, 2025

Microsoft is warning of an active scam that diverts employees’ paycheck payments to attacker-controlled accounts after first taking over their profiles on Workday or other cloud-based HR services.

Payroll Pirate, as Microsoft says the campaign has been dubbed, gains access to victims’ HR portals by sending them phishing emails that trick the recipients into providing their credentials for logging in to the cloud account. The scammers are able to recover multi-factor authentication codes by using adversary-in-the-middle tactics, which work by sitting between the victims and the site they think they’re logging in to, which is, in fact, a fake site operated by the attackers.

Not all MFA is created equal

The attackers then enter the intercepted credentials, including the MFA code, into the real site. This tactic, which has grown increasingly common in recent years, underscores the importance of adopting FIDO-compliant forms of MFA, which are immune to such attacks.

Once inside the employees’ accounts, the scammers make changes to payroll configurations within Workday. The changes cause direct-deposit payments to be diverted from accounts originally chosen by the employee and instead flow to an account controlled by the attackers. To block messages Workday automatically sends to users when such account details have been changed, the attackers create email rules that keep the messages from appearing in the inbox.

“The threat actor used realistic phishing emails, targeting accounts at multiple universities, to harvest credentials,” Microsoft said in a Thursday post. “Since March 2025, we’ve observed 11 successfully compromised accounts at three universities that were used to send phishing emails to nearly 6,000 email accounts across 25 universities.”

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Discord says hackers stole government IDs of 70,000 users

age verification, Biz & IT, discord, id, privacy, Security / Tim Belzer / October 9, 2025

Discord says that hackers made off with images of 70,000 users’ government IDs that they were required to provide in order to use the site.

Like an increasing number of sites, Discord requires certain users to provide a photo or scan of their driver’s license or other government ID that shows they meet the minimum age requirements in their country. In some cases, Discord allows users to prove their age by providing a selfie that shows their faces (it’s not clear how a face proves someone’s age, but there you go). The social media site imposes these requirements on users who are reported by other users to be under the minimum age for the country they’re connecting from.

“A substantial risk for identity theft”

On Wednesday, Discord said that ID images of roughly 70,000 users “may have had government-ID photos exposed” in a recent breach of a third-party service Discord entrusted to manage the data. The affected users had communicated with Discord’s Customer Support or Trust & Safety teams and subsequently submitted the IDs in reviews of age-related appeals.

“Recently, we discovered an incident where an unauthorized party compromised one of Discord’s third-party customer service providers,” the company said Wednesday. “The unauthorized party then gained access to information from a limited number of users who had contacted Discord through our Customer Support and/or Trust & Safety teams.”

Discord cut off the unnamed vendor’s access to its ticketing system after learning of the breach. The company is now in the process of emailing affected users. Notifications will come from noreply @ discord.com. Discord said it won’t contact any affected users by phone.

The data breach is a sign of things to come as more and more sites require users to turn over their official IDs as a condition of using their services. Besides, Discord, Roblox, Steam, and Twitch have also required at least some of their users to submit photo IDs. Laws passed in 19 US states, France, the UK, and elsewhere now require porn sites to verify visitors are of legal age to view adult content. Many sites have complied, but not all.

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Salesforce says it won’t pay extortion demand in 1 billion records breach

Biz & IT, Data breaches, extortion, ransomware, Salesforce, Security / Rejus Almole / October 8, 2025

Salesforce says it’s refusing to pay an extortion demand made by a crime syndicate that claims to have stolen roughly 1 billion records from dozens of Salesforce customers.

The threat group making the demands began their campaign in May, when they made voice calls to organizations storing data on the Salesforce platform, Google-owned Mandiant said in June. The English-speaking callers would provide a pretense that necessitated the target connect an attacker-controlled app to their Salesforce portal. Amazingly—but not surprisingly—many of the people who received the calls complied.

It’s becoming a real mess

The threat group behind the campaign is calling itself Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters, a mashup of three prolific data-extortion actors: Scattered Spider, LAPSuS$, and ShinyHunters. Mandiant, meanwhile, tracks the group as UNC6040, because the researchers so far have been unable to positively identify the connections.

Earlier this month, the group created a website that named Toyota, FedEx, and 37 other Salesforce customers whose data was stolen in the campaign. In all, the number of records recovered, Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters claimed, was “989.45m/~1B+.” The site called on Salesforce to begin negotiations for a ransom amount “or all your customers [sic] data will be leaked.” The site went on to say: “Nobody else will have to pay us, if you pay, Salesforce, Inc.” The site said the deadline for payment was Friday.

In an email Wednesday, a Salesforce representative said the company is spurning the demand.

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ICE wants to build a 24/7 social media surveillance team

Biz & IT, digital surveillance, federal surveillance, Government surveillance, immigration, immigration and customs enforcement, Policy, Security, syndication / Kris Guyer / October 4, 2025

Together, these teams would operate as intelligence arms of ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations division. They will receive tips and incoming cases, research individuals online, and package the results into dossiers that could be used by field offices to plan arrests.

The scope of information contractors are expected to collect is broad. Draft instructions specify open-source intelligence: public posts, photos, and messages on platforms from Facebook to Reddit to TikTok. Analysts may also be tasked with checking more obscure or foreign-based sites, such as Russia’s VKontakte.

They would also be armed with powerful commercial databases such as LexisNexis Accurint and Thomson Reuters CLEAR, which knit together property records, phone bills, utilities, vehicle registrations, and other personal details into searchable files.

The plan calls for strict turnaround times. Urgent cases, such as suspected national security threats or people on ICE’s Top Ten Most Wanted list, must be researched within 30 minutes. High-priority cases get one hour; lower-priority leads must be completed within the workday. ICE expects at least three-quarters of all cases to meet those deadlines, with top contractors hitting closer to 95 percent.

The plan goes beyond staffing. ICE also wants algorithms, asking contractors to spell out how they might weave artificial intelligence into the hunt—a solicitation that mirrors other recent proposals. The agency has also set aside more than a million dollars a year to arm analysts with the latest surveillance tools.

ICE did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Earlier this year, The Intercept revealed that ICE had floated plans for a system that could automatically scan social media for “negative sentiment” toward the agency and flag users thought to show a “proclivity for violence.” Procurement records previously reviewed by 404 Media identified software used by the agency to build dossiers on flagged individuals, compiling personal details, family links, and even using facial recognition to connect images across the web. Observers warned it was unclear how such technology could distinguish genuine threats from political speech.

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A biological 0-day? Threat-screening tools may miss AI-designed proteins.

AI, biohazards, bioterrorism, protein design, risk assessment, Science, Security / Paul Patrick / October 3, 2025

Ordering DNA for AI-designed toxins doesn’t always raise red flags.

Designing variations of the complex, three-dimensional structures of proteins has been made a lot easier by AI tools. Credit: Historical / Contributor

On Thursday, a team of researchers led by Microsoft announced that they had discovered, and possibly patched, what they’re terming a biological zero-day—an unrecognized security hole in a system that protects us from biological threats. The system at risk screens purchases of DNA sequences to determine when someone’s ordering DNA that encodes a toxin or dangerous virus. But, the researchers argue, it has become increasingly vulnerable to missing a new threat: AI-designed toxins.

How big of a threat is this? To understand, you have to know a bit more about both existing biosurveillance programs and the capabilities of AI-designed proteins.

Catching the bad ones

Biological threats come in a variety of forms. Some are pathogens, such as viruses and bacteria. Others are protein-based toxins, like the ricin that was sent to the White House in 2003. Still others are chemical toxins that are produced through enzymatic reactions, like the molecules associated with red tide. All of them get their start through the same fundamental biological process: DNA is transcribed into RNA, which is then used to make proteins.

For several decades now, starting the process has been as easy as ordering the needed DNA sequence online from any of a number of companies, which will synthesize a requested sequence and ship it out. Recognizing the potential threat here, governments and industry have worked together to add a screening step to every order: the DNA sequence is scanned for its ability to encode parts of proteins or viruses considered threats. Any positives are then flagged for human intervention to evaluate whether they or the people ordering them truly represent a danger.

Both the list of proteins and the sophistication of the scanning have been continually updated in response to research progress over the years. For example, initial screening was done based on similarity to target DNA sequences. But there are many DNA sequences that can encode the same protein, so the screening algorithms have been adjusted accordingly, recognizing all the DNA variants that pose an identical threat.

The new work can be thought of as an extension of that threat. Not only can multiple DNA sequences encode the same protein; multiple proteins can perform the same function. To form a toxin, for example, typically requires the protein to adopt the correct three-dimensional structure, which brings a handful of critical amino acids within the protein into close proximity. Outside of those critical amino acids, however, things can often be quite flexible. Some amino acids may not matter at all; other locations in the protein could work with any positively charged amino acid, or any hydrophobic one.

In the past, it could be extremely difficult (meaning time-consuming and expensive) to do the experiments that would tell you what sorts of changes a string of amino acids could tolerate while remaining functional. But the team behind the new analysis recognized that AI protein design tools have now gotten quite sophisticated and can predict when distantly related sequences can fold up into the same shape and catalyze the same reactions. The process is still error-prone, and you often have to test a dozen or more proposed proteins to get a working one, but it has produced some impressive successes.

So, the team developed a hypothesis to test: AI can take an existing toxin and design a protein with the same function that’s distantly related enough that the screening programs do not detect orders for the DNA that encodes it.

The zero-day treatment

The team started with a basic test: use AI tools to design variants of the toxin ricin, then test them against the software that is used to screen DNA orders. The results of the test suggested there was a risk of dangerous protein variants slipping past existing screening software, so the situation was treated like the equivalent of a zero-day vulnerability.

“Taking inspiration from established cybersecurity processes for addressing such situations, we contacted the relevant bodies regarding the potential vulnerability, including the International Gene Synthesis Consortium and trusted colleagues in the protein design community as well as leads in biosecurity at the US Office of Science and Technology Policy, US National Institute of Standards and Technologies, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response,” the authors report. “Outside of those bodies, details were kept confidential until a more comprehensive study could be performed in pursuit of potential mitigations and for ‘patches’… to be developed and deployed.”

Details of that original test are being made available today as part of a much larger analysis that extends the approach to a large range of toxic proteins. Starting with 72 toxins, the researchers used three open source AI packages to generate a total of about 75,000 potential protein variants.

And this is where things get a little complicated. Many of the AI-designed protein variants are going to end up being non-functional, either subtly or catastrophically failing to fold up into the correct configuration to create an active toxin. The only way to know which ones work is to make the proteins and test them biologically; most AI protein design efforts will make actual proteins from dozens to hundreds of the most promising-looking potential designs to find a handful that are active. But doing that for 75,000 designs is completely unrealistic.

Instead, the researchers used two software-based tools to evaluate each of the 75,000 designs. One of these focuses on the similarity between the overall predicted physical structure of the proteins, and another looks at the predicted differences between the positions of individual amino acids. Either way, they’re a rough approximation of just how similar the proteins formed by two strings of amino acids should be. But they’re definitely not a clear indicator of whether those two proteins would be equally functional.

In any case, DNA sequences encoding all 75,000 designs were fed into the software that screens DNA orders for potential threats. One thing that was very clear is that there were huge variations in the ability of the four screening programs to flag these variant designs as threatening. Two of them seemed to do a pretty good job, one was mixed, and another let most of them through. Three of the software packages were updated in response to this performance, which significantly improved their ability to pick out variants.

There was also a clear trend in all four screening packages: The closer the variant was to the original structurally, the more likely the package (both before and after the patches) was to be able to flag it as a threat. In all cases, there was also a cluster of variant designs that were unlikely to fold into a similar structure, and these generally weren’t flagged as threats.

What does this mean?

Again, it’s important to emphasize that this evaluation is based on predicted structures; “unlikely” to fold into a similar structure to the original toxin doesn’t mean these proteins will be inactive as toxins. Functional proteins are probably going to be very rare among this group, but there may be a handful in there. That handful is also probably rare enough that you would have to order up and test far too many designs to find one that works, making this an impractical threat vector.

At the same time, there are also a handful of proteins that are very similar to the toxin structurally and not flagged by the software. For the three patched versions of the software, the ones that slip through the screening represent about 1 to 3 percent of the total in the “very similar” category. That’s not great, but it’s probably good enough that any group that tries to order up a toxin by this method would attract attention because they’d have to order over 50 just to have a good chance of finding one that slipped through, which would raise all sorts of red flags.

One other notable result is that the designs that weren’t flagged were mostly variants of just a handful of toxin proteins. So this is less of a general problem with the screening software and might be more of a small set of focused problems. Of note, one of the proteins that produced a lot of unflagged variants isn’t toxic itself; instead, it’s a co-factor necessary for the actual toxin to do its thing. As such, some of the screening software packages didn’t even flag the original protein as dangerous, much less any of its variants. (For these reasons, the company that makes one of the better-performing software packages decided the threat here wasn’t significant enough to merit a security patch.)

So, on its own, this work doesn’t seem to have identified something that’s a major threat at the moment. But it’s probably useful, in that it’s a good thing to get the people who engineer the screening software to start thinking about emerging threats.

That’s because, as the people behind this work note, AI protein design is still in its early stages, and we’re likely to see considerable improvements. And there’s likely to be a limit to the sorts of things we can screen for. We’re already at the point where AI protein design tools can be used to create proteins that have entirely novel functions and do so without starting with variants of existing proteins. In other words, we can design proteins that are impossible to screen for based on similarity to known threats, because they don’t look at all like anything we know is dangerous.

Protein-based toxins would be very difficult to design, because they have to both cross the cell membrane and then do something dangerous once inside. While AI tools are probably unable to design something that sophisticated at the moment, I would be hesitant to rule out the prospects of them eventually reaching that sort of sophistication.

Science, 2025. DOI: 10.1126/science.adu8578 (About DOIs).

John is Ars Technica’s science editor. He has a Bachelor of Arts in Biochemistry from Columbia University, and a Ph.D. in Molecular and Cell Biology from the University of California, Berkeley. When physically separated from his keyboard, he tends to seek out a bicycle, or a scenic location for communing with his hiking boots.

A biological 0-day? Threat-screening tools may miss AI-designed proteins. Read More »

Google confirms Android dev verification will have free and paid tiers, no public list of devs

Apps, Google, play store, privacy, Security, Tech / Paul Patrick / October 3, 2025

A lack of trust

Google has an answer for the most problematic elements of its verification plan, but anywhere there’s a gap, it’s easy to see a conspiracy. Why? Well, let’s look at the situation in which Google finds itself.

The courts have ruled that Google acted illegally to maintain a monopoly in the Play Store—it worked against the interests of developers and users for years to make Google Play the only viable source of Android apps, and for what? The Play Store is an almost unusable mess of sponsored search results and suggested apps, most of which are little more than in-app purchase factories that deliver Google billions of dollars every year.

Google has every reason to protect the status quo (it may take the case all the way to the Supreme Court), and now it has suddenly decided the security risk of sideloaded apps must be addressed. The way it’s being addressed puts Google in the driver’s seat at a time when alternative app stores may finally have a chance to thrive. It’s all very convenient for Google.

Developers across the Internet are expressing wariness about giving Google their personal information. Google, however, has decided anonymity is too risky. We now know a little more about how Google will manage the information it collects on developers, though. While Play Store developer information is listed publicly, the video confirms there will be no public list of sideload developers. However, Google will have the information, and that means it could be demanded by law enforcement or governments.

The current US administration has had harsh words for apps like ICEBlock, which it successfully pulled from the Apple App Store. Google’s new centralized control of app distribution would allow similar censorship on Android, and the real identities of those who developed such an app would also be sitting in a Google database, ready to be subpoenaed. A few years ago, developers might have trusted Google with this data, but now? The goodwill is gone.

Google confirms Android dev verification will have free and paid tiers, no public list of devs Read More »

Japan is running out of its favorite beer after ransomware attack

cyberattack, ransomware, Security, syndication / Kris Guyer / October 2, 2025

According to cyber security experts at the Tokyo-based group Nihon Cyber Defence (NCD), Japanese companies are increasingly seen as attractive targets for ransomware attackers because of their poor defenses and the fact that many companies simply paid the demanded sum through back channels.

In 2024 Japan’s National Police Agency said it had received 222 official reports of ransomware attacks—a 12 percent rise from the previous year, but experts at NCD said it represented just a small fraction of the real volume of attacks.

In a survey conducted by the agency, Japanese companies said that in 49 percent of ransomware cases, it took at least a month to recover the data lost in the attack. Asahi said in a statement that there was no confirmed leakage of customer data to external parties.

In a measure of growing public and private sector panic over cyber vulnerabilities, Japan passed a law in May that granted the government greater rights to proactively combat cyber criminals and state-sponsored hackers. The chair of the government’s policy research council at the time, Itsunori Onodera, warned that without an urgent upgrade of the nation’s cyber security, “the lives of Japanese people will be put at risk.”

Asahi, whose shares fell 2.6 percent on Thursday, not only produces Super Dry beer in Japan but also soft drinks, mints, and baby food, as well as producing own brand goods for Japanese retailers.

Asahi is still investigating whether it was a ransomware attack, according to a spokesperson.

As a result of the cyber attack, Asahi has postponed the planned launch of eight new Asahi products, including fruit soda, lemon-flavored ginger ale, and protein bars, indefinitely.

On Wednesday, Asahi trialled using paper-based systems to process orders and deliveries in a small-scale trial and it is in the process of figuring out whether to proceed with more manual-style deliveries.

Operations in other regions of the world, such as Europe, where it sells Peroni Nastro Azzurro, have not been affected by the cyber attack.

Japan is running out of its favorite beer after ransomware attack Read More »

That annoying SMS phish you just got may have come from a box like this

Biz & IT, hacking, modems, phishing, Security, smishing, SMS / Kris Guyer / October 2, 2025

Scammers have been abusing unsecured cellular routers used in industrial settings to blast SMS-based phishing messages in campaigns that have been ongoing since 2023, researchers said.

The routers, manufactured by China-based Milesight IoT Co., Ltd., are rugged Internet of Things devices that use cellular networks to connect traffic lights, electric power meters, and other sorts of remote industrial devices to central hubs. They come equipped with SIM cards that work with 3G/4G/5G cellular networks and can be controlled by text message, Python scripts, and web interfaces.

An unsophisticated, yet effective, delivery vector

Security company Sekoia on Tuesday said that an analysis of “suspicious network traces” detected in its honeypots led to the discovery of a cellular router being abused to send SMS messages with phishing URLs. As company researchers investigated further, they identified more than 18,000 such routers accessible on the Internet, with at least 572 of them allowing free access to programming interfaces to anyone who took the time to look for them. The vast majority of the routers were running firmware versions that were more than three years out of date and had known vulnerabilities.

The researchers sent requests to the unauthenticated APIs that returned the contents of the routers’ SMS inboxes and outboxes. The contents revealed a series of campaigns dating back to October 2023 for “smishing”—a common term for SMS-based phishing. The fraudulent text messages were directed at phone numbers located in an array of countries, primarily Sweden, Belgium, and Italy. The messages instructed recipients to log in to various accounts, often related to government services, to verify the person’s identity. Links in the messages sent recipients to fraudulent websites that collected their credentials.

“In the case under analysis, the smishing campaigns appear to have been conducted through the exploitation of vulnerable cellular routers—a relatively unsophisticated, yet effective, delivery vector,” Sekoia researchers Jeremy Scion and Marc N. wrote. “These devices are particularly appealing to threat actors, as they enable decentralized SMS distribution across multiple countries, complicating both detection and takedown efforts.”

That annoying SMS phish you just got may have come from a box like this Read More »

Rocket Report: Keeping up with Kuiper; New Glenn’s second flight slips

ariane 6, artemis II, astra, blue origin, Firefly Aerospace, moon, NASA, new glenn, rocket report, Security, Space, space launch system, spacex, starship, VIPER / Tim Belzer / September 26, 2025

Amazon plans to conduct two launches of Kuiper broadband satellites just days apart.

An unarmed Trident II D5 Life Extension (D5LE) missile launches from an Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine off the coast of Florida. Credit: US Navy

Welcome to Edition 8.12 of the Rocket Report! We often hear from satellite operators—from the military to venture-backed startups—about their appetite for more launch capacity. With so many rocket launches happening around the world, some might want to dismiss these statements as a corporate plea for more competition, and therefore lower prices. SpaceX is on pace to launch more than 150 times this year. China could end the year with more than 70 orbital launches. These are staggering numbers compared to global launch rates just a few years ago. But I’m convinced there’s room for more alternatives for reliable (and reusable) rockets. All of the world’s planned mega-constellations will need immense launch capacity just to get off the ground, and if successful, they’ll go into regular replacement and replenishment cycles. Throw in the still-undefined Golden Dome missile shield and many nations’ desire for a sovereign launch capability, and it’s easy to see the demand curve going up.

As always, we welcome reader submissions. If you don’t want to miss an issue, please subscribe using the box below (the form will not appear on AMP-enabled versions of the site). Each report will include information on small-, medium-, and heavy-lift rockets, as well as a quick look ahead at the next three launches on the calendar.

Sharp words from Astra’s Chris Kemp. Chris Kemp, the chief executive officer of Astra, apparently didn’t get the memo about playing nice with his competitors in the launch business. Kemp made some spicy remarks at the Berkeley Space Symposium 2025 earlier this month, billed as the largest undergraduate aerospace event at the university (see video of the talk). During the speech, Kemp periodically deviated from building up Astra to hurling insults at several of his competitors in the launch industry, Ars reports. To be fair to Kemp, some of his criticisms are not without a kernel of truth. But they are uncharacteristically rough all the same, especially given Astra’s uneven-at-best launch record and financial solvency to date.

Wait, what?! … Kemp is generally laudatory in his comments about SpaceX, but his most crass statement took aim at the quality of life of SpaceX employees at Starbase, Texas. He said life at Astra is “more fun than SpaceX because we’re not on the border of Mexico where they’ll chop your head off if you accidentally take a left turn.” For the record, no SpaceX employees have been beheaded. “And you don’t have to live in a trailer. And we don’t make you work six and a half days a week, 12 hours a day.” Kemp also accused Firefly Aerospace of sending Astra “garbage” rocket engines as part of the companies’ partnership on propulsion for Astra’s next-generation rocket.

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A step forward for Europe’s reusable rocket program. No one could accuse the European Space Agency and its various contractors of moving swiftly when it comes to the development of reusable rockets. However, it appears that Europe is finally making some credible progress, Ars reports. Last week, the France-based ArianeGroup aerospace company announced that it completed the integration of the Themis vehicle, a prototype rocket that will test various landing technologies, on a launch pad in Sweden. Low-altitude hop tests, a precursor for developing a rocket’s first stage that can vertically land after an orbital launch, could start late this year or early next.

Hopping into the future … “This milestone marks the beginning of the ‘combined tests,’ during which the interface between Themis and the launch pad’s mechanical, electrical, and fluid systems will be thoroughly trialed, with the aim of completing a test under cryogenic conditions,” ArianeGroup said. This particular rocket will likely undergo only short hops, initially about 100 meters. A follow-up vehicle, Themis T1E, is intended to fly medium-altitude tests at a later date. Some of the learnings from these prototypes will feed into a smaller, reusable rocket intended to lift 500 kilograms to low-Earth orbit. This is under development by MaiaSpace, a subsidiary of ArianeGroup. Eventually, the European Space Agency would like to use technology developed as part of Themis to develop a new line of reusable rockets that will succeed the Ariane 6 rocket.

Navy conducts Trident missile drills. The US Navy carried out four scheduled missile tests of a nuclear-capable weapons system off the coast of Florida within the last week, Defense News reports. The service’s Strategic Systems Programs conducted flights of unarmed Trident II D5 Life Extension missiles from a submerged Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine from September 17 to September 21 as part of an ongoing scheduled event meant to test the reliability of the system. “The missile tests were not conducted in response to any ongoing world events,” a Navy release said.

Secret with high visibility … The Navy periodically performs these Trident missile tests off the coasts of Florida and California, taking advantage of support infrastructure and range support from the two busiest US spaceports. The military doesn’t announce the exact timing of the tests, but warnings issued for pilots to stay out of the area give a general idea of when they might occur. One of the launch events Sunday was visible from Puerto Rico, illuminating the night sky in photos published on social media. The missiles fell in the Atlantic Ocean as intended, the Navy said. The Trident II D5 missiles were developed in the 1980s and are expected to remain in service on the Navy’s ballistic missile submarines into the 2040s. The Trident system is one leg of the US military’s nuclear triad, alongside land-based Minuteman ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable strategic bombers. (submitted by EllPeaTea)

Firefly plans for Alpha’s return to flight. Firefly Aerospace expects to resume Alpha launches in the “coming weeks,” with two flights planned before the end of the year, Space News reports. These will be the first flights of Firefly’s one-ton-class Alpha rocket since a failure in April destroyed a Lockheed Martin tech demo satellite after liftoff from California. In a quarterly earnings call, Firefly shared a photo showing its next two Alpha rockets awaiting shipment from the company’s Texas factory.

Righting the ship … These next two launches really need to go well for Firefly. The Alpha rocket has, at best, a mixed record with only two fully successful flights in six attempts. Two other missions put their payloads into off-target orbits, and two Alpha launches failed to reach orbit at all. Firefly went public on the NASDAQ stock exchange last month, raising nearly $900 million in the initial public offering to help fund the company’s future programs, namely the medium-lift Eclipse rocket developed in partnership with Northrop Grumman. There’s a lot to like about Firefly. The company achieved the first fully successful landing of a commercial spacecraft on the Moon in March. NASA has selected Firefly for three more commercial landings on the Moon, and Firefly reported this week it has an agreement with an unnamed commercial customer for an additional dedicated mission. But the Alpha program hasn’t had the same level of success. We’ll see if Firefly can get the rocket on track soon. (submitted by EllPeaTea)

Avio wins contract to launch “extra-European” mission. Italian rocket builder Avio has signed a launch services agreement with US-based launch aggregator SpaceLaunch for a Vega C launch carrying an Earth observation satellite for an “extra-European institutional customer” in 2027, European Spaceflight reports. Avio announced that it had secured the launch contract on September 18. According to the company, the contract was awarded through an open international competition, with Vega C chosen for its “versatility and cost-effectiveness.” While Avio did not reveal the identity of the “extra-European” customer, it said that it would do so later this year.

Plenty of peculiarities … There are several questions to unpack here, and Andrew Parsonson of European Spaceflight goes through them all. Presumably, extra-European means the customer is based outside of Europe. Avio’s statement suggests we’ll find out the answer to that question soon. Details about the US-based launch broker SpaceLaunch are harder to find. SpaceLaunch appears to have been founded in January 2025 by two former Firefly Aerospace employees with a combined 40 years of experience in the industry. On its website, the company claims to provide end-to-end satellite launch integration, mission management, and launch procurement services with a “portfolio of launch vehicle capacity around the globe.” SpaceLaunch boasts it has supported the launch of more than 150 satellites on 12 different launch vehicles. However, according to public records, it does not appear that the company itself has supported a single launch. Instead, the claim seems to credit SpaceLaunch with launches that were actually carried out during the two founders’ previous tenures at Spaceflight, Firefly Aerospace, Northrop Grumman, and the US Air Force. (submitted by EllPeaTea)

Falcon 9 launches three missions for NASA and NOAA. Scientists loaded three missions worth nearly $1.6 billion on a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket for launch Wednesday, toward an orbit nearly a million miles from Earth, to measure the supersonic stream of charged particles emanating from the Sun, Ars reports. One of the missions, from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), will beam back real-time observations of the solar wind to provide advance warning of geomagnetic storms that could affect power grids, radio communications, GPS navigation, air travel, and satellite operations. The other two missions come from NASA, with research objectives that include studying the boundary between the Solar System and interstellar space and observing the rarely seen outermost layer of our own planet’s atmosphere.

Immense value … All three spacecraft will operate in orbit around the L1 Lagrange point, a gravitational balance point located more than 900,000 miles (1.5 million kilometers) from Earth. Bundling these three missions onto the same rocket saved at least tens of millions of dollars in launch costs. Normally, they would have needed three different rockets. Rideshare missions to low-Earth orbit are becoming more common, but spacecraft departing for more distant destinations like the L1 Lagrange point are rare. Getting all three missions on the same launch required extensive planning, a stroke of luck, and fortuitous timing. “This is the ultimate cosmic carpool,” said Joe Westlake, director of NASA’s heliophysics division. “These three missions heading out to the Sun-Earth L1 point riding along together provide immense value for the American taxpayer.”

US officials concerned about China mastering reusable launch. SpaceX’s dominance in reusable rocketry is one of the most important advantages the United States has over China as competition between the two nations extends into space, US Space Force officials said Monday. But several Chinese companies are getting close to fielding their own reusable rockets, Ars reports. “It’s concerning how fast they’re going,” said Brig. Gen. Brian Sidari, the Space Force’s deputy chief of space operations for intelligence. “I’m concerned about when the Chinese figure out how to do reusable lift that allows them to put more capability on orbit at a quicker cadence than currently exists.”

By the numbers … China has used 14 different types of rockets on its 56 orbital-class missions this year, and none have flown more than 11 times. Eight US rocket types have cumulatively flown 145 times, with 122 of those using SpaceX’s workhorse Falcon 9. Without a reusable rocket, China must maintain more rocket companies to sustain a launch rate of just one-third to one-half that of the United States. This contrasts with the situation just four years ago, when China outpaced the United States in orbital rocket launches. The growth in US launches has been a direct result of SpaceX’s improvements to launch at a higher rate, an achievement primarily driven by the recovery and reuse of Falcon 9 boosters and payload fairings.

Atlas V launches more Kuiper satellites. Roughly an hour past sunrise on Thursday, an Atlas V rocket from United Launch Alliance took flight from Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida. Onboard the rocket, flying in its most powerful configuration, were the next 27 Project Kuiper broadband satellites from Amazon, Spaceflight Now reports. This is the third batch of production satellites launched by ULA and the fifth overall for the growing low-Earth orbit constellation. The Atlas V rocket released the 27 Kuiper satellites about 280 miles (450 kilometers) above Earth. The satellites will use onboard propulsion to boost themselves to their assigned orbit at 392 miles (630 kilometers).

Another Kuiper launch on tap … With this deployment, Amazon now has 129 satellites in orbit. This is a small fraction of the network’s planned total of 3,232 satellites, but Amazon has enjoyed a steep ramp-up in the Kuiper launch cadence as the company’s satellite assembly line in Kirkland, Washington, continues churning out spacecraft. Another 24 Kuiper satellites are slated to launch September 30 on a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket, and Amazon has delivered enough satellites to Florida for an additional launch later this fall. (submitted by EllPeaTea)

German military will fly with Ariane 6. Airbus Defense and Space has awarded Arianespace a contract to launch a pair of SATCOMBw-3 communications satellites for the German Armed Forces, European Spaceflight reports. Airbus is the prime contractor for the nearly $2.5 billion (2.1 billion euro) SATCOMBw-3 program, which will take over from the two-satellite SATCOMBw-2 constellation currently providing secure communications for the German military. Arianespace announced Wednesday that it had been awarded the contract to launch the satellites aboard two Ariane 6 rockets. “By signing this new strategic contract for the German Armed Forces, Arianespace accomplishes its core mission of guaranteeing autonomous access to space for European sovereign satellites,” said Arianespace CEO David Cavaillolès.

Running home to Europe … The chief goal of the Ariane 6 program is to provide Europe with independent access to space, something many European governments see as a strategic requirement. Several European military, national security, and scientific satellites have launched on SpaceX Falcon 9 rockets in the last few years as officials waited for the debut of the Ariane 6 rocket. With three successful Ariane 6 flights now in the books, European customers seem to now have the confidence to commit to flying their satellites on Ariane 6. (submitted by EllPeaTea)

Artemis II launch targeted for February. NASA is pressing ahead with preparations for the first launch of humans beyond low-Earth orbit in more than five decades, and officials said Tuesday that the Artemis II mission could take flight early next year, Ars reports. Although work remains to be done, the space agency is now pushing toward a launch window that opens on February 5, 2026, officials said during a news conference on Tuesday at Johnson Space Center. The Artemis II mission represents a major step forward for NASA and seeks to send four astronauts—Reid Wiseman, Victor Glover, Christina Koch, and Jeremy Hansen—around the Moon and back. The 10-day mission will be the first time astronauts have left low-Earth orbit since the Apollo 17 mission in December 1972.

Orion named Integrity … The first astronauts set to fly to the Moon in more than 50 years will do so in Integrity, Ars reports. NASA’s Artemis II crew revealed Integrity as the name of their Orion spacecraft during a news conference on Wednesday at the Johnson Space Center in Houston. “We thought, as a crew, we need to name this spacecraft. We need to have a name for the Orion spacecraft that we’re going to ride this magical mission on,” said Wiseman, commander of the Artemis II mission.

FAA reveals new Starship trajectories. Sometime soon, perhaps next year, SpaceX will attempt to fly one of its enormous Starship rockets from low-Earth orbit back to its launch pad in South Texas. A successful return and catch at the launch tower would demonstrate a key capability underpinning Elon Musk’s hopes for a fully reusable rocket. For this to happen, SpaceX must overcome the tyranny of geography. A new document released by the Federal Aviation Administration shows the narrow corridors Starship will fly to space and back when SpaceX tries to recover them, Ars reports.

Flying over people … It was always evident that flying a Starship from low-Earth orbit back to Starbase would require the rocket to fly over Mexico and portions of South Texas. The rocket launches to the east over the Gulf of Mexico, so it must approach Starbase from the west when it comes in for a landing. The new maps show SpaceX will launch Starships to the southeast over the Gulf and the Caribbean Sea, and directly over Jamaica, or to the northeast over the Gulf and the Florida peninsula. On reentry, the ship will fly over Baja California and Mexico’s interior near the cities of Hermosillo and Chihuahua, each with a population of roughly a million people. The trajectory would bring Starship well north of the Monterrey metro area and its 5.3 million residents, then over the Rio Grande Valley near the Texas cities of McAllen and Brownsville.

New Glenn’s second flight at least a month away. The second launch of Blue Origin’s New Glenn rocket, carrying a NASA smallsat mission to Mars, is now expected in late October or early November, Space News reports. Tim Dunn, NASA’s senior launch director at Kennedy Space Center, provided an updated schedule for the second flight of New Glenn in comments after a NASA-sponsored launch on a Falcon 9 rocket on Wednesday. Previously, the official schedule from NASA showed the launch date as no earlier than September 29.

No surprise … It was already apparent that this launch wouldn’t happen on September 29. Blue Origin has test-fired the second stage for the upcoming flight of the New Glenn rocket but hasn’t rolled the first stage to the launch pad for its static fire. Seeing the rocket emerge from Blue’s factory in Florida will be an indication that the launch date is finally near. Blue Origin will launch NASA’s ESCAPADE mission, a pair of small satellites to study how the solar wind interacts with the Martian upper atmosphere.

Blue Origin will launch a NASA rover to the Moon. NASA has awarded Blue Origin a task order worth up to $190 million to deliver its Volatiles Investigating Polar Exploration Rover (VIPER) to the Moon’s surface, Aviation Week & Space Technology reports. Blue Origin, one of 13 currently active Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) providers, submitted the only bid to carry VIPER to the Moon after NASA requested offers from industry last month. NASA canceled the VIPER mission last year, citing cost overruns with the rover and delays in its planned ride to the Moon aboard a lander provided by Astrobotic. But engineers had already completed assembly of the rover, and scientists protested NASA’s decision to terminate the mission.

Some caveats … Blue Origin will deliver VIPER to a location near the Moon’s south pole in late 2027 using a robotic Blue Moon MK1 lander, a massive craft larger than the Apollo lunar landing module. The company’s first Blue Moon MK1 lander is scheduled to fly to the Moon next year. NASA’s contract for the VIPER delivery calls for Blue Origin to design accommodations for the rover on the Blue Moon lander. The agency said it will decide whether to proceed with the actual launch on a New Glenn rocket and delivery of VIPER to the Moon based partially on the outcome of the first Blue Moon test flight next year.

Next three launches

Sept. 26: Long March 4C | Unknown Payload | Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, China | 19: 20 UTC

Sept. 27: Long March 6A | Unknown Payload | Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center, China | 12: 39 UTC

Sept. 28: Falcon 9 | Starlink 11-20 | Vandenberg Space Force Base, California | 23: 32 UTC

Stephen Clark is a space reporter at Ars Technica, covering private space companies and the world’s space agencies. Stephen writes about the nexus of technology, science, policy, and business on and off the planet.

Rocket Report: Keeping up with Kuiper; New Glenn’s second flight slips Read More »

As many as 2 million Cisco devices affected by actively exploited 0-day

Biz & IT, Cisco, exploit, Security, zero-day, zero-day vulnerability / Tim Belzer / September 25, 2025

As many as 2 million Cisco devices are susceptible to an actively exploited zero-day that can remotely crash or execute code on vulnerable systems.

Cisco said Wednesday that the vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-20352, was present in all supported versions of Cisco IOS and Cisco IOS XE, the operating system that powers a wide variety of the company’s networking devices. The vulnerability can be exploited by low-privileged users to create a denial-of-service attack or by higher-privileged users to execute code that runs with unfettered root privileges. It carries a severity rating of 7.7 out of a possible 10.

Exposing SNMP to the Internet? Yep

“The Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) became aware of successful exploitation of this vulnerability in the wild after local Administrator credentials were compromised,” Wednesday’s advisory stated. “Cisco strongly recommends that customers upgrade to a fixed software release to remediate this vulnerability.”

The vulnerability is the result of a stack overflow bug in the IOS component that handles SNMP (simple network management protocol), which routers and other devices use to collect and handle information about devices inside a network. The vulnerability is exploited by sending crafted SNMP packets.

To execute malicious code, the remote attacker must have possession of read-only community string, an SNMP-specific form of authentication for accessing managed devices. Frequently, such strings ship with devices. Even when modified by an administrator, read-only community strings are often widely known inside an organization. The attacker would also require privileges on the vulnerable systems. With that, the attacker can obtain RCE (remote code execution) capabilities that run as root.

As many as 2 million Cisco devices affected by actively exploited 0-day Read More »