Security – Page 2

Russia takes unusual route to hack Starlink-connected devices in Ukraine

backdoors, Biz & IT, nation state hacking, phishing, Security, turla / Rejus Almole / December 11, 2024

“Microsoft assesses that Secret Blizzard either used the Amadey malware as a service (MaaS) or accessed the Amadey command-and-control (C2) panels surreptitiously to download a PowerShell dropper on target devices,” Microsoft said. “The PowerShell dropper contained a Base64-encoded Amadey payload appended by code that invoked a request to Secret Blizzard C2 infrastructure.”

The ultimate objective was to install Tavdig, a backdoor Secret Blizzard used to conduct reconnaissance on targets of interest. The Amdey sample Microsoft uncovered collected information from device clipboards and harvested passwords from browsers. It would then go on to install a custom reconnaissance tool that was “selectively deployed to devices of further interest by the threat actor—for example, devices egressing from STARLINK IP addresses, a common signature of Ukrainian front-line military devices.”

When Secret Blizzard assessed a target was of high value, it would then install Tavdig to collect information, including “user info, netstat, and installed patches and to import registry settings into the compromised device.”

Earlier in the year, Microsoft said, company investigators observed Secret Blizzard using tools belonging to Storm-1887 to also target Ukrainian military personnel. Microsoft researchers wrote:

In January 2024, Microsoft observed a military-related device in Ukraine compromised by a Storm-1837 backdoor configured to use the Telegram API to launch a cmdlet with credentials (supplied as parameters) for an account on the file-sharing platform Mega. The cmdlet appeared to have facilitated remote connections to the account at Mega and likely invoked the download of commands or files for launch on the target device. When the Storm-1837 PowerShell backdoor launched, Microsoft noted a PowerShell dropper deployed to the device. The dropper was very similar to the one observed during the use of Amadey bots and contained two base64 encoded files containing the previously referenced Tavdig backdoor payload (rastls.dll) and the Symantec binary (kavp.exe).

As with the Amadey bot attack chain, Secret Blizzard used the Tavdig backdoor loaded into kavp.exe to conduct initial reconnaissance on the device. Secret Blizzard then used Tavdig to import a registry file, which was used to install and provide persistence for the KazuarV2 backdoor, which was subsequently observed launching on the affected device.

Although Microsoft did not directly observe the Storm-1837 PowerShell backdoor downloading the Tavdig loader, based on the temporal proximity between the execution of the Storm-1837 backdoor and the observation of the PowerShell dropper, Microsoft assesses that it is likely that the Storm-1837 backdoor was used by Secret Blizzard to deploy the Tavdig loader.

Wednesday’s post comes a week after both Microsoft and Lumen’s Black Lotus Labs reported that Secret Blizzard co-opted the tools of a Pakistan-based threat group tracked as Storm-0156 to install backdoors and collect intel on targets in South Asia. Microsoft first observed the activity in late 2022. In all, Microsoft said, Secret Blizzard has used the tools and infrastructure of at least six other threat groups in the past seven years.

Russia takes unusual route to hack Starlink-connected devices in Ukraine Read More »

AMD’s trusted execution environment blown wide open by new BadRAM attack

AMD, Biz & IT, Cloud Computing, Security, sev-snp / Paul Patrick / December 10, 2024

Attack bypasses AMD protection promising security, even when a server is compromised.

One of the oldest maxims in hacking is that once an attacker has physical access to a device, it’s game over for its security. The basis is sound. It doesn’t matter how locked down a phone, computer, or other machine is; if someone intent on hacking it gains the ability to physically manipulate it, the chances of success are all but guaranteed.

In the age of cloud computing, this widely accepted principle is no longer universally true. Some of the world’s most sensitive information—health records, financial account information, sealed legal documents, and the like—now often resides on servers that receive day-to-day maintenance from unknown administrators working in cloud centers thousands of miles from the companies responsible for safeguarding it.

Bad (RAM) to the bone

In response, chipmakers have begun baking protections into their silicon to provide assurances that even if a server has been physically tampered with or infected with malware, sensitive data funneled through virtual machines can’t be accessed without an encryption key that’s known only to the VM administrator. Under this scenario, admins inside the cloud provider, law enforcement agencies with a court warrant, and hackers who manage to compromise the server are out of luck.

On Tuesday, an international team of researchers unveiled BadRAM, a proof-of-concept attack that completely undermines security assurances that chipmaker AMD makes to users of one of its most expensive and well-fortified microprocessor product lines. Starting with the AMD Epyc 7003 processor, a feature known as SEV-SNP—short for Secure Encrypted Virtualization and Secure Nested Paging—has provided the cryptographic means for certifying that a VM hasn’t been compromised by any sort of backdoor installed by someone with access to the physical machine running it.

If a VM has been backdoored, the cryptographic attestation will fail and immediately alert the VM admin of the compromise. Or at least that’s how SEV-SNP is designed to work. BadRAM is an attack that a server admin can carry out in minutes, using either about $10 of hardware, or in some cases, software only, to cause DDR4 or DDR5 memory modules to misreport during bootup the amount of memory capacity they have. From then on, SEV-SNP will be permanently made to suppress the cryptographic hash attesting its integrity even when the VM has been badly compromised.

“BadRAM completely undermines trust in AMD’s latest Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV-SNP) technology, which is widely deployed by major cloud providers, including Amazon AWS, Google Cloud, and Microsoft Azure,” members of the research team wrote in an email. “BadRAM for the first time studies the security risks of bad RAM—rogue memory modules that deliberately provide false information to the processor during startup. We show how BadRAM attackers can fake critical remote attestation reports and insert undetectable backdoors into _any_ SEV-protected VM.”

Compromising the AMD SEV ecosystem

On a website providing more information about the attack, the researchers wrote:

Modern computers increasingly use encryption to protect sensitive data in DRAM, especially in shared cloud environments with pervasive data breaches and insider threats. AMD’s Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is a cutting-edge technology that protects privacy and trust in cloud computing by encrypting a virtual machine’s (VM’s) memory and isolating it from advanced attackers, even those compromising critical infrastructure like the virtual machine manager or firmware.

We found that tampering with the embedded SPD chip on commercial DRAM modules allows attackers to bypass SEV protections—including AMD’s latest SEV-SNP version. For less than $10 in off-the-shelf equipment, we can trick the processor into allowing access to encrypted memory. We build on this BadRAM attack primitive to completely compromise the AMD SEV ecosystem, faking remote attestation reports and inserting backdoors into any SEV-protected VM.

In response to a vulnerability report filed by the researchers, AMD has already shipped patches to affected customers, a company spokesperson said. The researchers say there are no performance penalties, other than the possibility of additional time required during boot up. The BadRAM vulnerability is tracked in the industry as CVE-2024-21944 and AMD-SB-3015 by the chipmaker.

A stroll down memory lane

Modern dynamic random access memory for servers typically comes in the form of DIMMs, short for Dual In-Line Memory Modules. The basic building block of these rectangular sticks are capacitors, which, when charged, represent a binary 1 and, when discharged, represent a 0. The capacitors are organized into cells, which are organized into arrays of rows and columns, which are further arranged into ranks and banks. The more capacitors that are stuffed into a DIMM, the more capacity it has to store data. Servers usually have multiple DIMMs that are organized into channels that can be processed in parallel.

For a server to store or access a particular piece of data, it first must locate where the bits representing it are stored in this vast configuration of transistors. Locations are tracked through addresses that map the channel, rank, bank row, and column. For performance reasons, the task of translating these physical addresses to DRAM address bits—a job assigned to the memory controller—isn’t a one-to-one mapping. Rather, consecutive addresses are spread across different channels, ranks, and banks.

Before the server can map these locations, it must first know how many DIMMs are connected and the total capacity of memory they provide. This information is provided each time the server boots, when the BIOS queries the SPD—short for Serial Presence Detect—chip found on the surface of the DIMM. This chip is responsible for providing the BIOS basic information about available memory. BadRAM causes the SPD chip to report that its capacity is twice what it actually is. It does this by adding an extra addressing bit.

To do this, a server admin need only briefly connect a specially programmed Raspberry Pi to the SPD chip just once.

The researchers’ Raspberry Pi connected to the SPD chip of a DIMM. Credit: De Meulemeester et al.

Hacking by numbers, 1, 2, 3

In some cases, with certain DIMM models that don’t adequately lock down the chip, the modification can likely be done through software. In either case, the modification need only occur once. From then on, the SPD chip will falsify the memory capacity available.

Next, the server admin configures the operating system to ignore the newly created “ghost memory,” meaning the top half of the capacity reported by the compromised SPD chip, but continue to map to the lower half of the real memory. On Linux, this configuration can be done with the `memmap` kernel command-line parameter. The researchers’ paper, titled BadRAM: Practical Memory Aliasing Attacks on Trusted Execution Environments, provides many more details about the attack.

Next, a script developed as part of BadRAM allows the attacker to quickly find the memory locations of ghost memory bits. These aliases give the attacker access to memory regions that SEV-SNP is supposed to make inaccessible. This allows the attacker to read and write to these protected memory regions.

Access to this normally fortified region of memory allows the attacker to copy the cryptographic hash SEV-SNP creates to attest to the integrity of the VM. The access also permits the attacker to boot an SEV-compliant VM that has been backdoored. Normally, this malicious VM would trigger a warning in the form of a cryptographic hash. BadRAM allows the attacker to replace this attestation failure hash with the attestation success hash collected earlier.

The primary steps involved in BadRAM attacks are:

Compromise the memory module to lie about its size and thus trick the CPU into accessing the nonexistent ghost addresses that have been silently mapped to existing memory regions.
Find aliases. These addresses map to the same DRAM location.
Bypass CPU Access Control. The aliases allow the attacker to bypass memory protections that are supposed to prevent the reading of and writing to regions storing sensitive data.

Beware of the ghost bit

For those looking for more technical details, Jesse De Meulemeester, who along with Luca Wilke was lead co-author of the paper, provided the following, which more casual readers can skip:

In our attack, there are two addresses that go to the same DRAM location; one is the original address, the other one is what we call the alias.

When we modify the SPD, we double its size. At a low level, this means all memory addresses now appear to have one extra bit. This extra bit is what we call the “ghost” bit, it is the address bit that is used by the CPU, but is not used (thus ignored) by the DIMM. The addresses for which this “ghost” bit is 0 are the original addresses, and the addresses for which this bit is 1 is the “ghost” memory.

This explains how we can access protected data like the launch digest. The launch digest is stored at an address with the ghost bit set to 0, and this address is protected; any attempt to access it is blocked by the CPU. However, if we try to access the same address with the ghost bit set to 1, the CPU treats it as a completely new address and allows access. On the DIMM side, the ghost bit is ignored, so both addresses (with ghost bit 0 or 1) point to the same physical memory location.

A small example to illustrate this:

Original SPD: 4 bit addresses:

CPU: address 1101 -> DIMM: address 1101

Modified SPD: Reports 5 bits even though it only has 4:

CPU: address 01101 -> DIMM: address 1101

CPU: address 11101 -> DIMM: address 1101

In this case 01101 is the protected address, 11101 is the alias. Even though to the CPU they seem like two different addresses, they go to the same DRAM location.

As noted earlier, some DIMM models don’t lock down the SPD chip, a failure that likely makes software-only modifications possible. Specifically, the researchers found that two DDR4 models made by Corsair contained this flaw.

In a statement, AMD officials wrote:

AMD believes exploiting the disclosed vulnerability requires an attacker either having physical access to the system, operating system kernel access on a system with unlocked memory modules, or installing a customized, malicious BIOS. AMD recommends utilizing memory modules that lock Serial Presence Detect (SPD), as well as following physical system security best practices. AMD has also released firmware updates to customers to mitigate the vulnerability.

Members of the research team are from KU Leuven, the University of Lübeck, and the University of Birmingham. Specifically, they are:

The researchers tested BadRAM against the Intel SGX, a competing microprocessor sold by AMD’s much bigger rival promising integrity assurances comparable to SEV-SNP. The classic, now-discontinued version of the SGX did allow reading of protected regions, but not writing to them. The current Intel Scalable SGX and Intel TDX processors, however, allowed no reading or writing. Since a comparable Arm processor wasn’t available for testing, it’s unknown if it’s vulnerable.

Despite the lack of universality, the researchers warned that the design flaws underpinning the BadRAM vulnerability may creep into other systems and should always use the mitigations AMD has now put in place.

“Since our BadRAM primitive is generic, we argue that such countermeasures should be considered when designing a system against untrusted DRAM,” the researchers wrote in their paper. “While advanced hardware-level attacks could potentially circumvent the currently used countermeasures, further research is required to judge whether they can be carried out in an impactful attacker model.”

Dan Goodin is Senior Security Editor at Ars Technica, where he oversees coverage of malware, computer espionage, botnets, hardware hacking, encryption, and passwords. In his spare time, he enjoys gardening, cooking, and following the independent music scene. Dan is based in San Francisco. Follow him at here on Mastodon and here on Bluesky. Contact him on Signal at DanArs.82.

AMD’s trusted execution environment blown wide open by new BadRAM attack Read More »

US recommends encrypted messaging as Chinese hackers linger in telecom networks

Chinese hackers, Policy, salt typhoon, Security / Tim Belzer / December 4, 2024

An unnamed FBI official was quoted in the same report as saying that phone users “would benefit from considering using a cellphone that automatically receives timely operating system updates, responsibly managed encryption, and phishing-resistant” multifactor authentication for email accounts, social media, and collaboration tools.

The FBI official reportedly said the hackers obtained metadata showing the numbers that phones called and when, the live phone calls of some specific targets, and information from systems that telcos use for court-ordered surveillance.

Despite recognizing the security benefits of encryption, US officials have for many years sought backdoors that would give the government access to encrypted communications. Supporters of end-to-end encryption have pointed out that backdoors can also be used by criminal hackers and other nation-states.

“For years, the security community has pushed back against these backdoors, pointing out that the technical capability cannot differentiate between good guys and bad guys,” cryptographer Bruce Schneier wrote after the Chinese hacking of telecom networks was reported in October.

Noting the apparent hacking of systems for court-ordered wiretap requests, Schneier called it “one more example of a backdoor access mechanism being targeted by the ‘wrong’ eavesdroppers.”

1994 surveillance law in focus

CISA issued a statement on the Chinese hacking campaign in mid-November. It said:

The US government’s continued investigation into the People’s Republic of China (PRC) targeting of commercial telecommunications infrastructure has revealed a broad and significant cyber espionage campaign.

Specifically, we have identified that PRC-affiliated actors have compromised networks at multiple telecommunications companies to enable the theft of customer call records data, the compromise of private communications of a limited number of individuals who are primarily involved in government or political activity, and the copying of certain information that was subject to US law enforcement requests pursuant to court orders.

The hacks raise concerns about surveillance capabilities required by a 1994 law, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which requires “telecommunications carriers and manufacturers of telecommunications equipment design their equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that they have the necessary surveillance capabilities to comply with legal requests for information.”

US recommends encrypted messaging as Chinese hackers linger in telecom networks Read More »

Code found online exploits LogoFAIL to install Bootkitty Linux backdoor

Biz & IT, bootkitty, Linux, logofail, Security, uefi, unified extensible firmware interface / Tim Belzer / November 29, 2024

Normally, Secure Boot prevents the UEFI from running all subsequent files unless they bear a digital signature certifying those files are trusted by the device maker. The exploit bypasses this protection by injecting shell code stashed in a malicious bitmap image displayed by the UEFI during the boot-up process. The injected code installs a cryptographic key that digitally signs a malicious GRUB file along with a backdoored image of the Linux kernel, both of which run during later stages of the boot process on Linux machines.

The silent installation of this key induces the UEFI to treat the malicious GRUB and kernel image as trusted components, and thereby bypass Secure Boot protections. The final result is a backdoor slipped into the Linux kernel before any other security defenses are loaded.

Diagram illustrating the execution flow of the LogoFAIL exploit Binarly found in the wild. Credit: Binarly

In an online interview, HD Moore, CTO and co-founder at runZero and an expert in firmware-based malware, explained the Binarly report this way:

The Binarly paper points to someone using the LogoFAIL bug to configure a UEFI payload that bypasses secure boot (firmware) by tricking the firmware into accepting their self-signed key (which is then stored in the firmware as the MOK variable). The evil code is still limited to the user-side of UEFI, but the LogoFAIL exploit does let them add their own signing key to the firmware’s allow list (but does not infect the firmware in any way otherwise).

It’s still effectively a GRUB-based kernel backdoor versus a firmware backdoor, but it does abuse a firmware bug (LogoFAIL) to allow installation without user interaction (enrolling, rebooting, then accepting the new MOK signing key).

In a normal secure boot setup, the admin generates a local key, uses this to sign their updated kernel/GRUB packages, tells the firmware to enroll the key they made, then after reboot, the admin has to accept this new key via the console (or remotely via bmc/ipmi/ilo/drac/etc bios console).

In this setup, the attacker can replace the known-good GRUB + kernel with a backdoored version by enrolling their own signing key without user interaction via the LogoFAIL exploit, but it’s still effectively a GRUB-based bootkit, and doesn’t get hardcoded into the BIOS firmware or anything.

Machines vulnerable to the exploit include some models sold by Acer, HP, Fujitsu, and Lenovo when they ship with a UEFI developed by manufacturer Insyde and run Linux. Evidence found in the exploit code indicates the exploit may be tailored for specific hardware configurations of such machines. Insyde issued a patch earlier this year that prevents the exploit from working. Unpatched devices remain vulnerable. Devices from these manufacturers that use non-Insyde UEFIs aren’t affected.

Code found online exploits LogoFAIL to install Bootkitty Linux backdoor Read More »

Found in the wild: The world’s first unkillable UEFI bootkit for Linux

Biz & IT, bootkit, malware, Security, uefi / Kris Guyer / November 27, 2024

Over the past decade, a new class of infections has threatened Windows users. By infecting the firmware that runs immediately before the operating system loads, these UEFI bootkits continue to run even when the hard drive is replaced or reformatted. Now the same type of chip-dwelling malware has been found in the wild for backdooring Linux machines.

Researchers at security firm ESET said Wednesday that Bootkitty—the name unknown threat actors gave to their Linux bootkit—was uploaded to VirusTotal earlier this month. Compared to its Windows cousins, Bootkitty is still relatively rudimentary, containing imperfections in key under-the-hood functionality and lacking the means to infect all Linux distributions other than Ubuntu. That has led the company researchers to suspect the new bootkit is likely a proof-of-concept release. To date, ESET has found no evidence of actual infections in the wild.

The ASCII logo that Bootkitty is capable of rendering. Credit: ESET

Be prepared

Still, Bootkitty suggests threat actors may be actively developing a Linux version of the same sort of unkillable bootkit that previously was found only targeting Windows machines.

“Whether a proof of concept or not, Bootkitty marks an interesting move forward in the UEFI threat landscape, breaking the belief about modern UEFI bootkits being Windows-exclusive threats,” ESET researchers wrote. “Even though the current version from VirusTotal does not, at the moment, represent a real threat to the majority of Linux systems, it emphasizes the necessity of being prepared for potential future threats.”

A rootkit is a piece of malware that runs in the deepest regions of the operating system it infects. It leverages this strategic position to hide information about its presence from the operating system itself. A bootkit, meanwhile, is malware that infects the boot-up process in much the same way. Bootkits for the UEFI—short for Unified Extensible Firmware Interface—lurk in the chip-resident firmware that runs each time a machine boots. These sorts of bootkits can persist indefinitely, providing a stealthy means for backdooring the operating system even before it has fully loaded and enabled security defenses such as antivirus software.

The bar for installing a bootkit is high. An attacker first must gain administrative control of the targeted machine, either through physical access while it’s unlocked or somehow exploiting a critical vulnerability in the OS. Under those circumstances, attackers already have the ability to install OS-resident malware. Bootkits, however, are much more powerful since they (1) run before the OS does and (2) are, at least practically speaking, undetectable and unremovable.

Found in the wild: The world’s first unkillable UEFI bootkit for Linux Read More »

QNAP firmware update leaves NAS owners locked out of their boxes

Biz & IT, firmware updates, NAS, network attached storage, QNAP, Security, Tech / Rejus Almole / November 26, 2024

A recent firmware pushed to QNAP network attached storage (NAS) devices left a number of owners unable to access their storage systems. The company has pulled back the firmware and issued a fixed version, but the company’s response has left some users feeling less confident in the boxes into which they put all their digital stuff.

As seen on a QNAP community thread, and as announced by QNAP itself, the QNAP operating system, QTS, received update 5.2.2.2950, build 20241114, at some point around November 19. After QNAP “received feedbacks from some users reporting issues with device functionality after installation,” the firm says it withdrew it, “conducted a comprehensive investigation,” and re-released a fixed version “within 24 hours.”

The community thread sees many more users of different systems having problems than the shortlist (“limited models of TS-x53D series and TS-x51 series”) released by QNAP. Issues reported included owners being rejected as an authorized user, devices reporting issues with booting, and claims of Python not being installed to run some apps and services.

QNAP says affected users can either downgrade their devices (presumably to then upgrade once more to the fixed update) or contact support for help. Response from QNAP support, as told by users on forums and social media, has not measured up to the nature of losing access to an entire backup system.

QNAP firmware update leaves NAS owners locked out of their boxes Read More »

Spies hack Wi-Fi networks in far-off land to launch attack on target next door

advanced persistent threats, Biz & IT, hacking, Security, tradecraft / Rejus Almole / November 23, 2024

While stalking its target, GruesomeLarch performed credential-stuffing attacks that compromised the passwords of several accounts on a web service platform used by the organization’s employees. Two-factor authentication enforced on the platform, however, prevented the attackers from compromising the accounts.

So GruesomeLarch found devices in physically adjacent locations, compromised them, and used them to probe the target’s Wi-Fi network. It turned out credentials for the compromised web services accounts also worked for accounts on the Wi-Fi network, only no 2FA was required.

Adding further flourish, the attackers hacked one of the neighboring Wi-Fi-enabled devices by exploiting what in early 2022 was a zero-day vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows Print Spooler.

The 2022 hack demonstrates how a single faulty assumption can undo an otherwise effective defense. For whatever reason—likely an assumption that 2FA on the Wi-Fi network was unnecessary because attacks required close proximity—the target deployed 2FA on the Internet-connecting web services platform (Adair isn’t saying what type) but not on the Wi-Fi network. That one oversight ultimately torpedoed a robust security practice.

Advanced persistent threat groups like GruesomeLarch—a part of the much larger GRU APT with names including Fancy Bear, APT28, Forrest Blizzard, and Sofacy—excel in finding and exploiting these sorts of oversights.

Volexity’s post describing the 2022 attack provides plenty of technical details about the compromise on the many links in this sophisticated daisy chain attack flow. There’s also useful advice for protecting networks against these sorts of compromises.

Spies hack Wi-Fi networks in far-off land to launch attack on target next door Read More »

Microsoft president asks Trump to “push harder” against Russian hacks

china, Cybersecurity, Fancy Bear, hacking, microsoft, russia, Security, syndication / Tim Belzer / November 22, 2024

Smith testified before the US Senate in September that Russia, China, and Iran had stepped up their digital efforts to interfere in global elections this year, including in the US.

However, Microsoft’s own security standards have come under fire in recent months. A damning report by the US Cyber Safety Review Board in March said its security culture was “inadequate,” pointing to a “cascade… of avoidable errors” that last year allowed Chinese hackers to access hundreds of email accounts, including those belonging to senior US government security officials, that were hosted on Microsoft’s cloud systems.

Microsoft chief executive Satya Nadella has said in response that the company would prioritize security “above all else,” including by tying staff remuneration to security.

The company is also making changes to its Windows operating system to help its customers recover more quickly from incidents such as July’s global IT outage caused by CrowdStrike’s botched security update.

Beyond cyber security, Smith said it was “a little early” to determine the precise impact of a second Trump administration on the technology industry. Any anticipated liberalization of M&A regulation in the US would have to be weighed up against continued scrutiny of dealmaking in other parts of the world, he said.

Smith also reiterated his plea for the US government to “help accelerate exports of key American digital technologies,” especially to the Middle East and Africa, after the Biden administration imposed export controls on AI chips, fearing the technology could leak to China.

“We really need now to standardize processes so that American technology can reach these other parts of the world as fast as Chinese technology,” he said.

Microsoft president asks Trump to “push harder” against Russian hacks Read More »

The Case for Security.txt

Security / Tim Belzer / November 12, 2024

error code: 502

The Case for Security.txt Read More »

Law enforcement operation takes down 22,000 malicious IP addresses worldwide

Biz & IT, cybercrime, Interpol, police, Security / Tim Belzer / November 7, 2024

An international coalition of police agencies has taken a major whack at criminals accused of running a host of online scams, including phishing, the stealing of account credentials and other sensitive data, and the spreading of ransomware, Interpol said recently.

The operation, which ran from the beginning of April through the end of August, resulted in the arrest of 41 people and the takedown of 1,037 servers and other infrastructure running on 22,000 IP addresses. Synergia II, as the operation was named, was the work of multiple law enforcement agencies across the world, as well as three cybersecurity organizations.

A global response

“The global nature of cybercrime requires a global response which is evident by the support member countries provided to Operation Synergia II,” Neal Jetton, director of the Cybercrime Directorate at INTERPOL, said. “Together, we’ve not only dismantled malicious infrastructure but also prevented hundreds of thousands of potential victims from falling prey to cybercrime. INTERPOL is proud to bring together a diverse team of member countries to fight this ever-evolving threat and make our world a safer place.”

Among the highlights of Operation Synergia II were:

Hong Kong (China): Police supported the operation by taking offline more than 1,037 servers linked to malicious services.

Mongolia: Investigations included 21 house searches, the seizure of a server and the identification of 93 individuals with links to illegal cyber activities.

Macau (China): Police took 291 servers offline.

Madagascar: Authorities identified 11 individuals with links to malicious servers and seized 11 electronic devices for further investigation.

Estonia: Police seized more than 80GB of server data, and authorities are now working with INTERPOL to conduct further analysis of data linked to phishing and banking malware.

The three private cybersecurity organizations that were part of Operation Synergia II were Group-IB, Kaspersky, and Team Cymru. All three used the telemetry intelligence in their possession to identify malicious servers and made it available to participating law enforcement agencies. The law enforcement agencies conducted investigations that resulted in house searches, the disruption of malicious cyber activities, the lawful seizures of servers and other electronic devices, and arrests.

Law enforcement operation takes down 22,000 malicious IP addresses worldwide Read More »

Suspect arrested in Snowflake data-theft attacks affecting millions

Biz & IT, Data breaches, infostealers, Security / Mike M. / November 5, 2024

Attack Path UNC5537 has used in attacks against as many as 165 Snowflake customers. Credit: Mandiant

None of the affected accounts used multifactor authentication, which requires users to provide a one-time password or additional means of authentication besides a password. After that revelation, Snowflake enforced mandatory MFA for accounts and required that passwords be at least 14 characters long.

Mandiant had identified the threat group behind the breaches as UNC5537. The group has referred to itself ShinyHunters. Snowflake offers its services under a model known as SaaS (software as a service).

“UNC5537 aka Alexander ‘Connor’ Moucka has proven to be one of the most consequential threat actors of 2024,” Mandiant wrote in an emailed statement. “In April 2024, UNC5537 launched a campaign, systematically compromising misconfigured SaaS instances across over a hundred organizations. The operation, which left organizations reeling from significant data loss and extortion attempts, highlighted the alarming scale of harm an individual can cause using off-the-shelf tools.”

Mandiant said a co-conspirator, John Binns, was arrested in June. The status of that case wasn’t immediately known.

Besides Ticketmaster, other customers known to have been breached include AT&T and Spain-based bank Santander. In July, AT&T said that personal information and phone and text message records for roughly 110 million customers were stolen. WIRED later reported that AT&T paid $370,000 in return for a promise the data would be deleted.

Other Snowflake customers reported by various news outlets as breached are Pure Storage, Advance Auto Parts, Los Angeles Unified School District, QuoteWizard/LendingTree, Neiman Marcus, Anheuser-Busch, Allstate, Mitsubishi, and State Farm.

KrebsOnSecurity reported Tuesday that Moucka has been named in multiple charging documents filed by US federal prosecutors. Reporter Brian Krebs said specific charges and allegations are unknown because the cases remain sealed.

Suspect arrested in Snowflake data-theft attacks affecting millions Read More »

Hundreds of code libraries posted to NPM try to install malware on dev machines

code libraries, malware, Security, typosquatting / Kris Guyer / November 4, 2024

The IP address returned by a package Phylum analyzed was: hxxp://193.233.201[.]21: 3001.

While the method was likely intended to conceal the source of second-stage infections, it ironically had the effect of leaving a trail of previous addresses the attackers had used in the past. The researchers explained:

An interesting thing about storing this data on the Ethereum blockchain is that Ethereum stores an immutable history of all values it has ever seen. Thus, we can see every IP address this threat actor has ever used.

On 2024-09-23 00: 55: 23Z it was hxxp://localhost: 3001

From 2024-09-24 06: 18: 11Z it was hxxp://45.125.67[.]172: 1228

From 2024-10-21 05: 01: 35Z it was hxxp://45.125.67[.]172: 1337

From 2024-10-22 14: 54: 23Z it was hxxp://193.233[.]201.21: 3001

From 2024-10-26 17: 44: 23Z it is hxxp://194.53.54[.]188: 3001

When installed, the malicious packages come in the form of a packed Vercel package. The payload runs in memory, sets itself to load with each reboot, and connects to the IP address from the ethereum contract. It then “performs a handful of requests to fetch additional Javascript files and then posts system information back to the same requesting server,” the Phylum researchers wrote. “This information includes information about the GPU, CPU, the amount of memory on the machine, username, and OS version.”

Attacks like this one rely on typosquatting, a term for the use of names that closely mimic those of legitimate packages but contain small differences, such as those that might occur if the package was inadvertently misspelled. Typosquatting has long been a tactic for luring people to malicious websites. Over the past five years, typosquatting has been embraced to trick developers into downloading malicious code libraries.

Developers should always double-check names before running downloaded packages. The Phylum blog post provides names, IP addresses, and cryptographic hashes associated with the malicious packages used in this campaign.

Hundreds of code libraries posted to NPM try to install malware on dev machines Read More »