Security

agencies-using-vulnerable-ivanti-products-have-until-saturday-to-disconnect-them

Agencies using vulnerable Ivanti products have until Saturday to disconnect them

TOUGH MEDICINE —

Things were already bad with two critical zero-days. Then Ivanti disclosed a new one.

Photograph depicts a security scanner extracting virus from a string of binary code. Hand with the word

Getty Images

Federal civilian agencies have until midnight Saturday morning to sever all network connections to Ivanti VPN software, which is currently under mass exploitation by multiple threat groups. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency mandated the move on Wednesday after disclosing three critical vulnerabilities in recent weeks.

Three weeks ago, Ivanti disclosed two critical vulnerabilities that it said threat actors were already actively exploiting. The attacks, the company said, targeted “a limited number of customers” using the company’s Connect Secure and Policy Secure VPN products. Security firm Volexity said on the same day that the vulnerabilities had been under exploitation since early December. Ivanti didn’t have a patch available and instead advised customers to follow several steps to protect themselves against attacks. Among the steps was running an integrity checker the company released to detect any compromises.

Almost two weeks later, researchers said the zero-days were under mass exploitation in attacks that were backdooring customer networks around the globe. A day later, Ivanti failed to make good on an earlier pledge to begin rolling out a proper patch by January 24. The company didn’t start the process until Wednesday, two weeks after the deadline it set for itself.

And then, there were three

Ivanti disclosed two new critical vulnerabilities in Connect Secure on Wednesday, tracked as CVE-2024-21888 and CVE-2024-21893. The company said that CVE-2024-21893—a class of vulnerability known as a server-side request forgery—“appears to be targeted,” bringing the number of actively exploited vulnerabilities to three. German government officials said they had already seen successful exploits of the newest one. The officials also warned that exploits of the new vulnerabilities neutralized the mitigations Ivanti advised customers to implement.

Hours later, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency—typically abbreviated as CISA—ordered all federal agencies under its authority to “disconnect all instances of Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure solution products from agency networks” no later than 11: 59 pm on Friday. Agency officials set the same deadline for the agencies to complete the Ivanti-recommended steps, which are designed to detect if their Ivanti VPNs have already been compromised in the ongoing attacks.

The steps include:

  • Identifying any additional systems connected or recently connected to the affected Ivanti device
  • Monitoring the authentication or identity management services that could be exposed
  • Isolating the systems from any enterprise resources to the greatest degree possible
  • Continuing to audit privilege-level access accounts.

The directive went on to say that before agencies can bring their Ivanti products back online, they must follow a long series of steps that include factory resetting their system, rebuilding them following Ivanti’s previously issued instructions, and installing the Ivanti patches.

“Agencies running the affected products must assume domain accounts associated with the affected products have been compromised,” Wednesday’s directive said. Officials went on to mandate that by March 1, agencies must have reset passwords “twice” for on-premise accounts, revoke Kerberos-enabled authentication tickets, and then revoke tokens for cloud accounts in hybrid deployments.

Steven Adair, the president of Volexity, the security firm that discovered the initial two vulnerabilities, said its most recent scans indicate that at least 2,200 customers of the affected products have been compromised to date. He applauded CISA’s Wednesday directive.

“This is effectively the best way to alleviate any concern that a device might still be compromised,” Adair said in an email. “We saw that attackers were actively looking for ways to circumvent detection from the integrity checker tools. With the previous and new vulnerabilities, this course of action around a completely fresh and patched system might be the best way to go for organizations to not have to wonder if their device is actively compromised.”

The directive is binding only on agencies under CISA’s authority. Any user of the vulnerable products, however, should follow the same steps immediately if they haven’t already.

Agencies using vulnerable Ivanti products have until Saturday to disconnect them Read More »

chinese-malware-removed-from-soho-routers-after-fbi-issues-covert-commands

Chinese malware removed from SOHO routers after FBI issues covert commands

REBOOT OR, BETTER yet, REPLACE YOUR OLD ROUTERS! —

Routers were being used to conceal attacks on critical infrastructure.

A wireless router with an Ethernet cable hooked into it.

Enlarge / A Wi-Fi router.

The US Justice Department said Wednesday that the FBI surreptitiously sent commands to hundreds of infected small office and home office routers to remove malware China state-sponsored hackers were using to wage attacks on critical infrastructure.

The routers—mainly Cisco and Netgear devices that had reached their end of life—were infected with what’s known as KV Botnet malware, Justice Department officials said. Chinese hackers from a group tracked as Volt Typhoon used the malware to wrangle the routers into a network they could control. Traffic passing between the hackers and the compromised devices was encrypted using a VPN module KV Botnet installed. From there, the campaign operators connected to the networks of US critical infrastructure organizations to establish posts that could be used in future cyberattacks. The arrangement caused traffic to appear as originating from US IP addresses with trustworthy reputations rather than suspicious regions in China.

Seizing infected devices

Before the takedown could be conducted legally, FBI agents had to receive authority—technically for what’s called a seizure of infected routers or “target devices”—from a federal judge. An initial affidavit seeking authority was filed in US federal court in Houston in December. Subsequent requests have been filed since then.

“To effect these seizures, the FBI will issue a command to each Target Device to stop it from running the KV Botnet VPN process,” an agency special agent wrote in an affidavit dated January 9. “This command will also stop the Target Device from operating as a VPN node, thereby preventing the hackers from further accessing Target Devices through any established VPN tunnel. This command will not affect the Target Device if the VPN process is not running, and will not otherwise affect the Target Device, including any legitimate VPN process installed by the owner of the Target Device.”

Wednesday’s Justice Department statement said authorities had followed through on the takedown, which disinfected “hundreds” of infected routers and removed them from the botnet. To prevent the devices from being reinfected, the takedown operators issued additional commands that the affidavit said would “interfere with the hackers’ control over the instrumentalities of their crimes (the Target Devices), including by preventing the hackers from easily re-infecting the Target Devices.”

The affidavit said elsewhere that the prevention measures would be neutralized if the routers were restarted. These devices would then be once again vulnerable to infection.

Redactions in the affidavit make the precise means used to prevent re-infections unclear. Portions that weren’t censored, however, indicated the technique involved a loop-back mechanism that prevented the devices from communicating with anyone trying to hack them.

Portions of the affidavit explained:

22. To effect these seizures, the FBI will simultaneously issue commands that will interfere with the hackers’ control over the instrumentalities of their crimes (the Target Devices), including by preventing the hackers from easily re-infecting the Target Devices with KV Botnet malware.

  1. a. When the FBI deletes the KV Botnet malware from the Target Devices [redacted. To seize the Target Devices and interfere with the hackers’ control over them, the FBI [redacted]. This [redacted] will have no effect except to protect the Target Device from reinfection by the KV Botnet [redacted] The effect of can be undone by restarting the Target Device [redacted] make the Target Device vulnerable to re-infection.
  2. b. [redacted] the FBI will seize each such Target Device by causing the malware on it to communicate with only itself. This method of seizure will interfere with the ability of the hackers to control these Target Devices. This communications loopback will, like the malware itself, not survive a restart of a Target Device.
  3. c. To seize Target Devices, the FBI will [redacted] block incoming traffic [redacted] used exclusively by the KV Botnet malware on Target Devices, to block outbound traffic to [redacted] the Target Devices’ parent and command-and-control nodes, and to allow a Target Device to communicate with itself [redacted] are not normally used by the router, and so the router’s legitimate functionality is not affected. The effect of [redacted] to prevent other parts of the botnet from contacting the victim router, undoing the FBI’s commands, and reconnecting it to the botnet. The effect of these commands is undone by restarting the Target Devices.

23. To effect these seizures, the FBI will issue a command to each Target Device to stop it from running the KV Botnet VPN process. This command will also stop the Target Device from operating as a VPN node, thereby preventing the hackers from further accessing Target Devices through any established VPN tunnel. This command will not affect the Target Device if the VPN process is not running, and will not otherwise affect the Target Device, including any legitimate VPN process installed by the owner of the Target Device.

Chinese malware removed from SOHO routers after FBI issues covert commands Read More »

ars-technica-used-in-malware-campaign-with-never-before-seen-obfuscation

Ars Technica used in malware campaign with never-before-seen obfuscation

WHEN USERS ATTACK —

Vimeo also used by legitimate user who posted booby-trapped content.

Ars Technica used in malware campaign with never-before-seen obfuscation

Getty Images

Ars Technica was recently used to serve second-stage malware in a campaign that used a never-before-seen attack chain to cleverly cover its tracks, researchers from security firm Mandiant reported Tuesday.

A benign image of a pizza was uploaded to a third-party website and was then linked with a URL pasted into the “about” page of a registered Ars user. Buried in that URL was a string of characters that appeared to be random—but were actually a payload. The campaign also targeted the video-sharing site Vimeo, where a benign video was uploaded and a malicious string was included in the video description. The string was generated using a technique known as Base 64 encoding. Base 64 converts text into a printable ASCII string format to represent binary data. Devices already infected with the first-stage malware used in the campaign automatically retrieved these strings and installed the second stage.

Not typically seen

“This is a different and novel way we’re seeing abuse that can be pretty hard to detect,” Mandiant researcher Yash Gupta said in an interview. “This is something in malware we have not typically seen. It’s pretty interesting for us and something we wanted to call out.”

The image posted on Ars appeared in the about profile of a user who created an account on November 23. An Ars representative said the photo, showing a pizza and captioned “I love pizza,” was removed by Ars staff on December 16 after being tipped off by email from an unknown party. The Ars profile used an embedded URL that pointed to the image, which was automatically populated into the about page. The malicious base 64 encoding appeared immediately following the legitimate part of the URL. The string didn’t generate any errors or prevent the page from loading.

Pizza image posted by user.

Enlarge / Pizza image posted by user.

Malicious string in URL.

Enlarge / Malicious string in URL.

Mandiant researchers said there were no consequences for people who may have viewed the image, either as displayed on the Ars page or on the website that hosted it. It’s also not clear that any Ars users visited the about page.

Devices that were infected by the first stage automatically accessed the malicious string at the end of the URL. From there, they were infected with a second stage.

The video on Vimeo worked similarly, except that the string was included in the video description.

Ars representatives had nothing further to add. Vimeo representatives didn’t immediately respond to an email.

The campaign came from a threat actor Mandiant tracks as UNC4990, which has been active since at least 2020 and bears the hallmarks of being motivated by financial gain. The group has already used a separate novel technique to fly under the radar. That technique spread the second stage using a text file that browsers and normal text editors showed to be blank.

Opening the same file in a hex editor—a tool for analyzing and forensically investigating binary files—showed that a combination of tabs, spaces, and new lines were arranged in a way that encoded executable code. Like the technique involving Ars and Vimeo, the use of such a file is something the Mandiant researchers had never seen before. Previously, UNC4990 used GitHub and GitLab.

The initial stage of the malware was transmitted by infected USB drives. The drives installed a payload Mandiant has dubbed explorerps1. Infected devices then automatically reached out to either the malicious text file or else to the URL posted on Ars or the video posted to Vimeo. The base 64 strings in the image URL or video description, in turn, caused the malware to contact a site hosting the second stage. The second stage of the malware, tracked as Emptyspace, continuously polled a command-and-control server that, when instructed, would download and execute a third stage.

Mandiant

Mandiant has observed the installation of this third stage in only one case. This malware acts as a backdoor the researchers track as Quietboard. The backdoor, in that case, went on to install a cryptocurrency miner.

Anyone who is concerned they may have been infected by any of the malware covered by Mandiant can check the indicators of compromise section in Tuesday’s post.

Ars Technica used in malware campaign with never-before-seen obfuscation Read More »

chatgpt-is-leaking-passwords-from-private-conversations-of-its-users,-ars-reader-says

ChatGPT is leaking passwords from private conversations of its users, Ars reader says

OPENAI SPRINGS A LEAK —

Names of unpublished research papers, presentations, and PHP scripts also leaked.

OpenAI logo displayed on a phone screen and ChatGPT website displayed on a laptop screen.

Getty Images

ChatGPT is leaking private conversations that include login credentials and other personal details of unrelated users, screenshots submitted by an Ars reader on Monday indicated.

Two of the seven screenshots the reader submitted stood out in particular. Both contained multiple pairs of usernames and passwords that appeared to be connected to a support system used by employees of a pharmacy prescription drug portal. An employee using the AI chatbot seemed to be troubleshooting problems that encountered while using the portal.

“Horrible, horrible, horrible”

“THIS is so f-ing insane, horrible, horrible, horrible, i cannot believe how poorly this was built in the first place, and the obstruction that is being put in front of me that prevents it from getting better,” the user wrote. “I would fire [redacted name of software] just for this absurdity if it was my choice. This is wrong.”

Besides the candid language and the credentials, the leaked conversation includes the name of the app the employee is troubleshooting and the store number where the problem occurred.

The entire conversation goes well beyond what’s shown in the redacted screenshot above. A link Ars reader Chase Whiteside included showed the chat conversation in its entirety. The URL disclosed additional credential pairs.

The results appeared Monday morning shortly after reader Whiteside had used ChatGPT for an unrelated query.

“I went to make a query (in this case, help coming up with clever names for colors in a palette) and when I returned to access moments later, I noticed the additional conversations,” Whiteside wrote in an email. “They weren’t there when I used ChatGPT just last night (I’m a pretty heavy user). No queries were made—they just appeared in my history, and most certainly aren’t from me (and I don’t think they’re from the same user either).”

Other conversations leaked to Whiteside include the name of a presentation someone was working on, details of an unpublished research proposal, and a script using the PHP programming language. The users for each leaked conversation appeared to be different and unrelated to each other. The conversation involving the prescription portal included the year 2020. Dates didn’t appear in the other conversations.

The episode, and others like it, underscore the wisdom of stripping out personal details from queries made to ChatGPT and other AI services whenever possible. Last March, ChatGPT maker OpenAI took the AI chatbot offline after a bug caused the site to show titles from one active user’s chat history to unrelated users.

In November, researchers published a paper reporting how they used queries to prompt ChatGPT into divulging email addresses, phone and fax numbers, physical addresses, and other private data that was included in material used to train the ChatGPT large language model.

Concerned about the possibility of proprietary or private data leakage, companies, including Apple, have restricted their employees’ use of ChatGPT and similar sites.

As mentioned in an article from December when multiple people found that Ubiquity’s UniFy devices broadcasted private video belonging to unrelated users, these sorts of experiences are as old as the Internet is. As explained in the article:

The precise root causes of this type of system error vary from incident to incident, but they often involve “middlebox” devices, which sit between the front- and back-end devices. To improve performance, middleboxes cache certain data, including the credentials of users who have recently logged in. When mismatches occur, credentials for one account can be mapped to a different account.

An OpenAI representative said the company was investigating the report.

ChatGPT is leaking passwords from private conversations of its users, Ars reader says Read More »

beware-of-scammers-sending-live-couriers-to-liquidate-victims’-life-savings

Beware of scammers sending live couriers to liquidate victims’ life savings

CONFIDENCE GAMES —

The scams sound easy to detect, but they steal billions of dollars, often from the elderly.

Beware of scammers sending live couriers to liquidate victims’ life savings

Getty Images

Scammers are stepping up their game by sending couriers to the homes of elderly people and others as part of a ruse intended to rob them of their life savings, the FBI said in an advisory Monday.

“The FBI is warning the public about scammers instructing victims, many of whom are senior citizens, to liquidate their assets into cash and/or buy gold, silver, or other precious metals to protect their funds,” FBI officials with the agency’s Internet Crime Complaint Center said. “Criminals then arrange for couriers to meet the victims in person to pick up the cash or precious metals.”

The scammers pose as tech or customer support agents or government officials and sometimes use a multi-layered approach as they falsely claim they work on behalf of technology companies, financial institutions, or the US government. The scammers tell the targets they have been hacked or are at risk of being hacked and that their assets should be protected. The scammers then instruct the targets to liquidate assets into cash. In some cases, the scammers instruct targets to wire funds to a fake metal dealer who will ship purchased merchandise to the victims’ homes.

“Criminals then arrange for couriers to meet the victims in person to pick up the cash or precious metals,” Monday’s advisory warned.

Officials said that from May to December of last year, they tracked estimated aggregate losses topping $55 million from this sort of scam. More generally, the agency received 19,000 complaints of scams from January to June of 2023, with estimated victim losses of $542 million. Almost half of the victims were over 60 years old and accounted for 66 percent of the aggregated losses.

The types of scams included in Monday’s warning use tactics intended to coax the victim into developing trust and confidence in the perpetrators. The scammers promise to safeguard the assets in a protected account. In some cases, the scammers set a passcode with the target. If targets hand over money or other assets, they never hear from the scammers again.

Monday’s advisory comes four months after IC3 warned of an increase in complaints for what the agency calls “phantom hacker scams. This form of scam is an evolution of more traditional general tech ruses. They layer imposer tech support workers with workers from financial institutions and government agencies. Victims sometimes lose their entire holdings in bank, savings, retirement, or investment accounts.

Typically, the target receives a call from someone falsely claiming to work in tech or customer support from a known, reputable company and instructs the target to call a number for assistance resolving an imaginary problem. When a target calls, the scammer tricks the person into downloading and installing a program that gives remote access to the target’s device. The scammer then asks the target to open bank accounts or other types of accounts to investigate imaginary fraud. During this step, the scammer checks balances to see if there’s enough profit potential for follow-on activities.

In any follow-on activity, the scammers pose as either representatives of the financial institution or as an employee at the Federal Reserve or another US government agency. The scammers instruct the targets to wire money, in many cases directly to overseas recipients. The scammers may instruct the victim to send multiple transactions over a span of days or months. In the event the target grows suspicious, the scammers may send written correspondence over what appears to be official letterhead.

FBI IC3

The IC3 recommends people follow these practices to prevent falling victim to such scams:

  • The US Government and legitimate businesses will never request you purchase gold or other precious metals.
  • Protect your personal information. Never disclose your home address or agree to meet with unknown individuals to deliver cash or precious metals.
  • Do not click on unsolicited pop-ups on your computer, links sent via text messages, or email links and attachments.
  • Do not contact unknown telephone numbers provided in pop-ups, texts, or emails.
  • Do not download software at the request of unknown individuals who contact you.
  • Do not allow unknown individuals access to your computer.

The FBI requests victims report these types of fraud or suspicious activities to the IC3 as soon as possible. Victims should include as much transaction information as possible:

  • The name of the person or company that contacted you.
  • Methods of communication used, including websites, emails, and telephone numbers.
  • Any bank account number that received any wired funds, along with the recipient name(s).
  • The name and location of any metal dealer companies and the account that received the wired funds.

Beware of scammers sending live couriers to liquidate victims’ life savings Read More »

the-life-and-times-of-cozy-bear,-the-russian-hackers-who-just-hit-microsoft-and-hpe

The life and times of Cozy Bear, the Russian hackers who just hit Microsoft and HPE

FROM RUSSIA WITH ROOT —

Hacks by Kremlin-backed group continue to hit hard.

The life and times of Cozy Bear, the Russian hackers who just hit Microsoft and HPE

Getty Images

Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) said Wednesday that Kremlin-backed actors hacked into the email accounts of its security personnel and other employees last May—and maintained surreptitious access until December. The disclosure was the second revelation of a major corporate network breach by the hacking group in five days.

The hacking group that hit HPE is the same one that Microsoft said Friday broke into its corporate network in November and monitored email accounts of senior executives and security team members until being driven out earlier this month. Microsoft tracks the group as Midnight Blizzard. (Under the company’s recently retired threat actor naming convention, which was based on chemical elements, the group was known as Nobelium.) But it is perhaps better known by the name Cozy Bear—though researchers have also dubbed it APT29, the Dukes, Cloaked Ursa, and Dark Halo.

“On December 12, 2023, Hewlett Packard Enterprise was notified that a suspected nation-state actor, believed to be the threat actor Midnight Blizzard, the state-sponsored actor also known as Cozy Bear, had gained unauthorized access to HPE’s cloud-based email environment,” company lawyers wrote in a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. “The Company, with assistance from external cybersecurity experts, immediately activated our response process to investigate, contain, and remediate the incident, eradicating the activity. Based on our investigation, we now believe that the threat actor accessed and exfiltrated data beginning in May 2023 from a small percentage of HPE mailboxes belonging to individuals in our cybersecurity, go-to-market, business segments, and other functions.”

An HPE representative said in an email that Cozy Bear’s initial entry into the network was through “a compromised, internal HPE Office 365 email account [that] was leveraged to gain access.” The representative declined to elaborate. The representative also declined to say how HPE discovered the breach.

Cozy Bear hacking its way into the email systems of two of the world’s most powerful companies and monitoring top employees’ accounts for months aren’t the only similarities between the two events. Both breaches also involved compromising a single device on each corporate network, then escalating that toehold to the network itself. From there, Cozy Bear camped out undetected for months. The HPE intrusion was all the more impressive because Wednesday’s disclosure said that the hackers also gained access to Sharepoint servers in May. Even after HPE detected and contained that breach a month later, it would take HPE another six months to discover the compromised email accounts.

The pair of disclosures, coming within five days of each other, may create the impression that there has been a recent flurry of hacking activity. But Cozy Bear has actually been one of the most active nation-state groups since at least 2010. In the intervening 14 years, it has waged an almost constant series of attacks, mostly on the networks of governmental organizations and the technology companies that supply them. Multiple intelligence services and private research companies have attributed the hacking group as an arm of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, also known as the SVR.

The life and times of Cozy Bear (so far)

In its earliest years, Cozy Bear operated in relative obscurity—precisely the domain it prefers—as it hacked mostly Western governmental agencies and related organizations such as political think tanks and governmental subcontractors. In 2013, researchers from security firm Kaspersky unearthed MiniDuke, a sophisticated piece of malware that had taken hold of 60 government agencies, think tanks, and other high-profile organizations in 23 countries, including the US, Hungary, Ukraine, Belgium, and Portugal.

MiniDuke was notable for its odd combination of advanced programming and the gratuitous references to literature found embedded into its code. (It contained strings that alluded to Dante Alighieri’s Divine Comedy and to 666, the Mark of the Beast discussed in a verse from the Book of Revelation.) Written in assembly, employing multiple levels of encryption, and relying on hijacked Twitter accounts and automated Google searches to maintain stealthy communications with command-and-control servers, MiniDuke was among the most advanced pieces of malware found at the time.

It wasn’t immediately clear who was behind the mysterious malware—another testament to the stealth of its creators. In 2015, however, researchers linked MiniDuke—and seven other pieces of previously unidentified malware—to Cozy Bear. After a half-decade of lurking, the shadowy group was suddenly brought into the light of day.

Cozy Bear once again came to prominence the following year when researchers discovered the group (along with Fancy Bear, a separate Russian-state hacking group) inside the servers of the Democratic National Committee, looking for intelligence such as opposition research into Donald Trump, the Republican nominee for president at the time. The hacking group resurfaced in the days following Trump’s election victory that year with a major spear-phishing blitz that targeted dozens of organizations in government, military, defense contracting, media, and other industries.

One of Cozy Bear’s crowning achievements came in late 2020 with the discovery of an extensive supply chain attack that targeted customers of SolarWinds, the Austin, Texas, maker of network management tools. After compromising SolarWinds’ software build system, the hacking group pushed infected updates to roughly 18,000 customers. The hackers then used the updates to compromise nine federal agencies and about 100 private companies, White House officials have said.

Cozy Bear has remained active, with multiple campaigns coming to light in 2021, including one that used zero-day vulnerabilities to infect fully updated iPhones. Last year, the group devoted much of its time to hacks of Ukraine.

The life and times of Cozy Bear, the Russian hackers who just hit Microsoft and HPE Read More »

in-major-gaffe,-hacked-microsoft-test-account-was-assigned-admin-privileges

In major gaffe, hacked Microsoft test account was assigned admin privileges

In major gaffe, hacked Microsoft test account was assigned admin privileges

The hackers who recently broke into Microsoft’s network and monitored top executives’ email for two months did so by gaining access to an aging test account with administrative privileges, a major gaffe on the company’s part, a researcher said.

The new detail was provided in vaguely worded language included in a post Microsoft published on Thursday. It expanded on a disclosure Microsoft published late last Friday. Russia-state hackers, Microsoft said, used a technique known as password spraying to exploit a weak credential for logging into a “legacy non-production test tenant account” that wasn’t protected by multifactor authentication. From there, they somehow acquired the ability to access email accounts that belonged to senior executives and employees working in security and legal teams.

A “pretty big config error”

In Thursday’s post updating customers on findings from its ongoing investigation, Microsoft provided more details on how the hackers achieved this monumental escalation of access. The hackers, part of a group Microsoft tracks as Midnight Blizzard, gained persistent access to the privileged email accounts by abusing the OAuth authorization protcol, which is used industry-wide to allow an array of apps to access resources on a network. After compromising the test tenant, Midnight Blizzard used it to create a malicious app and assign it rights to access every email address on Microsoft’s Office 365 email service.

In Thursday’s update, Microsoft officials said as much, although in language that largely obscured the extent of the major blunder. They wrote:

Threat actors like Midnight Blizzard compromise user accounts to create, modify, and grant high permissions to OAuth applications that they can misuse to hide malicious activity. The misuse of OAuth also enables threat actors to maintain access to applications, even if they lose access to the initially compromised account. Midnight Blizzard leveraged their initial access to identify and compromise a legacy test OAuth application that had elevated access to the Microsoft corporate environment. The actor created additional malicious OAuth applications. They created a new user account to grant consent in the Microsoft corporate environment to the actor controlled malicious OAuth applications. The threat actor then used the legacy test OAuth application to grant them the Office 365 Exchange Online full_access_as_app role, which allows access to mailboxes. [Emphasis added.]

Kevin Beaumont—a researcher and security professional with decades of experience, including a stint working for Microsoft—pointed out on Mastodon that the only way for an account to assign the all-powerful full_access_as_app role to an OAuth app is for the account to have administrator privileges. “Somebody,” he said, “made a pretty big config error in production.”

In major gaffe, hacked Microsoft test account was assigned admin privileges Read More »

mass-exploitation-of-ivanti-vpns-is-infecting-networks-around-the-globe

Mass exploitation of Ivanti VPNs is infecting networks around the globe

THIS IS NOT A DRILL —

Orgs that haven’t acted yet should, even if it means suspending VPN services.

Cybercriminals or anonymous hackers use malware on mobile phones to hack personal and business passwords online.

Enlarge / Cybercriminals or anonymous hackers use malware on mobile phones to hack personal and business passwords online.

Getty Images

Hackers suspected of working for the Chinese government are mass exploiting a pair of critical vulnerabilities that give them complete control of virtual private network appliances sold by Ivanti, researchers said.

As of Tuesday morning, security company Censys detected 492 Ivanti VPNs that remained infected out of 26,000 devices exposed to the Internet. More than a quarter of the compromised VPNs—121—resided in the US. The three countries with the next biggest concentrations were Germany, with 26, South Korea, with 24, and China, with 21.

Censys

Microsoft’s customer cloud service hosted the most infected devices with 13, followed by cloud environments from Amazon with 12, and Comcast at 10.

Censys

“We conducted a secondary scan on all Ivanti Connect Secure servers in our dataset and found 412 unique hosts with this backdoor, Censys researchers wrote. “Additionally, we found 22 distinct ‘variants’ (or unique callback methods), which could indicate multiple attackers or a single attacker evolving their tactics.”

In an email, members of the Censys research team said evidence suggests that the people infecting the devices are motivated by espionage objectives. That theory aligns with reports published recently by security firms Volexity and Mandiant. Volexity researchers said they suspect the threat actor, tracked as UTA0178, is a “Chinese nation-state-level threat actor.” Mandiant, which tracks the attack group as UNC5221, said the hackers are pursuing an “espionage-motivated APT campaign.”

All civilian governmental agencies have been mandated to take corrective action to prevent exploitation. Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies had until 11: 59 pm Monday to follow the mandate, which was issued Friday by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. Ivanti has yet to release patches to fix the vulnerabilities. In their absence, Ivanti, CISA, and security companies are urging affected users to follow mitigation and recovery guidance provided by Ivanti that include preventative measures to block exploitation and steps for customers to rebuild and upgrade their systems if they detect exploitation.

“This directive is no surprise, considering the worldwide mass exploitation observed since Ivanti initially revealed the vulnerabilities on January 10,” Censys researchers wrote. “These vulnerabilities are particularly serious given the severity, widespread exposure of these systems, and the complexity of mitigation—especially given the absence of an official patch from the vendor as of the current writing.

When Avanti disclosed the vulnerabilities on January 10, the company said it would release patches on a staggered basis starting this week. The company has not issued a public statement since confirming the patch was still on schedule.

VPNs are an ideal device for hackers to infect because the always-on appliances sit at the very edge of the network, where they accept incoming connections. Because the VPNs must communicate with broad parts of the internal network, hackers who compromise the devices can then expand their presence to other areas. When exploited in unison, the vulnerabilities, tracked as CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887, allow attackers to remotely execute code on servers. All supported versions of the Ivanti Connect Secure—often abbreviated as ICS and formerly known as Pulse Secure—are affected.

The ongoing attacks use the exploits to install a host of malware that acts as a backdoor. The hackers then use the malware to harvest as many credentials as possible belonging to various employees and devices on the infected network and to rifle around the network. Despite the use of this malware, the attackers largely employ an approach known as “living off the land,” which uses legitimate software and tools so they’re harder to detect.

The posts linked above from Volexity and Mandiant provide extensive descriptions of how the malware behaves and methods for detecting infections.

Given the severity of the vulnerabilities and the consequences that follow when they’re exploited, all users of affected products should prioritize mitigation of these vulnerabilities, even if that means temporarily suspending VPN usage.

Mass exploitation of Ivanti VPNs is infecting networks around the globe Read More »

hp-ceo-evokes-james-bond-style-hack-via-ink-cartridges

HP CEO evokes James Bond-style hack via ink cartridges

Office printer with

Last Thursday, HP CEO Enrique Lores addressed the company’s controversial practice of bricking printers when users load them with third-party ink. Speaking to CNBC Television, he said, “We have seen that you can embed viruses in the cartridges. Through the cartridge, [the virus can] go to the printer, [and then] from the printer, go to the network.”

That frightening scenario could help explain why HP, which was hit this month with another lawsuit over its Dynamic Security system, insists on deploying it to printers.

Dynamic Security stops HP printers from functioning if an ink cartridge without an HP chip or HP electronic circuitry is installed. HP has issued firmware updates that block printers with such ink cartridges from printing, leading to the above lawsuit (PDF), which is seeking class-action certification. The suit alleges that HP printer customers were not made aware that printer firmware updates issued in late 2022 and early 2023 could result in printer features not working. The lawsuit seeks monetary damages and an injunction preventing HP from issuing printer updates that block ink cartridges without an HP chip.

But are hacked ink cartridges something we should actually be concerned about?

To investigate, I turned to Ars Technica Senior Security Editor Dan Goodin. He told me that he didn’t know of any attacks actively used in the wild that are capable of using a cartridge to infect a printer.

Goodin also put the question to Mastodon, and cybersecurity professionals, many with expertise in embedded-device hacking, were decidedly skeptical.

Another commenter, going by Graham Sutherland / Polynomial on Mastodon, referred to serial presence detect (SPD) electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), a form of flash memory used extensively in ink cartridges, saying:

I’ve seen and done some truly wacky hardware stuff in my life, including hiding data in SPD EEPROMs on memory DIMMs (and replacing them with microcontrollers for similar shenanigans), so believe me when I say that his claim is wildly implausible even in a lab setting, let alone in the wild, and let alone at any scale that impacts businesses or individuals rather than selected political actors.

HP’s evidence

Unsurprisingly, Lores’ claim comes from HP-backed research. The company’s bug bounty program tasked researchers from Bugcrowd with determining if it’s possible to use an ink cartridge as a cyberthreat. HP argued that ink cartridge microcontroller chips, which are used to communicate with the printer, could be an entryway for attacks.

As detailed in a 2022 article from research firm Actionable Intelligence, a researcher in the program found a way to hack a printer via a third-party ink cartridge. The researcher was reportedly unable to perform the same hack with an HP cartridge.

Shivaun Albright, HP’s chief technologist of print security, said at the time:

A researcher found a vulnerability over the serial interface between the cartridge and the printer. Essentially, they found a buffer overflow. That’s where you have got an interface that you may not have tested or validated well enough, and the hacker was able to overflow into memory beyond the bounds of that particular buffer. And that gives them the ability to inject code into the device.

Albright added that the malware “remained on the printer in memory” after the cartridge was removed.

HP acknowledges that there’s no evidence of such a hack occurring in the wild. Still, because chips used in third-party ink cartridges are reprogrammable (their “code can be modified via a resetting tool right in the field,” according to Actionable Intelligence), they’re less secure, the company says. The chips are said to be programmable so that they can still work in printers after firmware updates.

HP also questions the security of third-party ink companies’ supply chains, especially compared to its own supply chain security, which is ISO/IEC-certified.

So HP did find a theoretical way for cartridges to be hacked, and it’s reasonable for the company to issue a bug bounty to identify such a risk. But its solution for this threat was announced before it showed there could be a threat. HP added ink cartridge security training to its bug bounty program in 2020, and the above research was released in 2022. HP started using Dynamic Security in 2016, ostensibly to solve the problem that it sought to prove exists years later.

Further, there’s a sense from cybersecurity professionals that Ars spoke with that even if such a threat exists, it would take a high level of resources and skills, which are usually reserved for targeting high-profile victims. Realistically, the vast majority of individual consumers and businesses shouldn’t have serious concerns about ink cartridges being used to hack their machines.

HP CEO evokes James Bond-style hack via ink cartridges Read More »

microsoft-network-breached-through-password-spraying-by-russian-state-hackers

Microsoft network breached through password-spraying by Russian-state hackers

Microsoft network breached through password-spraying by Russian-state hackers

Getty Images

Russia-state hackers exploited a weak password to compromise Microsoft’s corporate network and accessed emails and documents that belonged to senior executives and employees working in security and legal teams, Microsoft said late Friday.

The attack, which Microsoft attributed to a Kremlin-backed hacking group it tracks as Midnight Blizzard, is at least the second time in as many years that failures to follow basic security hygiene has resulted in a breach that has the potential to harm customers. One paragraph in Friday’s disclosure, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, was gobsmacking:

Beginning in late November 2023, the threat actor used a password spray attack to compromise a legacy non-production test tenant account and gain a foothold, and then used the account’s permissions to access a very small percentage of Microsoft corporate email accounts, including members of our senior leadership team and employees in our cybersecurity, legal, and other functions, and exfiltrated some emails and attached documents. The investigation indicates they were initially targeting email accounts for information related to Midnight Blizzard itself. We are in the process of notifying employees whose email was accessed.

Microsoft didn’t detect the breach until January 12, exactly a week before Friday’s disclosure. Microsoft’s account raises the prospect that the Russian hackers had uninterrupted access to the accounts for as long as two months.

A translation of the 93 words quoted above: A device inside Microsoft’s network was protected by a weak password with no form of two-factor authentication employed. The Russian adversary group was able to guess it by peppering it with previously compromised or commonly used passwords until they finally landed on the right one. The threat actor then accessed the account, indicating that either 2FA wasn’t employed or the protection was somehow bypassed.

Furthermore, this “legacy non-production test tenant account” was somehow configured so that Midnight Blizzard could pivot and gain access to some of the company’s most senior and sensitive employee accounts.

As Steve Bellovin, a computer science professor and affiliate law prof at Columbia University with decades of experience in cybersecurity, wrote on Mastodon:

A lot of fascinating implications here. A successful password spray attack suggests no 2FA and either reused or weak passwords. Access to email accounts belonging to “senior leadership… cybersecurity, and legal” teams using just the permissions of a “test tenant account” suggests that someone gave that test account amazing privileges. Why? Why wasn’t it removed when the test was over? I also note that it took Microsoft about seven weeks to detect the attack.

While Microsoft said that it wasn’t aware of any evidence that Midnight Blizzard gained access to customer environments, production systems, source code, or AI systems, some researchers voiced doubts, particularly about whether the Microsoft 365 service might be or have been susceptible to similar attack techniques. One of the researchers was Kevin Beaumont, who has had a long cybersecurity career that has included a stint working for Microsoft. On LinkedIn, he wrote:

Microsoft staff use Microsoft 365 for email. SEC filings and blogs with no details on Friday night are great.. but they’re going to have to be followed with actual detail. The age of Microsoft doing tents, incident code words, CELA’ing things and pretending MSTIC sees everything (threat actors have Macs too) are over — they need to do radical technical and cultural transformation to retain trust.

CELA is short for Corporate, External, and Legal Affairs, a group inside Microsoft that helps draft disclosures. MSTIC stands for the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center.

Microsoft network breached through password-spraying by Russian-state hackers Read More »

just-10-lines-of-code-can-steal-ai-secrets-from-apple,-amd,-and-qualcomm-gpus

Just 10 lines of code can steal AI secrets from Apple, AMD, and Qualcomm GPUs

massive leakage —

Patching all affected devices, which include some Macs and iPhones, may be tough.

ai brain

MEHAU KULYK/Getty Images

As more companies ramp up development of artificial intelligence systems, they are increasingly turning to graphics processing unit (GPU) chips for the computing power they need to run large language models (LLMs) and to crunch data quickly at massive scale. Between video game processing and AI, demand for GPUs has never been higher, and chipmakers are rushing to bolster supply. In new findings released today, though, researchers are highlighting a vulnerability in multiple brands and models of mainstream GPUs—including Apple, Qualcomm, and AMD chips—that could allow an attacker to steal large quantities of data from a GPU’s memory.

The silicon industry has spent years refining the security of central processing units, or CPUs, so they don’t leak data in memory even when they are built to optimize for speed. However, since GPUs were designed for raw graphics processing power, they haven’t been architected to the same degree with data privacy as a priority. As generative AI and other machine learning applications expand the uses of these chips, though, researchers from New York-based security firm Trail of Bits say that vulnerabilities in GPUs are an increasingly urgent concern.

“There is a broader security concern about these GPUs not being as secure as they should be and leaking a significant amount of data,” Heidy Khlaaf, Trail of Bits’ engineering director for AI and machine learning assurance, tells WIRED. “We’re looking at anywhere from 5 megabytes to 180 megabytes. In the CPU world, even a bit is too much to reveal.”

To exploit the vulnerability, which the researchers call LeftoverLocals, attackers would need to already have established some amount of operating system access on a target’s device. Modern computers and servers are specifically designed to silo data so multiple users can share the same processing resources without being able to access each others’ data. But a LeftoverLocals attack breaks down these walls. Exploiting the vulnerability would allow a hacker to exfiltrate data they shouldn’t be able to access from the local memory of vulnerable GPUs, exposing whatever data happens to be there for the taking, which could include queries and responses generated by LLMs as well as the weights driving the response.

In their proof of concept, as seen in the GIF below, the researchers demonstrate an attack where a target—shown on the left—asks the open source LLM Llama.cpp to provide details about WIRED magazine. Within seconds, the attacker’s device—shown on the right—collects the majority of the response provided by the LLM by carrying out a LeftoverLocals attack on vulnerable GPU memory. The attack program the researchers created uses less than 10 lines of code.

An attacker (right) exploits the LeftoverLocals vulnerability to listen to LLM conversations.

Last summer, the researchers tested 11 chips from seven GPU makers and multiple corresponding programming frameworks. They found the LeftoverLocals vulnerability in GPUs from Apple, AMD, and Qualcomm and launched a far-reaching coordinated disclosure of the vulnerability in September in collaboration with the US-CERT Coordination Center and the Khronos Group, a standards body focused on 3D graphics, machine learning, and virtual and augmented reality.

The researchers did not find evidence that Nvidia, Intel, or Arm GPUs contain the LeftoverLocals vulnerability, but Apple, Qualcomm, and AMD all confirmed to WIRED that they are impacted. This means that well-known chips like the AMD Radeon RX 7900 XT and devices like Apple’s iPhone 12 Pro and M2 MacBook Air are vulnerable. The researchers did not find the flaw in the Imagination GPUs they tested, but others may be vulnerable.

Just 10 lines of code can steal AI secrets from Apple, AMD, and Qualcomm GPUs Read More »

apple-airdrop-leaks-user-data-like-a-sieve-chinese-authorities-say-they’re-scooping-it-up.

Apple AirDrop leaks user data like a sieve. Chinese authorities say they’re scooping it up.

Apple AirDrop leaks user data like a sieve. Chinese authorities say they’re scooping it up.

Aurich Lawson | Getty Images

Chinese authorities recently said they’re using an advanced encryption attack to de-anonymize users of AirDrop in an effort to crack down on citizens who use the Apple file-sharing feature to mass-distribute content that’s outlawed in that country.

According to a 2022 report from The New York Times, activists have used AirDrop to distribute scathing critiques of the Communist Party of China to nearby iPhone users in subway trains and stations and other public venues. A document one protester sent in October of that year called General Secretary Xi Jinping a “despotic traitor.” A few months later, with the release of iOS 16.1.1, the AirDrop users in China found that the “everyone” configuration, the setting that makes files available to all other users nearby, automatically reset to the more contacts-only setting. Apple has yet to acknowledge the move. Critics continue to see it as a concession Apple CEO Tim Cook made to Chinese authorities.

The rainbow connection

On Monday, eight months after the half-measure was put in place, officials with the local government in Beijing said some people have continued mass-sending illegal content. As a result, the officials said, they were now using an advanced technique publicly disclosed in 2021 to fight back.

“Some people reported that their iPhones received a video with inappropriate remarks in the Beijing subway,” the officials wrote, according to translations. “After preliminary investigation, the police found that the suspect used the AirDrop function of the iPhone to anonymously spread the inappropriate information in public places. Due to the anonymity and difficulty of tracking AirDrop, some netizens have begun to imitate this behavior.”

In response, the authorities said they’ve implemented the technical measures to identify the people mass-distributing the content.

  • Screenshot showing log files containing the hashes to be extracted

  • Screenshot showing a dedicated tool converting extracted AirDrop hashes.

The scant details and the quality of Internet-based translations don’t explicitly describe the technique. All the translations, however, have said it involves the use of what are known as rainbow tables to defeat the technical measures AirDrop uses to obfuscate users’ phone numbers and email addresses.

Rainbow tables were first proposed in 1980 as a means for vastly reducing what at the time was the astronomical amount of computing resources required to crack at-scale hashes, the one-way cryptographic representations used to conceal passwords and other types of sensitive data. Additional refinements made in 2003 made rainbow tables more useful still.

When AirDrop is configured to distribute files only between people who know each other, Apple says, it relies heavily on hashes to conceal the real-world identities of each party until the service determines there’s a match. Specifically, AirDrop broadcasts Bluetooth advertisements that contain a partial cryptographic hash of the sender’s phone number and/or email address.

If any of the truncated hashes match any phone number or email address in the address book of the other device, or if the devices are set to send or receive from everyone, the two devices will engage in a mutual authentication handshake. When the hashes match, the devices exchange the full SHA-256 hashes of the owners’ phone numbers and email addresses. This technique falls under an umbrella term known as private set intersection, often abbreviated as PSI.

In 2021, researchers at Germany’s Technical University of Darmstadt reported that they had devised practical ways to crack what Apple calls the identity hashes used to conceal identities while AirDrop determines if a nearby person is in the contacts of another. One of the researchers’ attack methods relies on rainbow tables.

Apple AirDrop leaks user data like a sieve. Chinese authorities say they’re scooping it up. Read More »