Security

the-who,-what,-and-why-of-the-attack-that-has-shut-down-stryker’s-windows-network

The who, what, and why of the attack that has shut down Stryker’s Windows network

What else is known about Handala Hack?

The group has existed since at least 2023. It takes its name from a character in the political cartoons of Palestinian artist Naji al-Ali. The group’s logo depicts a small Palestinian boy who is a symbol associated with Palestinian resistance.

Check Point and other security firms have said Handala Hack is affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security and maintains multiple online personas. Compared to other nation-state-sponsored hacking groups, Handala Hack has kept a comparatively lower profile. Still, it has carried out a series of destructive wiping attacks and influence operations over the years.

Around the same time the Stryker attack came to light, posts to a Telegram account and website controlled by Handala Hack took credit for the takedown. Handala posts cited last week’s killing of 165 civilians at a girls’ school in Iran by an American Tomahawk missile and past hacking operations that the US and Israel have perpetuated on Iran.

What is the point of striking a corporation in retaliation for airstrikes carried out by the US and Israel?

Such actions are taken for their psychological effects, which are often disproportionately larger than the resources required to bring them about. With limited means for Iran to strike back militarily, the Stryker disruption allows an alternative means for the country and its allies to retaliate. The success is intended to demonstrate that pro-Iranian forces can still exact a price that has a material effect on large populations in the US, Israel, and countries allied with them.

As a major supplier of lifesaving medical devices relied on throughout the US and its allies, Stryker plays a strategic and symbolic role in their security, researchers at Flash Point said Thursday. “By operating behind a persona styled as a grassroots, pro-Palestinian resistance movement, Iranian state-nexus actors are able to conduct destructive cyber operations against Western organizations while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability.”

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14,000 routers are infected by malware that’s highly resistant to takedowns

Researchers say they have uncovered a takedown-resistant botnet of 14,000 routers and other network devices—primarily made by Asus—that have been conscripted into a proxy network that anonymously carries traffic used for cybercrime.

The malware—dubbed KadNap—takes hold by exploiting vulnerabilities that have gone unpatched by their owners, Chris Formosa, a researcher at security firm Lumen’s Black Lotus Labs, told Ars. The high concentration of Asus routers is likely due to botnet operators acquiring a reliable exploit for vulnerabilities affecting those models. He said it’s unlikely that the attackers are using any zero-days in the operation.

A botnet that stands out among others

The number of infected routers averages about 14,000 per day, up from 10,000 last August, when Black Lotus discovered the botnet. Compromised devices are overwhelmingly located in the US, with smaller populations in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Russia. One of the most salient features of KadNap is a sophisticated peer-to-peer design based on Kademlia, a network structure that uses distributed hash tables to conceal the IP addresses of command-and-control servers. The design makes the botnet resistant to detection and takedowns through traditional methods.

“The KadNap botnet stands out among others that support anonymous proxies in its use of a peer-to-peer network for decentralized control,” Formosa and fellow Black Lotus researcher Steve Rudd wrote Wednesday. “Their intention is clear: avoid detection and make it difficult for defenders to protect against.”

Distributed hash tables have long been used to create hardened peer-to-peer networks, most notably BitTorrent and the Inter-Planetary File System. Rather than having one or more centralized servers that directly control nodes and provide them with the IP addresses of other nodes, DHTs allow any node to poll other nodes for the device or server it’s looking for. The decentralized structure and the substitution of IP addresses with hashes give the network resilience against takedowns or denial of service attacks.

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From Iran to Ukraine, everyone’s trying to hack security cameras


Research shows apparent Iranian state hackers trying to hijack consumer-grade cameras.

Cameras are placed in public areas in Tehran. Credit: Anadolu/Getty Images

For decades, satellites, drones, and human spotters have all been part of war’s surveillance and reconnaissance tool kit. In an age of cheap, insecure, Internet-connected consumer devices, however, militaries have gained another powerful set of eyes on the ground: every hackable security camera installed outside a home or on a city street, pointed at potential bombing targets.

On Wednesday, Tel Aviv–based security firm Check Point released new research describing hundreds of hacking attempts that targeted consumer-grade security cameras around the Middle East—with many apparently timed to Iran’s recent missile and drone strikes on targets that included Israel, Qatar, and Cyprus. Those camera-hijacking efforts, some of which Check Point has attributed to a hacker group that’s been previously linked to Iranian intelligence, suggest that Iran’s military has tried to use civilian surveillance cameras as a means to spot targets, plan strikes, or assess damage from its attacks as it retaliates for the US and Israeli bombings that have sparked a widening war in the region.

Iran wouldn’t be the first to adopt that camera-hacking surveillance tactic. Earlier this week, the Financial Times reported that the Israeli military had accessed “nearly all” the traffic cameras in Iran’s capital of Tehran and, in partnership with the CIA, used them to target the air strike that killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader. In Ukraine, the country’s officials have warned for years that Russia has hacked consumer surveillance cameras to target strikes and spy on troop movements—while Ukrainian hackers have hijacked Russian cameras to surveil Russian troops and perhaps even to monitor its own attacks.

Exploiting the insecurity of networked civilian cameras is, in other words, becoming part of the standard operating procedures of armed forces around the world: A relatively cheap and accessible means of getting eyes on a target hundreds of thousands of miles away. “Now hacking cameras has become part of the playbook of military activity,” says Sergey Shykevich, who leads threat intelligence research at Check Point. “You get direct visibility without using any expensive military means such as satellites, often with better resolution.”

“For any attacker who is planning military activity, it’s now a straightforward act to try it,” Shykevich adds, “because it’s easy and provides very good value for your effort.”

In the latest example of that recon technique, Check Point found that hackers had attempted to exploit five distinct vulnerabilities in Hikvision and Dahua security cameras that would have allowed their takeover. Shykevich describes dozens of attempts—which Check Point says it blocked—across Bahrain, Cyprus, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as hundreds more in Israel itself. Check Point notes it could view attempted intrusions only on networks equipped with its firewall network appliances and that its findings are likely skewed by the company’s relatively larger customer base in Israel.

None of the five vulnerabilities are “complicated or sophisticated,” Shykevich says. All of them have been patched in previous software updates from Hikvision and Dahua and were discovered years ago—one as early as 2017. Yet as with hackable bugs in so many Internet-of-things devices, they persist in security cameras because owners rarely install updates or even become aware that they’re available. (Hikvision and Dahua are both effectively banned in the United States due to security concerns; neither company responded to WIRED’s request for comment on the hacking campaign.)

Check Point found that the camera-hacking attempts were largely timed to February 28 and March 1, just as the US and Israel were beginning their air strikes across Iran. Some of the attempted camera takeovers also occurred in mid-January, as protests spread across Iran and the US and Israel made preparations for their attacks. Check Point says it has tied the targeting of the cameras to three distinct groups it believes to be Iranian in origin, based on the servers and VPNs they used to carry out the campaign. Some of those servers, Shykevich notes, have been previously linked in particular to the Iranian hacker group known as Handala, which several cybersecurity companies have identified as working on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

In fact, Check Point says it tracked similar Iranian targeting of cameras as early as last June during Israel’s previous 12-day war with Iran. The head of Israel’s National Cybersecurity Directorate, Yossi Karadi, also warned at the time that Iranian hackers were using civilian camera systems to target Israelis and had compromised a street camera across from the country’s Weizmann Institute of Science before hitting it with a missile.

The joint US and Israeli strikes on Iran and the assassination of Khamenei have revealed, however, just how thoroughly Israel’s own hackers—or those of its allies, including potentially the US—had penetrated Tehran’s camera systems, too. Israeli intelligence sources speaking to the Financial Times described assembling the patterns of life of Iranian security guards around Khamenei based on the real-time data that traffic cameras provided across the city. “We knew Tehran like we know Jerusalem,” one source told the FT.

Prior to the current escalating war in the Middle East, the powerful surveillance role of hacked civilian cameras first became apparent in the midst of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials warned in January 2024, for instance, that Russian forces had hacked two security cameras in the capital of Kyiv to observe Ukrainian infrastructure targets and air defenses. “The aggressor used these cameras to collect data to prepare and adjust strikes on Kyiv,” reads a post from Ukraine’s SSU intelligence service.

The SSU went so far, it writes, as to somehow disable 10,000 Internet-connected cameras—it didn’t reveal how—that could be used by Russia’s military. “The SSU is calling on the owners of street webcams to stop online broadcasts from their devices, and on citizens to report any streams from such cameras,” the post reads.

Even as Ukraine has attempted to block that spying technique, it seems also to have adopted it. When the Ukrainian military used its own underwater drone to blow up a Russian submarine in the bay of Sevastopol in Crimea, it published video that defense-focused news outlet The Military Times noted looked very much like it had come from a hacked surveillance camera. A BBC report about Ukrainian hacktivist group One Fist notes more explicitly that they were commended by the Ukrainian government for work that included hacking cameras to watch Russia’s movement of matériel across the Kerch Bridge between Russia and Crimea.

“The advantages of co-opting a civilian camera network are presence and expense,” says Peter W. Singer, a military-focused researcher at the New America Foundation and the author of the 2015 science fiction novel Ghost Fleet, which imagines future war scenarios. “The adversary’s already done the work for you. They’ve placed cameras all around a city.”

Singer notes that hacking those cameras is vastly cheaper and easier than relying on satellites or high-altitude drones. The trick is stealthier than drones, too, which are only viable when the enemy has few air defenses, and drones can often be detected by countersurveillance measures. Ground-level, hacked cameras also offer angles and perspectives that aren’t possible with the bird’s-eye view of a satellite or drone, he adds. All of that makes them powerful tools for reconnaissance, targeting, and what he calls “bomb damage assessment” after a strike.

Hacked cameras are a tough problem to solve, in part, because those who have the ability to secure them rarely suffer the consequences of that surveillance, says Beau Woods, a security researcher who formerly worked as an adviser to the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. “The manufacturer of the device and the owner of the device are not the victim,” Woods says. “So the victim isn’t in a position to control the tool that’s used by the adversary.”

The difficulty of pinning down responsibility for Internet-connected consumer cameras means that their role in military surveillance is likely to persist for many years—and wars—to come.

“Who’s liable, who’s responsible, who’s accountable?” Woods asks. “The camera itself is not directly causing the harm. But it’s part of the kill chain.”

This story originally appeared on wired.com.

Photo of WIRED

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Feds take notice of iOS vulnerabilities exploited under mysterious circumstances

Coruna is also notable for its use by three distinct hacking groups. Google first detected its use in February of last year in an operation conducted by a “customer of a surveillance vendor.” The vulnerability exploited, tracked as CVE-2025-23222, had been patched 13 months earlier. In July 2025, a “suspected Russian espionage group” exploited CVE-2023-43000 in attacks planted on websites that were frequented by Ukrainian targets. Last December, when it was used by a “financially motivated threat actor from China,” Google was able to retrieve the complete exploit kit.

“How this proliferation occurred is unclear, but suggests an active market for ‘second hand’ zero-day exploits,” Google wrote. “Beyond these identified exploits, multiple threat actors have now acquired advanced exploitation techniques that can be re-used and modified with newly identified vulnerabilities.”

Google researchers went on to write:

We retrieved all the obfuscated exploits, including ending payloads. Upon further analysis, we noticed an instance where the actor deployed the debug version of the exploit kit, leaving in the clear all of the exploits, including their internal code names. That’s when we learned that the exploit kit was likely named Coruna internally. In total, we collected a few hundred samples covering a total of five full iOS exploit chains. The exploit kit is able to target various iPhone models running iOS version 13.0 (released in September 2019) up to version 17.2.1 (released in December 2023).

The 23 exploits, along with the code names and other information, are:

Type Codename Targeted versions (inclusive) Fixed versions CVE
WebContent R/W buffout 13 → 15.1.1 15.2 CVE-2021-30952
WebContent R/W jacurutu 15.2 → 15.5 15.6 CVE-2022-48503
WebContent R/W bluebird 15.6 → 16.1.2 16.2 No CVE
WebContent R/W terrorbird 16.2 → 16.5.1 16.6 CVE-2023-43000
WebContent R/W cassowary 16.6 → 17.2.1 16.7.5, 17.3 CVE-2024-23222
WebContent PAC bypass breezy 13 → 14.x ? No CVE
WebContent PAC bypass breezy15 15 → 16.2 ? No CVE
WebContent PAC bypass seedbell 16.3 → 16.5.1 ? No CVE
WebContent PAC bypass seedbell_16_6 16.6 → 16.7.12 ? No CVE
WebContent PAC bypass seedbell_17 17 → 17.2.1 ? No CVE
WebContent sandbox escape IronLoader 16.0 → 16.3.116.4.0 (<= A12) 15.7.8, 16.5 CVE-2023-32409
WebContent sandbox escape NeuronLoader 16.4.0 → 16.6.1 (A13-A16) 17.0 No CVE
PE Neutron 13.X 14.2 CVE-2020-27932
PE (infoleak) Dynamo 13.X 14.2 CVE-2020-27950
PE Pendulum 14 → 14.4.x 14.7 No CVE
PE Photon 14.5 → 15.7.6 15.7.7, 16.5.1 CVE-2023-32434
PE Parallax 16.4 → 16.7 17.0 CVE-2023-41974
PE Gruber 15.2 → 17.2.1 16.7.6, 17.3 No CVE
PPL Bypass Quark 13.X 14.5 No CVE
PPL Bypass Gallium 14.x 15.7.8, 16.6 CVE-2023-38606
PPL Bypass Carbone 15.0 → 16.7.6 17.0 No CVE
PPL Bypass Sparrow 17.0 → 17.3 16.7.6, 17.4 CVE-2024-23225
PPL Bypass Rocket 17.1 → 17.4 16.7.8, 17.5 CVE-2024-23296

CISA is adding only three of the CVEs to its catalog. They are:

  • CVE-2021-30952 Apple Multiple Products Integer Overflow or Wraparound Vulnerability
  • CVE-2023-41974 Apple iOS and iPadOS Use-After-Free Vulnerability
  • CVE-2023-43000 Apple Multiple products Use-After-Free Vulnerability

CISA is directing agencies to “apply mitigations per vendor instructions, follow applicable… guidance for cloud services, or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable.” The agency went on to warn: “These types of vulnerabilities are frequent attack vectors for malicious cyber actors and pose significant risks to the federal enterprise.”

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google-quantum-proofs-https-by-squeezing-15kb-of-data-into-700-byte-space

Google quantum-proofs HTTPS by squeezing 15kB of data into 700-byte space

Google and other browser makers require that all TLS certificates be published in public transparency logs, which are append-only distributed ledgers. Website owners can then check the logs in real time to ensure that no rogue certificates have been issued for the domains they use. The transparency programs were implemented in response to the 2011 hack of Netherlands-based DigiNotar, which allowed the minting of 500 counterfeit certificates for Google and other websites, some of which were used to spy on web users in Iran.

Once viable, Shor’s algorithm could be used to forge classical encryption signatures and break classical encryption public keys of the certificate logs. Ultimately, an attacker could forge signed certificate timestamps used to prove to a browser or operating system that a certificate has been registered when it hasn’t.

To rule out this possibility, Google is adding cryptographic material from quantum-resistant algorithms such as ML-DSA. This addition would allow forgeries only if an attacker were to break both classical and post-quantum encryption. The new regime is part of what Google is calling the quantum-resistant root store, which will complement the Chrome Root Store the company formed in 2022.

The MTCs use Merkle Trees to provide quantum-resistant assurances that a certificate has been published without having to add most of the lengthy keys and hashes. Using other techniques to reduce the data sizes, the MTCs will be roughly the same 4kB length they are now, Westerbaan said.

The new system has already been implemented in Chrome. For the time being, Cloudflare is enrolling roughly 1,000 TLS certificates to test how well the MTCs work. For now, Cloudflare is generating the distributed ledger. The plan is for CAs to eventually fill that role. The Internet Engineering Task Force standards body has recently formed a working group called the PKI, Logs, And Tree Signatures, which is coordinating with other key players to develop a long-term solution.

“We view the adoption of MTCs and a quantum-resistant root store as a critical opportunity to ensure the robustness of the foundation of today’s ecosystem,” Google’s Friday blog post said. “By designing for the specific demands of a modern, agile internet, we can accelerate the adoption of post-quantum resilience for all web users.”

Post updated to correct reported sizes of various items.

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new-airsnitch-attack-breaks-wi-fi-encryption-in-homes,-offices,-and-enterprises

New AirSnitch attack breaks Wi-Fi encryption in homes, offices, and enterprises


CLOWNS TO THE LEFT, JOKERS TO THE RIGHT

That guest network you set up for your neighbors may not be as secure as you think.

Illustration of a symbol representing radio waves for Wi-Fi networks

Credit: Getty Image | BlackJack3D

Credit: Getty Image | BlackJack3D

It’s hard to overstate the role that Wi-Fi plays in virtually every facet of life. The organization that shepherds the wireless protocol says that more than 48 billion Wi-Fi-enabled devices have shipped since it debuted in the late 1990s. One estimate pegs the number of individual users at 6 billion, roughly 70 percent of the world’s population.

Despite the dependence and the immeasurable amount of sensitive data flowing through Wi-Fi transmissions, the history of the protocol has been littered with security landmines stemming both from the inherited confidentiality weaknesses of its networking predecessor, Ethernet (it was once possible for anyone on a network to read and modify the traffic sent to anyone else), and the ability for anyone nearby to receive the radio signals Wi-Fi relies on.

Ghost in the machine

In the early days, public Wi-Fi networks often resembled the Wild West, where ARP spoofing attacks that allowed renegade users to read other users’ traffic were common. The solution was to build cryptographic protections that prevented nearby parties—whether an authorized user on the network or someone near the AP (access point)—from reading or tampering with the traffic of any other user.

New research shows that behaviors that occur at the very lowest levels of the network stack make encryption—in any form, not just those that have been broken in the past—incapable of providing client isolation, an encryption-enabled protection promised by all router makers, that is intended to block direct communication between two or more connected clients.

The isolation can effectively be nullified through AirSnitch, the name the researchers gave to a series of attacks that capitalize on the newly discovered weaknesses. Various forms of AirSnitch work across a broad range of routers, including those from Netgear, D-Link, Ubiquiti, Cisco, and those running DD-WRT and OpenWrt.

AirSnitch “breaks worldwide Wi-Fi encryption, and it might have the potential to enable advanced cyberattacks,” Xin’an Zhou, the lead author of the research paper, said in an interview. “Advanced attacks can build on our primitives to [perform] cookie stealing, DNS and cache poisoning. Our research physically wiretaps the wire altogether so these sophisticated attacks will work. It’s really a threat to worldwide network security.” Zhou presented his research on Wednesday at the 2026 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium.

Paper co-author Mathy Vanhoef, said a few hours after this post went live that the attack may be better described as a Wi-Fi encryption “bypass,” “in the sense that we can bypass client isolation. We don’t break Wi-Fi authentication or encryption. Crypto is often bypassed instead of broken. And we bypass it ;)” People who don’t rely on client or network isolation, he added, are safe.

Previous Wi-Fi attacks that overnight broke existing protections such as WEP and WPA worked by exploiting vulnerabilities in the underlying encryption they used. AirSnitch, by contrast, targets a previously overlooked attack surface—the lowest levels of the networking stack, a hierarchy of architecture and protocols based on their functions and behaviors.

The lowest level, Layer-1, encompasses physical devices such as cabling, connected nodes, and all the things that allow them to communicate. The highest level, Layer-7, is where applications such as browsers, email clients, and other Internet software run. Levels 2 through 6 are known as the Data Link, Network, Transport, Session, and Presentation layers, respectively.

Identity crisis

Unlike previous Wi-Fi attacks, AirSnitch exploits core features in Layers 1 and 2 and the failure to bind and synchronize a client across these and higher layers, other nodes, and other network names such as SSIDs (Service Set Identifiers). This cross-layer identity desynchronization is the key driver of AirSnitch attacks.

The most powerful such attack is a full, bidirectional machine-in-the-middle (MitM) attack, meaning the attacker can view and modify data before it makes its way to the intended recipient. The attacker can be on the same SSID, a separate one, or even a separate network segment tied to the same AP. It works against small Wi-Fi networks in both homes and offices and large networks in enterprises.

With the ability to intercept all link-layer traffic (that is, the traffic as it passes between Layers 1 and 2), an attacker can perform other attacks on higher layers. The most dire consequence occurs when an Internet connection isn’t encrypted—something that Google recently estimated occurred when as much as 6 percent and 20 percent of pages loaded on Windows and Linux, respectively. In these cases, the attacker can view and modify all traffic in the clear and steal authentication cookies, passwords, payment card details, and any other sensitive data. Since many company intranets are sent in plaintext, traffic from them can also be intercepted.

Even when HTTPS is in place, an attacker can still intercept domain look-up traffic and use DNS cache poisoning to corrupt tables stored by the target’s operating system. The AirSnitch MitM also puts the attacker in the position to wage attacks against vulnerabilities that may not be patched. Attackers can also see the external IP addresses hosting webpages being visited and often correlate them with the precise URL.

Given the range of possibilities it affords, AirSnitch gives attackers capabilities that haven’t been possible with other Wi-Fi attacks, including KRACK from 2017 and 2019 and more recent Wi-Fi attacks that, like AirSnitch, inject data (known as frames) into remote GRE tunnels and bypass network access control lists.

“This work is impressive because unlike other frame injection methods, the attacker controls a bidirectional flow,” said HD Moore, a security expert and the founder and CEO of runZero.

He continued:

This research shows that a wireless-connected attacker can subvert client isolation and implement full relay attacks against other clients, similar to old-school ARP spoofing. In a lot of ways, this restores the attack surface that was present before client isolation became common. For folks who lived through the chaos of early wireless guest networking rollouts (planes, hotels, coffee shops) this stuff should be familiar, but client isolation has become so common, these kinds of attacks may have fallen off people’s radar.

Stuck in the middle with you

The MitM targets Layers 1 and 2 and the interaction between them. It starts with port stealing, one of the earliest attack classes of Ethernet that’s adapted to work against Wi-Fi. An attacker carries it out by modifying the Layer-1 mapping that associates a network port with a victim’s MAC—a unique address that identifies each connected device. By connecting to the BSSID that bridges the AP to a radio frequency the target isn’t using (usually a 2.4GHz or 5GHz) and completing a Wi-Fi four-way handshake, the attacker replaces the target’s MAC with one of their own.

The attacker spoofs the victim’s MAC address on a different NIC,

causing the internal switch to mistakenly associate the victim’s address with the attacker’s port/BSSID. As a result, frames intended for the victim are

forwarded to the attacker and encrypted using the attacker’s PTK.

Credit: Zhou et al.

The attacker spoofs the victim’s MAC address on a different NIC,

causing the internal switch to mistakenly associate the victim’s address with the attacker’s port/BSSID. As a result, frames intended for the victim are

forwarded to the attacker and encrypted using the attacker’s PTK. Credit: Zhou et al.

In other words, the attacker connects to the Wi-Fi network using the target’s MAC and then receives the target’s traffic. With this, an attacker obtains all downlink traffic (data sent from the router) intended for the target. Once the switch at Layer-2 sees the response, it updates its MAC address table to preserve the new mapping for as long as the attacker needs.

This completes the first half of the MitM, allowing all data to flow to the attacker. That alone would result in little more than a denial of service for the target. To prevent the target from noticing—and more importantly, to gain the bidirectional MitM capability needed to perform more advanced attacks—the attacker needs a way to restore the original mapping (the one assigning the victim’s MAC to the Layer-1 port). An attacker performs this restoration by sending an ICMP ping from a random MAC. The ping, which must be wrapped in a Group Temporal key shared among all clients, triggers replies that cause the Layer-1 mapping (i.e., port states) to revert back to the original one.

“In a normal Layer-2 switch, the switch learns the MAC of the client by seeing it respond with its source address,” Moore explained. “This attack confuses the AP into thinking that the client reconnected elsewhere, allowing an attacker to redirect Layer-2 traffic. Unlike Ethernet switches, wireless APs can’t tie a physical port on the device to a single client; clients are mobile by design.”

The back-and-forth flipping of the MAC from the attacker to the target, and vice versa, can continue for as long as the attacker wants. With that, the bidirectional MitM has been achieved. Attackers can then perform a host of other attacks, both related to AirSnitch or ones such as the cache poisoning discussed earlier. Depending on the router the target is using, the attack can be performed even when the attacker and target are connected to separate SSIDs connected by the same AP. In some cases, Zhou said, the attacker can even be connected from the Internet.

“Even when the guest SSID has a different name and password, it may still share parts of the same internal network infrastructure as your main Wi-Fi,” the researcher explained. “In some setups, that shared infrastructure can allow unexpected connectivity between guest devices and trusted devices.”

No, enterprise defenses won’t protect you

Variations of the attack defeat the client isolation promised by makers of enterprise routers, which typically use credentials and a master encryption key that are unique to each client. One such attack works across multiple APs when they share a wired distribution system, as is common in enterprise and campus networks.

In their paper, AirSnitch: Demystifying and Breaking Client Isolation in Wi-Fi Networks, the researchers wrote:

Although port stealing was originally devised for hosts on the same switch, we show that attackers can hijack MAC-to-port mappings at a higher layer, i.e., at the level of the distribution switch—to intercept traffic to victims associated with different APs. This escalates the attack beyond its traditional limits, breaking the assumption that separate APs provide effective isolation.

This discovery exposes a blind spot in client isolation: even physically separated APs, broadcasting different SSIDs, offer ineffective isolation if connected to a common distribution system. By redirecting traffic at the distribution switch, attackers can intercept and manipulate victim traffic across AP boundaries, expanding the threat model for modern Wi-Fi networks.

The researchers demonstrated that their attacks can enable the breakage of RADIUS, a centralized authentication protocol for enhanced security in enterprise networks. “By spoofing a gateway MAC and connecting to an AP,” the researchers wrote, “an attacker can steal uplink RADIUS packets.” The attacker can go on to crack a message authenticator that’s used for integrity protection and, from there, learn a shared passphrase. “This allows the attacker to set up a rogue RADIUS server and associated rogue WPA2/3 access point, which allows any legitimate client to connect, thereby intercepting their traffic and credentials.”

The researchers tested the following 11 devices:

  • Netgear Nighthawk x6 R8000
  • Tenda RX2 Pro
  • D-LINK DIR-3040
  • TP-LINK Archer AXE75
  • ASUS RT-AX57
  • DD-WRT v3.0-r44715
  • OpenWrt 24.10
  • Ubiquiti AmpliFi Alien Router
  • Ubiquiti AmpliFi Router HD
  • LANCOM LX-6500
  • Cisco Catalyst 9130

As noted earlier, every tested router was vulnerable to at least one attack. Zhou said that some router makers have already released updates that mitigate some of the attacks, and more updates are expected in the future. But he also said some manufacturers have told him that some of the systemic weaknesses can only be addressed through changes in the underlying chips they buy from silicon makers.

The hardware manufacturers face yet another challenge: The client isolation mechanisms vary from maker to maker. With no industry-wide standard, these one-off solutions are splintered and may not receive the concerted security attention that formal protocols are given.

So how bad is AirSnitch, really?

With a basic understanding of AirSnitch, the next step is to put it into historical context and assess how big a threat it poses in the real world. In some respects, it resembles the 2007 PTW attack (named for its creators Andrei Pyshkin, Erik Tews, and Ralf-Philipp Weinmann) that completely and immediately broke WEP, leaving Wi-Fi users everywhere with no means to protect themselves against nearby adversaries. For now, client isolation is similarly defeated—almost completely and overnight—with no immediate remedy available.

At the same time, the bar for waging WEP attacks was significantly lower, since it was available to anyone within range of an AP. AirSnitch, by contrast, requires that the attacker already have some sort of access to the Wi-Fi network. For many people, that may mean steering clear of public Wi-Fi networks altogether.

If the network is properly secured—meaning it’s protected by a strong password that’s known only to authorized users—AirSnitch may not be of much value to an attacker. The nuance here is that even if an attacker doesn’t have access to a specific SSID, they may still use AirSnitch if they have access to other SSIDs or BSSIDs that use the same AP or other connecting infrastructure.

Yet another difference to the PTW attack—and others that have followed breaking WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 protections—is that they were limited to hacks using terrestrial radio signals, a much more limited theater than the one AirSnitch uses. Ultimately, the AirSnitch attacks are broader but less severe.

Also unlike those previous attacks, firewall mitigations may be more problematic.

“We expand the threat model showing an attacker can be on another channel or port, or can be from the Internet,” Zhou said. “Firewalls are also networking devices. We often say a firewall is a Layer-3 device because it works at the IP layer. But fundamentally, it’s connected by wire to different network elements. That wire is not secure.”

Some of the threat can be mitigated by using VPNs, but this remedy has all the usual drawbacks that come with them. For one, VPNs are notorious for leaking metadata, DNS queries, and other traffic that can be useful to attackers, making the protection limited. And for another, finding a reputable and trustworthy VPN provider has historically proven to be vexingly difficult, though things have improved more recently. Ultimately, a VPN shouldn’t be regarded as much more than a bandage.

Another potential mitigation is using wireless VLANs to isolate one SSID from another. Zhou said such options aren’t universally available and are also “super easy to be configured wrong.” Specifically, he said VLANs can often be implemented in ways that allow “hopping vulnerabilities.” Further, Moore has argued why “VLANs are not a practical barrier” against all AirSnitch attacks

The most effective remedy may be to adopt a security stance known as zero trust, which treats each node inside a network as a potential adversary until it provides proof it can be trusted. This model is challenging for even well-funded enterprise organizations to adopt, although it’s becoming easier. It’s not clear if it will ever be feasible for more casual Wi-Fi users in homes and smaller businesses.

Probably the most reasonable response is to exercise measured caution for all Wi-Fi networks managed by people you don’t know. When feasible, use a trustworthy VPN on public APs or, better yet, tether a connection from a cell phone.

Wi-Fi has always been a risky proposition, and AirSnitch only expands the potential for malice. Then again, the new capabilities may mean little in the real world, where evil twin attacks accomplish many of the same objectives with much less hassle.

Moore said the attacks possible before client isolation were often as simple as running ettercap or similar tools as soon as a normal Wi-Fi connection was completed. AirSnitch attacks require considerably more work, at least until someone writes an easy-to-use script that automates it.

“It will be interesting to see if the wireless vendors care enough to resolve these issues completely and if attackers care enough to put all of this together when there might be easier things to do (like run a fake AP instead),” Moore said. “At the least it should make pentesters’ lives more interesting since it re-opens a lot of exposure that many folks may not have any experience with.”

Photo of Dan Goodin

Dan Goodin is Senior Security Editor at Ars Technica, where he oversees coverage of malware, computer espionage, botnets, hardware hacking, encryption, and passwords. In his spare time, he enjoys gardening, cooking, and following the independent music scene. Dan is based in San Francisco. Follow him at here on Mastodon and here on Bluesky. Contact him on Signal at DanArs.82.

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password-managers’-promise-that-they-can’t-see-your-vaults-isn’t-always-true

Password managers’ promise that they can’t see your vaults isn’t always true


ZERO KNOWLEDGE, ZERO CLUE

Contrary to what password managers say, a server compromise can mean game over.

Over the past 15 years, password managers have grown from a niche security tool used by the technology savvy into an indispensable security tool for the masses, with an estimated 94 million US adults—or roughly 36 percent of them—having adopted them. They store not only passwords for pension, financial, and email accounts, but also cryptocurrency credentials, payment card numbers, and other sensitive data.

All eight of the top password managers have adopted the term “zero knowledge” to describe the complex encryption system they use to protect the data vaults that users store on their servers. The definitions vary slightly from vendor to vendor, but they generally boil down to one bold assurance: that there is no way for malicious insiders or hackers who manage to compromise the cloud infrastructure to steal vaults or data stored in them. These promises make sense, given previous breaches of LastPass and the reasonable expectation that state-level hackers have both the motive and capability to obtain password vaults belonging to high-value targets.

A bold assurance debunked

Typical of these claims are those made by Bitwarden, Dashlane, and LastPass, which together are used by roughly 60 million people. Bitwarden, for example, says that “not even the team at Bitwarden can read your data (even if we wanted to).” Dashlane, meanwhile, says that without a user’s master password, “malicious actors can’t steal the information, even if Dashlane’s servers are compromised.” LastPass says that no one can access the “data stored in your LastPass vault, except you (not even LastPass).”

New research shows that these claims aren’t true in all cases, particularly when account recovery is in place or password managers are set to share vaults or organize users into groups. The researchers reverse-engineered or closely analyzed Bitwarden, Dashlane, and LastPass and identified ways that someone with control over the server—either administrative or the result of a compromise—can, in fact, steal data and, in some cases, entire vaults. The researchers also devised other attacks that can weaken the encryption to the point that ciphertext can be converted to plaintext.

“The vulnerabilities that we describe are numerous but mostly not deep in a technical sense,” the researchers from ETH Zurich and USI Lugano wrote. “Yet they were apparently not found before, despite more than a decade of academic research on password managers and the existence of multiple audits of the three products we studied. This motivates further work, both in theory and in practice.”

The researchers said in interviews that multiple other password managers they didn’t analyze as closely likely suffer from the same flaws. The only one they were at liberty to name was 1Password. Almost all the password managers, they added, are vulnerable to the attacks only when certain features are enabled.

The most severe of the attacks—targeting Bitwarden and LastPass—allow an insider or attacker to read or write to the contents of entire vaults. In some cases, they exploit weaknesses in the key escrow mechanisms that allow users to regain access to their accounts when they lose their master password. Others exploit weaknesses in support for legacy versions of the password manager. A vault-theft attack against Dashlane allowed reading but not modification of vault items when they were shared with other users.

Staging the old key switcheroo

One of the attacks targeting Bitwarden key escrow is performed during the enrollment of a new member of a family or organization. After a Bitwarden group admin invites the new member, the invitee’s client accesses a server and obtains a group symmetric key and the group’s public key. The client then encrypts the symmetric key with the group public key and sends it to the server. The resulting ciphertext is what’s used to recover the new user’s account. This data is never integrity-checked when it’s sent from the server to the client during an account enrollment session.

The adversary can exploit this weakness by replacing the group public key with one from a keypair created by the adversary. Since the adversary knows the corresponding private key, it can use it to decrypt the ciphertext and then perform an account recovery on behalf of the targeted user. The result is that the adversary can read and modify the entire contents of the member vault as soon as an invitee accepts an invitation from a family or organization.

Normally, this attack would work only when a group admin has enabled autorecovery mode, which, unlike a manual option, doesn’t require interaction from the member. But since the group policy the client downloads during the enrollment policy isn’t integrity-checked, adversaries can set recovery to auto, even if an admin had chosen a manual mode that requires user interaction.

Compounding the severity, the adversary in this attack also obtains a group symmetric key for all other groups the member belongs to since such keys are known to all group members. If any of the additional groups use account recovery, the adversary can obtain the members’ vaults for them, too. “This process can be repeated in a worm-like fashion, infecting all organizations that have key recovery enabled and have overlapping members,” the research paper explained.

A second attack targeting Bitwarden account recovery can be performed when a user rotates vault keys, an option Bitwarden recommends if a user believes their master password has been compromised. When account recovery is on (either manually or automatically), the user client regenerates the recovery ciphertext, which as described earlier involves obtaining a new public key that’s encrypted with the organization public key. The researchers denoted the group public key as pkorg. They denote the public key supplied by the adversary as pkadvorg, the recovery ciphertext as crec, and the user symmetric key as k.

The paper explained:

The key point here is that pkorg is not retrieved from the user’s vault; rather the client performs a sync operation with the server to obtain it. Crucially, the organization data provided by this sync operation is not authenticated in any way. This thus provides the adversary with another opportunity to obtain a victim’s user key, by supplying a new public key pkadvorg, for which they know the skadvorg and setting the account recovery enrollment to true. The client will then send an account recovery ciphertext crec containing the new user key, which the adversary can decrypt to obtain k′.

The third attack on the Bitwarden account recovery allows an adversary to recover a user’s master key. It abuses key connector, a feature primarily used by enterprise customers.

More ways to pilfer vaults

The attack allowing theft of LastPass vaults also targets key escrow, specifically in the Teams and Teams 5 versions, when a member’s master key is reset by a privileged user known as a superadmin. The next time the member logs in through the LastPass browser extension, their client will retrieve an RSA keypair assigned to each superadmin in the organization, encrypt their new key with each one, and send the resulting ciphertext to each superadmin.

Because LastPass also fails to authenticate the superadmin keys, an adversary can once again replace the superadmin public key (pkadm) with their own public key (pkadvadm).

“In theory, only users in teams where password reset is enabled and who are selected for reset should be affected by this vulnerability,” the researchers wrote. “In practice, however, LastPass clients query the server at each login and fetch a list of admin keys. They then send the account recovery ciphertexts independently of enrollment status.” The attack, however, requires the user to log in to LastPass with the browser extension, not the standalone client app.

Several attacks allow reading and modification of shared vaults, which allow a user to share selected items with one or more other users. When Dashlane users share an item, their client apps sample a fresh symmetric key, which either directly encrypts the shared item or, when sharing with a group, encrypts group keys, which in turn encrypt the shared item. In either case, the newly created RSA keypair(s)—belonging to either the shared user or group—isn’t authenticated. The item is then encrypted with the private key(s).

An adversary can supply their own key pair and use the public key to encrypt the ciphertext sent to the recipients. The adversary then decrypts that ciphertext with their corresponding secret key to recover the shared symmetric key. With that, the adversary can read and modify all shared items. When sharing is used in either Bitwarden or LastPass, similar attacks are possible and lead to the same consequence.

Another avenue for attackers or adversaries with control of a server is to target the backward compatibility that all three password managers provide to support older, less-secure versions. Despite incremental changes designed to harden the apps against the very attacks described in the paper, all three password managers continue to support the versions without these improvements. This backward compatibility is a deliberate decision intended to prevent users who haven’t upgraded from losing access to their vaults.

The severity of these attacks is lower than that of the previous ones described, with the exception of one, which is possible against Bitwarden. Older versions of the password manager used a single symmetric key to encrypt and decrypt the user key from the server and items inside vaults. This design allowed for the possibility that an adversary could tamper with the contents. To add integrity checks, newer versions provide authenticated encryption by augmenting the symmetric key with an HMAC hash function.

To protect customers using older app versions, Bitwarden ciphertext has an attribute of either 0 or 1. A 0 designates authenticated encryption, while a 1 supports the older unauthenticated scheme. Older versions also use a key hierarchy that Bitwarden deprecated to harden the app. To support the old hierarchy, newer client versions generate a new RSA keypair for the user if the server doesn’t provide one. The newer version will proceed to encrypt the secret key portion with the master key if no user ciphertext is provided by the server.

This design opens Bitwarden to several attacks. The most severe, allowing reading (but not modification) of all items created after the attack is performed. At a simplified level, it works because the adversary can forge the ciphertext sent by the server and cause the client to use it to derive a user key known to the adversary.

The modification causes the use of CBC (cipher block chaining), a form of encryption that’s vulnerable to several attacks. An adversary can exploit this weaker form using a padding oracle attack and go on to retrieve the plaintext of the vault. Because HMAC protection remains intact, modification isn’t possible.

Surprisingly, Dashlane was vulnerable to a similar padding oracle attack. The researchers devised a complicated attack chain that would allow a malicious server to downgrade a Dashlane user’s vault to CBC and exfiltrate the contents. The researchers estimate that the attack would require about 125 days to decrypt the ciphertext.

Still other attacks against all three password managers allow adversaries to greatly reduce the selected number of hashing iterations—in the case of Bitwarden and LastPass, from a default of 600,000 to 2. Repeated hashing of master passwords makes them significantly harder to crack in the event of a server breach that allows theft of the hash. For all three password managers, the server sends the specified iteration count to the client, with no mechanism to ensure it meets the default number. The result is that the adversary receives a 300,000-fold decrease in the time and resources required to crack the hash and obtain the user’s master password.

Attacking malleability

Three of the attacks—one against Bitwarden and two against LastPass—target what the researchers call “item-level encryption” or “vault malleability.” Instead of encrypting a vault in a single, monolithic blob, password managers often encrypt individual items, and sometimes individual fields within an item. These items and fields are all encrypted with the same key. The attacks exploit this design to steal passwords from select vault items.

An adversary mounts an attack by replacing the ciphertext in the URL field, which stores the link where a login occurs, with the ciphertext for the password. To enhance usability, password managers provide an icon that helps visually recognize the site. To do this, the client decrypts the URL field and sends it to the server. The server then fetches the corresponding icon. Because there’s no mechanism to prevent the swapping of item fields, the client decrypts the password instead of the URL and sends it to the server.

“That wouldn’t happen if you had different keys for different fields or if you encrypted the entire collection in one pass,” Kenny Paterson, one of the paper co-authors, said. “A crypto audit should spot it, but only if you’re thinking about malicious servers. The server is deviating from expected behavior.

The following table summarizes the causes and consequences of the 25 attacks they devised:

Credit: Scarlata et al.

Credit: Scarlata et al.

A psychological blind spot

The researchers acknowledge that the full compromise of a password manager server is a high bar. But they defend the threat model.

“Attacks on the provider server infrastructure can be prevented by carefully designed operational security measures, but it is well within the bounds of reason to assume that these services are targeted by sophisticated nation-state-level adversaries, for example via software supply-chain attacks or spearphishing,” they wrote. “Moreover, some of the service providers have a history of being breached—for example, LassPass suffered breaches in 2015 and 2022, and another serious security incident in 2021.

They went on to write: “While none of the breaches we are aware of involved reprogramming the server to make it undertake malicious actions, this goes just one step beyond attacks on password manager service providers that have been documented. Active attacks more broadly have been documented in the wild.”

Part of the challenge of designing password managers or any end-to-end encryption service is the tendency for a false sense of security of the client.

“It’s a psychological problem when you’re writing both client and server software,” Paterson explained. “You should write the client super defensively, but if you’re also writing the server, well of course your server isn’t going to send malformed packets or bad info. Why would you do that?”

Marketing gimmickry or not, “zero-knowledge” is here to stay

In many of the cases, engineers have already fixed the weaknesses described after receiving private reports from the researchers. Engineers are still patching other vulnerabilities. In statements, Bitwarden, Lastpass, and Dashlane representatives noted the high bar of the threat model, despite statements on their websites that assure customers their wares will withstand it. Along with 1Password representatives, they also noted that their products regularly receive stringent security audits and undergo red-team exercises.

A Bitwarden representative wrote:

Bitwarden continually evaluates and improves its software through internal review, third-party assessments, and external research. The ETH Zurich paper analyzes a threat model in which the server itself behaves maliciously and intentionally attempts to manipulate key material and configuration values. That model assumes full server compromise and adversarial behavior beyond standard operating assumptions for cloud services.

LastPass said, “We take a multi‑layered, ongoing approach to security assurance that combines independent oversight, continuous monitoring, and collaboration with the research community. Our cloud security testing is inclusive of the scenarios referenced in the malicious-server threat model outlined in the research.”

Specific measures include:

A statement from Dashlane read, “Dashlane conducts rigorous internal and external testing to ensure the security of our product. When issues arise, we work quickly to mitigate any possible risk and ensure customers have clarity on the problem, our solution, and any required actions.”

1Password released a statement that read in part:

Our security team reviewed the paper in depth and found no new attack vectors beyond those already documented in our publicly available Security Design White Paper.

We are committed to continually strengthening our security architecture and evaluating it against advanced threat models, including malicious-server scenarios like those described in the research, and evolving it over time to maintain the protections our users rely on.

1Password also says that the zero-knowledge encryption it provides “means that no one but you—not even the company that’s storing the data—can access and decrypt your data. This protects your information even if the server where it’s held is ever breached.” In the company’s white paper linked above, 1Password seems to allow for this possibility when it says:

At present there’s no practical method for a user to verify the public key they’re encrypting data to belongs to their intended recipient. As a consequence it would be possible for a malicious or compromised 1Password server to provide dishonest public keys to the user, and run a successful attack. Under such an attack, it would be possible for the 1Password server to acquire vault encryption keys with little ability for users to detect or prevent it.

1Password’s statement also includes assurances that the service routinely undergoes rigorous security testing.

All four companies defended their use of the term “zero knowledge.” As used in this context, the term can be confused with zero-knowledge proofs, a completely unrelated cryptographic method that allows one party to prove to another party that they know a piece of information without revealing anything about the information itself. An example is a proof that shows a system can determine if someone is over 18 without having any knowledge of the precise birthdate.

The adulterated zero-knowledge term used by password managers appears to have come into being in 2007, when a company called SpiderOak used it to describe its cloud infrastructure for securely sharing sensitive data. Interestingly, SpiderOak formally retired the term a decade later after receiving user pushback.

“Sadly, it is just marketing hype, much like ‘military-grade encryption,’” Matteo Scarlata, lead author of the paper, said. “Zero-knowledge seems to mean different things to different people (e.g., LastPass told us that they won’t adopt a malicious server threat model internally). Much unlike ‘end-to-end encryption,’ ‘zero-knowledge encryption’ is an elusive goal, so it’s impossible to tell if a company is doing it right.”

Photo of Dan Goodin

Dan Goodin is Senior Security Editor at Ars Technica, where he oversees coverage of malware, computer espionage, botnets, hardware hacking, encryption, and passwords. In his spare time, he enjoys gardening, cooking, and following the independent music scene. Dan is based in San Francisco. Follow him at here on Mastodon and here on Bluesky. Contact him on Signal at DanArs.82.

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once-hobbled-lumma-stealer-is-back-with-lures-that-are-hard-to-resist

Once-hobbled Lumma Stealer is back with lures that are hard to resist

Last May, law enforcement authorities around the world scored a key win when they hobbled the infrastructure of Lumma, an infostealer that infected nearly 395,000 Windows computers over just a two-month span leading up to the international operation. Researchers said Wednesday that Lumma is once again “back at scale” in hard-to-detect attacks that pilfer credentials and sensitive files.

Lumma, also known as Lumma Stealer, first appeared in Russian-speaking cybercrime forums in 2022. Its cloud-based malware-as-a-service model provided a sprawling infrastructure of domains for hosting lure sites offering free cracked software, games, and pirated movies, as well as command-and-control channels and everything else a threat actor needed to run their infostealing enterprise. Within a year, Lumma was selling for as much as $2,500 for premium versions. By the spring of 2024, the FBI counted more than 21,000 listings on crime forums. Last year, Microsoft said Lumma had become the “go-to tool” for multiple crime groups, including Scattered Spider, one of the most prolific groups.

Takedowns are hard

The FBI and an international coalition of its counterparts took action early last year. In May, they said they seized 2,300 domains, command-and-control infrastructure, and crime marketplaces that had enabled the infostealer to thrive. Recently, however, the malware has made a comeback, allowing it to infect a significant number of machines again.

“LummaStealer is back at scale, despite a major 2025 law-enforcement takedown that disrupted thousands of its command-and-control domains,” researchers from security firm Bitdefender wrote. “The operation has rapidly rebuilt its infrastructure and continues to spread worldwide.”

As with Lumma before, the recent surge leans heavily on “ClickFix,” a form of social engineering lure that’s proving to be vexingly effective in causing end users to infect their own machines. Typically, these types of bait come in the form of fake CAPTCHAs that—rather requiring users to click a box or identify objects or letters in a jumbled image—instruct them to copy text and paste it into an interface, a process that takes just seconds. The text comes in the form of malicious commands provided by the fake CAPTCHA. The interface is the Windows terminal. Targets who comply then install loader malware, which in turn installs Lumma.

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windows’-original-secure-boot-certificates-expire-in-june—here’s-what-you-need-to-do

Windows’ original Secure Boot certificates expire in June—here’s what you need to do

The second thing to check is the “default db,” which shows whether the new Secure Boot certificates are baked into your PC’s firmware. If they are, even resetting Secure Boot settings to the defaults in your PC’s BIOS will still allow you to boot operating systems that use the new certificates.

To check this, open PowerShell or Terminal again and type ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString((Get-SecureBootUEFI dbdefault).bytes) -match 'Windows UEFI CA 2023'). If this command returns “true,” your system is running an updated BIOS with the new Secure Boot certificates built in. Older PCs and systems without a BIOS update installed will return “false” here.

Microsoft’s Costa says that “many newer PCs built since 2024, and almost all the devices shipped in 2025, already include the certificates” and won’t need to be updated at all. And PCs several years older than that may be able to get the certificates via a BIOS update.

In the US, Dell, HP, Lenovo, and Microsoft all have lists of specific systems and firmware versions, while Asus provides more general information about how to get the new certificates via Windows Update, the MyAsus app, or the Asus website. The oldest of the PCs listed generally date back to 2019 or 2020. If your PC shipped with Windows 11 out of the box, there should be a BIOS update with the new certificates available, though that may not be true of every system that meets the requirements for upgrading to Windows 11.

Microsoft encourages home users who can’t install the new certificates to use its customer support services for help. Detailed documentation is also available for IT shops and other large organizations that manage their own updates.

“The Secure Boot certificate update marks a generational refresh of the trust foundation that modern PCs rely on at startup,” writes Costa. “By renewing these certificates, the Windows ecosystem is ensuring that future innovations in hardware, firmware, and operating systems can continue to build on a secure, industry‐aligned boot process.”

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malicious-packages-for-dydx-cryptocurrency-exchange-empties-user-wallets

Malicious packages for dYdX cryptocurrency exchange empties user wallets

Open source packages published on the npm and PyPI repositories were laced with code that stole wallet credentials from dYdX developers and backend systems and, in some cases, backdoored devices, researchers said.

“Every application using the compromised npm versions is at risk ….” the researchers, from security firm Socket, said Friday. “Direct impact includes complete wallet compromise and irreversible cryptocurrency theft. The attack scope includes all applications depending on the compromised versions and both developers testing with real credentials and production end-users.”

Packages that were infected were:

npm (@dydxprotocol/v4-client-js):

  • 3.4.1
  • 1.22.1
  • 1.15.2
  • 1.0.31

PyPI (dydx-v4-client):

  • 1.1.5post1

Perpetual trading, perpetual targeting

dYdX is a decentralized derivatives exchange that supports hundreds of markets for “perpetual trading,” or the use of cryptocurrency to bet that the value of a derivative future will rise or fall. Socket said dYdX has processed over $1.5 trillion in trading volume over its lifetime, with an average trading volume of $200 million to $540 million and roughly $175 million in open interest. The exchange provides code libraries that allow third-party apps for trading bots, automated strategies, or backend services, all of which handle mnemonics or private keys for signing.

The npm malware embedded a malicious function in the legitimate package. When a seed phrase that underpins wallet security was processed, the function exfiltrated it, along with a fingerprint of the device running the app. The fingerprint allowed the threat actor to correlate stolen credentials to track victims across multiple compromises. The domain receiving the seed was dydx[.]priceoracle[.]site, which mimics the legitimate dYdX service at dydx[.]xyz through typosquatting.

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microsoft-releases-urgent-office-patch-russian-state-hackers-pounce.

Microsoft releases urgent Office patch. Russian-state hackers pounce.

Russian-state hackers wasted no time exploiting a critical Microsoft Office vulnerability that allowed them to compromise the devices inside diplomatic, maritime, and transport organizations in more than half a dozen countries, researchers said Wednesday.

The threat group, tracked under names including APT28, Fancy Bear, Sednit, Forest Blizzard, and Sofacy, pounced on the vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-21509, less than 48 hours after Microsoft released an urgent, unscheduled security update late last month, the researchers said. After reverse-engineering the patch, group members wrote an advanced exploit that installed one of two never-before-seen backdoor implants.

Stealth, speed, and precision

The entire campaign was designed to make the compromise undetectable to endpoint protection. Besides being novel, the exploits and payloads were encrypted and ran in memory, making their malice hard to spot. The initial infection vector came from previously compromised government accounts from multiple countries and were likely familiar to the targeted email holders. Command and control channels were hosted in legitimate cloud services that are typically allow-listed inside sensitive networks.

“The use of CVE-2026-21509 demonstrates how quickly state-aligned actors can weaponize new vulnerabilities, shrinking the window for defenders to patch critical systems,” the researchers, with security firm Trellix, wrote. “The campaign’s modular infection chain—from initial phish to in-memory backdoor to secondary implants was carefully designed to leverage trusted channels (HTTPS to cloud services, legitimate email flows) and fileless techniques to hide in plain sight.”

The 72-hour spear phishing campaign began January 28 and delivered at least 29 distinct email lures to organizations in nine countries, primarily in Eastern Europe. Trellix named eight of them: Poland, Slovenia, Turkey, Greece, the UAE, Ukraine, Romania, and Bolivia. Organizations targeted were defense ministries (40 percent), transportation/logistics operators (35 percent), and diplomatic entities (25 percent).

Microsoft releases urgent Office patch. Russian-state hackers pounce. Read More »

notepad++-users-take-note:-it’s-time-to-check-if-you’re-hacked

Notepad++ users take note: It’s time to check if you’re hacked

According to independent researcher Kevin Beaumont, three organizations told him that devices inside their networks that had Notepad++ installed experienced “security incidents” that “resulted in hands on keyboard threat actors,” meaning the hackers were able to take direct control using a web-based interface. All three of the organizations, Beaumont said, have interests in East Asia.

The researcher explained that his suspicions were aroused when Notepad++ version 8.8.8 introduced bug fixes in mid-November to “harden the Notepad++ Updater from being hijacked to deliver something… not Notepad++.”

The update made changes to a bespoke Notepad++ updater known as GUP, or alternatively, WinGUP. The gup.exe executable responsible reports the version in use to https://notepad-plus-plus.org/update/getDownloadUrl.php and then retrieves a URL for the update from a file named gup.xml. The file specified in the URL is downloaded to the %TEMP% directory of the device and then executed.

Beaumont wrote:

If you can intercept and change this traffic, you can redirect the download to any location it appears by changing the URL in the property.

This traffic is supposed to be over HTTPS, however it appears you may be [able] to tamper with the traffic if you sit on the ISP level and TLS intercept. In earlier versions of Notepad++, the traffic was just over HTTP.

The downloads themselves are signed—however some earlier versions of Notepad++ used a self signed root cert, which is on Github. With 8.8.7, the prior release, this was reverted to GlobalSign. Effectively, there’s a situation where the download isn’t robustly checked for tampering.

Because traffic to notepad-plus-plus.org is fairly rare, it may be possible to sit inside the ISP chain and redirect to a different download. To do this at any kind of scale requires a lot of resources.

Beaumont published his working theory in December, two months to the day prior to Monday’s advisory by Notepad++. Combined with the details from Notepad++, it’s now clear that the hypothesis was spot on.

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