We can expect next year’s numbers to also show a large growth in solar production, as the EIA says that the US saw record levels of new solar installations in 2024, with 37 gigawatts of new capacity. Since some of that came online later in the year, it’ll produce considerably more power next year. And, in its latest short-term energy analysis, the EIA expects to see over 20 GW of solar capacity added in each of the next two years. New wind capacity will push that above 30 GW of renewable capacity each of these years.
That growth will, it’s expected, more than offset continued growth in demand, although that growth is expected to be somewhat slower than we saw in 2024. It also predicts about 15 GW of coal will be removed from the grid during those two years. So, even without any changes in policy, we’re likely to see a very dynamic grid landscape over the next few years.
But changes in policy are almost certainly on the way. The flurry of executive orders issued by the Trump administration includes a number of energy-related changes. These include defining “energy” in a way that excludes wind and solar, an end to offshore wind leasing and the threat to terminate existing leases, and a re-evaluation of the allocation of funds from some of the Biden administration’s energy-focused laws.
In essence, this sets up a clash among economics, state policies, and federal policy. Even without any subsidies, wind and solar are the cheapest ways to produce electricity in much of the US. In addition, a number of states have mandates that will require the use of more renewable energy. At the same time, the permitting process for the plants and their grid connections will often require approvals at the federal level, and it appears to be official policy to inhibit renewables when possible. And a number of states are also making attempts to block new renewable power installations.
It’s going to be a challenging period for everyone involved in renewable energy.
Set to be killed by Trump, the rules mostly lock in existing trends.
In April last year, the Environmental Protection Agency released its latest attempt to regulate the carbon emissions of power plants under the Clean Air Act. It’s something the EPA has been required to do since a 2007 Supreme Court decision that settled a case that started during the Clinton administration. The latest effort seemed like the most aggressive yet, forcing coal plants to retire or install carbon capture equipment and making it difficult for some natural gas plants to operate without capturing carbon or burning green hydrogen.
Yet, according to a new analysis published in Thursday’s edition of Science, they wouldn’t likely have a dramatic effect on the US’s future emissions even if they were to survive a court challenge. Instead, the analysis suggests the rules serve more like a backstop to prevent other policy changes and increased demand from countering the progress that would otherwise be made. This is just as well, given that the rules are inevitably going to be eliminated by the incoming Trump administration.
A long time coming
The net result of a number of Supreme Court decisions is that greenhouse gasses are pollutants under the Clean Air Act, and the EPA needed to determine whether they posed a threat to people. George W. Bush’s EPA dutifully performed that analysis but sat on the results until its second term ended, leaving it to the Obama administration to reach the same conclusion. The EPA went on to formulate rules for limiting carbon emissions on a state-by-state basis, but these were rapidly made irrelevant because renewable power and natural gas began displacing coal even without the EPA’s encouragement.
Nevertheless, the Trump administration replaced those rules with ones designed to accomplish even less, which were thrown out by a court just before Biden’s inauguration. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court stepped in to rule on the now-even-more-irrelevant Obama rules, determining that the EPA could only regulate carbon emissions at the level of individual power plants rather than at the level of the grid.
All of that set the stage for the latest EPA rules, which were formulated by the Biden administration’s EPA. Forced by the court to regulate individual power plants, the EPA allowed coal plants that were set to retire within the decade to continue to operate as they have. Anything that would remain operational longer would need to either switch fuels or install carbon capture equipment. Similarly, natural gas plants were regulated based on how frequently they were operational; those that ran less than 40 percent of the time could face significant new regulations. More than that, and they’d have to capture carbon or burn a fuel mixture that is primarily hydrogen produced without carbon emissions.
While the Biden EPA’s rules are currently making their way through the courts, they’re sure to be pulled in short order by the incoming Trump administration, making the court case moot. Nevertheless, people had started to analyze their potential impact before it was clear there would be an incoming Trump administration. And the analysis is valuable in the sense that it will highlight what will be lost when the rules are eliminated.
By some measures, the answer is not all that much. But the answer is also very dependent upon whether the Trump administration engages in an all-out assault on renewable energy.
Regulatory impact
The work relies on the fact that various researchers and organizations have developed models to explore how the US electric grid can economically meet demand under different conditions, including different regulatory environments. The researchers obtained nine of them and ran them with and without the EPA’s proposed rules to determine their impact.
On its own, eliminating the rules has a relatively minor impact. Without the rules, the US grid’s 2040 carbon dioxide emissions would end up between 60 and 85 percent lower than they were in 2005. With the rules, the range shifts to between 75 and 85 percent—in essence, the rules reduce the uncertainty about the outcomes that involve the least change.
That’s primarily because of how they’re structured. Mostly, they target coal plants, as these account for nearly half of the US grid’s emissions despite supplying only about 15 percent of its power. They’ve already been closing at a rapid clip, and would likely continue to do so even without the EPA’s encouragement.
Natural gas plants, the other major source of carbon emissions, would primarily respond to the new rules by operating less than 40 percent of the time, thus avoiding stringent regulation while still allowing them to handle periods where renewable power underproduces. And we now have a sufficiently large fleet of natural gas plants that demand can be met without a major increase in construction, even with most plants operating at just 40 percent of their rated capacity. The continued growth of renewables and storage also contributes to making this possible.
One irony of the response seen in the models is that it suggests that two key pieces of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) are largely irrelevant. The IRA provides benefits for the deployment of carbon capture and the production of green hydrogen (meaning hydrogen produced without carbon emissions). But it’s likely that, even with these credits, the economics wouldn’t favor the use of these technologies when alternatives like renewables plus storage are available. The IRA also provides tax credits for deploying renewables and storage, pushing the economics even further in their favor.
Since not a lot changes, the rules don’t really affect the cost of electricity significantly. Their presence boosts costs by an estimated 0.5 to 3.7 percent in 2050 compared to a scenario where the rules aren’t implemented. As a result, the wholesale price of electricity changes by only two percent.
A backstop
That said, the team behind the analysis argues that, depending on other factors, the rules could play a significant role. Trump has suggested he will target all of Biden’s energy policies, and that would include the IRA itself. Its repeal could significantly slow the growth of renewable energy in the US, as could continued problems with expanding the grid to incorporate new renewable capacity.
In addition, the US is seeing demand for electricity rise at a faster pace in 2023 than in the decade leading up to it. While it’s still unclear whether that’s a result of new demand or simply weather conditions boosting the use of electricity in heating and cooling, there are several factors that could easily boost the use of electricity in coming years: the electrification of transport, rising data center use, and the electrification of appliances and home heating.
Should these raise demand sufficiently, then it could make continued coal use economical in the absence of the EPA rules. “The rules … can be viewed as backstops against higher emissions outcomes under futures with improved coal plant economics,” the paper suggests, “which could occur with higher demand, slower renewables deployment from interconnection and permitting delays, or higher natural gas prices.”
And it may be the only backstop we have. The report also notes that a number of states have already set aggressive emissions reduction targets, including some for net zero by 2050. But these don’t serve as a substitute for federal climate policy, given that the states that are taking these steps use very little coal in the first place.
John is Ars Technica’s science editor. He has a Bachelor of Arts in Biochemistry from Columbia University, and a Ph.D. in Molecular and Cell Biology from the University of California, Berkeley. When physically separated from his keyboard, he tends to seek out a bicycle, or a scenic location for communing with his hiking boots.
What’s with the sudden interest in nuclear power among tech titans?
Fuel pellets flow down the reactor (left), as gas transfer heat to a boiler (right). Credit: X-energy
On Tuesday, Google announced that it had made a power purchase agreement for electricity generated by a small modular nuclear reactor design that hasn’t even received regulatory approval yet. Today, it’s Amazon’s turn. The company’s Amazon Web Services (AWS) group has announced three different investments, including one targeting a different startup that has its own design for small, modular nuclear reactors—one that has not yet received regulatory approval.
Unlike Google’s deal, which is a commitment to purchase power should the reactors ever be completed, Amazon will lay out some money upfront as part of the agreements. We’ll take a look at the deals and technology that Amazon is backing before analyzing why companies are taking a risk on unproven technologies.
Money for utilities and a startup
Two of Amazon’s deals are with utilities that serve areas where it already has a significant data center footprint. One of these is Energy Northwest, which is an energy supplier that sends power to utilities in the Pacific Northwest. Amazon is putting up the money for Energy Northwest to study the feasibility of adding small modular reactors to its Columbia Generating Station, which currently houses a single, large reactor. In return, Amazon will get the right to purchase power from an initial installation of four small modular reactors. The site could potentially support additional reactors, which Energy Northwest would be able to use to meet demands from other users.
The deal with Virginia’s Dominion Energy is similar in that it would focus on adding small modular reactors to Dominion’s existing North Anna Nuclear Generating Station. But the exact nature of the deal is a bit harder to understand. Dominion says the companies will “jointly explore innovative ways to advance SMR development and financing while also mitigating potential cost and development risks.”
Should either or both of these projects go forward, the reactor designs used will come from a company called X-energy, which is involved in the third deal Amazon is announcing. In this case, it’s a straightforward investment in the company, although the exact dollar amount is unclear (the company says Amazon is “anchoring” a $500 million round of investments). The money will help finalize the company’s reactor design and push it through the regulatory approval process.
Small modular nuclear reactors
X-energy is one of several startups attempting to develop small modular nuclear reactors. The reactors all have a few features that are expected to help them avoid the massive time and cost overruns associated with the construction of large nuclear power stations. In these small reactors, the limited size allows them to be made at a central facility and then be shipped to the power station for installation. This limits the scale of the infrastructure that needs to be built in place and allows the assembly facility to benefit from economies of scale.
This also allows a great deal of flexibility at the installation site, as you can scale the facility to power needs simply by adjusting the number of installed reactors. If demand rises in the future, you can simply install a few more.
The small modular reactors are also typically designed to be inherently safe. Should the site lose power or control over the hardware, the reactor will default to a state where it can’t generate enough heat to melt down or damage its containment. There are various approaches to achieving this.
X-energy’s technology is based on small, self-contained fuel pellets called TRISO particles for TRi-structural ISOtropic. These contain both the uranium fuel and a graphite moderator and are surrounded by a ceramic shell. They’re structured so that there isn’t sufficient uranium present to generate temperatures that can damage the ceramic, ensuring that the nuclear fuel will always remain contained.
The design is meant to run at high temperatures and extract heat from the reactor using helium, which is used to boil water and generate electricity. Each reactor can produce 80 megawatts of electricity, and the reactors are designed to work efficiently as a set of four, creating a 320 MW power plant. As of yet, however, there are no working examples of this reactor, and the design hasn’t been approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Why now?
Why is there such sudden interest in small modular reactors among the tech community? It comes down to growing needs and a lack of good alternatives, even given the highly risky nature of the startups that hope to build the reactors.
It’s no secret that data centers require enormous amounts of energy, and the sudden popularity of AI threatens to raise that demand considerably. Renewables, as the cheapest source of power on the market, would be one way of satisfying that growth, but they’re not ideal. For one thing, the intermittent nature of the power they supply, while possible to manage at the grid level, is a bad match for the around-the-clock demands of data centers.
The US has also benefitted from over a decade of efficiency gains keeping demand flat despite population and economic growth. This has meant that all the renewables we’ve installed have displaced fossil fuel generation, helping keep carbon emissions in check. Should newly installed renewables instead end up servicing rising demand, it will make it considerably more difficult for many states to reach their climate goals.
Finally, renewable installations have often been built in areas without dedicated high-capacity grid connections, resulting in a large and growing backlog of projects (2.6 TW of generation and storage as of 2023) that are stalled as they wait for the grid to catch up. Expanding the pace of renewable installation can’t meet rising server farm demand if the power can’t be brought to where the servers are.
These new projects avoid that problem because they’re targeting sites that already have large reactors and grid connections to use the electricity generated there.
In some ways, it would be preferable to build more of these large reactors based on proven technologies. But not in two very important ways: time and money. The last reactor completed in the US was at the Vogtle site in Georgia, which started construction in 2009 but only went online this year. Costs also increased from $14 billion to over $35 billion during construction. It’s clear that any similar projects would start generating far too late to meet the near-immediate needs of server farms and would be nearly impossible to justify economically.
This leaves small modular nuclear reactors as the least-bad option in a set of bad options. Despite many startups having entered the space over a decade ago, there is still just a single reactor design approved in the US, that of NuScale. But the first planned installation saw the price of the power it would sell rise to the point where it was no longer economically viable due to the plunge in the cost of renewable power; it was canceled last year as the utilities that would have bought the power pulled out.
The probability that a different company will manage to get a reactor design approved, move to construction, and manage to get something built before the end of the decade is extremely low. The chance that it will be able to sell power at a competitive price is also very low, though that may change if demand rises sufficiently. So the fact that Amazon is making some extremely risky investments indicates just how worried it is about its future power needs. Of course, when your annual gross profit is over $250 billion a year, you can afford to take some risks.
John is Ars Technica’s science editor. He has a Bachelor of Arts in Biochemistry from Columbia University, and a Ph.D. in Molecular and Cell Biology from the University of California, Berkeley. When physically separated from his keyboard, he tends to seek out a bicycle, or a scenic location for communing with his hiking boots.
On Monday, the UK will see the closure of its last operational coal power plant, Ratcliffe-on-Soar, which has been operating since 1968. The closure of the plant, which had a capacity of 2,000 megawatts, will bring an end to the history of the country’s coal use, which started with the opening of the first coal-fired power station in 1882. Coal played a central part in the UK’s power system in the interim, in some years providing over 90 percent of its total electricity.
But a number of factors combined to place coal in a long-term decline: the growth of natural gas-powered plants and renewables, pollution controls, carbon pricing, and a government goal to hit net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.
From boom to bust
It’s difficult to overstate the importance of coal to the UK grid. It was providing over 90 percent of the UK’s electricity as recently as 1956. The total amount of power generated continued to climb well after that, reaching a peak of 212 terawatt hours of production by 1980. And the construction of new coal plants was under consideration as recently as the late 2000s. According to the organization Carbon Brief’s excellent timeline of coal use in the UK, continuing the use of coal with carbon capture was given consideration.
But several factors slowed the use of fuel ahead of any climate goals set out by the UK, some of which have parallels to the US’s situation. The European Union, which included the UK at the time, instituted new rules to address acid rain, which raised the cost of coal plants. In addition, the exploitation of oil and gas deposits in the North Sea provided access to an alternative fuel. Meanwhile, major gains in efficiency and the shift of some heavy industry overseas cut demand in the UK significantly.
Through their effect on coal use, these changes also lowered employment in coal mining. The mining sector has sometimes been a significant force in UK politics, but the decline of coal reduced the number of people employed in the sector, reducing its political influence.
These had all reduced the use of coal even before governments started taking any aggressive steps to limit climate change. But, by 2005, the EU implemented a carbon trading system that put a cost on emissions. By 2008, the UK government adopted national emissions targets, which have been maintained and strengthened since then by both Labour and Conservative governments up until Rishi Sunak, who was voted out of office before he had altered the UK’s trajectory. What started as a pledge for a 60 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 now requires the UK to hit net zero by that date.
These have included a floor on the price of carbon that ensures fossil-powered plants pay a cost for emissions that’s significant enough to promote the transition to renewables, even if prices in the EU’s carbon trading scheme are too low for that. And that transition has been rapid, with the total generations by renewables nearly tripling in the decade since 2013, heavily aided by the growth of offshore wind.
How to clean up the power sector
The trends were significant enough that, in 2015, the UK announced that it would target the end of coal in 2025, despite the fact that the first coal-free day on the grid wouldn’t come until two years after. But two years after that landmark, however, the UK was seeing entire weeks where no coal-fired plants were active.
To limit the worst impacts of climate change, it will be critical for other countries to follow the UK’s lead. So it’s worthwhile to consider how a country that was committed to coal relatively recently could manage such a rapid transition. There are a few UK-specific factors that won’t be possible to replicate everywhere. The first is that most of its coal infrastructure was quite old—Ratcliffe-on-Soar dates from the 1960s—and so it required replacement in any case. Part of the reason for its aging coal fleet was the local availability of relatively cheap natural gas, something that might not be true elsewhere, which put economic pressure on coal generation.
Another key factor is that the ever-shrinking number of people employed by coal power didn’t exert significant pressure on government policies. Despite the existence of a vocal group of climate contrarians in the UK, the issue never became heavily politicized. Both Labour and Conservative governments maintained a fact-based approach to climate change and set policies accordingly. That’s notably not the case in countries like the US and Australia.
But other factors are going to be applicable to a wide variety of countries. As the UK was moving away from coal, renewables became the cheapest way to generate power in much of the world. Coal is also the most polluting source of electrical power, providing ample reasons for regulation that have little to do with climate. Forcing coal users to pay even a fraction of its externalized costs on human health and the environment serve to make it even less economical compared to alternatives.
If these later factors can drive a move away from coal despite government inertia, then it can pay significant dividends in the fight to limit climate change. Inspired in part by the success in moving its grid off coal, the new Labour government in the UK has moved up its timeline for decarbonizing its power sector to 2030 (up from the previous Conservative government’s target of 2035).
While solar power is growing at an extremely rapid clip, in absolute terms, the use of natural gas for electricity production has continued to outpace renewables. But that looks set to change in 2024, as the US Energy Information Agency (EIA) has run the numbers on the first half of the year and found that wind, solar, and batteries were each installed at a pace that dwarfs new natural gas generators. And the gap is expected to get dramatically larger before the year is over.
Solar, batteries booming
According to the EIA’s numbers, about 20 GW of new capacity was added in the first half of this year, and solar accounts for 60 percent of it. Over a third of the solar additions occurred in just two states, Texas and Florida. There were two projects that went live that were rated at over 600 MW of capacity, one in Texas, the other in Nevada.
Next up is batteries: The US saw 4.2 additional gigawatts of battery capacity during this period, meaning over 20 percent of the total new capacity. (Batteries are treated as the equivalent of a generating source by the EIA since they can dispatch electricity to the grid on demand, even if they can’t do so continuously.) Texas and California alone accounted for over 60 percent of these additions; throw in Arizona and Nevada, and you’re at 93 percent of the installed capacity.
The clear pattern here is that batteries are going where the solar is, allowing the power generated during the peak of the day to be used to meet demand after the sun sets. This will help existing solar plants avoid curtailing power production during the lower-demand periods in the spring and fall. In turn, this will improve the economic case for installing additional solar in states where its production can already regularly exceed demand.
Wind power, by contrast, is running at a more sedate pace, with only 2.5 GW of new capacity during the first six months of 2024. And for likely the last time this decade, additional nuclear power was placed on the grid, at the fourth 1.1 GW reactor (and second recent build) at the Vogtle site in Georgia. The only other additions came from natural gas-powered facilities, but these totaled just 400 MW, or just 2 percent of the total of new capacity.
The EIA has also projected capacity additions out to the end of 2024 based on what’s in the works, and the overall shape of things doesn’t change much. However, the pace of installation goes up as developers rush to get their project operational within the current tax year. The EIA expects a bit over 60 GW of new capacity to be installed by the end of the year, with 37 GW of that coming in the form of solar power. Battery growth continues at a torrid pace, with 15 GW expected, or roughly a quarter of the total capacity additions for the year.
Wind will account for 7.1 GW of new capacity, and natural gas 2.6 GW. Throw in the contribution from nuclear, and 96 percent of the capacity additions of 2024 are expected to operate without any carbon emissions. Even if you choose to ignore the battery additions, the fraction of carbon-emitting capacity added remains extremely small, at only 6 percent.
Gradual shifts on the grid
Obviously, these numbers represent the peak production of these sources. Over a year, solar produces at about 25 percent of its rated capacity in the US, and wind at about 35 percent. The former number will likely decrease over time as solar becomes inexpensive enough to make economic sense in places that don’t receive as much sunshine. By contrast, wind’s capacity factor may increase as more offshore wind farms get completed. For natural gas, many of the newer plants are being designed to operate erratically so that they can provide power when renewables are under-producing.
A clearer sense of what’s happening comes from looking at the generating sources that are being retired. The US saw 5.1 GW of capacity drop off the grid in the first half of 2024, and aside from a 0.2 GW of “other,” all of it was fossil fuel-powered, including 2.1 GW of coal capacity and 2.7 GW of natural gas. The latter includes a large 1.4 GW natural gas plant in Massachusetts.
But total retirements are expected to be just 7.5 GWO this year—less than was retired in the first half of 2023. That’s likely because the US saw electricity use rise by 5 percent in the first half of 2025, based on numbers the EIA released on Friday (note that this link will take you to more recent data a month from now). It’s unclear how much of that was due to weather—a lot of the country saw heat that likely boosted demand for air conditioning—and how much could be accounted for by rising use in data centers and for the electrification of transit and appliances.
That data release includes details on where the US got its electricity during the first half of 2024. The changes aren’t dramatic compared to where they were when we looked at things last month. Still, what has changed over the past month is good news for renewables. In May, wind and solar production were up 8.4 percent compared to the same period the year before. By June, they were up by over 12 percent.
Given the EIA’s expectations for the rest of the year, the key question is likely to be whether the pace of new solar installations is going to be enough to offset the drop in production that will occur as the US shifts to the winter months.
With the plunging price of photovoltaics, the construction of solar plants has boomed in the US. Last year, for example, the US’s Energy Information Agency expected that over half of the new generating capacity would be solar, with a lot of it coming online at the very end of the year for tax reasons. Yesterday, the EIA released electricity generation numbers for the first five months of 2024, and that construction boom has seemingly made itself felt: generation by solar power has shot up by 25 percent compared to just one year earlier.
The EIA breaks down solar production according to the size of the plant. Large grid-scale facilities have their production tracked, giving the EIA hard numbers. For smaller installations, like rooftop solar on residential and commercial buildings, the agency has to estimate the amount produced, since the hardware often resides behind the metering equipment, so only shows up via lower-than-expected consumption.
In terms of utility-scale production, the first five months of 2024 saw it rise by 29 percent compared to the same period in the year prior. Small-scale solar was “only” up by 18 percent, with the combined number rising by 25.3 percent.
Most other generating sources were largely flat, year over year. This includes coal, nuclear, and hydroelectric, all of which changed by 2 percent or less. Wind was up by 4 percent, while natural gas rose by 5 percent. Because natural gas is the largest single source of energy on the grid, however, its 5 percent rise represents a lot of electrons—slightly more than the total increase in wind and solar.
Overall, energy use was up by about 4 percent compared to the same period in 2023. This could simply be a matter of changing weather conditions that require more heating or cooling. But there have been several trends that should increase electricity usage: the rise of bitcoin mining, the growth of data centers, and the electrification of appliances and transport. So far, that hasn’t shown up in the actual electricity usage in the US, which has stayed largely flat for decades. It could be possible that 2024 is the year when usage starts going up again.
More to come
It’s worth noting that this data all comes from before some of the most productive months of the year for solar power; overall, the EIA is predicting that solar production could rise by as much as 42 percent in 2024.
So, where does this leave the US’s efforts to decarbonize? If we combine nuclear, hydro, wind, and solar under the umbrella of carbon-free power sources, then these account for about 45 percent of US electricity production so far this year. Within that category, wind and solar now produce more than three times hydroelectric, and roughly the same amount as nuclear.
Wind and solar have also produced 1.3 times as much electricity as coal so far in 2024, with solar alone now producing about half as much as coal. That said, natural gas still produces twice as much electricity as wind and solar combined, indicating we still have a long way to go to decarbonize our grid.
Still, we can expect solar’s productivity to climb even before the year is out. That’s in part because we don’t yet have numbers for June, the month that contains the longest day of the year. But it’s also because the construction boom shows no sign of stopping. As noted here, solar and wind deployments are expected to dwarf everything else over the coming year. The items in gray on the map primarily represent battery storage, which will allow us to make better use of those renewables, as well.
By contrast, facilities that are scheduled for retirement over the next year largely consist of coal and natural gas plants.
Is space-based solar power a costly, risky pipe dream? Or is it a viable way to combat climate change? Although beaming solar power from space to Earth could ultimately involve transmitting gigawatts, the process could be made surprisingly safe and cost-effective, according to experts from Space Solar, the European Space Agency, and the University of Glasgow.
But we’re going to need to move well beyond demonstration hardware and solve a number of engineering challenges if we want to develop that potential.
Designing space-based solar
Beaming solar energy from space is not new; telecommunications satellites have been sending microwave signals generated by solar power back to Earth since the 1960s. But sending useful amounts of power is a different matter entirely.
“The idea [has] been around for just over a century,” said Nicol Caplin, deep space exploration scientist at the ESA, on a Physics World podcast. “The original concepts were indeed sci-fi. It’s sort of rooted in science fiction, but then, since then, there’s been a trend of interest coming and going.”
Researchers are scoping out multiple designs for space-based solar power. Matteo Ceriotti, senior lecturer in space systems engineering at the University of Glasgow, wrote in The Conversation that many designs have been proposed.
The Solaris initiative is exploring two possible technologies, according to Sanjay Vijendran, lead for the Solaris initiative at the ESA: one that involves beaming microwaves from a station in geostationary orbit down to a receiver on Earth and another that involves using immense mirrors in a lower orbit to reflect sunlight down onto solar farms. He said he thinks that both of these solutions are potentially valuable. Microwave technology has drawn wider interest and was the main focus of these interviews. It has enormous potential, although high-frequency radio waves can also be used.
“You really have a source of 24/7 clean power from space,” Vijendran said. The power can be transmitted regardless of weather conditions because of the frequency of the microwaves.
“A 1-gigawatt power plant in space would be comparable to the top five solar farms on earth. A power plant with a capacity of 1 gigawatt could power around 875,000 households for one year,” said Andrew Glester, host of the Physics World podcast.
But we’re not ready to deploy anything like this. “It will be a big engineering challenge,” Caplin said. There are a number of physical hurdles involved in successfully building a solar power station in space.
Using microwave technology, the solar array for an orbiting power station that generates a gigawatt of power would have to be over 1 square kilometer in size, according to a Nature article by senior reporter Elizabeth Gibney. “That’s more than 100 times the size of the International Space Station, which took a decade to build.” It would also need to be assembled robotically, since the orbiting facility would be uncrewed.
The solar cells would need to be resilient to space radiation and debris. They would also need to be efficient and lightweight, with a power-to-weight ratio 50 times more than the typical silicon solar cell, Gibney wrote. Keeping the cost of these cells down is another factor that engineers have to take into consideration. Reducing the losses during power transmission is another challenge, Gibney wrote. The energy conversion rate needs to be improved to 10–15 percent, according to the ESA. This would require technical advances.
Space Solar is working on a satellite design called CASSIOPeiA, which Physics World describes as looking “like a spiral staircase, with the photovoltaic panels being the ‘treads’ and the microwave transmitters—rod-shaped dipoles—being the ‘risers.’” It has a helical shape with no moving parts.
“Our system’s comprised of hundreds of thousands of the same dinner-plate-sized power modules. Each module has the PV which converts the sun’s energy into DC electricity,” said Sam Adlen, CEO of Space Solar.
“That DC power then drives electronics to transmit the power… down toward Earth from dipole antennas. That power up in space is converted to [microwaves] and beamed down in a coherent beam down to the Earth where it’s received by a rectifying antenna, reconverted into electricity, and input to the grid.”
Adlen said that robotics technologies for space applications, such as in-orbit assembly, are advancing rapidly.
Ceriotti wrote that SPS-ALPHA, another design, has a large solar-collector structure that includes many heliostats, which are modular small reflectors that can be moved individually. These concentrate sunlight onto separate power-generating modules, after which it’s transmitted back to Earth by yet another module.
One of the most striking things about the explosion of renewable power that’s happening in the US is that much of it is going on in states governed by politicians who don’t believe in the problem wind and solar are meant to address. Acceptance of the evidence for climate change tends to be lowest among Republicans, yet many of the states where renewable power has boomed—wind in Wyoming and Iowa, solar in Texas—are governed by Republicans.
That’s partly because, up until about 2020, there was a strong bipartisan consensus in favor of expanding wind and solar power, with support above 75 percent among both parties. Since then, however, support among Republicans has dropped dramatically, approaching 50 percent, according to polling data released this week.
To a certain extent, none of this should be surprising. The current leader of the Republican Party has been saying that wind turbines cause cancer and offshore wind is killing whales. And conservative-backed groups have been spreading misinformation in order to drum up opposition to solar power facilities.
Meanwhile, since 2022, the Inflation Reduction Act has been promoted as one of the Biden administration’s signature accomplishments and has driven significant investments in renewable power, much of it in red states. Negative partisanship is undoubtedly contributing to this drop in support.
One striking thing about the new polling data, gathered by the Pew Research Center, is how dramatically it skews with age. When given a choice between expanding fossil fuel production or expanding renewable power, Republicans under the age of 30 favored renewables by a 2-to-1 margin. Republicans over 30, in contrast, favored fossil fuels by margins that increased with age, topping out at a three-to-one margin in favor of fossil fuels among those in the 65-and-over age group. The decline in support occurred in those over 50 starting in 2020; support held steady among younger groups until 2024, when the 30–49 age group started moving in favor of fossil fuels.
Democrats, by contrast, break in favor of renewables by 75 points, with little difference across age groups and no indication of significant change over time. They’re also twice as likely to think a solar farm will help the local economy than Republicans are.
Similar differences were apparent when Pew asked about policies meant to encourage the sale of electric vehicles, with 83 percent of Republicans opposed to having half of cars sold be electric in 2032. By contrast, nearly two-thirds of Democrats favored this policy.
There’s also a rural/urban divide apparent (consistent with Republicans getting more support from rural voters). Forty percent of urban residents felt that a solar farm would improve the local economy; only 25 percent of rural residents agreed. Rural residents were also more likely to say solar farms made the landscape unattractive and take up too much space. (Suburban participants were consistently in between rural and urban participants.)
What’s behind these changes? The single biggest factor appears to be negative partisanship combined with the election of Joe Biden.
Among Republicans, support for every single form of power started to change in 2020—fossil fuels, renewables, and nuclear. Among Democrats, that’s largely untrue. Their high level of support for renewable power and aversion to fossil fuels remained largely unchanged. The lone exception is nuclear power, where support rose among both Democrats and Republicans (the Biden administration has adopted a number of pro-nuclear policies).
This isn’t to say that non-political factors are playing no role. The rapid expansion of renewable power means that many more people are seeing facilities open near them, and viewing that as an indication of a changing society. Some degree of backlash was almost inevitable and, in this case, the close ties between conservative lobbyists and fossil fuel interests were ready to take advantage of it.
Earlier this week, the US Senate passed what’s being called the ADVANCE Act, for Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy. Among a number of other changes, the bill would attempt to streamline permitting for newer reactor technology and offer cash incentives for the first companies that build new plants that rely on one of a handful of different technologies. It enjoyed broad bipartisan support both in the House and Senate and now heads to President Biden for his signature.
Given Biden’s penchant for promoting his bipartisan credentials, it’s likely to be signed into law. But the biggest hurdles nuclear power faces are all economic, rather than regulatory, and the bill provides very little in the way of direct funding that could help overcome those barriers.
Incentives
For reasons that will be clear only to congressional staffers, the Senate version of the bill was attached to an amendment to the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act. Nevertheless, it passed by a margin of 88-2, indicating widespread (and potentially veto-proof) support. Having passed the House already, there’s nothing left but the president’s signature.
The bill’s language focuses on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and its role in licensing nuclear reactor technology. The NRC is directed to develop a variety of reports for Congress—so, so many reports, focusing on everything from nuclear waste to fusion power—that could potentially inform future legislation. But the meat of the bill has two distinct focuses: streamlining regulation and providing some incentives for new technology.
The incentives are one of the more interesting features of the bill. They’re primarily focused on advanced nuclear technology, which is defined extremely broadly by an earlier statute as providing any of the following:
(A) additional inherent safety features
(B) significantly lower levelized cost of electricity
(C) lower waste yields
(D) greater fuel utilization
(E) enhanced reliability
(F) increased proliferation resistance
(G) increased thermal efficiency
(H) ability to integrate into electric and nonelectric applications
Normally, the work of the NRC in licensing is covered via application fees paid by the company seeking the license. But the NRC is instructed to lower its licensing fees for anyone developing advanced nuclear technologies. And there’s a “prize” incentive where the first company to get across the line with any of a handful of specific technologies will have all these fees refunded to it.
Winners will be awarded when they have met any of the following requirements: the first advanced reactor design that receives a license from the NRC; the first to be loaded with fuel for operation; the first to use isotopes derived from spent fuel; the first to build a facility where the reactor is integrated into a system that stores energy; the first to build a facility where the reactor provides electricity or processes heat for industrial applications.
The first award will likely go to NuScale, which is developing a small, modular reactor design and has gotten pretty far along in the licensing process. Its first planned installation, however, has been cancelled due to rising costs, so there’s no guarantee that the company will be first to fuel a reactor. TerraPower, a company backed by Bill Gates, is fairly far along in the design of a rector facility that will come with integrated storage, and so may be considered a frontrunner there.
For the remaining two prizes, there aren’t frontrunners for very different reasons. Nearly every company building small modular nuclear reactors promotes them as a potential source of process heat. By contrast, reprocessing spent fuel has been hugely expensive in any country where it has been tried, so it’s unlikely that prize will ever be given out.
High-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) has been touted as the go-to fuel for powering next-gen nuclear reactors, which include the sodium-cooled TerraPower or the space-borne system powering Demonstration Rocket for Agile Cislunar Operations (DRACO). That’s because it was supposed to offer higher efficiency while keeping uranium enrichment “well below the threshold needed for weapons-grade material,” according to the US Department of Energy.
This justified huge government investments in HALEU production in the US and UK, as well as relaxed security requirements for facilities using it as fuel. But now, a team of scientists has published an article in Science that argues that you can make a nuclear bomb using HALEU.
“I looked it up and DRACO space reactor will use around 300 kg of HALEU. This is marginal, but I would say you could make one a weapon with that much,” says Edwin Lyman, the director of Nuclear Power Safety at the Union of Concerned Scientists and co-author of the paper.
Forgotten threats
“When uranium is mined out of the ground, it’s mostly a mixture of two isotopes: uranium-238 and uranium-235. Uranium 235 concentrations are below one percent,” says Lyman. This is sent through an enrichment process, usually in gas centrifuges, where it is turned into gaseous form and centrifuged till the two isotopes are separated from each other due to their slight difference in their atomic weights. This can produce uranium with various levels of enrichment. Material that’s under 10 percent uranium-235 is called low-enriched uranium (LEU) and is used in power reactors working today. Moving the enrichment level up to between 10 and 20 percent, we get HALEU; above 20 percent, we start talking about highly enriched uranium, which can reach over 90 percent enrichment for uses like nuclear weapons.
“Historically, 20 percent has been considered a threshold between highly enriched uranium and low enriched uranium and, over time, that’s been associated with the limit of what is usable in nuclear weapons and what isn’t. But the truth is that threshold is not really a limit of weapons usability,” says Lyman. And we knew that since long time ago.
A study assessing the weaponization potential of uranium with different enrichment levels was done by the Los Alamos National Laboratory back in 1954. The findings were clear: Uranium enriched up to 10 percent was no good for weapons, regardless of how much of it you had. HALEU, though, was found to be of “weapons significance,” provided a sufficient amount was available. “My sense is that once they established 20 percent is somewhat acceptable, and given the material is weapons-usable only when you have enough of it, they just thought we’d need to limit the quantities and we’d be okay. That sort of got baked into the international security framework for uranium because there was not that much HALEU,” says Lyman. The Los Alamos study recommended releasing 100 kg of uranium enriched to up to 20 percent for research purposes in other countries, as they didn’t think 100 kg could lead to any nuclear threats.
The question that wasn’t answered at the time was how much was too much.
On Thursday, the US Department of Energy released its preliminary estimate for the nation’s carbon emissions in the previous year. Any drop in emissions puts us on a path that would avoid some of the catastrophic warming scenarios that were still on the table at the turn of the century. But if we’re to have a chance of meeting the Paris Agreement goal of keeping the planet from warming beyond 2° C, we’ll need to see emissions drop dramatically in the near future.
So, how is the US doing? Emissions continue to trend downward, but there’s no sign the drop has accelerated. And most of the drop has come from a single sector: changes in the power grid.
Off the grid, on the road
US carbon emissions have been trending downward since roughly 2007, when they peaked at about six gigatonnes. In recent years, the pandemic produced a dramatic drop in emissions in 2020, lowering them to under five gigatonnes for the first time since before 1990, when the EIA’s data started. Carbon dioxide release went up a bit afterward, with 2023 marking the first post-pandemic decline, with emissions again clearly below five gigatonnes.
The DOE’s Energy Information Agency (EIA) divides the sources of carbon dioxide into five different sectors: electricity generation, transportation, and residential, commercial, and industrial uses. The EIA assigns 80 percent of the 2023 reduction in US emissions to changes in the electric power grid, which is not a shock given that it’s the only sector that’s seen significant change in the entire 30-year period the EIA is tracking.
What’s happening with the power grid? Several things. At the turn of the century, coal accounted for over half of the US’s electricity generation; it’s now down to 16 percent. Within the next two years, it’s likely to be passed by wind and solar, which were indistinguishable from zero percent of generation as recently as 2004. Things would be even better for them if not for generally low wind speeds leading to a decline in wind generation in 2023. The biggest change, however, has been the rise of natural gas, which went from 10 percent of generation in 1990 to over 40 percent in 2023.
A small contributor to the lower emissions came from lower demand—it dropped by a percentage point compared to 2022. Electrification of transport and appliances, along with the growth of AI processing, are expected to send demand soaring in the near future, but there’s no indication of that on the grid yet.
Currently, generating electricity accounts for 30 percent of the US’s carbon emissions. That places it as the second most significant contributor, behind transportation, which is responsible for 39 percent of emissions. The EIA rates transportation emissions as unchanged relative to 2022, despite seeing air travel return to pre-pandemic levels and a slight increase in gasoline consumption. Later in this decade, tighter fuel efficiency rules are expected to drive a decline in transportation emissions, which are only down about 10 percent compared to their 2006 peak.
Buildings and industry
The remaining sectors—commercial, residential, and industrial—have a more complicated relationship with fossil fuels. Some of their energy comes via the grid, so its emissions are already accounted for. Thanks to the grid decarbonizing, these would be going down, but for business and residential use, grid-dependent emissions are dropping even faster than that would imply. This suggests that things like more efficient lighting and appliances are having an impact.
Separately, direct use of fossil fuels for things like furnaces, water heaters, etc., has been largely flat for the entire 30 years the EIA is looking at, although milder weather led to a slight decline in 2023 (8 percent for residential properties, 4 percent for commercial).
In contrast, the EIA only tracks the direct use of fossil fuels for industrial processes. These are down slightly over the 30-year period but have been fairly stable since the 2008 economic crisis, with no change in emissions between 2022 and 2023. As with the electric grid, the primary difference in this sector has been due to the growth of natural gas and the decline of coal.
Overall, there are two ways to look at this data. The first is that progress at limiting carbon emissions has been extremely limited and that there has been no progress at all in several sectors. The more optimistic view is that the technologies for decarbonizing the electric grid and improving building electrical usage are currently the most advanced, and the US has focused its decarbonization efforts where they’ll make the most difference.
From either perspective, it’s clear that the harder challenges are still coming, both in terms of accelerating decarbonization, and in terms of tackling sectors where decarbonization will be harder. The Biden administration has been working to put policies in place that should drive progress in this regard, but we probably won’t see much of their impact until early in the following decade.
Glistening in the dry expanses of the Nevada desert is an unusual kind of power plant that harnesses energy not from the sun or wind, but from the Earth itself.
Known as Project Red, it pumps water thousands of feet into the ground, down where rocks are hot enough to roast a turkey. Around the clock, the plant sucks the heated water back up to power generators. Since last November, this carbon-free, Earth-borne power has been flowing onto a local grid in Nevada.
Geothermal energy, though it’s continuously radiating from Earth’s super-hot core, has long been a relatively niche source of electricity, largely limited to volcanic regions like Iceland where hot springs bubble from the ground. But geothermal enthusiasts have dreamed of sourcing Earth power in places without such specific geological conditions—like Project Red’s Nevada site, developed by energy startup Fervo Energy.
Such next-generation geothermal systems have been in the works for decades, but they’ve proved expensive and technologically difficult, and have sometimes even triggered earthquakes. Some experts hope that newer efforts like Project Red may now, finally, signal a turning point, by leveraging techniques that were honed in oil and gas extraction to improve reliability and cost-efficiency.
The advances have garnered hopes that with enough time and money, geothermal power—which currently generates less than 1 percent of the world’s electricity, and 0.4 percent of electricity in the United States—could become a mainstream energy source. Some posit that geothermal could be a valuable tool in transitioning the energy system off of fossil fuels, because it can provide a continuous backup to intermittent energy sources like solar and wind. “It’s been, to me, the most promising energy source for a long time,” says energy engineer Roland Horne of Stanford University. “But now that we’re moving towards a carbon-free grid, geothermal is very important.”
A rocky start
Geothermal energy works best with two things: heat, plus rock that is permeable enough to carry water. In places where molten rock sizzles close to the surface, water will seep through porous volcanic rock, warm up and bubble upward as hot water, steam, or both.
If the water or steam is hot enough—ideally at least around 300 degrees Fahrenheit—it can be extracted from the ground and used to power generators for electricity. In Kenya, nearly 50 percent of electricity generated comes from geothermal. Iceland gets 25 percent of its electricity from this source, while New Zealand gets about 18 percent and the state of California, 6 percent.
Some natural geothermal resources are still untapped, such as in the western United States, says geologist Ann Robertson-Tait, president of GeothermEx, a geothermal energy consulting division at the oilfield services company SLB. But by and large, we’re running out of natural, high-quality geothermal resources, pushing experts to consider ways of extracting geothermal energy from areas where the energy is much harder to access. “There’s so much heat in the Earth,” Robertson-Tait says. But, she adds, “much of it is locked inside rock that isn’t permeable.”
Tapping that heat requires deep drilling and creating cracks in these non-volcanic, dense rocks to allow water to flow through them. Since 1970, engineers have been developing “enhanced geothermal systems” (EGS) that do just that, applying methods similar to the hydraulic fracturing—or fracking—used to suck oil and gas out of deep rocks. Water is pumped at high pressure into wells, up to several miles deep, to blast cracks into the rocks. The cracked rock and water create an underground radiator where water heats before rising to the surface through a second well. Dozens of such EGS installations have been built in the United States, Europe, Australia, and Japan—most of them experimental and government-funded—with mixed success.
Famously, one EGS plant in South Korea was abruptly shuttered in 2017 after having probably caused a 5.5-magnitude earthquake; fracking of any kind can add pressure to nearby tectonic faults. Other issues were technological—some plants didn’t create enough fractures for good heat exchange, or fractures traveled in the wrong direction and failed to connect the two wells.
Some efforts, however, turned into viable power plants, including several German and French systems built between 1987 and 2012 in the Rhine Valley. There, engineers made use of existing fractures in the rock.
But overall, there just hasn’t been enough interest to develop EGS into a more reliable and lucrative technology, says geophysicist Dimitra Teza of the energy research institute Fraunhofer IEG in Karlsruhe, Germany, who helped develop some of the Rhine Valley EGS systems. “It has been quite tough for the industry.”