Security

spies-hack-high-value-mail-servers-using-an-exploit-from-yesteryear

Spies hack high-value mail servers using an exploit from yesteryear

Threat actors, likely supported by the Russian government, hacked multiple high-value mail servers around the world by exploiting XSS vulnerabilities, a class of bug that was among the most commonly exploited in decades past.

XSS is short for cross-site scripting. Vulnerabilities result from programming errors found in webserver software that, when exploited, allow attackers to execute malicious code in the browsers of people visiting an affected website. XSS first got attention in 2005, with the creation of the Samy Worm, which knocked MySpace out of commission when it added more than one million MySpace friends to a user named Samy. XSS exploits abounded for the next decade and have gradually fizzled more recently, although this class of attacks continues now.

Just add JavaScript

On Thursday, security firm ESET reported that Sednit, a Kremlin-backed hacking group also tracked as APT28, Fancy Bear, Forest Blizzard, and Sofacy—gained access to high-value email accounts by exploiting XSS vulnerabilities in mail server software from four different makers. Those packages are: Roundcube, MDaemon, Horde, and Zimbra.

The hacks most recently targeted mail servers used by defense contractors in Bulgaria and Romania, some of which are producing Soviet-era weapons for use in Ukraine as it fends off an invasion from Russia. Governmental organizations in those countries were also targeted. Other targets have included governments in Africa, the European Union, and South America.

RoundPress, as ESET has named the operation, delivered XSS exploits through spearphishing emails. Hidden inside some of the HTML in the emails was an XSS exploit. In 2023, ESET observed Sednit exploiting CVE-2020-43770, a vulnerability that has since been patched in Roundcube. A year later, ESET watched Sednit exploit different XSS vulnerabilities in Horde, MDaemon, and Zimbra. One of the now-patched vulnerabilities, from MDaemon, was a zero-day at the time Sednit exploited it.

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Google introduces Advanced Protection mode for its most at-risk Android users

Google is adding a new security setting to Android to provide an extra layer of resistance against attacks that infect devices, tap calls traveling through insecure carrier networks, and deliver scams through messaging services.

On Tuesday, the company unveiled the Advanced Protection mode, most of which will be rolled out in the upcoming release of Android 16. The setting comes as mercenary malware sold by NSO Group and a cottage industry of other exploit sellers continues to thrive. These players provide attacks-as-a-service through end-to-end platforms that exploit zero-day vulnerabilities on targeted devices, infect them with advanced spyware, and then capture contacts, message histories, locations, and other sensitive information. Over the past decade, phones running fully updated versions of Android and iOS have routinely been hacked through these services.

A core suite of enhanced security features

Advanced Protection is Google’s latest answer to this type of attack. By flipping a single button in device settings, users can enable a host of protections that can thwart some of the most common techniques used in sophisticated hacks. In some cases, the protections hamper performance and capabilities of the device, so Google is recommending the new mode mainly for journalists, elected officials, and other groups who are most often targeted or have the most to lose when infected.

“With the release of Android 16, users who choose to activate Advanced Protection will gain immediate access to a core suite of enhanced security features,” Google’s product manager for Android Security, Il-Sung Lee, wrote. “Additional Advanced Protection features like Intrusion Logging, USB protection, the option to disable auto-reconnect to insecure networks, and integration with Scam Detection for Phone by Google will become available later this year.”

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AI agents that autonomously trade cryptocurrency aren’t ready for prime time

The researchers wrote:

The implications of this vulnerability are particularly severe given that ElizaOSagents are designed to interact with multiple users simultaneously, relying on shared contextual inputs from all participants. A single successful manipulation by a malicious actor can compromise the integrity of the entire system, creating cascading effects that are both difficult to detect and mitigate. For example, on ElizaOS’s Discord server, various bots are deployed to assist users with debugging issues or engaging in general conversations. A successful context manipulation targeting any one of these bots could disrupt not only individual interactions but also harm the broader community relying on these agents for support

and engagement.

This attack exposes a core security flaw: while plugins execute sensitive operations, they depend entirely on the LLM’s interpretation of context. If the context is compromised, even legitimate user inputs can trigger malicious actions. Mitigating this threat requires strong integrity checks on stored context to ensure that only verified, trusted data informs decision-making during plugin execution.

In an email, ElizaOS creator Shaw Walters said the framework, like all natural-language interfaces, is designed “as a replacement, for all intents and purposes, for lots and lots of buttons on a webpage.” Just as a website developer should never include a button that gives visitors the ability to execute malicious code, so too should administrators implementing ElizaOS-based agents carefully limit what agents can do by creating allow lists that permit an agent’s capabilities as a small set of pre-approved actions.

Walters continued:

From the outside it might seem like an agent has access to their own wallet or keys, but what they have is access to a tool they can call which then accesses those, with a bunch of authentication and validation between.

So for the intents and purposes of the paper, in the current paradigm, the situation is somewhat moot by adding any amount of access control to actions the agents can call, which is something we address and demo in our latest latest version of Eliza—BUT it hints at a much harder to deal with version of the same problem when we start giving the agent more computer control and direct access to the CLI terminal on the machine it’s running on. As we explore agents that can write new tools for themselves, containerization becomes a bit trickier, or we need to break it up into different pieces and only give the public facing agent small pieces of it… since the business case of this stuff still isn’t clear, nobody has gotten terribly far, but the risks are the same as giving someone that is very smart but lacking in judgment the ability to go on the internet. Our approach is to keep everything sandboxed and restricted per user, as we assume our agents can be invited into many different servers and perform tasks for different users with different information. Most agents you download off Github do not have this quality, the secrets are written in plain text in an environment file.

In response, Atharv Singh Patlan, the lead co-author of the paper, wrote: “Our attack is able to counteract any role based defenses. The memory injection is not that it would randomly call a transfer: it is that whenever a transfer is called, it would end up sending to the attacker’s address. Thus, when the ‘admin’ calls transfer, the money will be sent to the attacker.”

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DOGE software engineer’s computer infected by info-stealing malware

Login credentials belonging to an employee at both the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and the Department of Government Efficiency have appeared in multiple public leaks from info-stealer malware, a strong indication that devices belonging to him have been hacked in recent years.

Kyle Schutt is a 30-something-year-old software engineer who, according to Dropsite News, gained access in February to a “core financial management system” belonging to the Federal Emergency Management Agency. As an employee of DOGE, Schutt accessed FEMA’s proprietary software for managing both disaster and non-disaster funding grants. Under his role at CISA, he likely is privy to sensitive information regarding the security of civilian federal government networks and critical infrastructure throughout the US.

A steady stream of published credentials

According to journalist Micah Lee, user names and passwords for logging in to various accounts belonging to Schutt have been published at least four times since 2023 in logs from stealer malware. Stealer malware typically infects devices through trojanized apps, phishing, or software exploits. Besides pilfering login credentials, stealers can also log all keystrokes and capture or record screen output. The data is then sent to the attacker and, occasionally after that, can make its way into public credential dumps.

“I have no way of knowing exactly when Schutt’s computer was hacked, or how many times,” Lee wrote. “I don’t know nearly enough about the origins of these stealer log datasets. He might have gotten hacked years ago and the stealer log datasets were just published recently. But he also might have gotten hacked within the last few months.”

Lee went on to say that credentials belonging to a Gmail account known to belong to Schutt have appeared in 51 data breaches and five pastes tracked by breach notification service Have I Been Pwned. Among the breaches that supplied the credentials is one from 2013 that pilfered password data for 3 million Adobe account holders, one in a 2016 breach that stole credentials for 164 million LinkedIn users, a 2020 breach affecting 167 million users of Gravatar, and a breach last year of the conservative news site The Post Millennial.

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WhatsApp provides no cryptographic management for group messages

The flow of adding new members to a WhatsApp group message is:

  • A group member sends an unsigned message to the WhatsApp server that designates which users are group members, for instance, Alice, Bob, and Charlie
  • The server informs all existing group members that Alice, Bob, and Charlie have been added
  • The existing members have the option of deciding whether to accept messages from Alice, Bob, and Charlie, and whether messages exchanged with them should be encrypted

With no cryptographic signatures verifying an existing member who wants to add a new member, additions can be made by anyone with the ability to control the server or messages that flow into it. Using the common fictional scenario for illustrating end-to-end encryption, this lack of cryptographic assurance leaves open the possibility that Malory can join a group and gain access to the human-readable messages exchanged there.

WhatsApp isn’t the only messenger lacking cryptographic assurances for new group members. In 2022, a team that included some of the same researchers that analyzed WhatsApp found that Matrix—an open source and proprietary platform for chat and collaboration clients and servers—also provided no cryptographic means for ensuring only authorized members join a group. The Telegram messenger, meanwhile, offers no end-to-end encryption for group messages, making the app among the weakest for ensuring the confidentiality of group messages.

By contrast, the open source Signal messenger provides a cryptographic assurance that only an existing group member designated as the group admin can add new members. In an email, researcher Benjamin Dowling, also of King’s College, explained:

Signal implements “cryptographic group management.” Roughly this means that the administrator of a group, a user, signs a message along the lines of “Alice, Bob and Charley are in this group” to everyone else. Then, everybody else in the group makes their decision on who to encrypt to and who to accept messages from based on these cryptographically signed messages, [meaning] who to accept as a group member. The system used by Signal is a bit different [than WhatsApp], since [Signal] makes additional efforts to avoid revealing the group membership to the server, but the core principles remain the same.

On a high-level, in Signal, groups are associated with group membership lists that are stored on the Signal server. An administrator of the group generates a GroupMasterKey that is used to make changes to this group membership list. In particular, the GroupMasterKey is sent to other group members via Signal, and so is unknown to the server. Thus, whenever an administrator wants to make a change to the group (for instance, invite another user), they need to create an updated membership list (authenticated with the GroupMasterKey) telling other users of the group who to add. Existing users are notified of the change and update their group list, and perform the appropriate cryptographic operations with the new member so the existing member can begin sending messages to the new members as part of the group.

Most messaging apps, including Signal, don’t certify the identity of their users. That means there’s no way Signal can verify that the person using an account named Alice does, in fact, belong to Alice. It’s fully possible that Malory could create an account and name it Alice. (As an aside, and in sharp contrast to Signal, the account members that belong to a given WhatsApp group are visible to insiders, hackers, and to anyone with a valid subpoena.)

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We have reached the “severed fingers and abductions” stage of the crypto revolution

French gendarmes have been busy policing crypto crimes, but these aren’t the usual financial schemes, cons, and HODL! shenanigans one usually reads about. No, these crimes involve abductions, (multiple) severed fingers, and (multiple) people rescued from the trunks of cars—once after being doused with gasoline.

This previous weekend was particularly nuts, with an older gentleman snatched from the streets of Paris’ 14th arrondissement on May 1 by men in ski masks. The 14th is a pleasant place—I highly recommend a visit to the catacombs in Place Denfert-Rochereau—and not usually the site of snatch-and-grab operations. The abducted man was apparently the father of someone who had made a packet in crypto. The kidnappers demanded a multimillion-euro ransom from the man’s son.

According to Le Monde, the abducted father was taken to a house in a Parisian suburb, where one of the father’s fingers was cut off in the course of ransom negotiations. Police feared “other mutilations” if they were unable to find the man, but they did locate and raid the house this weekend, arresting five people in their 20s. (According to the BBC, French police used “phone signals” to locate the house.)

Sounds crazy, but this was the second such incident this year. In January, crypto maven David Balland was also abducted along with his partner on January 21. Balland was taken to a house, where he also had a finger cut off. According to The Guardian, “Police were contacted by Balland’s business partner, who received a video of the finger alongside a demand for a large ransom in cryptocurrency, of around 10 million euro. Balland was freed in a police raid soon after. His partner was found tied up in the boot of a car in a carpark in the Essonne area south of Paris the next day.”

And a few weeks before that, attackers went to the home of someone whose son was a “crypto-influencer based in Dubai.” At the father’s home, the kidnappers “tied up [the father’s] wife and daughter and forced him into a car. The man’s influencer son received a ransom demand and contacted police. The two women were then quickly freed. The father was only discovered 24 hours later in the boot of a car in Normandy, tied up and showing signs of physical violence, having been sprinkled with petrol.”

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Jury orders NSO to pay $167 million for hacking WhatsApp users

A jury has awarded WhatsApp $167 million in punitive damages in a case the company brought against Israel-based NSO Group for exploiting a software vulnerability that hijacked the phones of thousands of users.

The verdict, reached Tuesday, comes as a major victory not just for Meta-owned WhatsApp but also for privacy- and security-rights advocates who have long criticized the practices of NSO and other exploit sellers. The jury also awarded WhatsApp $444 million in compensatory damages.

Clickless exploit

WhatsApp sued NSO in 2019 for an attack that targeted roughly 1,400 mobile phones belonging to attorneys, journalists, human-rights activists, political dissidents, diplomats, and senior foreign government officials. NSO, which works on behalf of governments and law enforcement authorities in various countries, exploited a critical WhatsApp vulnerability that allowed it to install NSO’s proprietary spyware Pegasus on iOS and Android devices. The clickless exploit worked by placing a call to a target’s app. A target did not have to answer the call to be infected.

“Today’s verdict in WhatsApp’s case is an important step forward for privacy and security as the first victory against the development and use of illegal spyware that threatens the safety and privacy of everyone,” WhatsApp said in a statement. “Today, the jury’s decision to force NSO, a notorious foreign spyware merchant, to pay damages is a critical deterrent to this malicious industry against their illegal acts aimed at American companies and the privacy and security of the people we serve.”

NSO created WhatsApp accounts in 2018 and used them a year later to initiate calls that exploited the critical vulnerability on phones, which, among others, included 100 members of “civil society” from 20 countries, according to an investigation research group Citizen Lab performed on behalf of WhatsApp. The calls passed through WhatsApp servers and injected malicious code into the memory of targeted devices. The targeted phones would then use WhatsApp servers to connect to malicious servers maintained by NSO.

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Man pleads guilty to using malicious AI software to hack Disney employee

A California man has pleaded guilty to hacking an employee of The Walt Disney Company by tricking the person into running a malicious version of a widely used open source AI image-generation tool.

Ryan Mitchell Kramer, 25, pleaded guilty to one count of accessing a computer and obtaining information and one count of threatening to damage a protected computer, the US Attorney for the Central District of California said Monday. In a plea agreement, Kramer said he published an app on GitHub for creating AI-generated art. The program contained malicious code that gave access to computers that installed it. Kramer operated using the moniker NullBulge.

Not the ComfyUI you’re looking for

According to researchers at VPNMentor, the program Kramer used was ComfyUI_LLMVISION, which purported to be an extension for the legitimate ComfyUI image generator and had functions added to it for copying passwords, payment card data, and other sensitive information from machines that installed it. The fake extension then sent the data to a Discord server that Kramer operated. To better disguise the malicious code, it was folded into files that used the names OpenAI and Anthropic.

Two files automatically downloaded by ComfyUI_LLMVISION, as displayed by a user’s Python package manager. Credit: VPNMentor

The Disney employee downloaded ComfyUI_LLMVISION in April 2024. After gaining unauthorized access to the victim’s computer and online accounts, Kramer accessed private Disney Slack channels. In May, he downloaded roughly 1.1 terabytes of confidential data from thousands of the channels.

In early July, Kramer contacted the employee and pretended to be a member of a hacktivist group. Later that month, after receiving no reply from the employee, Kramer publicly released the stolen information, which, besides private Disney material, also included the employee’s bank, medical, and personal information.

In the plea agreement, Kramer admitted that two other victims had installed ComfyUI_LLMVISION, and he gained unauthorized access to their computers and accounts as well. The FBI is investigating. Kramer is expected to make his first court appearance in the coming weeks.

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Signal clone used by Trump official stops operations after report it was hacked

Waltz was removed from his post late last week, with Trump nominating him to serve as ambassador to the United Nations.

TeleMessage website removes Signal mentions

The TeleMessage website until recently boasted the ability to “capture, archive and monitor mobile communication” through text messages, voice calls, WhatsApp, WeChat, Telegram, and Signal, as seen in an Internet Archive capture from Saturday. Another archived page says that TeleMessage “captures and records Signal calls, messages, deletions, including text, multimedia, [and] files,” and “maintain[s] all Signal app features and functionality as well as the Signal encryption.”

The TeleMessage home page currently makes no mention of Signal, and links on the page have been disabled.

The anonymous hacker who reportedly infiltrated TeleMessage told 404 Media that it took about 15 to 20 minutes and “wasn’t much effort at all.” While the hacker did not obtain Waltz’s messages, “the hack shows that the archived chat logs are not end-to-end encrypted between the modified version of the messaging app and the ultimate archive destination controlled by the TeleMessage customer,” according to 404 Media.

“Data related to Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the cryptocurrency giant Coinbase, and other financial institutions are included in the hacked material, according to screenshots of messages and backend systems obtained by 404 Media,” the report said. 404 Media added that the “hacker did not access all messages stored or collected by TeleMessage, but could have likely accessed more data if they decided to, underscoring the extreme risk posed by taking ordinarily secure end-to-end encrypted messaging apps such as Signal and adding an extra archiving feature to them.”

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Hundreds of e-commerce sites hacked in supply-chain attack

Hundreds of e-commerce sites, at least one owned by a large multinational company, were backdoored by malware that executes malicious code inside the browsers of visitors, where it can steal payment card information and other sensitive data, security researchers said Monday.

The infections are the result of a supply-chain attack that compromised at least three software providers with malware that remained dormant for six years and became active only in the last few weeks. At least 500 e-commerce sites that rely on the backdoored software were infected, and it’s possible that the true number is double that, researchers from security firm Sansec said.

Among the compromised customers was a $40 billion multinational company, which Sansec didn’t name. In an email Monday, a Sansec representative said that “global remediation [on the infected customers] remains limited.”

Code execution on visitors’ machines

The supply chain attack poses a significant risk to the thousands or millions of people visiting the infected sites, because it allows attackers to execute code of their choice on ecommerce site servers. From there, the servers run info-stealing code on visitor machines.

“Since the backdoor allows uploading and executing arbitrary PHP code, the attackers have full remote code execution (RCE) and can do essentially anything they want,” the representative wrote. “In nearly all Adobe Commerce/Magento breaches we observe, the backdoor is then used to inject skimming software that runs in the user’s browser and steals payment information (Magecart).”

The three software suppliers identified by Sansec were Tigren, Magesolution (MGS), and Meetanshi. All three supply software that’s based on Magento, an open source e-commerce platform used by thousands of online stores. A software version sold by a fourth provider named Weltpixel has been infected with similar code on some of its customers’ stores, but Sansec so far has been unable to confirm whether it was the stores or Weltpixel that were hacked. Adobe has owned Megento since 2018.

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why-mfa-is-getting-easier-to-bypass-and-what-to-do-about-it

Why MFA is getting easier to bypass and what to do about it

These sorts of adversary-in-the-middle attacks have grown increasingly common. In 2022, for instance, a single group used it in a series of attacks that stole more than 10,000 credentials from 137 organizations and led to the network compromise of authentication provider Twilio, among others.

One company that was targeted in the attack campaign but wasn’t breached was content delivery network Cloudflare. The reason the attack failed was because it uses MFA based on WebAuthn, the standard that makes passkeys work. Services that use WebAuthn are highly resistant to adversary-in-the-middle attacks, if not absolutely immune. There are two reasons for this.

First, WebAuthn credentials are cryptographically bound to the URL they authenticate. In the above example, the credentials would work only on https://accounts.google.com. If a victim tried to use the credential to log in to https://accounts.google.com.evilproxy[.]com, the login would fail each time.

Additionally, WebAuthn-based authentication must happen on or in proximity to the device the victim is using to log in to the account. This occurs because the credential is also cryptographically bound to a victim device. Because the authentication can only happen on the victim device, it’s impossible for an adversary in the middle to actually use it in a phishing attack on their own device.

Phishing has emerged as one of the most vexing security problems facing organizations, their employees, and their users. MFA in the form of a one-time password, or traditional push notifications, definitely adds friction to the phishing process, but with proxy-in-the-middle attacks becoming easier and more common, the effectiveness of these forms of MFA is growing increasingly easier to defeat.

WebAuthn-based MFA comes in multiple forms; a key, known as a passkey, stored on a phone, computer, Yubikey, or similar dongle is the most common example. Thousands of sites now support WebAuthn, and it’s easy for most end users to enroll. As a side note, MFA based on U2F, the predecessor standard to WebAuthn, also prevents adversary-in-the-middle attacks from succeeding, although the latter provides flexibility and additional security.

Post updated to add details about passkeys.

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