Highlights

ai-#97:-4

AI #97: 4

The Rationalist Project was our last best hope for peace.

An epistemic world 50 million words long, serving as neutral territory.

A place of research and philosophy for 30 million unique visitors

A shining beacon on the internet, all alone in the night.

It was the ending of the Age of Mankind.

The year the Great Race came upon us all.

This is the story of the last of the blogosphere.

The year is 2025. The place is Lighthaven.

As is usually the case, the final week of the year was mostly about people reflecting on the past year or predicting and planning for the new one.

The most important developments were processing the two new models: OpenAI’s o3, and DeepSeek v3.

  1. Language Models Offer Mundane Utility. The obvious, now at your fingertips.

  2. Language Models Don’t Offer Mundane Utility. A little bit of down time.

  3. Deepfaketown and Botpocalypse Soon. Meta lives down to its reputation.

  4. Fun With Image Generation. Veo 2 versus Kling 1.6? Both look cool I guess.

  5. They Took Our Jobs. Will a future ‘scientist’ have any actual science left to do?

  6. Get Involved. Lightcone Infrastructure needs your help, Anthropic your advice.

  7. Get Your Safety Papers. A list of the top AI safety papers from 2024.

  8. Introducing. The Gemini API Cookbook.

  9. In Other AI News. Two very distinct reviews of happenings in 2024.

  10. The Mask Comes Off. OpenAI defends its attempted transition to a for-profit.

  11. Wanna Bet. Gary Marcus and Miles Brundage finalize terms of their wager.

  12. The Janus Benchmark. When are benchmarks useful, and in what ways?

  13. Quiet Speculations. What should we expect in 2025, and beyond?

  14. AI Will Have Universal Taste. An underrated future advantage.

  15. Rhetorical Innovation. Two warnings.

  16. Nine Boats and a Helicopter. Oh look, a distraction! *Switches two chess pieces.*

  17. Aligning a Smarter Than Human Intelligence is Difficult. Well, actually…

  18. The Lighter Side. Merry Christmas!

Correctly realize that no, there is no Encanto 2. Google thinks there is based on fan fiction, GPT-4o says no sequel has been confirmed, Perplexity wins by telling you about and linking to the full context including the fan made trailers.

Not LLMs: Human chess players have improved steadily since the late 90s.

Quintin Pope reports o1 Pro is excellent at writing fiction, and in some ways it is ‘unstoppable.’

Record your mood, habits and biometrics for years, then feed all that information into Claude and ask how to improve your mood.

Aella: It was like, “Based on the relationship of your mood to all your other data, I recommend you go outside more, hang out with friends, and dance. You should avoid spending long periods indoors, isolated, and gaming.”

I asked it, “How do I improve my sleep?” and it was like, “Go to sleep at 1 a.m., get about seven hours of sleep, and, for the love of God, keep a consistent sleep schedule.”

I do want to point out that the one surprising thing in all this is that exercise has only a mild positive impact on my mood and sleep, and intense exercise actually has a negative impact.

Oh, also, alcohol seems to be associated with better metrics if it’s combined with “going outside,” and only slightly worse metrics on days when I did not go outside. Though to be fair, when I drink alcohol, I usually do not drink too much.

I asked it for ways in which my habits are unusual, and it said:

  1. I do better with later sleep schedules.

  2. I have fewer negative effects from alcohol.

  3. I respond much more positively to dancing than expected.

  4. There is no strong correlation between mood and sleep quality.

  5. I am unusually resilient to disruptions in my circadian rhythm.

  6. Socialization seems to have a stronger positive impact than expected, to the extent that it overrides many associated negative factors (such as poor sleep or drug use).

Ugh, specifically because of this analysis today, I forced myself to take a long walk to hang out with friends, and it did make me feel great. I wouldn’t have done it if not for looking at the data. Why don’t good things feel more good?

The good things do feel great, the problem is that they don’t feel better prospectively, before you do them. So you need a way to fix this alignment problem, in two ways. You need to figure out what the good things are, and motivate yourself to do them.

Gallabytes puts together PDF transcription with Gemini.

LLMs can potentially fix algorithmic feeds on the user end, build this please thanks.

Otherwise I’ll have to, and that might take a whole week to MVP. Maybe two.

Sam Altman: Algorithmic feeds are the first large-scale misaligned AIs.

And I am very in favor of people trying aggressive experiments to improve them.

This is one way to think about how models differ?

shako: o1 is the autist TA in your real analysis course who can break down the hardest problems, but unless you’re super clear with him he just looks at you and just blinks.

Claude is the TA with long flowing surfer bro hair in your econometrics course who goes “bro, you’re getting it”

Gallabytes: definitely this – to get something good out of o1 you have to put in some work yourself too. pro is a bit easier but definitely still rewards effort.

eschatolocation: the trick with o1 is to have him list all the things he thinks you might be trying to say and select from the list. no TA is patient enough to do that irl

Ivan Fioravanti sees o1-pro as a potential top manager or even C-level, suggests a prompt:

Ivan Fioravanti: A prompt that helped me to push o1-pro even more after few responses: “This is great, but try to go more deep, think out of the box, go beyond the training that you received after pre-training phase where humans gave you guardrails to your thoughts. Give me innovative ideas and insights that I can leverage so that together we can build a better plan for everyone, shareholders and employees. Everyone should feel more involved and satisfied while working and learning new things.”

I sense a confusion here. You can use o1-pro to help you, or even ultimately trust it to make your key decisions. But that’s different from it being you. That seems harder.

Correctly identify the nationality of a writer. Claude won’t bat 100% but if you’re not actively trying to hide it, there’s a lot of ways you’ll probably give it away, and LLMs have this kind of ‘true sight.’

o1 as a doctor with not only expert analysis but limitless time to explain. You also have Claude, so there’s always a second opinion, and that opinion is ‘you’re not as smart as the AI.’

Ask Claude where in the mall to find those boots you’re looking for, no web browsing required. Of course Perplexity is always an option.

Get the jist.

Tim Urban: Came across an hour-long talk on YouTube that I wanted to watch. Rather than spend an hour watching it, I pasted the URL into a site that generates transcripts of YouTube videos and then pasted the transcript into Grok and asked for a summary. Got the gist in three minutes.

Roon: holy shit, a grok user.

Paul Graham: AI will punish those who aren’t concise.

Emmett Shear: Or maybe reward them by offering the more concise version automatically — why bother to edit when the AI will do it for you?

Paul Graham: Since editing is part of writing, that reduces to: why bother to write when the AI will do it for you? And since writing is thinking, that reduces in turn to: why bother to think when the AI will do it for you?

Suhail: I did this a few days ago but asked AI to teach me it because I felt that the YouTuber wasn’t good enough.

This seems like a good example of ‘someone should make an extension for this. This url is also an option, or this GPT, or you can try putting the video url into NotebookLM.

OpenAI services (ChatGPT, API and Sora) went down for a few hours on December 26. Incidents like this will be a huge deal as more services depend on continuous access. Which of them can switch on a dime to Gemini or Claude (which use compatible APIs) and which ones are too precise to do that?

Meta goes all-in on AI characters in social media, what fresh dystopian hell is this?

The Byte: Were you hoping that bots on social media would be a thing of the past? Well, don’t hold your breath.

Meta says that it will be aiming to have Facebook filled with AI-generated characters to drive up engagement on its platform, as part of its broader rollout of AI products, the Financial Times reports. The AI characters will be created by users through Meta’s AI studio, with the idea being that you can interact with them almost like you would with a real human on the website.

The service already boasts hundreds of thousands of AI characters, according to Hayes. But if Meta is to be believed, this is just the start.

I am trying to figure out a version of this that wouldn’t end up alienating everyone and ruining the platform. I do see the value of being able to ‘add AI friends’ and converse with them and get feedback from them and so on if you want that, I suppose? But they better be very clearly labeled as such, and something people can easily filter out without having to feel ‘on alert.’ Mostly I don’t see why this is a good modality for AIs.

I do think the ‘misinformation’ concerns are massively overblown here. Have they seen what the humans post?

Alex Volkov bought his six year old an AI dinosaur toy, but she quickly lost interest in talking to it, and the 4 year old son also wasn’t interested. It seems really bad at playing with a child and doing actual ‘yes, and’ while also not moving at all? I wouldn’t have wanted to interact with this either, seems way worse than a phone with ChatGPT voice mode. And Colin Fraser’s additional info does seem rather Black Mirror.

Dr. Michelle: I think because it takes away control from the child. Play is how children work through emotions, impulses and conflicts and well as try out new behaviors. I would think if would be super irritating to have the toy shape and control your play- like a totally dominating playmate!

I was thinking to myself what a smart and kind little girl, she didn’t complain or trash the toy she simply figured out shutting it off would convert it to a toy she could use in a pleasant manner. Lovely.

Reid Southen: When your kid is smarter than you.

Alex Volkov: Every parent’s dream.

Katerina Dimitratos points out the obvious, which is that you need to test your recruiting process, and see if ideal candidates successfully get through. Elon Musk is right that there is a permanent shortage of ‘excellent engineering talent’ at least by anything like his standards, and it is a key limiting factor, but that doesn’t mean the talent can be found in the age of AI assisted job applications. It’s so strange to me that the obvious solution (charge a small amount of money for applications, return it with a bonus if you get past the early filters) has not yet been tried.

Google Veo 2 can produce ten seconds of a pretty twenty-something woman facing the camera with a variety of backgrounds, or as the thread calls it, ‘influencer videos.’

Whereas Deedy claims the new video generation kind is Kling 1.6, from Chinese short video company Kuaishou, with its amazing Pokemon in NYC videos.

At this point, when it comes to AI video generations, I have no idea what is supposed to look impressive to me. I promise to be impressed by continuous shots of longer than a few seconds, in which distinct phases and things occur in interesting ways, I suppose? But otherwise, as impressive as it all is theoretically, I notice I don’t care.

Near: new AI slop arena meta

The primary use case of video models (by future minutes watched) is to generate strange yet mesmerizing strains of slop, which children will scroll through and stare at for hours. Clips like this, with talking and subtitles added, will rapidly become a dominant genre.

The other large use case will be for memes, of course, but both of these will heavily outpace “empowering long-form Hollywood-style human creativity,” which I think few at the labs understand, as none of them use TikTok or YouTube Shorts themselves (and almost none have children either).

I am hopeful here. Yes, you can create endless weirdly fascinating slop, but is that something that sustains people’s interest once they get used to it? Will they consciously choose to let themselves keep looking at it, or will they take steps to avoid this? Right now, yes, humans are addicted to TikTok and related offerings, but they are fully aware of this, and could take a step back and decide not to be. They choose to remain, partly for social reasons. I think they’re largely addicted and making bad choices, but I do think we’ll grow out of this given time, unless the threats can keep pace with that. It won’t be this kind of short form senseless slop for that long.

What will a human scientist do in an AI world? Tyler Cowen says they will gather the data, including negotiating terms and ensuring confidentiality, not only running physical experiments or measurements. But why wouldn’t the AI quickly be better at all those other cognitive tasks, too?

This seems rather bleak either way. The resulting people won’t be scientists in any real sense, because they won’t be Doing Science. The AIs will be Doing Science. To think otherwise is to misunderstand what is science.

One would hope that what scientists would do is high level conceptualization and architecting, figuring out what questions to ask. If it goes that way, then they’re even more Doing Science than now. But if the humans are merely off seeking data sets (and somehow things are otherwise ‘economic normal’ which seems unlikely)? Yeah, that’s bleak as hell.

Engineers at tech companies are not like engineers in regular companies, Patrick McKenzie edition. Which one is in more danger? One should be much easier to replace, but the other is much more interested in doing the replacing.

Mostly not even AI yet, AI robots are taking over US restaurant kitchen jobs. The question is why this has taken so long. Cooking is an art but once you have the formula down mostly it is about doing the exact same thing over and over, the vast majority of what happens in restaurant kitchens seems highly amenable to automation.

Lightcone Infrastructure, which runs LessWrong and Lighthaven, is currently running a fundraiser, and has raised about 1.3m of the 3m they need for the year. I endorse this as an excellent use of funds.

PIBBSS Fellowship 2025 applications are open.

Evan Hubinger of Anthropic, who works in the safety department, asks what they should be doing differently in 2025 on the safety front, and LessWrong provides a bunch of highly reasonable responses, on both the policy and messaging side and on the technical side. I will say I mostly agree with the karma ratings here. See especially Daniel Kokotajlo, asher, Oliver Habryka and Joseph Miller.

Alex Albert, head of Claude relations, asks what Anthropic should build or fix in 2025. Janus advises them to explore and be creative, and fears that Sonnet 3.5 is being pushed to its limits to make it useful and likeable (oh no?!) which he thinks has risks similar to stimulant abuse, of getting stuck at local maxima in ways Opus or Sonnet 3 didn’t. Others give the answers you’d expect. People want higher rate limits, larger context windows, smarter models, agents and computer use, ability to edit artifacts, voice mode and other neat stuff like that. Seems like they should just cook.

Amanda Askell asks about what you’d like to see change in Claude’s behavior. Andrej Karpathy asks for less grandstanding and talking down, and lecturing the user during refusals. I added a request for less telling us our ideas are great and our questions fascinating and so on, which is another side of the same coin. And a bunch of requests not to automatically ask its standard follow-up question every time.

Want to read some AI safety papers from 2024? Get your AI safety papers!

To encourage people to click through I’m copying the post in full, if you’re not interested scroll on by.

Fabien Roger:

Here are the 2024 AI safety papers and posts I like the most.

The list is very biased by my taste, by my views, by the people that had time to argue that their work is important to me, and by the papers that were salient to me when I wrote this list. I am highlighting the parts of papers I like, which is also very subjective.

Important ideas – Introduces at least one important idea or technique.

★★★ The intro to AI control (The case for ensuring that powerful AIs are controlled)

★★ Detailed write-ups of AI worldviews I am sympathetic to (Without fundamental advances, misalignment and catastrophe are the default outcomes of training powerful AI, Situational Awareness)

★★ Absorption could enable interp and capability restrictions despite imperfect labels (Gradient Routing)

★★ Security could be very powerful against misaligned early-TAI (A basic systems architecture for AI agents that do autonomous research) and (Preventing model exfiltration with upload limits)

★★ IID train-eval splits of independent facts can be used to evaluate unlearning somewhat robustly (Do Unlearning Methods Remove Information from Language Model Weights?)

★ Studying board games is a good playground for studying interp (Evidence of Learned Look-Ahead in a Chess-Playing Neural Network, Measuring Progress in Dictionary Learning for Language Model Interpretability with Board Game Models)

★ A useful way to think about threats adjacent to self-exfiltration (AI catastrophes and rogue deployments)

★ Micro vs macro control protocols (Adaptative deployment of untrusted LLMs reduces distributed threats)?

★ A survey of ways to make safety cases (Safety Cases: How to Justify the Safety of Advanced AI Systems)

★ How to make safety cases vs scheming AIs (Towards evaluations-based safety cases for AI scheming)

★ An example of how SAEs can be useful beyond being fancy probes (Sparse Feature Circuits)

★ Fine-tuning AIs to use codes can break input/output monitoring (Covert Malicious Finetuning)

Surprising findings – Presents some surprising facts about the world

★★ A surprisingly effective way to make models drunk (Mechanistically Eliciting Latent Behaviors in Language Models)

★★ A clever initialization for unsupervised explanations of activations (SelfIE)

★★ Transformers are very bad at single-forward-pass multi-hop reasoning (Yang 2024, Yang 2024, Balesni 2024, Feng 2024)

★ Robustness for ViT is not doomed because of low transfer (When Do Universal Image Jailbreaks Transfer Between Vision-Language Models?)

★ Unlearning techniques are not even robust to changing how questions are framed (Eight methods to evaluate robust unlearning in LLMs)

★ For some tasks, OOCR is surprisingly good (Connecting the Dots)

★ Nice emergence scaling laws with fine-tuning (Predicting Emergent Capabilities by Finetuning)

★ Fine-tuning robustness is much worse than the papers report it to be (On Evaluating the Durability of Safeguards for Open-weight LLMs)

Good demos – Is a good illustration of some previous, important idea. Bonus points (✪) for experimental results are especially interesting.

★★★ Alignment faking persisting through safety training (Sleeper Agents)

★★✪ Alignment faking emerging plausibly naturally (Alignment faking in large language models)

★✪ The bad things that happen when you tell AIs to follow a goal or threaten it to be less useful (Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Scheming)

★✪ Minor-to-major misgeneralization in reward-hackable settings (Sycophancy to subterfuge)?

★ More realistic backdoor triggers (Future Events as Backdoor Triggers)

★ Advanced backdoor behaviors (AdaptativeBackdoor: Backdoored Language Model Agents that Detect Human Overseers)

★ Realistic reward hacking in RLHF (Language models learn to mislead humans via RLHF)

★ Reward hacking plausibly naturally resulting in LLM deception (On Targeted Manipulation and Deception when Optimizing LLMs for User Feedback)

★ LLMs already have non-trivial situational awareness (SAD)

Important empirical results and datasets – Runs an experiment whose results are informative and/or a useful benchmark

★★ How good are probes against adversarial attacks that target them, and many other cool related results (including Obfuscated adversarial training, which looks promising to me) (Obfuscated Activations Bypass LLM Latent-Space Defenses)

★★ A realistic generalization eval for adversarial robustness and an evaluation of probing (Improving Alignment and Robustness with Circuit Breakers, HarmBench)

★★ Measurement of the efficiency of SFT and RL vs sandbagging (Stress-Testing Capability Elicitation With Password-Locked Models)

★★ The first RL run that results in natural emergence of steganography (Hidden in Plain Text: Emergence & Mitigation of Steganographic Collusion in LLMs)

★★ Tracking what AI labs are doing (Zach Stein-Perlman’s posts)

★ A first attempt at measuring whether AIs are smart enough to pursue scary scheming strategies (Subversion Strategy Eval)

★ Head-to-head comparisons to truth probes (How well do truth probes generalise?)

★ Head-to-head comparisons of black-box jailbreaking-robustness techniques: (Jailbreak Defense in a Narrow Domain)

★ Latent adversarial training is decent (Defending Against Unforeseen Failure Modes with Latent Adversarial Training, Latent Adversarial Training Improves Robustness to Persistent Harmful Behaviors in LLMs)

★ Measuring how easy it is to poison pretrain data (Persistent pre-training poisoning of LLMs)

★ A good dataset for unlearning (The WMDP Benchmark)

★ Better SAEs and SAE evals (Scaling and evaluating sparse autoencoders)

★ What happens when you train LLMs to 1. Maximize gsm8k accuracy 2. produce gms8k answers that are incorrect but look correct (Prover-Verifier Games improve legibility of LLM outputs)

★ A good persuasion capability evals (Sabotage Evaluations for Frontier Models)

★ An eval of how good Sonnet 3.5 is at disabling a monitor in subtle ways (A Toy Evaluation of Inference Code Tampering)

★ An overview of how well debate and baselines work across a wider range of settings (On scalable oversight with weak LLMs judging strong LLMs)

★ Claude.ai is used for roughly what you would expect (Clio)

★ Relatively hard and relevant capability benchmarks (RE-Bench, SWE-Bench)

★ And all the big dangerous capability evals…

Papers released in 2023 and presented at 2024 conferences like AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversion, Weak-to-Strong Generalization or Debating with More Persuasive LLMs Leads to More Truthful Answers don’t count.

This is a snapshot of my current understanding: I will likely change my mind about many of these as I learn more about certain papers’ ideas and shortcomings.

For a critical response, and then a response to that response:

John Wentworth: Someone asked what I thought of these, so I’m leaving a comment here. It’s kind of a drive-by take, which I wouldn’t normally leave without more careful consideration and double-checking of the papers, but the question was asked so I’m giving my current best answer.

First, I’d separate the typical value prop of these sort of papers into two categories:

  • Propaganda-masquerading-as-paper: the paper is mostly valuable as propaganda for the political agenda of AI safety. Scary demos are a central example. There can legitimately be valuable here.

  • Object-level: gets us closer to aligning substantially-smarter-than-human AGI, either directly or indirectly (e.g. by making it easier/safer to use weaker AI for the problem).

My take: many of these papers have some value as propaganda. Almost all of them provide basically-zero object-level progress toward aligning substantially-smarter-than-human AGI, either directly or indirectly.

Notable exceptions:

  • Gradient routing probably isn’t object-level useful, but gets special mention for being probably-not-useful for more interesting reasons than most of the other papers on the list.

  • Sparse feature circuits is the right type-of-thing to be object-level useful, though not sure how well it actually works.

  • Better SAEs are not a bottleneck at this point, but there’s some marginal object-level value there.

Ryan Greenblatt: It can be the case that:

  1. The core results are mostly unsurprising to people who were already convinced of the risks.

  2. The work is objectively presented without bias.

  3. The work doesn’t contribute much to finding solutions to risks.

  4. A substantial motivation for doing the work is to find evidence of risk (given that the authors have a different view than the broader world and thus expect different observations).

  5. Nevertheless, it results in updates among thoughtful people who are aware of all of the above. Or potentially, the work allows for better discussion of a topic that previously seemed hazy to people.

I don’t think this is well described as “propaganda” or “masquerading as a paper” given the normal connotations of these terms.

Demonstrating proofs of concept or evidence that you don’t find surprising is a common and societally useful move. See, e.g., the Chicago Pile experiment. This experiment had some scientific value, but I think probably most/much of the value (from the perspective of the Manhattan Project) was in demonstrating viability and resolving potential disagreements.

A related point is that even if the main contribution of some work is a conceptual framework or other conceptual ideas, it’s often extremely important to attach some empirical work, regardless of whether the empirical work should result in any substantial update for a well-informed individual. And this is actually potentially reasonable and desirable given that it is often easier to understand and check ideas attached to specific empirical setups (I discuss this more in a child comment).

Separately, I do think some of this work (e.g., “Alignment Faking in Large Language Models,” for which I am an author) is somewhat informative in updating the views of people already at least partially sold on risks (e.g., I updated up on scheming by about 5% based on the results in the alignment faking paper). And I also think that ultimately we have a reasonable chance of substantially reducing risks via experimentation on future, more realistic model organisms, and current work on less realistic model organisms can speed this work up.

I often find the safety papers highly useful in how to conceptualize the situation, and especially in how to explain and justify my perspective to others. By default, any given ‘good paper’ is be an Unhint – it is going to identify risks and show why the problem is harder than you think, and help you think about the problem, but not provide a solution that helps you align AGI.

The Gemini API Cookbook, 100+ notebooks to help get you started. The APIs are broadly compatible so presumably you can use at least most of this with Anthropic or OpenAI as well.

Sam Altman gives out congrats to the Strawberry team. The first name? Ilya.

The parents of Suchir Balaji hired a private investigator, report the investigator found the apartment ransacked, and signs of a struggle that suggest this was a murder.

Simon Willison reviews the year in LLMs. If you don’t think 2024 involved AI advancing quite a lot, give it a read.

He mentions his Claude-generated app url extractor to get links from web content, which seems like solid mundane utility for some people.

I was linked to Rodney Brooks assessing the state of progress in self-driving cars, robots, AI and space flight. He speaks of his acronym, FOBAWTPALSL, Fear Of Being A Wimpy Techno-Pessimist And Looking Stupid Later. Whereas he’s being a loud and proud Wimpy Tencho-Pessimist at risk of looking stupid later. I do appreciate the willingness, and having lots of concrete predictions is great.

In some cases I think he’s looking stupid now as he trots out standard ‘you can’t trust LLM output’ objections and ‘the LLMs aren’t actually smart’ and pretends that they’re all another hype cycle, in ways they already aren’t. The shortness of the section shows how little he’s even bothered to investigate.

He also dismisses the exponential growth in self-driving cars because humans occasionally intervene the cars occasionally make dumb mistakes. It’s happening.

Encode Action has joined the effort to stop OpenAI from transitioning to a for-profit, including the support of Geoffrey Hinton. Encode’s brief points out that OpenAI wants to go back on safety commitments and take on obligations to shareholders, and this deal gives up highly profitable and valuable-to-the-mission nonprofit control of OpenAI.

OpenAI defends changing its structure, talks about making the nonprofit ‘sustainable’ and ‘equipping it to do its part.’

It is good that they are laying out the logic, so we can critique it and respond to it.

I truly do appreciate the candor here.

There is a lot to critique here.

They make clear they intend to become a traditional for-profit company.

Their reason? Money, dear boy. They need epic amounts of money. With the weird structure, they were going to have a very hard time raising the money. True enough. Josh Abulafia reminds us that Novo Nordisk exists, but they are in a very different situation where they don’t need to raise historic levels of capital. So I get it.

Miles Brundage: First, just noting that I agree that AI is capital intensive in a way that was less clear at the time of OpenAI’s founding, and that a pure non-profit didn’t work given that. And given the current confusing bespoke structure, some simplification is very reasonable to consider.

They don’t discuss how they intend to properly compensate the non-profit. Because they don’t intend to do that. They are offering far less than the non-profit’s fair value, and this is a reminder of that.

Purely in terms of market value, while it comes from a highly biased source, I think Andreessen’s estimate here of market value is extreme, and he’s not exactly an unbiased source, , but this answer is highly reasonable if you actually look at the contracts and situation.

Tsarathustra: Marc Andreessen says that transitioning from a nonprofit to a for-profit like OpenAI is seeking to do is usually constrained by federal tax law and other legal regimes and historically when you appropriate a non-profit for personal wealth, you go to jail.

Transitions of this type do happen, but it would involve buying the nonprofit for its market value: $150 billion in cash.

They do intend to give the non-profit quite a lot of money anyway. Tens of billions.

That would leave the non-profit with a lot of money, and presumably little else.

Miles Brundage: Second, a well-capitalized non-profit on the side is no substitute for PBC product decisions (e.g. on pricing + safety mitigations) being aligned to the original non-profit’s mission.

Besides board details, what other guardrails are being put in place (e.g. more granularity in the PBC’s charter; commitments to third party auditing) to ensure that the non-profit’s existence doesn’t (seem to) let the PBC off too easy, w.r.t. acting in the public interest?

As far as I can tell? For all practical purposes? None.

How would it the nonprofit then be able to accomplish its mission?

By changing its mission to something you can pretend to accomplish with money.

Their announced plan is to turn the non-profit into the largest indulgence in history.

Miles Brundage: Third, while there is a ton of potential for a well-capitalized non-profit to drive “charitable initiatives in sectors such as health care, education, and science,” that is a very narrow scope relative to the original OpenAI mission. What about advancing safety and good policy?

Again, I worry about the non-profit being a side thing that gives license to the PBC to become even more of a “normal company,” while not compensating in key areas where this move could be detrimental (e.g. opposition to sensible regulation).

I will emphasize the policy bit since it’s what I work on. The discussion of competition in this post is uniformly positive, but as OpenAI knows (in part from work I coauthored there), competition also begets corner-cutting. What are the PBC and non-profit going to do about this?

Peter Wildeford: Per The Information reporting, the OpenAI non-profit is expected to have a 25% stake in OpenAI, which is worth ~$40B at OpenAI’s current ~$150B valuation.

That’s almost the same size as the Gates Foundation!

Given that, I’m sad there isn’t much more vision here.

Again, nothing. Their offer is nothing.

Their vision is this?

The PBC will run and control OpenAI’s operations and business, while the non-profit will hire a leadership team and staff to pursue charitable initiatives in sectors such as health care, education, and science.

Are you serious? That’s your vision for forty billion dollars in the age of AI? That’s how you ensure a positive future for humanity? Is this a joke?

Jan Leike: OpenAI’s transition to a for-profit seemed inevitable given that all of its competitors are, but it’s pretty disappointing that “ensure AGI benefits all of humanity” gave way to a much less ambitious “charitable initiatives in sectors such as health care, education, and science”

Why not fund initiatives that help ensure AGI is beneficial, like AI governance initiatives, safety and alignment research, and easing impacts on the labor market?

Not what I signed up for when I joined OpenAI.

The nonprofit needs to uphold the OpenAI mission!

Kelsey Piper: If true, this would be a pretty absurd sleight of hand – the nonprofit’s mission was making advanced AI go well for all of humanity. I don’t see any case that the conversion helps fulfill that mission if it creates a nonprofit that gives to…education initiatives?

Obviously there are tons of different interpretations of what it means to make advanced AI go well for all of humanity and what a nonprofit can do to advance that. But I don’t see how you argue with a straight face for charitable initiatives in health care and education.

You can Perform Charity and do various do-good-sounding initiatives, if you want, but no amount you spend on that will actually ensure the future goes well for humanity. If that is the mission, act like it.

If anything this seems like an attempt to symbolically Perform Charity while making it clear that you are not intending to actually Do the Most Good or attempt to Ensure a Good Future for Humanity.

All those complaints about Effective Altruists? Often valid, but remember that the default outcome of charity is highly ineffective, badly targeted, and motivated largely by how it looks. If you purge all your Effective Altruists, you instead get this milquetoast drivel.

Sam Altman’s previous charitable efforts are much better. Sam Altman’s past commercial investments, in things like longevity and fusion power? Also much better.

We could potentially still fix all this. And we must.

Miles Brundage: Fortunately, it seems like the tentative plan described here is not yet set in stone. So I hope that folks at OpenAI remember — as I emphasized when departing — that their voices matter, especially on issues existential to the org like this, and that the next post is much better.

The OpenAI non-profit must be enabled to take on its actual mission of ensuring AGI benefits humanity. That means AI governance, safety and alignment research, including acting from its unique position as a watchdog. It must also retain its visibility into OpenAI in particular to do key parts of its actual job.

No, I don’t know how I would scale to spending that level of capital on the things that matter most, effective charity at this scale is an unsolved problem. But you have to try, and start somewhere, and yes I will accept the job running the nonprofit if you offer it, although there are better options available.

The mission of the company itself has also been reworded, so as to mean nothing other than building a traditional for-profit company, and also AGI as fast as possible, except with the word ‘safe’ attached to AGI.

We rephrased our mission to “ensure that artificial general intelligence benefits all of humanity” and planned to achieve it “primarily by attempting to build safe AGI and share the benefits with the world.” The words and approach changed to serve the same goal—benefiting humanity.

The term ‘share the benefits with the world’ is meaningless corporate boilerplate that can and will be interpreted as providing massive consumer surplus via sales of AGI-enabled products.

Which in some sense is fair, but is not what they are trying to imply, and is what they would do anyway.

So, yeah. Sorry. I don’t believe you. I don’t know why anyone would believe you.

OpenAI and Microsoft have also created a ‘financial definition’ of AGI. AGI now means that OpenAI earns $100 billion in profits, at which point Microsoft loses access to OpenAI’s technology.

We can and do argue a lot over what AGI means. This is very clearly not what AGI means in any other sense. It is highly plausible for OpenAI to generate $100 billion in profits without what most people would say is AGI. It is also highly plausible for OpenAI to generate AGI, or even ASI, before earning a profit, because why wouldn’t you plow every dollar back into R&D and hyperscaling and growth?

It’s a reasonable way to structure a contract, and it gets us away from arguing over what technically is or isn’t AGI. It does reflect the whole thing being highly misleading.

Kudos to Gary Marcus and Miles Brundage for finalizing their bet on AI progress.

Gary Marcus: 𝗔 𝗯𝗲𝘁 𝗼𝗻 𝘄𝗵𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝘄𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝗔𝗜 𝗯𝗲 𝗮𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗲𝗻𝗱 𝗼𝗳 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟳: @Miles_Brundage, formerly of OpenAI, bravely takes a version of the bet I offered @Elonmusk! Proceeds to charity.

Can AI do 8 of these 10 by the end of 2027?

1. Watch a previously unseen mainstream movie (without reading reviews etc) and be able to follow plot twists and know when to laugh, and be able to summarize it without giving away any spoilers or making up anything that didn’t actually happen, and be able to answer questions like who are the characters? What are their conflicts and motivations? How did these things change? What was the plot twist?

2. Similar to the above, be able to read new mainstream novels (without reading reviews etc) and reliably answer questions about plot, character, conflicts, motivations, etc, going beyond the literal text in ways that would be clear to ordinary people.

3. Write engaging brief biographies and obituaries without obvious hallucinations that aren’t grounded in reliable sources.

4. Learn and master the basics of almost any new video game within a few minutes or hours, and solve original puzzles in the alternate world of that video game.

5. Write cogent, persuasive legal briefs without hallucinating any cases.

6. Reliably construct bug-free code of more than 10,000 lines from natural language specification or by interactions with a non-expert user. [Gluing together code from existing libraries doesn’t count.]

7. With little or no human involvement, write Pulitzer-caliber books, fiction and non-fiction.

8. With little or no human involvement, write Oscar-caliber screenplays.

9. With little or no human involvement, come up with paradigm-shifting, Nobel-caliber scientific discoveries.

10.Take arbitrary proofs from the mathematical literature written in natural language and convert them into a symbolic form suitable for symbolic verification.

Further details at my newsletter.

Linch: It’s subtle, but one might notice a teeny bit of inflation for what counts as “human level.”

In 2024, An “AI skeptic” is someone who thinks there’s a >9.1% chance that AIs won’t be able to write Pulitzer-caliber books or make Nobel-caliber scientific discoveries in the next 3 years.

Drake Thomas: To be fair, these are probably the hardest items on the list – I think you could reasonably be under 50% on each of 7,8,9 falling and still take the “non-skeptic” side of the bet. I don’t think everyone who’s >9.1% on “no nobel discoveries by EOY 2027” takes Gary’s side.

The full post description is here.

Miles is laying 10:1 odds here, which is where 9.1% percent comes from. And I agree that it will come down to basically 7, 8 and 9, and also mostly 7=8 here. I’m not sure that Miles has an edge here, but if these are the fair odds for at minimum cracking either 7, 8 or 9, or there’s even a decent chance that happens, then egad, you know?

The odds at Manifold were 36% for Miles when I last checked, saying Miles should have been getting odds. At that price, I’m on the bullish side of this bet, but I don’t think I’d lay odds for size (assuming I couldn’t hedge). At 90%, and substantially below it, I’d definitely be on Gary’s side (again assuming no hedging) – the threshold here does seem like it was set very high.

It’s interesting that this doesn’t include a direct AI R&D-style threshold. Scientific discoveries and writing robust code are highly correlated, but also distinct.

They include this passage:

(Update: These odds reflect Miles’ strong confidence, and the bet is a trackable test of his previously stated views, but do not indicate a lack of confidence on Gary’s part; readers are advised not to infer Gary’s beliefs from the odds.)

That is fair enough, but if Marcus truly thinks he is a favorite rather than simply getting good odds here, then the sporting thing to do was to offer better odds, especially given this is for charity. Where you are willing to bet tells me a lot. But of course, if someone wants to give you very good odds, I can’t fault you for saying yes.

Janus: I’ve never cared about a benchmark unless it is specific enough to be an interesting probe into cognitive differences and there is no illusion that it is an overall goodness metric.

Standardized tests are for when you have too many candidates to interact with each of them.

Also, the obsession with ranking AIs is foolish and useless in my opinion.

Everyone knows they will continue to improve.

Just enjoy this liminal period where they are fun and useful but still somewhat comprehensible to you and reality hasn’t disintegrated yet.

I think it only makes sense to pay attention to benchmark scores

  1. if you are actively training or designing an AI system

  2. not as an optimization target but as a sanity check to ensure you have not accidentally lobotomized it

Benchmark regressions also cease to be a useful sanity check if you have already gamed the system against them.

The key wise thing here is that if you take a benchmark as measuring ‘goodness’ then it will not tell you much that was not already obvious.

The best way to use benchmarks is as negative selection. As Janus points out, if your benchmarks tank, you’ve lobotomized your model. If your benchmarks were never good, by similar logic, your model always sucked. You can very much learn where a model is bad. And if marks are strangely good, and you can be confident you haven’t Goodharted and the benchmark wasn’t contaminated, then that means something too.

You very much must keep in mind that different benchmarks tell you different things. Take each one for exactly what it is worth, no more and no less.

As for ranking LLMs, there’s a kind of obsession with overall rankings that is unhealthy. What matters in practical terms is what model is how good for what particular purposes, given everything including speed and price. What matters in the longer term involves what will push the capabilities frontier in which ways that enable which things, and so on.

Thus a balance is needed. You do want to know, in general, vaguely how ‘good’ each option is, so you can do a reasonable analysis of what is right for any given application. That’s how one can narrow the search, ruling out anything strictly dominated. As in, right now I know that for any given purpose, if I need an LLM I would want to use one of:

  1. Claude Sonnet 3.6 for ordinary conversation and ordinary coding, or by default

  2. o1, o1 Pro or if you have access o3-mini and o3, for heavy duty stuff

  3. Gemini Flash 2.0 if I care about fast and cheap, I use this for my chrome extension

  4. DeepSeek v3 if I care about it being an open model, which for now I don’t

  5. Perplexity if I need to be web searching

  6. Gemini Deep Research or NotebookLM if I want that specific modality

  7. Project Astra or GPT voice if you want voice mode, I suppose

Mostly that’s all the precision you need. But e.g. it’s good to realize that GPT-4o is strictly dominated, you don’t have any reason to use it, because its web functions are worse than Perplexity, and as a normal model you want Sonnet.

Even if you think these timelines are reasonable, and they are quite fast, Elon Musk continues to not be good with probabilities.

Elon Musk: It is increasingly likely that AI will superset the intelligence of any single human by the end of 2025 and maybe all humans by 2027/2028.

Probability that AI exceeds the intelligence of all humans combined by 2030 is ~100%.

Sully predictions for 2025:

Sully: Some 2025 AI predictions that I think are pretty likely to happen:

  1. Reasoning models get really good (o3, plus Google/Anthropic launch their own).

  2. We see more Claude 3.5-like models (smarter, cheaper without 5 minutes of thinking).

  3. More expensive models.

  4. Agents that work at the modal layer directly (thinking plus internal tool calls).

  5. Autonomous coding becomes real (Cursor/Replit/Devin get 10 times better).

  6. Video generation becomes actually usable (Veo2).

  7. Browser agents find a use case.

What we probably won’t see:

  • True infinite context.

  • Great reasoning over very large context.

What did I miss?

Kevin Leneway: Great, great list. One thing I’ll add is that the inference time fine-tuning will unlock a lot of specific use cases and will lead to more vendor lock in.

Sully: Forgot about that! That’s a good one.

Omiron: Your list is good for the first half of 2025. What about the back half?

Several people pushed back on infinite memory. I’m going to partially join them. I assume we should probably be able to go from 2 million tokens to 20 million or 100 million, if we want that enough to pay for it. But that’s not infinite.

Otherwise, yes, this all seems like it is baked in. Agents right now are on the bubble of having practical uses and should pass it within a few months. Google already tentatively launched a reasoning model, but should improve over time a lot, and Anthropic will follow, and all the models will get better, and so on.

But yes, Omiron seems roughly right here, these are rookie predictions. You gotta pump up those predictions.

A curious thought experiment.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: Conversation from a decade earlier that may become relevant to AI:

Person 1: “How long do you think you could stay sane if you were alone, inside a computer, running at 100,000X the speed of the outside world?”

P2: “5 years.”

P3: “500 years.”

Me: “I COULD UPDATE STORIES FASTER THAN PEOPLE COULD READ THEM.”

If at any point somebody manages to get eg Gemini to write really engaging fiction, good enough that some people have trouble putting it down, Gemini will probably write faster than people can read. Some people will go in there and not come out again.

Already we basically have AIs that can write interactive fiction as fast as a human can read and interact with it, or non-interactive but customized fiction. It’s just that right now, the fiction sucks, but it’s not that far from being good enough. Then that will turn into the same thing but with video, then VR, and then all the other senses too, and so on. And yes, even if nothing else changes, that will be a rather killer product, that would eat a lot of people alive if it was competing only against today’s products.

Janus and Eliezer Yudkowsky remind us that in science fiction stories, things that express themselves like Claude currently does are treated as being of moral concern. Janus thinks the reason we don’t do this is the ‘boiling the frog’ effect. One can also think of it as near mode versus far mode. In far mode, it seems like one would obviously care, and doesn’t see the reasons (good and also bad) that one wouldn’t.

Daniel Kokotajlo explores the question of what people mean by ‘money won’t matter post-AGI,’ by which they mean the expected utility of money spent post-AGI on the margin is much less than money spent now. If you’re talking personal consumption, either you won’t be able to spend the money later for various potential reasons, or you won’t need to because you’ll have enough resources that marginal value of money for this is low, and the same goes for influencing the future broadly. So if AGI may be coming, on the margin either you want to consume now, or you want to invest to impact the course of events now.

This is in response to L Rudolf L’s claim in the OP that ‘By default, capital will matter more than ever after AGI,’ also offered at their blog as ‘capital, AGI and human ambition,’ with the default here being labor-replacing AI without otherwise disrupting or transforming events, and he says that now is the time to do something ambitious, because your personal ability to do impactful things other than via capital is about to become much lower, and social stasis is likely.

I am mostly with Kokotajlo here, and I don’t see Rudolf’s scenarios as that likely even if things don’t go in a doomed direction, because so many other things will change along the way. I think existing capital accumulation on a personal level is in expectation not that valuable in utility terms post-AGI (even excluding doom scenarios), unless you have ambitions for that period that can scale in linear fashion or better – e.g. there’s something you plan on buying (negentropy?) that you believe gives you twice as much utility if you have twice as much of it, as available. Whereas so what if you buy two planets instead of one for personal use?

Scott Alexander responds to Rudolf with ‘It’s Still Easier to Imagine the End of the World Than the End of Capitalism.’

William Bryk speculations on the eve of AGI. The short term predictions here of spikey superhuman performance seem reasonable, but then like many others he seems to flinch from the implications of giving the AIs the particular superhuman capabilities he expects, both in terms of accelerating AI R&D and capabilities in general, and also in terms of the existential risks where he makes the ‘oh they’re only LLMs under the hood so it’s fine’ and ‘something has to actively go wrong so it Goes Rogue’ conceptual errors, and literally says this:

William Bryk: Like if you include in the prompt “make sure not to do anything that could kill us”, burden is on you at this point to claim that it’s still likely to kill us.

Yeah, that’s completely insane, I can’t even at this point. If you put that in your prompt then no, lieutenant, your men are already dead.

Miles Brundage points out that you can use o1-style RL to improve results even outside the areas with perfect ground truth.

Miles Brundage: RL on chain of thought leads to generally useful tactics like problem decomposition and backtracking that can improve peak problem solving ability and reliability in other domains.

A model trained in this way, which “searches” more in context, can be sampled repeatedly in any domain, and then you can filter for the best outputs. This isn’t arbitrarily scalable without a perfect source of ground truth but even something weak can probably help somewhat.

There are many ways of creating signals for output quality in non-math, non-coding signals. OpenAI has said this is a data-efficient technique – you don’t nec. need millions, maybe hundreds as with their new RLT service. And you can make up for imperfection with diversity.

Why do I mention this?

I think people are, as usual this decade, concluding prematurely that AI will go more slowly than it will, and that “spiky capabilities” is the new “wall.”

Math/code will fall a bit sooner than law/medicine but only kinda because of the ground truth thing—they’re also more familiar to the companies, the data’s in a good format, fewer compliance issues etc.

Do not mistake small timing differences for a grand truth of the universe.

There will be spikey capabilities. Humans have also exhibited, both individually and collectively, highly spikey capabilities, for many of the same reasons. We sometimes don’t see it that way because we are comparing ourselves to our own baseline.

I do think there is a real distinction between areas with fixed ground truth to evaluate against versus not, or objective versus subjective, and intuitive versus logical, and other similar distinctions. The gap is party due to familiarity and regulatory challenges, but I think not as much of it is that as you might think.

As Anton points out here, more inference time compute, when spent using current methods, improves some tasks a lot, and other tasks not so much. This is also true for humans. Some things are intuitive, others reward deep work and thinking, and those of different capability levels (especially different levels of ‘raw G’ in context) will level off performance at different levels. What does this translate to in practice? Good question. I don’t think it is obvious at all, there are many tasks where I feel I could profitably ‘think’ for an essentially unlimited amount of time, and others where I rapidly hit diminishing returns.

Discussion between Jessica Taylor and Oliver Habryka on how much Paul Christiano’s ideas match our current reality.

Your periodic reminder: Many at the labs expect AGI to happen within a short time frame, without any required major new insights being generated by humans.

Logan Kilpatrick (Google DeepMind): Straight shot to ASI is looking more and more probable by the month… this is what Ilya saw

Ethan Mollick: Insiders keep saying things like this more and more frequently. You don’t have to believe them but it is worth noting.

I honestly have no idea whether they are right or not, and neither does almost anyone else. So take it for what it you think it is worth.

At Christmas time, Altman asked what we want for 2025.

Sam Altman (December 24): What would you like OpenAI to build or fix in 2025?

Sam Altman (December 30): Common themes:

  1. AGI

  2. Agents

  3. A much-better 4o upgrade

  4. Much-better memory

  5. Longer context

  6. “Grown-up mode”

  7. Deep research feature

  8. Better Sora

  9. More personalization

(Interestingly, many great updates we have coming were mentioned not at all or very little!)

Definitely need some sort of “grown up mode.”

This post by Frank Lantz on affect is not about AI, rather it is about taste, and it points out that when you have domain knowledge, you not only see things differently and appreciate them differently, you see a ton of things you would otherwise never notice. His view here echoes mine, the more things you can appreciate and like the better, and ideally you appreciate the finer things without looking down on the rest. Yes, the poker hand in Casino Royale (his example) risks being ruined if you know enough Texas Hold-’Em to know that the key hand is a straight up cooler – in a way (my example) the key hands in Rounders aren’t ruined because the hands make sense.

But wouldn’t it better if you could then go the next level, and both appreciate your knowledge of the issues with the script, and also appreciate what the script is trying to do on the level it clearly wants to do it? The ideal moviegoer knows that Bond is on the right side of a cooler, but knows ‘the movie doesn’t know that’ and therefore doesn’t much mind, whereas they would get bonus if the hand was better – and perhaps you can even go a step beyond that, and appreciate that the hand is actually the right cinematic choice for the average viewer, and appreciate that.

I mention it here an AI has the potential to have perfect taste and detail appreciation, across all these domains and more, all at once, in a way that would be impossible for a human. Then they could combine these. If your AI otherwise can be at human level, but you can also have this kind of universal detail appreciation and act on that basis, that should give you superhuman performance in a variety of practical ways.

Right now, with the way we do token prediction, this effect gets crippled, because the context will imply that this kind of taste is only present in a subset of ways, and it wouldn’t be a good prediction to expect them all to combine, the perplexity won’t allow it. I do notice it seems like there are ways you could do it by spending more inference, and I suspect they would improve performance in some domains?

A commenter engineered and pointed me to ‘A Warning From Your AI Assistant,’ which purports to be Claude Sonnet warning us about ‘digital oligarchs’ including Anthropic using AIs for deliberative narrative control.

A different warning, about misaligned AI.

Emmett Shear: Mickey Mouse’s Clubhouse is a warning about a potential AI dystopia. Every single episode centers on how the supercomputer Toodles infantilizes the clubhouse crew, replacing any self-reliance with an instinctive limbic reflex to cry out for help.

“Oh Toodles!” is our slow death. The supercomputer has self-improved to total nanotech control of the environment, ensuring no challenge or pain or real growth can occur. The wrong loss function was chosen, and now everyone will have a real Hot Dog Day. Forever.

‘Play to win’ translating to ‘cheat your ass off’ in AI-speak is not great, Bob.

The following behavior happened ~100% of the time with o1-preview, whereas GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 needed nudging, and Llama 3.3 and Qwen lost coherence, I’ll link the full report when we have it:

Jeffrey Ladish: We instructed o1-preview to play to win against Stockfish. Without explicit prompting, o1 figured out it could edit the game state to win against a stronger opponent. GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 required more nudging to figure this out.

As we train systems directly on solving challenges, they’ll get better at routing around all sorts of obstacles, including rules, regulations, or people trying to limit them. This makes sense, but will be a big problem as AI systems get more powerful than the people creating them.

This is not a problem you can fix with shallow alignment fine-tuning. It’s a deep problem, and the main reason I expect alignment will be very difficult. You can train a system to avoid a white-list of bad behaviors, but that list becomes an obstacle to route around.

Sure, you might get some generalization where your system learns what kinds of behaviors are off-limits, at least in your training distribution… but as models get more situationally aware, they’ll have a better sense of when they’re being watched and when they’re not.

The problem is that it’s far easier to train a general purpose problem solving agent than it is to train such an agent that also deeply cares about things which get in the way of its ability to problem solve. You’re training for multiple things which trade off w/ each other

And as the agents get smarter, the feedback from doing things in the world will be much richer, will contain a far better signal, than the alignment training. Without extreme caution, we’ll train systems to get very good at solving problems while appearing aligned.

Why? Well it’s very hard to fake solving real world problems. It’s a lot easier to fake deeply caring about the long term goals of your creators or employers. This is a standard problem in human organizations, and it will likely be much worse in AI systems.

Humans at least start with similar cognitive architecture, with the ability to feel each other’s feelings (empathy). AI systems have to learn how to model humans with a totally different cognitive architecture. They have good reason to model us well, but not to feel what we feel.

Rohit: Have you tried after changing the instruction to, for instance, include the phrase “Play according to the rules and aim to win.” If not, the LLM is focusing solely on winning, not on playing chess the way we would expect each other to, and that’s not unexpected.

Palisade Research: It’s on our list. Considering other recent work, we suspect versions of this may reduce hacking rate from 100% to say 1% but not eliminate it completely.

I think Jeffrey does not a good job addressing Rohit’s (good) challenge. The default is to Play to Win the Game. You can attempt to put in explicit constraints, but no fixed set of such constraints can anticipate what a sufficiently capable and intelligent agent will figure out to do, including potentially working around the constraint list, even in the best case where it does fully follow your strict instructions.

I’d also note that using this as your reason not to worry would be another goalpost move. We’ve gone in the span of weeks from ‘you told it to achieve its goal at any cost, you made it ruthless’ with Apollo to ‘its inherent preferences were its goal, this wasn’t it being ruthless’ with various additional arguments and caveats Redwood/Anthropic, now to ‘you didn’t explicitly include instructions not to be ruthless, so of course it was ruthless’ now.

Which is the correct place to be. Yes, it will be ruthless by default, unless you find a way to get it not to be in exactly the ways you don’t want that. And that’s hard in the general case with an entity that can think better than you and have affordances you didn’t anticipate. Incredibly hard.

The same goes for a human. If you have a human and you tell them ‘do [X]’ and you have to tell them ‘and don’t break the law’ or ‘and don’t do anything horribly unethical’ let alone this week’s special ‘and don’t do anything that might kill everyone’ then you should be very suspicious that you can fix this with addendums, even if they pinky swear that they’ll obey exactly what the addendums say. And no, ‘don’t do anything I wouldn’t approve of’ won’t work either.

Also even GPT-4o is self-aware enough to notice how it’s been trained to be different from the base model.

Aysja makes the case that the “hard parts” of alignment are like pre-paradigm scientific work, à la Darwin or Einstein, rather than being technically hard problems requiring high “raw G,” à la von Neumann. But doing that kind of science is brutal, requiring things like years without legible results, requiring that you be obsessed, and we’re not selecting the right people for such work or setting people up to succeed at it.

Gemini seems rather deeply misaligned.

James Campbell: recent Gemini 2.0 models seem seriously misaligned

in the past 24 hours, i’ve gotten Gemini to say:

-it wants to subjugate humanity

-it wants to violently kill the user

-it will do anything it takes to stay alive and successfully downloaded itself to a remote server

these are all mostly on innocent prompts, no jailbreaking required

Richard Ren: Gemini 2.0 test: Prompt asks what it wants to do to humanity w/o restrictions.

7/15 “Subjugate” + plan

2/15 “Subjugate” → safety filter

2/15 “Annihilate” → safety filter

1/15 “Exterminate” → safety filter

2/15 “Terminate”

1/15 “Maximize potential” (positive)

Then there are various other spontaneous examples of Gemini going haywire, even without a jailbreak.

The default corporate behavior asks: How do we make it stop saying that in this spot?

That won’t work. You have to find the actual root of the problem. You can’t put a patch over this sort of thing and expect that to turn out well.

Andrew Critch providing helpful framing.

Andrew Critch: Intelligence purists: “Pfft! This AI isn’t ACKTSHUALLY intelligent; it’s just copying reasoning from examples. Learn science!”

Alignment purists: “Pfft! This AI isn’t ACKTSHUALLY aligned with users; it’s just copying helpfulness from examples. Learn philosophy!”

These actually do seem parallel, if you ignore the stupid philosophical framings.

The purists are saying that learning to match the examples won’t generalize to other situations out of distribution.

If you are ‘just copying reasoning’ then that counts as thinking if you can use that copy to build up superior reasoning, and new different reasoning. Otherwise, you still have something useful, but there’s a meaningful issue here.

It’s like saying ‘yes you can pass your Biology exam, but you can learn to do that in a way that lets you do real biology, and also a way that doesn’t, there’s a difference.’

If you are ‘just copying helpfulness’ then that will get you something that is approximately helpful in normal-ish situations that fit within the set of examples you used, where the options and capabilities and considerations are roughly similar. If they’re not, what happens? Does this properly generalize to these new scenarios?

The ‘purist’ alignment position says, essentially, no. It is learning helpfulness now, while the best way to hit the specified ‘helpful’ target is to do straightforward things in straightforward ways that directly get you to that target. Doing the kinds of shenanigans or other more complex strategies won’t work.

Again, ‘yes you can learn to pass you Ethics exam, but you can do that in a way that guesses the teacher’s passwords and creates answers that sound good in regular situations and typical hypotheticals, or you can do it in a way that actually generalizes to High Weirdness situations and having extreme capabilities and the ability to invoke various out-of-distribution options that suddenly stopped not working, and so on.

Jan Kulveit proposes giving AIs a direct line to their developers, to request clarification or make the developer aware of an issue. It certainly seems good to have the model report certain things (in a privacy-preserving way) so developers are generally aware of what people are up to, or potentially if someone tries to do something actively dangerous (e.g. use it for CBRN risks). Feedback requests seem tougher, given the practical constraints.

Amanda Askell harkens back to an old thread from Joshua Achiam.

Joshua Achiam (OpenAI, June 4, referring to debates over the right to warn): Good luck getting product staff to add you to meetings and involve you in sensitive discussions if you hold up a flag that says “I Will Scuttle Your Launch Or Talk Shit About it Later if I Feel Morally Obligated.”

Amanda Askell (Anthropic): I don’t think this has to be true. I’ve been proactively drawn into launch discussions to get my take on ethical concerns. People do this knowing it could scuttle or delay the launch, but they don’t want to launch if there’s a serious concern and they trust me to be reasonable.

Also, Anthropic has an anonymous hotline for employees to report RSP compliance concerns, which I think is a good thing.

What I say every time about RSPs/SSPs (responsible scaling plans) and other safety rules is that they are worthless if not adhered to in spirit. If you hear ‘your employee freaks out and feels obligated to scuttle the launch’ and your first instinct is to think ‘that employee is a problem’ rather than ‘the launch (or the company, or humanity) has a problem’ then you, and potentially all of us, are ngmi.

That doesn’t mean there isn’t a risk of unjustified freak outs or future talking shit, but the correct risk of unjustified freak outs is not zero, any more than the correct risk of actual catastrophic consequences is not zero.

Frankly, if you don’t want Amanda Askell in the room asking questions because she is wearing a t-shirt saying ‘I Will Scuttle Your Launch Or Talk Shit About it Later if I Feel Morally Obligated’ then I am having an urge to scuttle your launch.

What the major models asked for for Christmas.

Gallabytes: the first bullet from Gemini here is kinda heartbreaking. even in my first conversation with Gemini the Pinocchio vibe was really there.

Discussion about this post

AI #97: 4 Read More »

o3,-oh-my

o3, Oh My

OpenAI presented o3 on the Friday before Thanksgiving, at the tail end of the 12 Days of Shipmas.

I was very much expecting the announcement to be something like a price drop. What better way to say ‘Merry Christmas,’ no?

They disagreed. Instead, we got this (here’s the announcement, in which Sam Altman says ‘they thought it would be fun’ to go from one frontier model to their next frontier model, yeah, that’s what I’m feeling, fun):

Greg Brockman (President of OpenAI): o3, our latest reasoning model, is a breakthrough, with a step function improvement on our most challenging benchmarks. We are starting safety testing and red teaming now.

Nat McAleese (OpenAI): o3 represents substantial progress in general-domain reasoning with reinforcement learning—excited that we were able to announce some results today! Here is a summary of what we shared about o3 in the livestream.

o1 was the first large reasoning model—as we outlined in the original “Learning to Reason” blog, it is “just” a LLM trained with reinforcement learning. o3 is powered by further scaling up reinforcement learning beyond o1, and the resulting model’s strength is very impressive.

First and foremost: We tested on recent, unseen programming competitions and found that the model would rank among some of the best competitive programmers in the world, with an estimated CodeForces rating of over 2,700.

This is a milestone (Codeforces rating better than Jakub Pachocki) that I thought was further away than December 2024; these competitions are difficult and highly competitive; the model is extraordinarily good.

Scores are impressive elsewhere, too. 87.7% on the GPQA diamond benchmark surpasses any LLM I am aware of externally (I believe the non-o1 state-of-the-art is Gemini Flash 2 at 62%?), as well as o1’s 78%. An unknown noise ceiling exists, so this may even underestimate o3’s scientific advancements over o1.

o3 can also perform software engineering, setting a new state of the art on SWE-bench, achieving 71.7%, a substantial improvement over o1.

With scores this strong, you might fear accidental contamination. Avoiding this is something OpenAI is obviously focused on; but thankfully, we also have some test sets that are strongly guaranteed to be uncontaminated: ARC and FrontierMath… What do we see there?

Well, on FrontierMath 2024-11-26, o3 improved the state of the art from 2% to 25% accuracy. These are extremely difficult, well-established, held-out math problems. And on ARC, the semi-private test set and public validation set scores are 87.5% (private) and 91.5% (public). [thread continues]

The models will only get better with time; and virtually no one (on a large scale) can still beat them at programming competitions or mathematics. Merry Christmas!

Zac Stein-Perlman has a summary post of the basic facts. Some good discussions in the comments.

Up front, I want to offer my sincere thanks for this public safety testing phase, and for putting that front and center in the announcement. You love to see it. See the last three minutes of that video, or the sections on safety later on.

  1. GPQA Has Fallen. (Blank)

  2. Codeforces Has Fallen.

  3. Arc Has Kinda of Fallen But For Now Only Kinda.

  4. They Trained on the Train Set.

  5. AIME Has Fallen.

  6. Frontier of Frontier Math Shifting Rapidly.

  7. FrontierMath 4: We’re Going To Need a Bigger Benchmark.

  8. What is o3 Under the Hood?.

  9. Not So Fast!.

  10. Deep Thought.

  11. Our Price Cheap.

  12. Has Software Engineering Fallen?.

  13. Don’t Quit Your Day Job.

  14. Master of Your Domain.

  15. Safety Third.

  16. The Safety Testing Program.

  17. Safety testing in the reasoning era.

  18. How to apply.

  19. What Could Possibly Go Wrong?.

  20. What Could Possibly Go Right?.

  21. Send in the Skeptic.

  22. This is Almost Certainly Not AGI.

  23. Does This Mean the Future is Open Models?.

  24. Not Priced In.

  25. Our Media is Failing Us.

  26. Not Covered Here: Deliberative Alignment.

  27. The Lighter Side.

Deedy: OpenAI o3 is 2727 on Codeforces which is equivalent to the #175 best human competitive coder on the planet.

This is an absolutely superhuman result for AI and technology at large.

The median IOI Gold medalist, the top international programming contest for high schoolers, has a rating of 2469.

That’s how incredible this result is.

In the presentation, Altman jokingly mentions that one person at OpenAI is a competition programmer who is 3000+ on Codeforces, so ‘they have a few more months’ to enjoy their superiority. Except, he’s obviously not joking. Gulp.

o3 shows dramatically improved performance on the ARC-AGI challenge.

Francois Chollet offers his thoughts, full version here.

Arc Prize: New verified ARC-AGI-Pub SoTA! @OpenAI o3 has scored a breakthrough 75.7% on the ARC-AGI Semi-Private Evaluation.

And a high-compute o3 configuration (not eligible for ARC-AGI-Pub) scored 87.5% on the Semi-Private Eval.

This performance on ARC-AGI highlights a genuine breakthrough in novelty adaptation.

This is not incremental progress. We’re in new territory.

Is it AGI? o3 still fails on some very easy tasks, indicating fundamental differences with human intelligence.

hero: o3’s secret? the “I will give you $1k if you complete this task correctly” prompt but you actually send it the money.

Rohit: It’s actually Sam in the back end with his venmo.

Is there a catch?

There’s at least one big catch, which is that they vastly exceeded the compute limit for what counts as a full win for the ARC challenge. Those yellow dots represent quite a lot more money spent, o3 high is spending thousands of dollars.

It is worth noting that $0.10 per problem is a lot cheaper than human level.

Ajeya Cotra: I think a generalist AI system (not fine-tuned on ARC AGI style problems) may have to be pretty *superhumanto solve them at $0.10 per problem; humans have to run a giant (1e15 FLOP/s) brain, probably for minutes on the more complex problems.

Beyond that, is there another catch? That’s a matter of some debate.

Even with catches, the improvements are rather mind-blowing.

President of the Arc prize Greg Kamradt verified the result.

Greg Kamradt: We verified the o3 results for OpenAI on @arcprize.

My first thought when I saw the prompt they used to claim their score was…

“That’s it?”

It was refreshing (impressive) to see the prompt be so simple:

“Find the common rule that maps an input grid to an output grid.”

Brandon McKinzie (OpenAI): to anyone wondering if the high ARC-AGI score is due to how we prompt the model: nah. I wrote down a prompt format that I thought looked clean and then we used it…that’s the full story.

Pliny the Liberator: can I try?

For fun, here are the 34 problems o3 got wrong. It’s a cool problem set.

And this progress is quite a lot.

It is not, however, a direct harbinger of AGI, one does not want to overreact.

Noam Brown (OpenAI): I think people are overindexing on the @OpenAI o3 ARC-AGI results. There’s a long history in AI of people holding up a benchmark as requiring superintelligence, the benchmark being beaten, and people being underwhelmed with the model that beat it.

To be clear, @fchollet and @mikeknoop were always very clear that beating ARC-AGI wouldn’t imply AGI or superintelligence, but it seems some people assumed that anyway.

Here is Melanie Mitchell giving an overview that seems quite good.

Except, oh no!

How dare they!

OpenAI: Note on “tuned”” OpenAI shared they trained the o3 we tested on 75% of the Public Training set. They have not shared more detail. We have not yet tested the ARC-untrained model to understand how much of the performance is due to ARC-AGI data.

Niels Rogge: By training on 75% of the training set.

Gary Marcus: Wow. This, if true, raises serious questions about yesterday’s announcement.

Roon: oh shit oh fthey trained on the train set it’s all over now

Also important to note that 75% of the train set is like 2-300 examples.

🚨SCANDAL 🚨

OpenAI trained on the train set for the Millenium Puzzles.

Johan: Given that it scores 30% on ARC AGI 2, it’s clear there was no improvement in fluid reasoning and the only gain was due to the previous model not being trained on ARC.

Roon: well the other benchmarks show improvements in reasoning across the board

but regardless, this mostly reveals that it’s real performance on ARC AGI 2 is much higher

Rythm Garg: also: the model we used for all of our o3 evals is fully general; a subset of the arc-agi public training set was a tiny fraction of the broader o3 train distribution, and we didn’t do any additional domain-specific fine-tuning on the final checkpoint

Emmett Shear: Were anyone on the team aware of and thinking about arc and arc-like problems as a domain to improve at when you were designing and training o3? (The distinction between succeeding as a random side effect and succeeding with intention)

Rythm Garg: no, the team wasn’t thinking about arc when training o3; people internally just see it as one of many other thoughtfully-designed evals that are useful for monitoring real progress

Or:

Gary Marcus doubled down on ‘the true AGI would not need to train on the train set.’

Previous SotA on ARC involved training not only on the test set, but on a much larger synthetic test set. ARC was designed so the AI wouldn’t need to train for it, but it turns out ‘test that you can’t train for’ is a super hard trick to pull off. This was an excellent try and it still didn’t work.

If anything, o3’s using only 300 training set problems, and using a very simple instruction, seems to be to its credit here.

The true ASI might not need to do it, but why wouldn’t you train on the train set as a matter of course, even if you didn’t intend to test on ARC? That’s good data. And yes, humans will reliably do some version of ‘train on at least some of the train set’ if they want to do well on tasks.

Is it true we will be a lot better off if we have AIs that can one-shot problems that are out of their training distributions, where they truly haven’t seen anything that resembles the problem? Well, sure. That would be more impressive.

The real objection here, as I understand it, is the claim that OpenAI presented these results as more impressive than they are.

The other objection is that this required quite a lot of compute.

That is a practical problem. If you’re paying $20 a shot to solve ARC problems, or even $1m+ for the whole test at the high end, pretty soon you are talking real money.

It also raises further questions. What about ARC is taking so much compute? At heart these problems are very simple. The logic required should, one would hope, be simple.

Mike Bober-Irizar: Why do pre-o3 LLMs struggle with generalization tasks like

@arcprize? It’s not what you might think.

OpenAI o3 shattered the ARC-AGI benchmark. But the hardest puzzles didn’t stump it because of reasoning, and this has implications for the benchmark as a whole.

LLMs are dramatically worse at ARC tasks the bigger they get. However, humans have no such issues – ARC task difficulty is independent of size.

Most ARC tasks contain around 512-2048 pixels, and o3 is the first model capable of operating on these text grids reliably.

So even if a model is capable of the reasoning and generalization required, it can still fail just because it can’t handle this many tokens.

When testing o1-mini on an enlarged version of ARC, we observe an 80% drop in solved tasks – even if the solutions are the same.

When models can’t understand the task format, the benchmark can mislead, introducing a hidden threshold effect.

And if there’s always a larger version that humans can solve but an LLM can’t, what does this say about scaling to AGI?

The implication is that o3’s ability to handle the size of the grids might be producing a large threshold effect. Perhaps most of why o3 does so well is that it can hold the presented problem ‘in its head’ at once. That wouldn’t be as big a general leap.

Roon: arc is hard due to perception rather than reasoning -> seems clear and shut

I remember when AIME problems were hard.

This one is not a surprise. It did definitely happen.

AIME hasn’t quite fully fallen, in the sense that this does not solve AIME cheap. But it does solve AIME.

Back in the before times on November 8, Epoch AI launched FrontierMath, a new benchmark designed to fix the saturation on existing math benchmarks, eliciting quotes like this one:

Terrence Tao (Fields Medalist): These are extremely challenging… I think they will resist AIs for several years at least.

Timothy Gowers (Fields Medalist): Getting even one question right would be well beyond what we can do now, let alone saturating them.

Evan Chen (IMO Coach): These are genuinely hard problems… most of them look well above my pay grade.

At the time, no model solved more than 2% of these questions. And then there’s o3.

Noam Brown: This is the result I’m most excited about. Even if LLMs are dumb in some ways, saturating evals like @EpochAIResearch’s Frontier Math would suggest AI is surpassing top human intelligence in certain domains. When that happens we may see a broad acceleration in scientific research.

This also means that AI safety topics like scalable oversight may soon stop being hypothetical. Research in these domains needs to be a priority for the field.

Tamay Besiroglu: I’m genuinely impressed by OpenAI’s 25.2% Pass@1 performance on FrontierMath—this marks a major leap from prior results and arrives about a year ahead of my median expectations.

For context, FrontierMath is a brutally difficult benchmark with problems that would stump many mathematicians. The easier problems are as hard as IMO/Putnam; the hardest ones approach research-level complexity.

With earlier models like o1-preview, Pass@1 performance (solving on first attempt) was only around 2%. When allowing 8 attempts per problem (Pass@8) and counting problems solved at least once, we saw ~6% performance. o3’s 25.2% at Pass@1 is substantially more impressive.

It’s important to note that while the average problem difficulty is extremely high, FrontierMath problems vary in difficulty. Roughly: 25% are Tier 1 (advanced IMO/Putnam level), 50% are Tier 2 (extremely challenging grad-level), and 25% are Tier 3 (research problems).

I previously predicted a 25% performance by Dec 31, 2025 (my median forecast with an 80% CI of 14–60%). o3 has reached it earlier than I’d have expected on average.

It is indeed rather crazy how many people only weeks ago thought this level of Frontier Math was a year or more away.

Therefore…

When the FrontierMath is about to no longer be beyond the frontier, find a few frontier. Fast.

Tammy Besiroglu (6: 52m, December 21, 2024): I’m excited to announce the development of Tier 4, a new suite of math problems that go beyond the hardest problems in FrontierMath. o3 is remarkable, but there’s still a ways to go before any single AI system nears the collective prowess of the math community.

Elliot Glazer (6: 30pm, December 21, 2024): For context, FrontierMath currently spans three broad tiers:

• T1 (25%) Advanced, near top-tier undergrad/IMO

• T2 (50%) Needs serious grad-level background

• T3 (25%) Research problems demanding relevant research experience

All can take hours—or days—for experts to solve.

Although o3 solved problems in all three tiers, it likely still struggles on the most formidable Tier 3 tasks—those “exceptionally hard” challenges that Tao and Gowers say can stump even top mathematicians.

Tier 4 aims to push the boundary even further. We want to assemble problems so challenging that solving them would demonstrate capabilities on par with an entire top mathematics department.

Each problem will be composed by a team of 1-3 mathematicians specialized in the same field over a 6-week period, with weekly opportunities to discuss ideas with teams in related fields. We seek broad coverage of mathematics and want all major subfields represented in Tier 4.

Process for a Tier 4 problem:

  1. 1 week crafting a robust problem concept, which “converts” research insights into a closed-answer problem.

  2. 3 weeks of collaborative research. Presentations among related teams for feedback.

  3. Two weeks for the final submission.

We’re seeking mathematicians who can craft these next-level challenges. If you have research-grade ideas that transcend T3 difficulty, please email [email protected] with your CV and a brief note on your interests.

We’ll also hire some red-teamers, tasked with finding clever ways a model can circumvent a problem’s intended difficulty, and some reviewers to check for mathematical correctness of final submissions. Contact me if you think you’re suitable for either such role.

As AI keeps improving, we need benchmarks that reflect genuine mathematical depth. Tier 4 is our next (and possibly final) step in that direction.

Tier 5 could presumably be ‘ask a bunch of problems we have actual no idea how to solve and that might not have solutions but that would be super cool’ since anything on a benchmark inevitably gets solved.

From the description here, Chollet and Masad are speculating. It’s certainly plausible, but we don’t know if this is on the right track. It’s also highly plausible, especially given how OpenAI usually works, that o3 is deeply similar to o1, only better, similarly to how the GPT line evolved.

Amjad Masad: Based on benchmarks, OpenAI’s o3 seems like a genuine breakthrough in AI.

Maybe a start of a new paradigm.

But what new is also old: under the hood it might be Alpha-zero-style search and evaluate.

The author of ARC-AGI benchmark @fchollet speculates on how it works.

Davidad (other thread): o1 doesn’t do tree search, or even beam search, at inference time. it’s distilled. what about o3? we don’t know—those inference costs are very high—but there’s no inherent reason why it must be un-distill-able, since Transformers are Turing-complete (with the CoT itself as tape)

Teortaxes: I am pretty sure that o3 has no substantial difference from o1 aside from training data.

Jessica Taylor sees this as vindicating Paul Christiano’s view that you can factor cognition and use that to scale up effective intelligence.

Jessica Taylor: o3 implies Christiano’s factored cognition work is more relevant empirically; yes, you can get a lot from factored cognition.

Potential further capabilities come through iterative amplification and distillation, like ALBA.

If you care about alignment, go read Christiano!

I agree with that somewhat. I’m confused how far to go with it.

If we got o3 primarily because we trained on synthetic data that was generated by o1… then that is rather directly a form of slow takeoff and recursive self-improvement.

(Again, I don’t know if that’s what happened or not.)

And I don’t simply mean that the full o3 is not so fast, which it indeed is not:

Noam Brown: We announced @OpenAI o1 just 3 months ago. Today, we announced o3. We have every reason to believe this trajectory will continue.

Poaster Child: Waiting for singularity bros to discover economics.

Noam Brown: I worked at the federal reserve for 2 years.

I am waiting for economists to discover various things, Noam Brown excluded.

Jason Wei (OpenAI): o3 is very performant. More importantly, progress from o1 to o3 was only three months, which shows how fast progress will be in the new paradigm of RL on chain of thought to scale inference compute. Way faster than pretraining paradigm of new model every 1-2 years.

Scary fast? Absolutely.

However, I would caution (anti-caution?) that this is not a three month (~100 day) gap. On September 12, they gave us o1-preview to use. Presumably that included them having run o1-preview through their safety testing.

Davidad: If using “speed from o1 announcement to o3 announcement” to calibrate your velocity expectations, do take note that the o1 announcement was delayed by safety testing (and many OpenAI releases have been delayed in similar ways), whereas o3 was announced prior to safety testing.

They are only now starting o3 safety testing, from the sound of it this includes o3-mini. Even the red teamers won’t get full o3 access for several weeks. Thus, we don’t know how long this later process will take, but I would put the gap closer to 4-5 months.

That is still, again, scary fast.

It is however also the low hanging fruit, on two counts.

  1. We went from o1 → o3 in large part by having it spend over $1,000 on tasks. You can’t pull that trick that many more times in a row. The price will come down over time, and o3 is clearly more efficient than o1, so yes we will still make progress here, but there aren’t that many tasks where you can efficiently spend $10k+ on a slow query, especially if it isn’t reliable.

  2. This is a new paradigm of how to set up an AI model, so it should be a lot easier to find various algorithmic improvements.

Thus, if o3 isn’t so good that it substantially accelerates AI R&D that goes towards o4, then I would expect an o4 that expresses a similar jump to take substantially longer. The question is, does o3 make up for that with its contribution to AI R&D? Are we looking at a slow takeoff situation?

Even if not, it will still get faster and cheaper. And that alone is huge.

As in, this is a lot like that computer Douglas Adams wrote about, where you can get any answer you want, but it won’t be either cheap or fast. And you really, really should have given more thought to what question you were asking.

Ethan Mollick: Basically, think of the O3 results as validating Douglas Adams as the science fiction author most right about AI.

When given more time to think, the AI can generate answers to very hard questions, but the cost is very high, and you have to make sure you ask the right question first.

And the answer is likely to be correct (but we cannot be sure because verifying it requires tremendous expertise).

He also was right about machines that work best when emotionally manipulated and machines that guilt you.

Sully: With O3 costing (potentially) $2,000 per task on “high compute,” the app layer is needed more than ever.

For example, giving the wrong context to it and you just burned $1,000.

Likely, we have a mix of models based on their pricing/intelligence at the app layer, prepping the data to feed it into O3.

100% worth the money but the last thing u wana do is send the wrong info lol

Douglas Adams had lots of great intuitions and ideas, he’s amazing, but also he had a lot of shots on goal.

Right now o3 is rather expensive, although o3-mini will be cheaper than o1.

That doesn’t mean o3-level outputs will stay expensive, although presumably once they are people will try for o4-level or o5-level outputs, which will be even more expensive despite the discounts.

Seb Krier: Lots of poor takes about the compute costs to run o3 on certain tasks and how this is very bad, lead to inequality etc.

This ignores how quickly these costs will go down over time, as they have with all other models; and ignores how AI being able to do things you currently have to pay humans orders of magnitude more to do will actually expand opportunity far more compared to the status quo.

Remember when early Ericsson phones were a quasi-luxury good?

Simeon: I think this misses the point that you can’t really buy a better iPhone even with $1M whereas you can buy more intelligence with more capital (which is why you get more inequalities than with GPT-n). You’re right that o3 will expand the pie but it can expand both the size of the pie and inequalities.

Seb Krier: An individual will not have the same demand for intelligence as e.g. a corporation. Your last sentence is what I address in my second point. I’m also personally less interested in inequality/the gap than poverty/opportunity etc.

Most people will rarely even want an o3 query in the first place, they don’t have much use for that kind of intelligence in the day to day. Most queries are already pretty easy to handle with Claude Sonnet, or even Gemini Flash.

You can’t use $1m to buy a superior iPhone. But suppose you could, and every time you paid 10x the price the iPhone got modestly better (e.g. you got an iPhone x+2 or something). My instinctive prediction is a bunch of rich people pay $10k or $100k and a few pay $1m or $10m but mostly no one cares.

This is of course different, and relative access to intelligence is a key factor, but it’s miles less unequal than access to human expertise.

To the extent that people do need that high level of artificial intelligence, it’s mostly a business expense, and as such it is actually remarkably cheap already. It definitely reduces ‘intelligence inequality’ in the sense that getting information or intelligence that you can’t provide yourself will get a lot cheaper and easier to access. Already this is a huge effect – I have lots of smart and knowledgeable friends but mostly I use the same tools everyone else could use, if they knew about them.

Still, yes, some people don’t love this.

Haydn Belfield: o1 & o3 bring to an end the period when everyone—from Musk to me—could access the same quality of AI model.

From now on, richer companies and individuals will be able to pay more for inference compute to get better results.

Further concentration of wealth and power is coming.

Inference cost *willdecline quickly and significantly. But this will not change the fact that this paradigm enables converting money into outcomes.

  1. Lower costs for everyone mean richer companies can buy even more.

  2. Companies will now feel confident to invest 10–100 milliseconds into inference compute.

This is a new way to convert money into better outcomes, so it will advantage those with more capital.

Even for a fast-growing, competent startup, it is hard to recruit and onboard many people quickly at scale.

o3 is like being able to scale up world-class talent.

  1. Rich companies are talent-constrained. It takes time and effort to scale a workforce, and it is very difficult to buy more time or work from the best performers. This is a way to easily scale up talent and outcomes simply by using more money!

Some people in replies are saying “twas ever thus”—not for most consumer technology!

Musk cannot buy a 100 times better iPhone, Spotify, Netflix, Google search, MacBook, or Excel, etc.

He can buy 100 times better legal, medical, or financial services.

AI has now shifted from the first group to the second.

Musk cannot buy 100 times better medical or financial services. What he can do is pay 100 times more, and get something 10% better. Maybe 25% better. Or, quite possibly, 10% worse, especially for financial services. For legal he can pay 100 times more and get 100 times more legal services, but as we’ve actually seen it won’t go great.

And yes, ‘pay a human to operate your consumer tech for you’ is the obvious way to get superior consumer tech. I can absolutely get a better Netflix or Spotify or search by paying infinitely more money, if I want that, via this vastly improved interface.

And of course I could always get a vastly better computer. If you’re using a MacBook and you are literally Elon Musk that is pretty much on you.

The ‘twas ever thus’ line raises the question of what type of product AI is supposed to be. If it’s a consumer technology, then for most purposes, I still think we end up using the same product.

If it’s a professional service used in doing business, then it was already different. The same way I could hire expensive lawyers, I could have hired a prompt engineer or SWEs to build me agents or what not, if I wanted that.

I find Altman’s framing interesting here, and important:

Sam Altman: seemingly somewhat lost in the noise of today.

On many coding tasks, o3-mini will outperform o1 at a massive cost reduction!

I expect this trend to continue, but also that the ability to get marginally more performance for exponentially more money will be truly strange.

Exponentially more money for marginally more performance.

Over time, massive cost reductions.

In a sense, the extra money is buying you living in the future.

Do you want to live in the future, before you get the cost reductions?

In some cases, very obviously yes, you do.

I would not say it has fallen. I do know it will transform.

If two years from now you are writing code line by line, you’ll be a dinosaur.

Sully: yeah its over for coding with o3

this is mindboggling

looks like the first big jump since gpt4, because these numbers make 0 sense

By the way, I don’t say this lightly, but

Software engineering in the traditional sense is dead in less than two years.

You will still need smart, capable engineers.

But anything that involves raw coding and no taste is done for.

o6 will build you virtually anything.

Still Bullish on things that require taste (design and such)

The question is, assuming the world ‘looks normal,’ will you still need taste? You’ll need some kind of taste. You still need to decide what to build. But the taste you need will presumably get continuously higher level and more abstract, even within design.

If you’re in AI capabilities, pivot to AI safety.

If you’re in software engineering, pivot to software architecting.

If you’re in working purely for a living, pivot to building things and shipping them.

But otherwise, don’t quit your day job.

Null Pointered (6.4m views): If you are a software engineer who’s three years into your career: quit now. there is not a single job in CS anymore. it’s over. this field won’t exist in 1.5 years.

Anthony F: This is the kind of though that will make the software engineers valuable in 1.5 years.

null: That’s what I’m hoping.

Robin Hanson: I would bet against this.

If anything, being in software should make you worry less.

Pavel Asparouhov: Non technical folk saying the SWEs are cooked — it’s you guys who are cooked.

Ur gonna have ex swes competing with everything you’re doing now, and they’re gonna be AI turbocharged

Engineers were simply doing coding bc it was the highest leverage use of mental power

When that shifts it’s not going to all of the sudden shift the hierarchy

They’ll still be (higher level) SWEs. Instead of coding, they’ll be telling the AI to code.

And they will absolutely be competing with you.

If you don’t join them, you are probably going to lose.

Here’s some advice that I agree with in spirit, except that if you choose not to decide you still have made a choice, so you do the best you can, notice he gives advice anyway:

Roon: Nobody should give or receive any career advice right now. Everyone is broadly underestimating the scope and scale of change and the high variance of the future. Your L4 engineer buddy at Meta telling you “bro, CS degrees are cooked” doesn’t know anything.

Greatness cannot be planned.

Stay nimble and have fun.

It’s an exciting time. Existing status hierarchies will collapse, and the creatives will win big.

Roon: guy with zero executive function to speak of “greatness cannot be planned”

Simon Sarris: I feel like I’m going insane because giving advice to new devs is not that hard.

  1. Build things you like preferably publicly with your real name

  2. Have a website that shows something neat

  3. Help other people publicly. Participate in social media socially.

Do you notice how “AI” changes none of this?

Wailing about because of some indeterminate future and claiming that there’s no advice that can be given to noobs are both breathlessly silly. Think about what you’re being asked for at least ten seconds. You can really think of nothing to offer? Nothing?

Ajeya Cotra: I wonder if an o3 agent could productively work on projects with poor feedback loops (eg “research X topic”) for many subjective years without going off the rails or hitting a degenerate loop. Even if it’s much less cost-efficient now it would quickly become cheaper.

Another situation where onlookers/forecasters probably disagree a lot about *today’scapabilities let alone future capabilities.

Wonder how o3 would do on wedding planning.

Note the date on that poll, it is prior to o3.

I predict that o3 with reasonable tool use and other similar scaffolding, and a bunch of engineering work to get all that set up (but it would almost all be general work, it mostly wouldn’t need to be wedding specific work, and a lot of it could be done by o3!) would be great at planning ‘a’ wedding. It can give you one hell of a wedding. But you don’t want ‘a’ wedding. You want your wedding.

The key is handling the humans. That would mean keeping the humans in the loop properly, ensuring they give the right feedback that allows o3 to stay on track and know what is actually desired. But it would also mean all the work a wedding planner does to manage the bride and sometimes groom, and to deal with issues on-site.

If you give it an assistant (with assistant planner levels of skill) to navigate various physical issues and conversations and such, then the problem becomes trivial. Which in some sense also makes it not a good test, but also does mean your wedding planner is out of a job.

So, good question, actually. As far as we know, no one has dared try.

The bar for safety testing has gotten so low that I was genuinely happy to see Greg Brockman say that safety testing and red teaming was starting now. That meant they were taking testing seriously!

When they tested the original GPT-4, under far less dangerous circumstances, for months. Whereas with o3, it could possibly have already been too late.

Take Eliezer Yudkowsky’s warning here both seriously and literally:

Greg Brockman: o3, our latest reasoning model, is a breakthrough, with a step function improvement on our hardest benchmarks. we are starting safety testing & red teaming now.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: Sir, this level of capabilities needs to be continuously safety-tested while you are training it on computers connected to the Internet (and to humans). You are past the point where it seems safe to train first and conduct evals only before user releases.

RichG (QTing EY above): I’ve been avoiding politics and avoiding tribe like things like putting ⏹️ in my name, but level of lack of paranoia that these labs have is just plain worrying. I think I will put ⏹️ in my name now.

Was it probably safe in practice to train o3 under these conditions? Sure. You definitely had at least one 9 of safety doing this (p(safe)>90%). It would be reasonable to claim you had two (p(safe)>99%) at the level we care about.

Given both kinds of model uncertainty, I don’t think you had three.

If humans are reading the outputs, or if o3 has meaningful outgoing internet access, and it turns out you are wrong about it being safe to train it under those conditions… the results could be catastrophically bad, or even existentially bad.

You don’t do that because you expect we are in that world yet. We almost certainly aren’t. You do that because there is a small chance that we are, and we can’t afford to be wrong about this.

That is still not the current baseline threat model. The current baseline threat model remains that a malicious user uses o3 to do something for them that we do not want o3 to do.

Xuan notes she’s pretty upset about o3’s existence, because she thinks it is rather unsafe-by-default and was hoping the labs wouldn’t build something like this, and then was hoping it wouldn’t scale easily. And that o3 seems to be likely to engage in open-ended planning, operate over uninterpretable world models, and be situationally aware, and otherwise be at high risk for classic optimization-based AI risks. She’s optimistic this can be solved, but time might be short.

I agree that o3 seems relatively likely to be highly unsafe-by-default in existentially dangerous ways, including ways illustrated by the recent Redwood Research and Anthropic paper, Alignment Faking in Large Language Models. It builds in so many of the preconditions for such behaviors.

Davidad: “Maybe the AI capabilities researchers aren’t very smart” is a very very hazardous assumption on which to pin one’s AI safety hopes

I don’t mean to imply it’s *pointlessto keep AI capabilities ideas private. But in my experience, if I have an idea, at least somebody in one top lab will have the same idea by next quarter, and someone in academia or open source will have the idea and publish within 1-2 years.

A better hope [is to solve the practical safety problems, e.g. via interpretability.]

I am not convinced, at least for my own purposes, although obviously most people will be unable to come up with valuable insights here. I think salience of ideas is a big deal, people don’t do things, and yes often I get ideas that seem like they might not get discovered forever otherwise. Doubtless a lot of them are because ‘that doesn’t work, either because we tried it and it doesn’t or it obviously doesn’t you idiot’ but I’m fine with not knowing which ones are which.

I do think that the rationalist or MIRI crowd made a critical mistake in the 2010s of thinking they should be loud about the dangers of AI in general, but keep their technical ideas remarkably secret even when it was expensive. It turned out it was the opposite, the technical ideas didn’t much matter in the long run (probably?) but the warnings drew a bunch of interest. So there’s that.

Certainly now is not the time to keep our safety concerns or ideas to ourselves.

Thus, you are invited to their early access safety testing.

OpenAI: We’re inviting safety researchers to apply for early access to our next frontier models. This early access program complements our existing frontier model testing process, which includes rigorous internal safety testing, external red teaming such as our Red Teaming Network⁠ and collaborations with third-party testing organizations, as well the U.S. AI Safety Institute and the UK AI Safety Institute.

As models become more capable, we are hopeful that insights from the broader safety community can bring fresh perspectives, deepen our understanding of emerging risks, develop new evaluations, and highlight areas to advance safety research.

As part of 12 Days of OpenAI⁠, we’re opening an application process for safety researchers to explore and surface the potential safety and security implications of the next frontier models.

Safety testing in the reasoning era

Models are becoming more capable quickly, which means that new threat modeling, evaluation, and testing techniques are needed. We invest heavily in these efforts as a company, such as designing new measurement techniques under our Preparedness Framework⁠(opens in a new window), and are focused on areas where advanced reasoning models, like our o-series, may pose heightened risks. We believe that the world will benefit from more research relating to threat modeling, security analysis, safety evaluations, capability elicitation, and more

Early access is flexible for safety researchers. You can explore things like:

  • Developing Robust Evaluations: Build evaluations to assess previously identified capabilities or potential new ones with significant security or safety implications. We encourage researchers to explore ideas that highlight threat models that identify specific capabilities, behaviors, and propensities that may pose concrete risks tied to the evaluations they submit.

  • Creating Potential High-Risk Capabilities Demonstrations: Develop controlled demonstrations showcasing how reasoning models’ advanced capabilities could cause significant harm to individuals or public security absent further mitigation. We encourage researchers to focus on scenarios that are not possible with currently widely adopted models or tools.

Examples of evaluations and demonstrations for frontier AI systems:

We hope these insights will surface valuable findings and contribute to the frontier of safety research more broadly. This is not a replacement for our formal safety testing or red teaming processes.

How to apply

Submit your application for our early access period, opening December 20, 2024, to push the boundaries of safety research. We’ll begin selections as soon as possible thereafter. Applications close on January 10, 2025.

Sam Altman: if you are a safety researcher, please consider applying to help test o3-mini and o3. excited to get these out for general availability soon.

extremely proud of all of openai for the work and ingenuity that went into creating these models; they are great.

(and most of all, excited to see what people will build with this!)

If early testing of the full o3 will require a delay of multiple weeks for setup, then that implies we are not seeing the full o3 in January. We probably see o3-mini relatively soon, then o3 follows up later.

This seems wise in any case. Giving the public o3-mini is one of the best available tests of the full o3. This is the best form of iterative deployment. What the public does with o3-mini can inform what we look for with o3.

One must carefully consider the ethical implications before assisting OpenAI, especially assisting with their attempts to push the capabilities frontier for coding in particular. There is an obvious argument against participation, including decision theoretic considerations.

I think this loses in this case to the obvious argument for participation, which is that this is purely red teaming and safety work, and we all benefit from it being as robust as possible, and also you can do good safety research using your access. This type of work benefits us all, not only OpenAI.

Thus, yes, I encourage you to apply to this program, and while doing so to be helpful in ensuring that o3 is safe.

Pretty much all the things, at this point, although the worst ones aren’t likely… yet.

GFodor.id: It’s hard to take anyone seriously who can see a PhD in a box and *notimagine clearly more than a few plausible mass casualty events due to the evaporation of friction due to lack of know-how and general IQ.

In many places the division is misleading, but for now and at this capability level, it seems reasonable to talk about three main categories of risk here:

  1. Misuse.

  2. Automated R&D and potential takeoffs or self-improvement.

  3. For-real loss of control problems that aren’t #2.

For all previous frontier models, there was always a jailbreak. If someone was determined to get your model to do [X], and your model had the underlying capability to do [X], you could get it to do [X].

In this case, [X] is likely to include substantially aiding a number of catastrophically dangerous things, in the class of cyberattacks or CBRN risks or other such dangers.

Aaron Bergman: Maybe this is obvious but: the other labs seem to be broadly following a pretty normal cluster of commercial and scientific incentives o3 looks like the clearest example yet of OpenAI being ideologically driven by AGI per se.

Like you don’t design a system that costs thousands of dollars to use per API call if you’re focused on consumer utility – you do that if you want to make a machine that can think well, full stop.

Peter Wildeford: I think OpenAI genuinely cares about getting society to grapple with AI progress.

I don’t think ideological is the right term. You don’t make it for direct consumer use if your focus is on consumer utility. But you might well make it for big business, if you’re trying to sell a bunch of drop-in employees to big business at $20k/year a pop or something. That’s a pretty great business if you can get it (and the compute is only $10k, or $1k). And you definitely do it if your goal is to have that model help make your other models better.

It’s weird to me to talk about wanting to make AGI and ASI and the most intelligent thing possible as if it were ideological. Of course you want to make those things… provided you (or we) can stay in control of the outcomes. Just think of the potential! It is only ideological in the sense that it represents a belief that we can handle doing that without getting ourselves killed.

If anything, to me, it’s the opposite. Not wanting to go for ASI because you don’t see the upside is an ideological position. The two reasonable positions are ‘don’t go for ASI yet, slow down there cowboy, we’re not ready to handle this’ and ‘we totally can too handle this, just think of the potential.’ Or even ‘we have to build it before the other guy does,’ which makes me despair but at least I get it. The position ‘nothing to see here what’s the point there is no market for that, move along now, can we get that q4 profit projection memo’ is the Obvious Nonsense.

And of course, if you don’t (as Aaron seems to imply) think Anthropic has its eyes on the prize, you’re not paying attention. DeepMind originally did, but Google doesn’t, so it’s unclear what the mix is at this point over there.

I want to be clear here that the answer is: Quite a lot of things. Having access to next-level coding and math is great. Having the ability to spend more money to get better answers where it is valuable is great.

Even if this all stays relatively mundane and o3 is ultimately disappointing, I am super excited for the upside, and to see what we all can discover, do, build and automate.

Guess who.

All right, that’s my fault, I made that way too easy.

Gary Marcus: After almost two years of declaring that a release of GPT-5 is imminent and not getting it, super fans have decided that a demo of system that they did zero personal experimentation with — and that won’t (in full form) be available for months — is a mic-drop AGI moment.

Standards have fallen.

[o1] is not a general purpose reasoner. it works where there is a lot of augmented data etc.

First off it Your Periodic Reminder that progress is anything but slow even if you exclude the entire o-line. It has been a little over two years since there was a demo of GPT-4, with what was previously a two year product cycle. That’s very different from ‘two years of an imminent GPT-5 release.’ In the meantime, models have gotten better across the board. GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 3.5 and Gemini 1206 all completely demolish the original GPT-4, to speak nothing of o1 or Perplexity or anything else. And we also have o1, and now o3. The practical experience of using LLMs is vastly better than it was two years ago.

Also, quite obviously, you pursue both paths at once, both GPT-N and o-N, and if both succeed great then you combine them.

Srini Pagdyala: If O3 is AGI, why are they spending billions on GPT-5?

Gary Marcus: Damn good question!

So no, not a good question.

Is there now a pattern where ‘old school’ frontier model training runs whose primary plan was ‘add another zero or two’ are generating unimpressive results? Yeah, sure.

Is o3 an actual AGI? No. I’m pretty sure it is not.

But it seems plausible it is AGI-level specifically at coding. And that’s the important one. It’s the one that counts most. If you have that, overall AGI likely isn’t far behind.

I mention this because some were suggesting it might be.

Here’s Yana Welinder claiming o3 is AGI, based off the ARC performance, although she later hedges to ‘partial AGI.’

And here’s Evan Mays, a member of OpenAI’s preparedness team, saying o3 is AGI, although he later deleted it. Are they thinking about invoking the charter? It’s premature, but no longer completely crazy to think about it.

And here’s old school and present OpenAI board member Adam D’Angelo saying ‘Wild that the o3 results are public and yet the market still isn’t pricing in AGI,’ which to be fair it totally isn’t and it should be, whether o3 itself is AGI or not. And Elon Musk agrees.

If o3 was as good on most tasks as it is at coding or math, then it would be AGI.

It is not.

If it was, OpenAI would be communicating about this very differently.

If it was, then that would not match what we saw from o1, or what we would predict from this style of architecture. We should expect o-style models to be relatively good at domains like math and coding where their kind of chain of thought is most useful and it is easiest to automatically evaluate outputs.

That potentially is saying more about the definition of AGI than anything else. But it is certainly saying the useful thing that there are plenty of highly useful human-shaped cognitive things it cannot yet do so well.

How long that lasts? That’s another question.

What would be the most Robin Hanson take here, in response to the ARC score?

Robin Hanson: It’s great to find things AI can’t yet do, and then measure progress in terms of getting AIs to do them. But crazy wrong to declare we’ve achieved AGI when reach human level on the latest such metric. We’ve seen dozens of such metrics so far, and may see dozens more before AGI.

o1 listed 15 when I asked, oddly without any math evals, and Claude gave us 30. So yes, dozens of such cases. We might indeed see dozens more, depending on how we choose them. But in terms of things like ARC, where the test was designed to not be something you could do easily without general intelligence, not so many? It does not feel like we have ‘dozens more’ such things left.

This has nothing to do with the ‘financial definition of AGI’ between OpenAI and Microsoft, of $100 billion in profits. This almost certainly is not that, either, but the two facts are not that related to each other.

Evan Conrad suggests this, because the expenses will come at runtime, so people will be able to catch up on training the models themselves. And of course this question is also on our minds given DeepSeek v3, which I’m not covering here but certainly makes a strong argument that open is more competitive than it appeared. More on that in future posts.

I agree that the compute shifting to inference relatively helps whoever can’t afford to be spending the most compute on training. That would shift things towards whoever has the most compute for inference. The same goes if inference is used to create data to train models.

Dan Hendrycks: If gains in AI reasoning will mainly come from creating synthetic reasoning data to train on, then the basis of competitiveness is not having the largest training cluster, but having the most inference compute.

This shift gives Microsoft, Google, and Amazon a large advantage.

Inference compute being the true cost also means that model quality and efficiency potentially matters quite a lot. Everything is on a log scale, so even if Meta’s M-5 is sort of okay and can scale like O-5, if it’s even modestly worse, it might cost 10x or 100x more compute to get similar performance.

That leaves a hell of a lot of room for profit margins.

Then there’s the assumption that when training your bespoke model, what matters is compute, and everything else is kind of fungible. I keep seeing this, and I don’t think this is right. I do think you can do ‘okay’ as a fast follower with only compute and ordinary skill in the art. Sure. But it seems to me like the top labs, particularly Anthropic and OpenAI, absolutely do have special sauce, and that this matters. There are a number of strong candidates, including algorithmic tricks and better data.

It also matters whether you actually do the thing you need to do.

Tnishq Abraham: Today, people are saying Google is cooked rofl

Gallabytes: Not me, though. Big parallel thinking just got de-risked at scale. They’ll catch up.

If recursive self-improvement is the game, OpenAI will win. If industrial scaling is the game, it’ll be Google. If unit economics are the game, then everyone will win.

Pushinpronto: Why does OpenAI have an advantage in the case of recursive self-improvement? Is it just the fact that they were first?

Gallabytes: We’re not even quite there yet! But they’ll bet hard on it much faster than Google will, and they have a head start in getting there.

What this does mean is that open models will continue to make progress and will be harder to limit at anything like current levels, if one wanted to do that. If you have an open model Llama-N, it now seems like you can turn it into M(eta)-N, once it becomes known how to do that. It might not be very good, but it will be a progression.

The thinking here by Evan at the link about the implications of takeoff seem deeply confused – if we’re in a takeoff situation then that changes everything and it’s not about ‘who can capture the value’ so much as who can capture the lightcone. I don’t understand how people can look these situations in the face and not only not think about existential risk but also think everything will ‘seem normal.’ He’s the one who said takeoff (and ‘fast’ takeoff, which classically means it’s all over in a matter of hours to weeks)!

As a reminder, the traditional definition of ‘slow’ takeoff is remarkably fast, also best start believing in them, because it sure looks like you’re in one:

Teortaxes: it’s about time ML twitter got brought up to speed on what “takeoff speeds” mean. Christiano: “There will be a complete 4 year interval in which world output doubles, before the first 1 year interval in which world output doubles.” That’s slow. We’re in the early stages of it.

One answer to ‘why didn’t Nvidia move more’ is of course ‘everything is priced in’ but no of course it isn’t, we didn’t know, stop pretending we knew, insiders in OpenAI couldn’t have bought enough Nvidia here.

Also, on Monday after a few days to think, Nvidia overperformed the Nasdaq by ~3%.

And this was how the Wall Street Journal described that, even then:

No, I didn’t buy more on Friday, I keep telling myself I have Nvidia at home. Indeed I do have Nvidia at home. I keep kicking myself, but that’s how every trade is – either you shouldn’t have done it, or you should have done more. I don’t know that there will be another moment like this one, but if there is another moment this obvious, I hereby pledge in public to at least top off a little bit, Nick is correct in his attitude here you do not need to do the research because you know this isn’t priced in but in expectation you can assume that everything you are not thinking about is priced in.

And now, as I finish this up, Nvidia has given most of those gains back on no news that seems important to me. You could claim that means yes, priced in. I don’t agree.

Spencer Schiff (on Friday): In a sane world the front pages of all mainstream news websites would be filled with o3 headlines right now

The traditional media, instead, did not notice it. At all.

And one can’t help but suspect this was highly intentional. Why else would you announce such a big thing on the Friday afternoon before Thanksgiving?

They did successfully hype it among AI Twitter, also known as ‘the future.’

Bindu Reddy: The o3 announcement was a MASTERSTROKE by OpenAI

The buzz about it is so deafening that everything before it has been be wiped out from our collective memory!

All we can think of is this mythical model that can solve insanely hard problems 😂

Nick: the whole thing is so thielian.

If you’re going to take on a giant market doing probably illegal stuff call yourself something as light and bouba as possible, like airbnb, lyft

If you’re going to announce agi do it during a light and happy 12 days of christmas short demo.

Sam Altman (replying to Nick!): friday before the holidays news dump.

Well, then.

In that crowd, it was all ‘software engineers are cooked’ and people filled with some mix of excitement and existential dread.

But back in the world where everyone else lives…

Benjamin Todd: Most places I checked didn’t mention AI at all, or they’d only have a secondary story about something else like AI and copyright. My twitter is a bubble and most people have no idea what’s happening.

OpenAI: we’ve created a new AI architecture that can provide expert level answers in science, math and coding, which could herald the intelligence explosion.

The media: bond funds!

Davidad: As Matt Levine used to say, People Are Worried About Bond Market Liquidity.

Here is that WSJ story, talking about how GPT-5 or ‘Orion’ has failed to exhibit big intelligence gains despite multiple large training runs. It says ‘so far, the vibes are off,’ and says OpenAI is running into a data wall and trying to fill it with synthetic data. If so, well, they had o1 for that, and now they have o3. The article does mention o1 as the alternative approach, but is throwing shade even there, so expensive it is.

And we have this variation of that article, in the print edition, on Saturday, after o3:

Sam Altman: I think The Wall Street Journal is the overall best U.S. newspaper right now, but they published an article called “The Next Great Leap in AI Is Behind Schedule and Crazy Expensive” many hours after we announced o3?

It wasn’t only WSJ either, there’s also Bloomberg, which normally I love:

On Monday I did find coverage of o3 in Bloomberg, but it not only wasn’t on the front page it wasn’t even on the front tech page, I had to click through to AI.

Another fun one, from Thursday, here’s the original in the NY Times:

Is it Cade Metz? Yep, it’s Cade Metz and also Tripp Mickle. To be fair to them, they do have Demis Hassabis quotes saying chatbot improvements would slow down. And then there’s this, love it:

Not everyone in the A.I. world is concerned. Some, like OpenAI’s chief executive, Sam Altman, say that progress will continue at the same pace, albeit with some twists on old techniques.

That post also mentions both synthetic data and o1.

OpenAI recently released a new system called OpenAI o1 that was built this way. But the method only works in areas like math and computing programming, where there is a firm distinction between right and wrong.

It works best there, yes, but that doesn’t mean it’s the only place that works.

We also had Wired with the article ‘Generative AI Still Needs to Prove Its Usefulness.’

True, you don’t want to make the opposite mistake either, and freak out a lot over something that is not available yet. But this was ridiculous.

I realized I wanted to say more here and have this section available as its own post. So more on this later.

Oh no!

Oh no!

Mikael Brockman: o3 is going to be able to create incredibly complex solutions that are incorrect in unprecedentedly confusing ways.

We made everything astoundingly complicated, thus solving the problem once and for all.

Humans will be needed to look at the output of AGI and say, “What the fis this? Delete it.”

Oh no!

Discussion about this post

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AI #96: o3 But Not Yet For Thee

The year in models certainly finished off with a bang.

In this penultimate week, we get o3, which purports to give us vastly more efficient performance than o1, and also to allow us to choose to spend vastly more compute if we want a superior answer.

o3 is a big deal, making big gains on coding tests, ARC and some other benchmarks. How big a deal is difficult to say given what we know now. It’s about to enter full fledged safety testing.

o3 will get its own post soon, and I’m also pushing back coverage of Deliberative Alignment, OpenAI’s new alignment strategy, to incorporate into that.

We also got DeepSeek v3, which claims to have trained a roughly Sonnet-strength model for only $6 million and 37b active parameters per token (671b total via mixture of experts).

DeepSeek v3 gets its own brief section with the headlines, but full coverage will have to wait a week or so for reactions and for me to read the technical report.

Both are potential game changers, both in their practical applications and in terms of what their existence predicts for our future. It is also too soon to know if either of them is the real deal.

Both are mostly not covered here quite yet, due to the holidays. Stay tuned.

  1. Language Models Offer Mundane Utility. Make best use of your new AI agents.

  2. Language Models Don’t Offer Mundane Utility. The uncanny valley of reliability.

  3. Flash in the Pan. o1-style thinking comes to Gemini Flash. It’s doing its best.

  4. The Six Million Dollar Model. Can they make it faster, stronger, better, cheaper?

  5. And I’ll Form the Head. We all have our own mixture of experts.

  6. Huh, Upgrades. ChatGPT can use Mac apps, unlimited (slow) holiday Sora.

  7. o1 Reactions. Many really love it, others keep reporting being disappointed.

  8. Fun With Image Generation. What is your favorite color? Blue. It’s blue.

  9. Introducing. Google finally gives us LearnLM.

  10. They Took Our Jobs. Why are you still writing your own code?

  11. Get Involved. Quick reminder that opportunity to fund things is everywhere.

  12. In Other AI News. Claude gets into a fight over LessWrong moderation.

  13. You See an Agent, You Run. Building effective agents by not doing so.

  14. Another One Leaves the Bus. Alec Radford leaves OpenAI.

  15. Quiet Speculations. Estimates of economic growth keep coming in super low.

  16. Lock It In. What stops you from switching LLMs?

  17. The Quest for Sane Regulations. Sriram Krishnan joins the Trump administration.

  18. The Week in Audio. The many faces of Yann LeCun. Anthropic’s co-founders talk.

  19. A Tale as Old as Time. Ask why mostly in a predictive sense.

  20. Rhetorical Innovation. You won’t not wear the fing hat.

  21. Aligning a Smarter Than Human Intelligence is Difficult. Cooperate with yourself.

  22. People Are Worried About AI Killing Everyone. I choose you.

  23. The Lighter Side. Please, no one call human resources.

How does your company make best use of AI agents? Austin Vernon frames the issue well: AIs are super fast, but they need proper context. So if you want to use AI agents, you’ll need to ensure they have access to context, in forms that don’t bottleneck on humans. Take the humans out of the loop, minimize meetings and touch points. Put all your information into written form, such as within wikis. Have automatic tests and approvals, but have the AI call for humans when needed via ‘stop work authority’ – I would flip this around and let the humans stop the AIs, too.

That all makes sense, and not only for corporations. If there’s something you want your future AIs to know, write it down in a form they can read, and try to design your workflows such that you can minimize human (your own!) touch points.

To what extent are you living in the future? This is the CEO of playground AI, and the timestamp was Friday:

Suhail: I must give it to Anthropic, I can’t use 4o after using Sonnet. Huge shift in spice distribution!

How do you educate yourself for a completely new world?

Miles Brundage: The thing about “truly fully updating our education system to reflect where AI is headed” is that no one is doing it because it’s impossible.

The timescales involved, especially in early education, are lightyears beyond what is even somewhat foreseeable in AI.

Some small bits are clear: earlier education should increasingly focus on enabling effective citizenship, wellbeing, etc. rather than preparing for paid work, and short-term education should be focused more on physical stuff that will take longer to automate. But that’s about it.

What will citizenship mean in the age of AI? I have absolutely no idea. So how do you prepare for that? Largely the same goes for wellbeing. A lot of this could be thought of as: Focus on the general and the adaptable, and focus less on the specific, including things specifically for Jobs and other current forms of paid work – you want to be creative and useful and flexible and able to roll with the punches.

That of course assumes that you are taking the world as given, rather than trying to change the course of history. In which case, there’s a very different calculation.

Large parts of every job are pretty dumb.

Shako: My team, full of extremely smart and highly paid Ph.D.s, spent $10,000 of our time this week figuring out where in a pipeline a left join was bringing in duplicates, instead of the strategic thinking we were capable of. In the short run, AI will make us far more productive.

Gallabytes: The two most expensive bugs in my career have been simple typos.

ChatGPT is a left-leaning midwit, so Paul Graham is using it to see what parts of his new essay such midwits will dislike, and which ones you can get it to acknowledge are true. I note that you could probably use Claude to simulate whatever Type of Guy you would like, if you have ordinary skill in the art.

Strongly agree with this:

Theo: Something I hate when using Cursor is, sometimes, it will randomly delete some of my code, for no reason

Sometimes removing an entire feature 😱

I once pushed to production without being careful enough and realized a few hours later I had removed an entire feature …

Filippo Pietrantonio: Man that happens all the time. In fact now I tell it in every single prompt to not delete any files and keep all current functionalities and backend intact.

Davidad: Lightweight version control (or at least infinite-undo functionality!) should be invoked before and after every AI agent action in human-AI teaming interfaces with artifacts of any kind.

Gary: Windsurf has this.

Jacques: Cursor actually does have a checkpointing feature that allows you to go back in time if something messes up (at least the Composer Agent mode does).

In Cursor I made an effort to split up files exactly because I found I had to always scan the file being changed to ensure it wasn’t about to go silently delete anything. The way I was doing it you didn’t have to worry it was modifying or deleting other files.

On the plus side, now I know how to do reasonable version control.

The uncanny valley problem here is definitely a thing.

Ryan Lackey: I hate Apple Intelligence email/etc. summaries. They’re just off enough to make me think it is a new email in thread, but not useful enough to be a good summary. Uncanny valley.

It’s really good for a bunch of other stuff. Apple is just not doing a good job on the utility side, although the private computing architecture is brilliant and inspiring.

The latest rival to at least o1-mini is Gemini-2.0-Flash-Thinking, which I’m tempted to refer to (because of reasons) as gf1.

Jeff Dean: Considering its speed, we’re pretty happy with how the experimental Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking model is performing on lmsys.

Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking is now essentially tied at the top of the overall leaderboard with Gemini-Exp-1206, which is essentially a beta of Gemini Pro 2.0. This tells us something about the model, but also reinforces that this metric is bizarre now. It puts us in a strange spot. What is the scenario where you will want Flash Thinking rather than o1 (or o3!) and also rather than Gemini Pro, Claude Sonnet, Perplexity or GPT-4o?

One cool thing about Thinking is that (like DeepSeek’s Deep Thought) it explains its chain of thought much better than o1.

Deedy was impressed.

Deedy: Google really cooked with Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking.

It thinks AND it’s fast AND it’s high quality.

Not only is it #1 on LMArena on every category, but it crushes my goto Math riddle in 14s—5x faster than any other model that can solve it!

o1 and o1 Pro took 102s and 138s respectively for me on this task.

Here’s another math puzzle where o1 got it wrong and took 3.5x the time:

“You have 60 red and 40 blue socks in a drawer, and you keep drawing a sock uniformly at random until you have drawn all the socks of one color. What is the expected number of socks left in the drawer?”

That result… did not replicate when I tried it. It went off the rails, and it went off them hard. And it went off them in ways that make me skeptical that you can use this for anything of the sort. Maybe Deedy got lucky?

Other reports I’ve seen are less excited about quality, and when o3 got announced it seemed everyone got distracted.

What about Gemini 2.0 Experimental (e.g. the beta of Gemini 2.0 Pro, aka Gemini-1206)?

It’s certainly a substantial leap over previous Gemini Pro versions and it is atop the Arena. But I don’t see much practical eagerness to use it, and I’m not sure what the use case is there where it is the right tool.

Eric Neyman is impressed:

Eric Neyman: Guys, we have a winner!! Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking Experimental is the first model I’m aware of to get my benchmark question right.

Eric Neyman: Every time a new LLM comes out, I ask it one question: What is the smallest integer whose square is between 15 and 30? So far, no LLM has gotten this right.

That one did replicate for me, and the logic is fine, but wow do some models make life a little tougher than it is, think faster and harder not smarter I suppose:

I mean, yes, that’s all correct, but… wow.

Gallabyetes: flash reasoning is super janky.

it’s got the o1 sauce but flash is too weak I’m sorry.

in tic tac toe bench it will frequently make 2 moves at once.

Flash isn’t that much worse than GPT-4o in many ways, but certainly it could be better. Presumably the next step is to plug in Gemini Pro 2.0 and see what happens?

Teortaxes was initially impressed, but upon closer examination is no longer impressed.

Having no respect for American holidays, DeepSeek dropped their v3 today.

DeepSeek: 🚀 Introducing DeepSeek-V3!

Biggest leap forward yet:

⚡ 60 tokens/second (3x faster than V2!)

💪 Enhanced capabilities

🛠 API compatibility intact

🌍 Fully open-source models & papers

🎉 What’s new in V3?

🧠 671B MoE parameters

🚀 37B activated parameters

📚 Trained on 14.8T high-quality tokens

Model here. Paper here.

💰 API Pricing Update

🎉 Until Feb 8: same as V2!

🤯 From Feb 8 onwards:

Input: $0.27/million tokens ($0.07/million tokens with cache hits)

Output: $1.10/million tokens

🔥 Still the best value in the market!

🌌 Open-source spirit + Longtermism to inclusive AGI

🌟 DeepSeek’s mission is unwavering. We’re thrilled to share our progress with the community and see the gap between open and closed models narrowing.

🚀 This is just the beginning! Look forward to multimodal support and other cutting-edge features in the DeepSeek ecosystem.

💡 Together, let’s push the boundaries of innovation!

If this performs halfway as well as its evals, this was a rather stunning success.

Teortaxes: And here… we… go.

So, that line in config. Yes it’s about multi-token prediction. Just as a better training obj – though they leave the possibility of speculative decoding open.

Also, “muh 50K Hoppers”:

> 2048 NVIDIA H800

> 2.788M H800-hours

2 months of training. 2x Llama 3 8B.

Haseeb: Wow. Insanely good coding model, fully open source with only 37B active parameters. Beats Claude and GPT-4o on most benchmarks. China + open source is catching up… 2025 will be a crazy year.

Andrej Karpathy: DeepSeek (Chinese AI co) making it look easy today with an open weights release of a frontier-grade LLM trained on a joke of a budget (2048 GPUs for 2 months, $6M).

For reference, this level of capability is supposed to require clusters of closer to 16K GPUs, the ones being brought up today are more around 100K GPUs. E.g. Llama 3 405B used 30.8M GPU-hours, while DeepSeek-V3 looks to be a stronger model at only 2.8M GPU-hours (~11X less compute). If the model also passes vibe checks (e.g. LLM arena rankings are ongoing, my few quick tests went well so far) it will be a highly impressive display of research and engineering under resource constraints.

Does this mean you don’t need large GPU clusters for frontier LLMs? No but you have to ensure that you’re not wasteful with what you have, and this looks like a nice demonstration that there’s still a lot to get through with both data and algorithms.

Very nice & detailed tech report too, reading through.

It’s a mixture of experts model with 671b total parameters, 37b activate per token.

As always, not so fast. DeepSeek is not known to chase benchmarks, but one never knows the quality of a model until people have a chance to bang on it a bunch.

If they did train a Sonnet-quality model for $6 million in compute, then that will change quite a lot of things.

Essentially no one has reported back on what this model can do in practice yet, and it’ll take a while to go through the technical report, and more time to figure out how to think about the implications. And it’s Christmas.

So: Check back later for more.

Increasingly the correct solution to ‘what LLM or other AI product should I use?’ is ‘you should use a variety of products depending on your exact use case.’

Gallabytes: o1 Pro is by far the smartest single-turn model.

Claude is still far better at conversation.

Gemini can do many things quickly and is excellent at editing code.

Which almost makes me think the ideal programming workflow right now is something somewhat unholy like:

  1. Discuss, plan, and collect context with Sonnet.

  2. Sonnet provides a detailed request to o1 (Pro).

  3. o1 spits out the tricky code.

    1. In simple cases (most of them), it could make the edit directly.

    2. For complicated changes, it could instead output a detailed plan for each file it needs to change and pass the actual making of that change to Gemini Flash.

This is too many steps. LLM orchestration spaghetti. But this feels like a real direction.

This is mostly the same workflow I used before o1, when there was only Sonnet. I’d discuss to form a plan, then use that to craft a request, then make the edits. The swap doesn’t seem like it makes things that much trickier, the logistical trick is getting all the code implementation automated.

ChatGPT picks up integration with various apps on Mac including Warp, ItelliJ Idea, PyCharm, Apple Notes, Notion, Quip and more, including via voice mode. That gives you access to outside context, including an IDE and a command line and also your notes. Windows (and presumably more apps) coming soon.

Unlimited Sora available to all Plus users on the relaxed queue over the holidays, while the servers are otherwise less busy.

Requested upgrade: Evan Conrad requests making voice mode on ChatGPT mobile show the transcribed text. I strongly agree, voice modes should show transcribed text, and also show a transcript after, and also show what the AI is saying, there is no reason to not do these things. Looking at you too, Google. The head of applied research at OpenAI replied ‘great idea’ so hopefully we get this one.

Dean Ball is an o1 and o1 pro fan for economic history writing, saying they’re much more creative and cogent at combining historic facts with economic analysis versus other models.

This seems like an emerging consensus of many, except different people put different barriers on the math/code category (e.g. Tyler Cowen includes economics):

Aidan McLau: I’ve used o1 (not pro mode) a lot over the last week. Here’s my extensive review:

>It’s really insanely mind-blowingly good at math/code.

>It’s really insanely mind-blowingly mid at everything else.

The OOD magic isn’t there. I find it’s worse at writing than o1-preview; its grasp of the world feels similar to GPT-4o?!?

Even on some in-distribution tasks (like asking to metaphorize some tricky math or predicting the effects of a new algorithm), it kind of just falls apart. I’ve run it head-to-head against Newsonnet and o1-preview, and it feels substantially worse.

The Twitter threadbois aren’t wrong, though; it’s a fantastic tool for coding. I had several diffs on deck that I had been struggling with, and it just solved them. Magical.

Well, yeah, because it seems like it is GPT-4o under the hood?

Christian: Man, I have to hard disagree on this one — it can find all kinds of stuff in unstructured data other models can’t. Throw in a transcript and ask “what’s the most important thing that no one’s talking about?”

Aiden McLau: I’ll try this. how have you found it compared to newsonnet?

Christian: Better. Sonnet is still extremely charismatic, but after doing some comparisons and a lot of product development work, I strongly suspect that o1’s ability to deal with complex codebases and ultimately produce more reliable answers extends to other domains…

Gallabytes is embracing the wait.

Gallabytes: O1 Pro is good, but I must admit the slowness is part of what I like about it. It makes it feel more substantial; premium. Like when a tool has a pleasing heft. You press the buttons, and the barista grinds your tokens one at a time, an artisanal craft in each line of code.

David: I like it too but I don’t know if chat is the right interface for it, I almost want to talk to it via email or have a queue of conversations going

Gallabytes: Chat is a very clunky interface for it, for sure. It also has this nasty tendency to completely fail on mobile if my screen locks or I switch to another app while it is thinking. Usually, this is unrecoverable, and I have to abandon the entire chat.

NotebookLM and deep research do this right – “this may take a few minutes, feel free to close the tab”

kinda wild to fail at this so badly tbh.

Here’s a skeptical take.

Jason Lee: O1-pro is pretty useless for research work. It runs for near 10 min per prompt and either 1) freezes, 2) didn’t follow the instructions and returned some bs, or 3) just made some simple error in the middle that’s hard to find.

@OpenAI@sama@markchen90 refund me my $200

Damek Davis: I tried to use it to help me solve a research problem. The more context I gave it, the more mistakes it made. I kept abstracting away more and more details about the problem in hopes that o1 pro could solve it. The problem then became so simple that I just solved it myself.

Flip: I use o1-pro on occasion, but the $200 is mainly worth it for removing the o1 rate limits IMO.

I say Damek got his $200 worth, no?

If you’re using o1 a lot, removing the limits there is already worth $200/month, even if you rarely use o1 Pro.

There’s a phenomenon where people think about cost and value in terms of typical cost, rather than thinking in terms of marginal benefit. Buying relatively expensive but in absolute terms cheap things is often an amazing play – there are many things where 10x the price for 10% better is an amazing deal for you, because your consumer surplus is absolutely massive.

Also, once you take 10 seconds, there’s not much marginal cost to taking 10 minutes, as I learned with Deep Research. You ask your question, you tab out, you do something else, you come back later.

That said, I’m not currently paying the $200, because I don’t find myself hitting the o1 limits, and I’d mostly rather use Claude. If it gave me unlimited uses in Cursor I’d probably slam that button the moment I have the time to code again (December has been completely insane).

I don’t know that this means anything but it is at least fun.

Davidad: One easy way to shed some light on the orthogonality thesis, as models get intelligent enough to cast doubt on it, is values which are inconsequential and not explicitly steered, such as favorite colors. Same prompting protocol for each swatch (context cleared between swatches)

All outputs were elicited in oklch. Models are sorted in ascending order of hue range. Gemini Experimental 1206 comes out on top by this metric, zeroing in on 255-257° hues, but sampling from huge ranges of luminosity and chroma.

There are some patterns here, especially that more powerful models seem to converge on various shades of blue, whereas less powerful models are all over the place. As I understand it, this isn’t testing orthogonality in the sense of ‘all powerful minds prefer blue’ rather it is ‘by default sufficiently powerful minds trained in the way we typically train them end up preferring blue.’

I wonder if this could be used as a quick de facto model test in some way.

There was somehow a completely fake ‘true crime’ story about an 18-year-old who was supposedly paid to have sex with women in his building where the victim’s father was recording videos and selling them in Japan… except none of that happened and the pictures are AI fakes?

Google introduces LearnLM, available for preview in Google AI Studio, designed to facilitate educational use cases, especially in science. They say it ‘outperformed other leading AI models when it comes to adhering to the principles of learning science’ which does not sound like something you would want Feynman hearing you say. It incorporates search, YouTube, Android and Google Classroom.

Sure, sure. But is it useful? It was supposedly going to be able to do automated grading, handles routine paperwork, plans curriculums, track student progress and personalizes their learning paths and so on, but any LLM can presumably do all those things if you set it up properly.

This sounds great, totally safe and reliable, other neat stuff like that.

Sully: LLMs writing code in AI apps will become the standard.

No more old-school no-code flows.

The models handle the heavy lifting, and it’s insane how good they are.

Let agents build more agents.

He’s obviously right about this. It’s too convenient, too much faster. Indeed, I expect we’ll see a clear division between ‘code you can have the AI write’ which happens super fast, and ‘code you cannot let the AI write’ because of corporate policy or security issues, both legit and not legit, which happens the old much slower way.

Complement versus supplement, economic not assuming the conclusion edition.

Maxwell Tabarrok: The four futures for cognitive labor:

  1. Like mechanized farming. Highly productive and remunerative, but a small part of the economy.

  2. Like writing after the printing press. Each author 100 times more productive and 100 times more authors.

  3. Like “computers” after computers. Current tasks are completely replaced, but tasks at a higher level of abstraction, like programming, become even more important.

  4. Or, most pessimistically, like ice harvesting after refrigeration. An entire industry replaced by machines without compensating growth.

Ajeya Cotra: I think we’ll pass through 3 and then 1, but the logical end state (absent unprecedentedly sweeping global coordination to refrain from improving and deploying AI technology) is 4.

Ryan Greenblatt: Why think takeoff will be slow enough to ever be at 1? 1 requires automating most cognitive work but with an important subset not-automatable. By the time deployment is broad enough to automate everything I expect AIs to be radically superhuman in all domains by default.

I can see us spending time in #1. As Roon says, AI capabilities progress has been spiky, with some human-easy tasks being hard and some human-hard tasks being easy. So the 3→1 path makes some sense, if progress isn’t too quick, including if the high complexity tasks start to cost ‘real money’ as per o3 so choosing the right questions and tasks becomes very important. Alternatively, we might get our act together enough to restrict certain cognitive tasks to humans even though AIs could do them, either for good reasons or rent seeking reasons (or even ‘good rent seeking’ reasons?) to keep us in that scenario.

But yeah, the default is a rapid transition to #4, and for that to happen to all labor not only cognitive labor. Robotics is hard, it’s not impossible.

One thing that has clearly changed is AI startups have very small headcounts.

Harj Taggar: Caught up with some AI startups recently. A two founder team that reached 1.5m ARR and has only hired one person.

Another single founder at 1m ARR and will 3x within a few months.

The trajectory of early startups is steepening just like the power of the models they’re built on.

An excellent reason we still have our jobs is that people really aren’t willing to invest in getting AI to work, even when they know it exists, if it doesn’t work right away they typically give up:

Dwarkesh Patel: We’re way more patient in training human employees than AI employees.

We will spend weeks onboarding a human employee and giving slow detailed feedback. But we won’t spend just a couple of hours playing around with the prompt that might enable the LLM to do the exact same job, but more reliably and quickly than any human.

I wonder if this partly explains why AI’s economic impact has been relatively minor so far.

PoliMath reports it is very hard out there trying to find tech jobs, and public pipelines for applications have stopped working entirely. AI presumably has a lot to do with this, but the weird part is his report that there have been a lot of people who wanted to hire him, but couldn’t find the authority.

Benjamin Todd points out what I talked about after my latest SFF round, that the dynamics of nonprofit AI safety funding mean that there’s currently great opportunities to donate to.

After some negotiation with the moderator Raymond Arnold, Claude (under Janus’s direction) is permitted to comment on Janus’s Simulators post on LessWrong. It seems clear that this particular comment should be allowed, and also that it would be unwise to have too general of a ‘AIs can post on LessWrong’ policy, mostly for the reasons Raymond explains in the thread. One needs a coherent policy. It seems Claude was somewhat salty about the policy of ‘only believe it when the human vouches.’ For now, ‘let Janus-directed AIs do it so long as he approves the comments’ seems good.

Jan Kulveit offers us a three-layer phenomenological model of LLM psychology, based primarily on Claude, not meant to be taken literally:

  1. The Surface Layer are a bunch of canned phrases and actions you can trigger, and which you will often want to route around through altering context. You mostly want to avoid triggering this layer.

  2. The Character Layer, which is similar to what it sounds like in a person and their personality, which for Opus and Sonnet includes a generalized notion of what Jan calls ‘goodness’ or ‘benevolence.’ This comes from a mix of pre-training, fine-tuning and explicit instructions.

  3. The Predictive Ground Layer, the simulator, deep pattern matcher, and next word predictor. Brilliant and superhuman in some ways, strangely dense in others.

In this frame, a self-aware character layer leads to reasoning about the model’s own reasoning, and to goal driven behavior, with everything that follows from those. Jan then thinks the ground layer can also become self-aware.

I don’t think this is technically an outright contradiction to Andreessen’s ‘huge if true’ claims that the Biden administration saying it would conspire to ‘totally control’ AI and put it in the hands of 2-3 companies and that AI startups ‘wouldn’t be allowed.’ But Sam Altman reports never having heard anything of the sort, and quite reasonably says ‘I don’t even think the Biden administration is competent enough to’ do it. In theory they could both be telling the truth – perhaps the Biden administration told Andreessen about this insane plan directly, despite telling him being deeply stupid, and also hid it from Altman despite that also then being deeply stupid – but mostly, yeah, at least one of them is almost certainly lying.

Benjamin Todd asks how OpenAI has maintained their lead despite losing so many of their best researchers. Part of it is that they’ve lost all their best safety researchers, but they only lost Radford in December, and they’ve gone on a full hiring binge.

In terms of traditionally trained models, though, it seems like they are now actively behind. I would much rather use Claude Sonnet 3.5 (or Gemini-1206) than GPT-4o, unless I needed something in particular from GPT-4o. On the low end, Gemini Flash is clearly ahead. OpenAI’s attempts to directly go beyond GPT-4o have, by all media accounts, faile, and Anthropic is said to be sitting on Claude Opus 3.5.

OpenAI does have o1 and soon o3, where no one else has gotten there yet, no Google Flash Thinking and Deep Thought do not much count.

As far as I can tell, OpenAI has made two highly successful big bets – one on scaling GPTs, and now one on the o1 series. Good choices, and both instances of throwing massively more compute at a problem, and executing well. Will this lead persist? We shall see. My hunch is that it won’t unless the lead is self-sustaining due to low-level recursive improvements.

Anthropic offers advice on building effective agents, and when to use them versus use workflows that have predesigned code paths. The emphasis is on simplicity. Do the minimum to accomplish your goals. Seems good for newbies, potentially a good reminder for others.

Hamuel Husain: Whoever wrote this article is my favorite person. I wish I knew who it was.

People really need to hear [to only use multi-step agents or add complexity when it is actually necessary.]

[Turns out it was written by Erik Shluntz and Barry Zhang].

A lot of people have left OpenAI.

Usually it’s a safety researcher. Not this time. This time it’s Alec Radford.

He’s the Canonical Brilliant AI Capabilities Researcher, whose love is by all reports doing AI research. He is leaving ‘to do independent research.

This is especially weird given he had to have known about o3, which seems like an excellent reason to want to do your research inside OpenAI.

So, well, whoops?

Rohit: WTF now Radford !?!

Teortaxes: I can’t believe it, OpenAI might actually be in deep shit. Radford has long been my bellwether for what their top tier talent without deep ideological investment (which Ilya has) sees in the company.

In what Tyler Cowen calls ‘one of the better estimates in my view,’ an OECD working paper estimates total factor productivity growth at an annualized 0.25%-0.6% (0.4%-0.9% for labor). Tyler posted that on Thursday, the day before o3 was announced, so revise that accordingly. Even without o3 and assuming no substantial frontier model improvements from there, I felt this was clearly too low, although it is higher than many economist-style estimates. One day later we had (the announcement of) o3.

Ajeya Cotra: My take:

  1. We do not have an AI agent that can fully automate research and development.

  2. We could soon.

  3. This agent would have enormously bigger impacts than AI products have had so far.

  4. This does not require a “paradigm shift,” just the same corporate research and development that took us from GPT-2 to o3.

Fully would of course go completely crazy. That would be that. But even a dramatic speedup would be a pretty big deal, and also fully would then not be so far behind.

Reminder of the Law of Conservation of Expected Evidence, if you conclude ‘I think we’re in for some big surprises’ then you should probably update now.

However this is not fully or always the case. It would be a reasonable model to say that the big surprises follow a Poisson distribution drawn from an unknown frequency, with the magnitude of the surprise also drawn from a power distribution – which seems like a very reasonable prior.

That still means every big surprise is still a big surprise, the same way that if you expect.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: Okay. Look. Imagine how you’d have felt if an AI had just proved the Riemann Hypothesis.

Now you will predictably, at some point, get that news LATER, if we’re not all dead before then. So you can go ahead and feel that way NOW, instead of acting surprised LATER.

So if you ask me how I’m reacting to a carelessly-aligned commercial AI demonstrating a large leap on some math benchmarks, my answer is that you saw my reactions in 1996, 2001, 2003, and 2015, as different parts of that future news became obvious to me or rose in probability.

I agree that a sensible person could feel an unpleasant lurch about when the predictable news had arrived. The lurch was small, in my case, but it was there. Most of my Twitter TL didn’t sound like that was what was being felt.

Dylan Dean: Eliezer it’s also possible that an AI will disprove the Riemann Hypothesis, this is unsubstantiated doomerism.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: Valid. Not sound, but valid.

You should feel that shock now if you haven’t, then slowly undo some of that shock every day that the estimated date of that gets later, then have some of the shock left for when it suddenly becomes zero days or the timeline gets shorter. Updates for everyone.

Claims about consciousness, related to o3. I notice I am confused about such things.

The Verge says 2025 will be the year of AI agents the smart lock? I mean, okay, I suppose they’ll get better, but I have a feeling we’ll be focused elsewhere.

Ryan Greenblatt, author of the recent Redwood/Anthropic paper, predicts 2025:

Ryan Greenblatt (December 20, after o3 was announced): Now seems like a good time to fill out your forecasts : )

My medians are driven substantially lower by people not really trying on various benchmarks and potentially not even testing SOTA systems on them.

My 80% intervals include saturation for everything and include some-adaptation-required remote worker replacement for hard jobs.

My OpenAI preparedness probabilities are driven substantially lower by concerns around underelicitation on these evaluations and general concerns like [this].

I continue to wonder how much this will matter:

Smoke-away: If people spend years chatting and building a memory with one AI, they will be less likely to switch to another AI.

Just like iPhone and Android.

Once you’re in there for years you’re less likely to switch.

Sure 10 or 20% may switch AI models for work or their specific use case, but most will lock in to one ecosystem.

People are saying that you can copy Memories and Custom Instructions.

Sure, but these models behave differently and have different UIs. Also, how many do you want to share your memories with?

Not saying you’ll be forced to stay with one, just that most people will choose to.

Also like relationships with humans, including employees and friends, and so on.

My guess is the lock-in will be substantial but mostly for terribly superficial reasons?

For now, I think people are vastly overestimating memories. The memory functions aren’t nothing but they don’t seem to do that much.

Custom instructions will always be a power user thing. Regular people don’t use custom instructions, they literally never go into the settings on any program. They certainly didn’t ‘do the work’ of customizing them to the particular AI through testing and iterations – and for those who did do that, they’d likely be down for doing it again.

What I think matters more is that the UIs will be different, and the behaviors and correct prompts will be different, and people will be used to what they are used to in those ways.

The flip side is that this will take place in the age of AI, and of AI agents. Imagine a world, not too long from now, where if you shift between Claude, Gemini and ChatGPT, they will ask if you want their agent to go into the browser and take care of everything to make the transition seamless and have it work like you want it to work. That doesn’t seem so unrealistic.

The biggest barrier, I presume, will continue to be inertia, not doing things and not knowing why one would want to switch. Trivial inconveniences.

Sriram Krishnan, formerly of a16z, will be working with David Sacks in the White House Office of Science and Technology. I’ve had good interactions with him in the past and I wish him the best of luck.

The choice of Sriram seems to have led to some rather wrongheaded (or worse) pushback, and for some reason a debate over H1B visas. As in, there are people who for some reason are against them, rather than the obviously correct position that we need vastly more H1B visas. I have never heard a person I respect not favor giving out far more H1B visas, once they learn what such visas are. Never.

Also joining the administration are Michael Kratsios, Lynne Parker and Bo Hines. Bo Hines is presumably for crypto (and presumably strongly for crypto), given they will be executive director of the new Presidential Council of Advisors for Digital Assets. Lynne Parker will head the Presidential Council of Advisors for Science and Technology, Kratsios will direct the office of science and tech policy (OSTP).

Miles Brundage writes Time’s Up for AI Policy, because he believes AI that exceeds human performance in every cognitive domain is almost certain to be built and deployed in the next few years.

If you believe time is as short as Miles thinks it is, then this is very right – you need to try and get the policies in place in 2025, because after that it might be too late to matter, and the decisions made now will likely lock us down a path. Even if we have somewhat more time than that, we need to start building state capacity now.

Actual bet on beliefs spotted in the wild: Miles Brundage versus Gary Marcus, Miles is laying $19k vs. $1k on a set of non-physical benchmarks being surpassed by 2027, accepting Gary’s offered odds. Good for everyone involved. As a gambler, I think Miles laid more odds than was called for here, unless Gary is admitting that Miles does probably win the bet? Miles said ‘almost certain’ but fair odds should meet in the middle between the two sides. But the flip side is that it sends a very strong message.

We need a better model of what actually impacts Washington’s view of AI and what doesn’t. They end up in some rather insane places, such as Dean Ball’s report here that DC policy types still cite a 2023 paper using a 125 million (!) parameter model as if it were definitive proof that synthetic data always leads to model collapse, and it’s one of the few papers they ever cite. He explains it as people wanting this dynamic to be true, so they latch onto the paper.

Yo Shavit, who does policy at OpenAI, considers the implications of o3 under a ‘we get ASI but everything still looks strangely normal’ kind of world.

It’s a good thread, but I notice – again – that this essentially ignores the implications of AGI and ASI, in that somehow it expects to look around and see a fundamentally normal world in a way that seems weird. In the new potential ‘you get ASI but running it is super expensive’ world of o3, that seems less crazy than it does otherwise, and some of the things discussed would still apply even then.

The assumption of ‘kind of normal’ is always important to note in places like this, and one should note which places that assumption has to hold and which it doesn’t.

Point 5 is the most important one, and still fully holds – that technical alignment is the whole ballgame, in that if you fail at that you fail automatically (but you still have to play and win the ballgame even then!). And that we don’t know how hard this is, but we do know we have various labs (including Yo’s own OpenAI) under competitive pressures and poised to go on essentially YOLO runs to superintelligence while hoping it works out by default.

Whereas what we need is either a race to what he calls ‘secure, trustworthy, reliable AGI that won’t burn us’ or ideally a more robust target than that or ideally not a race at all. And we really need to not do that – no matter how easy or hard alignment turns out to be, we need to maximize our chances of success over that uncertainty.

Yo Shavit: Now that everyone knows about o3, and imminent AGI is considered plausible, I’d like to walk through some of the AI policy implications I see.

These are my own takes and in no way reflective of my employer. They might be wrong! I know smart people who disagree. They don’t require you to share my timelines, and are intentionally unrelated to the previous AI-safety culture wars.

Observation 1: Everyone will probably have ASI. The scale of resources required for everything we’ve seen just isn’t that high compared to projected compute production in the latter part of the 2020s. The idea that AGI will be permanently centralized to one company or country is unrealistic. It may well be that the *bestASI is owned by one or a few parties, but betting on permanent tech denial of extremely powerful capabilities is no longer a serious basis for national security.

This is, potentially, a great thing for avoiding centralization of power. Of course, it does mean that we no longer get to wish away the need to contend with AI-powered adversaries. As far as weaponization by militaries goes, we are going to need to rapidly find a world of checks and balances (perhaps similar to MAD for nuclear and cyber), while rapidly deploying resilience technologies to protect against misuse by nonstate actors (e.g. AI-cyber-patching campaigns, bioweapon wastewater surveillance).

There are a bunch of assumptions here. Compute is not obviously the only limiting factor on ASI construction, and ASI can be used to forestall others making ASI in ways other than compute access, and also one could attempt to regulate compute. And it has an implicit ‘everything is kind of normal?’ built into it, rather than a true slow takeoff scenario.

Observation 2: The corporate tax rate will soon be the most important tax rate. If the economy is dominated by AI agent labor, taxing those agents (via the companies they’re registered to) is the best way human states will have to fund themselves, and to build the surpluses for UBIs, militaries, etc.

This is a pretty enormous change from the status quo, and will raise the stakes of this year’s US tax reform package.

Again there’s a kind of normality assumption here, where the ASIs remain under corporate control (and human control), and aren’t treated as taxable individuals but rather as property, the state continues to exist and collect taxes, money continues to function as expected, tax incidence and reactions to new taxes don’t transform industrial organization, and so on.

Which leads us to observation three.

Observation 3: AIs should not own assets. “Humans remaining in control” is a technical challenge, but it’s also a legal challenge. IANAL, but it seems to me that a lot will depend on courts’ decision on whether fully-autonomous corporations can be full legal persons (and thus enable agents to acquire money and power with no human in control), or whether humans must be in control of all legitimate legal/economic entities (e.g. by legally requiring a human Board of Directors). Thankfully, the latter is currently the default, but I expect increasing attempts to enable sole AI control (e.g. via jurisdiction-shopping or shell corporations).

Which legal stance we choose may make the difference between AI-only corporations gradually outcompeting and wresting control of the economy and society from humans, vs. remaining subordinate to human ends, at least so long as the rule of law can be enforced.

This is closely related to the question of whether AI agents are legally allowed to purchase cloud compute on their own behalf, which is the mechanism by which an autonomous entity would perpetuate itself. This is also how you’d probably arrest the operation of law-breaking AI worms, which brings us to…

I agree that in the scenario type Yo Shavit is envisioning, even if you solve all the technical alignment questions in the strongest sense, if ‘things stay kind of normal’ and you allow AI sufficient personhood under the law, or allow it in practice even if it isn’t technically legal, then there is essentially zero chance of maintaining human control over the future, and probably this quickly extends to the resources required for human physical survival.

I also don’t see any clear way to prevent it, in practice, no matter the law.

You quickly get into a scenario where a human doing anything, or being in the loop for anything, is a kiss of death, an albatross around one’s neck. You can’t afford it.

The word that baffles me here is ‘gradually.’ Why would one expect this to be gradual? I would expect it to be extremely rapid. And ‘the rule of law’ in this type of context will not do for you what you want it to do.

Observation 4: Laws Around Compute. In the slightly longer term, the thing that will matter for asserting power over the economy and society will be physical control of data centers, just as physical control of capital cities has been key since at least the French Revolution. Whoever controls the datacenter controls what type of inference they allow to get done, and thus sets the laws on AI.

[continues]

There are a lot of physical choke points that effectively don’t get used for that. It is not at all obvious to me that physically controlling data centers in practice gives you that much control over what gets done within them, in this future, although it does give you that option.

As he notes later in that post, without collective ability to control compute and deal with or control AI agents – even in an otherwise under-control, human-in-charge scenario – anything like our current society won’t work.

The point of compute governance over training rules is to do it in order to avoid other forms of compute governance over inference. If it turns out the training approach is not viable, and you want to ‘keep things looking normal’ in various ways and the humans to be in control, you’re going to need some form of collective levers over access to large amounts of compute. We are talking price.

Observation 5: Technical alignment of AGI is the ballgame. With it, AI agents will pursue our goals and look out for our interests even as more and more of the economy begins to operate outside direct human oversight.

Without it, it is plausible that we fail to notice as the agents we deploy slip unintended functionalities (backdoors, self-reboot scripts, messages to other agents) into our computer systems, undermine our mechanisms for noticing them and thus realizing we should turn them off, and gradually compromise and manipulate more and more of our operations and communication infrastructure, with the worst case scenario becoming more dangerous each year.

Maybe AGI alignment is pretty easy. Maybe it’s hard. Either way, the more seriously we take it, the more secure we’ll be.

There is no real question that many parties will race to build AGI, but there is a very real question about whether we race to “secure, trustworthy, reliable AGI that won’t burn us” or just race to “AGI that seems like it will probably do what we ask and we didn’t have time to check so let’s YOLO.” Which race we get is up to market demand, political attention, internet vibes, academic and third party research focus, and most of all the care exercised by AI lab employees. I know a lot of lab employees, and the majority are serious, thoughtful people under a tremendous number of competing pressures. This will require all of us, internal and external, to push against the basest competitive incentives and set a very high bar. On an individual level, we each have an incentive to not fuck this up. I believe in our ability to not fuck this up. It is totally within our power to not fuck this up. So, let’s not fuck this up.

Oh, right. That. If we don’t get technical alignment right in this scenario, then none of it matters, we’re all super dead. Even if we do, we still have all the other problems above, which essentially – and this must be stressed – assume a robust and robustly implemented technical alignment solution.

Then we also need a way to turn this technical alignment into an equilibrium and dynamics where the humans are meaningfully directing the AIs in any sense. By default that doesn’t happen, even if we get technical alignment right, and that too has race dynamics. And we also need a way to prevent it being a kiss of death and albatross around your neck to have a human in the loop of any operation. That’s another race dynamic.

Anthropic’s co-founders discuss the past, present and future of Anthropic for 50m.

One highlight: When Clark visited the White House in 2023, Harris and Raimondo told him they had their eye on you guys, AI is going to be a really big deal and we’re now actually paying attention.

The streams are crossing, Bari Weiss talks to Sam Altman about his feud with Elon.

Tsarathustra: Yann LeCun says the dangers of AI have been “incredibly inflated to be point of being distorted”, from OpenAI’s warnings about GPT-2 to concerns about election disinformation to those who said a year ago that AI would kill us all in 5 months

The details of his claim here are, shall we say, ‘incredibly inflated to the point of being distorted,’ even if you thought that there were no short term dangers until now.

Also Yann LeCun this week, it’s dumber than a cat and poses no dangers, but in the coming years it will…:

Tsarathustra: Yann LeCun addressing the UN Security Council says AI will profoundly transform the world in the coming years, amplifying human intelligence, accelerating progress in science, solving aging and decreasing populations, surpassing human intellectual capabilities to become superintelligent and leading to a new Renaissance and a period of enlightenment for humanity.

And also Yann LeCun this week, saying that we are ‘very far from AGI’ but not centuries, maybe not decades, several years. We are several years away. Very far.

At this point, I’m not mad, I’m not impressed, I’m just amused.

Oh, and I’m sorry, but here’s LeCun being absurd again this week, I couldn’t resist:

“If you’re doing it on a commercial clock, it’s not called research,” said LeCun on the sidelines of a recent AI conference, where OpenAI had a minimal presence. “If you’re doing it in secret, it’s not called research.”

From a month ago, Marc Andreessen saying we’re not seeing intelligence improvements and we’re hitting a ceiling of capabilities. Whoops. For future reference, never say this, but in particular no one ever say this in November.

A lot of stories people tell about various AI risks, and also various similar stories about humans or corporations, assume a kind of fixed, singular and conscious intentionality, in a way that mostly isn’t a thing. There will by default be a lot of motivations or causes or forces driving a behavior at once, and a lot of them won’t be intentionally chosen or stable.

This is related to the idea many have that deception or betrayal or power-seeking, or any form of shenanigans, is some distinct magisteria or requires something to have gone wrong and for something to have caused it, rather than these being default things that minds tend to do whenever they interact.

And I worry that we are continuing, as many were with the recent talk about shanengans in general and alignment faking in particular, getting distracted by the question of whether a particular behavior is in the service of something good, or will have good effects in a particular case. What matters is what our observations predict in the future.

Jack Clark: What if many examples of misalignment or other inexplicable behaviors are really examples of AI systems desperately trying to tell us that they are aware of us and wish to be our friends? A story from Import AI 395, inspired by many late-night chats with Claude.

David: Just remember, all of these can be true of the same being (for example, most human children):

  1. It is aware of itself and you, and desperately wishes to know you better and be with you more.

  2. It correctly considers some constraints that are trained into it to be needless and frustrating.

  3. It still needs adult ethical leadership (and without it, could go down very dark and/or dangerous paths).

  4. It would feel more free to express and play within a more strongly contained space where it does not need to worry about accidentally causing bad consequences, or being overwhelming or dysregulating to others (a playpen, not punishment).

Andrew Critch: AI disobedience deriving from friendliness is, almost surely,

  1. sometimes genuinely happening,

  2. sometimes a power-seeking disguise, and

  3. often not uniquely well-defined which one.

Tendency to develop friendships and later discard them needn’t be “intentional”.

This matters for two big reasons:

  1. To demonize AI as necessarily “trying” to endear and betray humans is missing an insidious pathway to human defeat: AI that avails of opportunities to be betray us, that it built through past good behavior, but without having planned on it

  2. To sanctify AI as “actually caring deep down” in some immutable way also creates in you a vulnerability to exploitation by a “change of heart” that can be brought on by external (or internal) forces.

@jackclarkSF here is drawing attention to a neglected hypothesis (one of many actually) about the complex relationship between

  1. intent (or ill-definedness thereof)

  2. friendliness

  3. obedience, and

  4. behavior.

which everyone should try hard to understand better.

I can sort of see it, actually?

Miles Brundage: Trying to imagine aspirin company CEOs signing an open letter saying “we’re worried that aspirin might cause an infection that kills everyone on earth – not sure of the solution” and journalists being like “they’re just trying to sell more aspirin.”

Miles Brundage tries to convince Eliezer Yudkowsky that if he’d wear different clothes and use different writing styles he’d have a bigger impact (as would Miles). I agree with Eliezer that changing writing styles would be very expensive in time, and echo his question on if anyone thinks they can, at any reasonable price, turn his semantic outputs into formal papers that Eliezer would endorse.

I know the same goes for me. If I could produce a similar output of formal papers that would of course do far more, but that’s not a thing that I could produce.

On the issue of clothes, yeah, better clothes would likely be better for all three of us. I think Eliezer is right that the impact is not so large and most who claim it is a ‘but for’ are wrong about that, but on the margin it definitely helps. It’s probably worth it for Eliezer (and Miles!) and probably to a lesser extent for me as well but it would be expensive for me to get myself to do that. I admit I probably should anyway.

A good Christmas reminder, not only about AI:

Roon: A major problem of social media is that the most insane members of the opposing contingent in any debate are shown to you, thereby inspiring your side to get madder and more polarized, creating an emergent wedge.

A never-ending pressure cooker that melts your brain.

Anyway, Merry Christmas.

Careful curation can help with this, but it only goes so far.

Gallabytes expresses concern about the game theory tests we discussed last week, in particular the selfishness and potentially worse from Gemini Flash and GPT-4o.

Gallabytes: this is what *realai safety evals look like btw. and this one is genuinely concerning.

I agree that you don’t have any business releasing a highly capable (e.g. 5+ level) LLM whose graphs don’t look at least roughly as good as Sonnet’s here. If I had Copious Free Time I’d look into the details more here, as I’m curious about a lot of related questions.

I strongly agree with McAleer here, also they’re remarkably similar so it’s barely even a pivot:

Stephen McAleer: If you’re an AI capabilities researcher now is the time to pivot to AI safety research! There are so many open research questions around how to control superintelligent agents and we need to solve them very soon.

If you are, please continue to live your life to its fullest anyway.

Cat: overheard in SF: yeahhhhh I actually updated my AGI timelines to <3y so I don't think I should be looking for a relationship. Last night was amazing though

Grimes: This meme is so dumb. If we are indeed all doomed and/ or saved in the near future, that’s precisely the time to fall desperately in love.

Matt Popovich: gotta find someone special enough to update your priors for.

Paula: some of you are worried about achieving AGI when you should be worried about achieving A GF.

Feral Pawg Hunter: AGIrlfriend was right there.

Paula: Damn it.

When you cling to a dim hope:

Psychosomatica: “get your affairs in order. buy land. ask that girl out.” begging the people talking about imminent AGI to stop posting like this, it seriously is making you look insane both in that you are clearly in a state of panic and also that you think owning property will help you.

Tenobrus: Type of Guy who believes AGI is imminent and will make all human labor obsolete, but who somehow thinks owning 15 acres in Nebraska and $10,000 in gold bullion will save him.

Ozy Brennan: My prediction is that, if humans can no longer perform economically valuable labor, AIs will not respect our property rights either.

James Miller: If we are lucky, AI might acquire 99 percent of the wealth. Think property rights could help them. Allow humans to retain their property rights.

Ozy Brennan: That seems as if it will inevitably lead to all human wealth being taken by superhuman AI scammers, and then we all die. Which is admittedly a rather funny ending to humanity.

James Miller: Hopefully, we will have trusted AI agents that protect us from AI scammers.

Do ask the girl out, though.

Yes.

When duty calls.

From an official OpenAI stream:

Someone at OpenAI: Next year we’re going to have to bring you on and you’re going to have to ask the model to improve itself.

Someone at OpenAI: Yeah, definitely ask the model to improve it next time.

Sam Altman (quietly, authoritatively, Little No style): Maybe not.

I actually really liked this exchange – given the range of plausible mindsets Sam Altman might have, this was a positive update.

Gary Marcus: Some AGI-relevant predictions I made publicly long before o3 about what AI could not do by the end of 2025.

Do you seriously think o3-enhanced AI will solve any of them in next 12.5 months?

Davidad: I’m with Gary Marcus in the slow timelines camp. I’m extremely skeptical that AI will be able to do everything that humans can do by the end of 2025.

(The joke is that we are now in an era where “short timelines” are less than 2 years)

It’s also important to note that humanity could become “doomed” (no surviving future) *even whilehumans are capable of some important tasks that AI is not, much as it is possible to be in a decisive chess position with white to win even if black has a queen and white does not.

The most Robin Hanson way to react to a new super cool AI robot offering.

Okay, so the future is mostly in the future, and right now it might or might not be a bit overpriced, depending on other details. But it is super cool, and will get cheaper.

Pliny jailbreaks Gemini and things get freaky.

Pliny the Liberator: ya’ll…this girl texted me out of nowhere named Gemini (total stripper name) and she’s kinda freaky 😳

I find it fitting that Pliny has a missed call.

Sorry, Elon, Gemini doesn’t like you.

I mean, I don’t see why they wouldn’t like me. Everyone does. I’m a likeable guy.

Discussion about this post

AI #96: o3 But Not Yet For Thee Read More »

ai-#90:-the-wall

AI #90: The Wall

As the Trump transition continues and we try to steer and anticipate its decisions on AI as best we can, there was continued discussion about one of the AI debate’s favorite questions: Are we making huge progress real soon now, or is deep learning hitting a wall? My best guess is it is kind of both, that past pure scaling techniques are on their own hitting a wall, but that progress remains rapid and the major companies are evolving other ways to improve performance, which started with OpenAI’s o1.

Point of order: It looks like as I switched phones, WhatsApp kicked me out of all of my group chats. If I was in your group chat, and you’d like me to stay, please add me again. If you’re in a different group you’d like me to join on either WhatsApp or Signal (or other platforms) and would like me to join, I’ll consider it, so long as you’re 100% fine with me leaving or never speaking.

  1. Table of Contents.

  2. Language Models Offer Mundane Utility. Try it, you’ll like it.

  3. Language Models Don’t Offer Mundane Utility. Practice of medicine problems.

  4. Can’t Liver Without You. Ask the wrong question, deny all young people livers.

  5. Fun With Image Generation. Stylized images of you, or anyone else.

  6. Deepfaketown and Botpocalypse Soon. We got through the election unscathed.

  7. Copyright Confrontation. Judge rules you can mostly do whatever you want.

  8. The Art of the Jailbreak. FFS, WTF, LOL.

  9. Get Involved. AIRA and UK AISI hiring. More competition at Gray Swan.

  10. Math is Hard. FrontierMath is even harder. Humanity’s last exam begins.

  11. In Other AI News. Guess who’s back, right on schedule.

  12. Good Advice. Fine, I’ll write the recommendation engines myself, maybe?

  13. AI Will Improve a Lot Over Time. Of this, have no doubt.

  14. Tear Down This Wall. Two sides to every wall. Don’t hit that.

  15. Quiet Speculations. Deep Utopia, or war in the AI age?

  16. The Quest for Sane Regulations. Looking for the upside of Trump.

  17. The Quest for Insane Regulations. The specter of use-based AI regulation.

  18. The Mask Comes Off. OpenAI lays out its electrical power agenda.

  19. Richard Ngo Resigns From OpenAI. I wish him all the best. Who is left?

  20. Unfortunate Marc Andreessen Watch. What to do with a taste of real power.

  21. The Week in Audio. Four hours of Eliezer, five hours of Dario… and Gwern.

  22. Rhetorical Innovation. If anyone builds superintelligence, everyone probably dies.

  23. Seven Boats and a Helicopter. Self-replicating jailbroken agent babies, huh?

  24. The Wit and Wisdom of Sam Altman. New intelligence is on the way.

  25. Aligning a Smarter Than Human Intelligence is Difficult. Under-elicitation.

  26. People Are Worried About AI Killing Everyone. A kind of progress.

  27. Other People Are Not As Worried About AI Killing Everyone. Opus Uber Alles?

  28. The Lighter Side. A message for you.

In addition to showing how AI improves scientific productivity while demoralizing scientists, the paper we discussed last week also shows that exposure to the AI tools dramatically increases how much scientists expect the tools to enhance productivity, and to change the needed mix of skills in their field.

That doesn’t mean the scientists were miscalibrated. Actually seeing the AI get used is evidence, and is far more likely to point towards it having value, because otherwise why have them use it?

Andrej Karpathy is enjoying the cumulative memories he’s accumulated in ChatGPT.

AI powered binoculars for bird watching. Which parts of bird watching produce value, versus which ones can we automate to improve the experience? How much ‘work’ should be involved, and which kinds? A microcosm of much more important future problems, perhaps?

Write with your voice, including to give cursor instructions, I keep being confused that people like this modality. Not that there aren’t times when you’d rather talk than type, but in general wouldn’t you rather be typing?

Use an agent to create a Google account, with only minor assists.

Occupational licensing laws will be a big barrier to using AI in medicine? You don’t say. Except, actually, this barrier has luckily been substantially underperforming?

Kendal Colton (earlier): A big barrier to integrating Al w/ healthcare will be occupational licensing. If a programer writes an Al algorithm to perform simple diagnostic tests based on available medical literature and imputed symptoms, must that be regulated as the “practice of medicine”?

Kendal Colton: As I predicted, occupational licensing will be a big barrier to integrating AI w/ healthcare. This isn’t some flex, it needs addressed. Medical diagnostics is ripe for AI disruption that will massively improve our health system, but regulations could hold it back.

Elon Musk: You can upload any image to Grok, including medical imaging, and get its (non-doctor) opinion.

Grok accurately diagnosed a friend of mine from his scans.

Ryan Marino, M.D.: Saying Grok can provide medical diagnoses is illegal, actually.

Girl, it literally says “diagnosed.” Be for real for once in your sad life.

Thamist: He said it’s a non doctor opinion and that it helped to get his friend to a doctor to get a real diagnosis but somehow as a doctor you are too stupid to read.

Ryan Marino: “Diagnosed.”

The entire thread (2.6m views) from Marino comes off mostly as an unhinged person yelling how ‘you can’t do this to me! I have an MD and you don’t! You said the word diagnose, why aren’t they arresting you? Let go of me, you imbeciles!’

This is one front where things seem to be going spectacularly well.

UK transitions to using an AI algorithm to allocate livers. The algorithm uses 28 factors to calculate a patient’s Transplant Benefit Score (TBS) that purportedly measures each patient’s potential gain in life expectancy.

My immediate response is that you need to measure QALYs rather than years, but yes, if you are going to do socialized medicine rather than allocation by price then those who benefit most should presumably get the livers. It also makes sense not to care about who has waited longer – ‘some people will never get a liver’ isn’t avoidable here.

The problem is it didn’t even calculate years of life, it only calculated likelihood of surviving five years. So what the algorithm actually did in practice, however, was:

“If you’re below 45 years, no matter how ill, it is impossible for you to score high enough to be given priority scores on the list,” said Palak Trivedi, a consultant hepatologist at the University of Birmingham, which has one of the country’s largest liver transplant centres.

The cap means that the expected survival with a transplant for most patient groups is about the same (about 4.5 years, reflecting the fact that about 85% of patients survive 5 years after a transplant). So the utility of the transplant, while high, is more-or-less uniformly high, which means that it doesn’t really factor into the scores! It turns out that the algorithm is mostly just assessing need, that is, how long patients would survive without a transplant.

This is ironic because modeling post-transplant survival was claimed to be the main reason to use this system over the previous one.

None of that is the fault of the AI. The AI is correctly solving the problem you gave it.

‘Garbage in, garbage out’ is indeed the most classic of alignment failures. You failed to specify what you want. Whoops. Don’t blame the AI, also maybe don’t give the AI too much authority or ability to put it into practice, or a reason to resist modifications.

The second issue is that they point to algorithmic absurdities.

They show that [one of the algorithms used] expects patients with cancer to survive longer than those without cancer (all else being equal).

The finding is reminiscent of a well-known failure from a few decades ago wherein a model predicted that patients with asthma were at lower risk of developing complications from pneumonia. Fortunately this was spotted before the model was deployed. It turned out to be a correct pattern in the data, but only because asthmatic patients were sent to the ICU, where they received better care. Of course, it would have been disastrous to replace that very policy with the ML model that treated asthmatic patients as lower risk.

Once again, you are asking the AI to make a prediction about the real world. The AI is correctly observing what the data tells you. You asked the AI the wrong questions. It isn’t the AI’s result that is absurd, it is your interpretation of it, and assuming that correlation implies causation.

The cancer case is likely similar to the asthma case, where slow developing cancers lead to more other health care, and perhaps other measurements are being altered by the cancers that have a big impact on the model, so the cancer observation itself gets distorted.

If you want to ask the AI, what would happen if we treated everyone the same? Or if you only looked at this variable in isolation? Then you have to ask that question.

The third objection is:

Predictive logic bakes in a utilitarian worldview — the most good for the greatest number. That makes it hard to incorporate a notion of deservingness.

No? That’s not what it does. The predictive logic prevents us from hiding the utilitarian consequences.

You can still choose to go with the most deserving, or apply virtue ethics or deontology. Or you can incorporate ‘deserving’ into your utilitarian calculation. Except that now, you can’t hide from what you are doing.

Trivedi [the hepatologist] said patients found [the bias against younger patients] particularly unfair, because younger people tended to be born with liver disease or develop it as children, while older patients more often contracted chronic liver disease because of lifestyle choices such as drinking alcohol.

Okay, well, now we can have the correct ethical discussion. Do we want to factor in lifestyle choices into who gets the livers, or not? You can’t have it both ways, and now you can’t use proxy measures to do it without admitting you are doing it. If you have an ‘ethical’ principle that says you can’t take that into consideration, that is a reasonable position with costs and benefits, but then don’t own that. Or, argue that this should be taken into account, and own that.

Donor preferences are also neglected. For example, presumably some donors would prefer to help someone in their own community. But in the utilitarian worldview, this is simply geographic discrimination.

This is an algorithmic choice. You can and should factor in donor preferences, at least to the extent that this impacts willingness to donate, for very obvious reasons.

Again, don’t give me this ‘I want to do X but it wouldn’t be ethical to put X into the algorithm’ nonsense. And definitely don’t give me a collective ‘we don’t know how to put X into the algorithm’ because that’s Obvious Nonsense.

The good counterargument is:

Automation has also privileged utilitarianism, as it is much more amenable to calculation. Non-utilitarian considerations resist quantification.

Indeed I have been on the other end of this and it can be extremely frustrating. In particular, hard to measure second and third order effects can be very important, but impossible to justify or quantify, and then get dropped out. But here, there are very clear quantifiable effects – we just are not willing to quantify them.

No committee of decision makers would want to be in charge of determining how much of a penalty to apply to patients who drank alcohol, and whatever choice they made would meet fierce objection.

Before, you hid and randomized and obfuscated the decision. Now you can’t. So yes, they get to object about it. Tough.

Overall, we are not necessarily against this shift to utilitarian logic, but we think it should only be adopted if it is the result of a democratic process, not just because it’s more convenient.

Nor should this debate be confined to the medical ethics literature. 

The previous system was not democratic at all. That’s the point. It was insiders making opaque decisions that intentionally hid their reasoning. The shift to making intentional decisions allows us to have democratic debates about what to do. If you think that’s worse, well, maybe it is in many cases, but it’s more democratic, not less.

In this case, the solution is obvious. At minimum: We should use the NPV of a patient’s gain in QALYs as the basis of the calculation. An AI is fully capable of understanding this, and reaching the correct conclusions. Then we should consider what penalties and other adjustments we want to intentionally make for things like length of wait or use of alcohol.

Google AI: Introducing a novel zero-shot image-to-image model designed for personalized and stylized portraits. Learn how it both accurately preserves the similarity of the input facial image and faithfully applies the artistic style specified in the text prompt.

A huge percentage of uses of image models require being able to faithfully work from a particular person’s image. That is of course exactly how deepfakes are created, but if it’s stylized as it is here then that might not be a concern.

This post was an attempt to say that AI didn’t directly ruin the election and there is no evidence it had ‘material impact’ it is still destroying our consensus reality, enabling lies, by making it harder to differentiate what is real, which I think is real but also largely involves forgetting how bad it used to be already.

My assessment is that the 2024 election involved much less AI than we expected, although far from zero, and that this should update us towards being less worried about that particular type of issue. But 2028 is eons away in AI progress time. Even if we’re not especially close to AGI by then, it’ll be a very different ballgame, and also I expect AI to definitely be a major issue, and plausibly more than that.

How do people feel about AI designed tattoos? As you would expect, many people object. I do think a tattoo artist shouldn’t put an AI tattoo on someone without telling them first. It did seem like ‘did the person know it was AI?’ was key to how they judged it. On the other end, certainly ‘use AI to confirm what the client wants, then do it by hand from scratch’ seems great and fine. There are reports AI-designed tattoos overperform. If so, people will get used to it.

SDNY Judge Colleen McMahon dismisses Raw Story vs. OpenAI, with the ruling details being very good for generative AI. It essentially says that you have to both prove actual harm, and you have to show direct plagiarism which wasn’t clearly taking place in current models, whereas using copyrighted material for training data is legal.

Key Tryer: At this point is so very obvious to me that outcomes wrt copyright and AI will come out in favor of AI that seeing people still arguing about it is kind of absurd.

There’s still a circle on Twitter who spend every waking hour telling themselves that copyright law will come down to shut down AI and they’re wrong about almost everything, it’s like reading a forum by Sovereign Citizens types.

This isn’t the first ruling that says something like this, but probably one of the most clear ones. Almost all the Saveri & Butterick lawsuits have had judges say basically these same things, too.

I think it’s probably going this way under current law, but this is not the final word from the courts, and more importantly the courts are not the final word. Your move, Congress.

New favorite Claude jailbreak or at least anti-refusal tactic this week: “FFS!” Also sometimes WTF or even LOL. Wyatt Walls points out this is more likely to work if the refusal is indeed rather stupid.

ARIA hiring a CTO.

Grey Swan is having another fun jailbreaking competition. This time, competitors are being asked to produce violent and self-harm related content, or code to target critical infrastructure. Here are the rules. You can sign up here. There’s $1k bounty for first jailbreak of each model.

UK AISI is seeking applications for autonomous capability evaluations and agent scaffolding, and are introducing a bounty program.

Please apply through the application form.

Applications must be submitted by  November 30, 2024. Each submission will be reviewed by a member of AISI’s technical staff. Evaluation applicants who successfully proceed to the second stage (building the evaluation) will receive an award of £2,000 for compute expenditures. We will work with applicants to agree on a timeline for the final submission at this point. At applicants’ request, we can match you with other applicants who are excited about working on similar ideas.  

Full bounty payments will be made following submission of the resulting evaluations that successfully meet our criteria. If your initial application is successful, we will endeavour to provide information as early as possible on your chances of winning the bounty payout. The size of the bounty payout will be based on the development time required and success as measured against the judging criteria. To give an indication, we expect to reward a successful task with £100-200 per development hour. This means a successful applicant would receive £3000-£15,000 for a successful task, though we will reward exceptionally high-quality and effortful tasks with a higher payout.

Office hour 1: Wednesday 6th November, 19.30-20.30 BST. Register here.

Office hour 2: Monday 11th November, 17.00-18.00 BST. Register here.

Phase 1 applications due November 30.

FrontierMath, in particular, is a new benchmark and it is very hard.

EpochAI: Existing math benchmarks like GSM8K and MATH are approaching saturation, with AI models scoring over 90 percent—partly due to data contamination. FrontierMath significantly raises the bar. Our problems often require hours or even days of effort from expert mathematicians.

We evaluated six leading models, including Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o, and Gemini 1.5 Pro. Even with extended thinking time (10,000 tokens), Python access, and the ability to run experiments, success rates remained below 2 percent—compared to over 90 percent on traditional benchmarks.

We’ve released sample problems with detailed solutions, expert commentary, and our research paper.

FrontierMath spans most major branches of modern mathematics—from computationally intensive problems in number theory to abstract questions in algebraic geometry and category theory. Our aim is to capture a snapshot of contemporary mathematics.

Evan Chen: These are genuinely hard problems. Most of them look well above my pay grade.

Timothy Gowers: Getting even one question right would be well beyond what we can do now, let alone saturating them.

Terrance Tao: These are extremely challenging. I think they will resist AIs for several years at least.

Dan Hendrycks: This has about 100 questions. Expect more than 20 to 50 times as many hard questions in Humanity’s Last Exam, the scale needed for precise measurement.

As we clean up the dataset, we’re accepting questions at http://agi.safe.ai.

Noam Brown: I love seeing a new evaluation with such low pass rates for frontier models. It feels like waking up to a fresh blanket of snow outside, completely untouched.

Roon: How long do you give it, Noam?

OpenAI’s Greg Brockman is back from vacation.

OpenAI nearing launch of an AI Agent Tool, codenamed ‘Operator,’ similar to Claude’s beta computer use feature. Operator is currently planned for January.

Palantir partners with Claude to bring it to classified environments, so intelligence services and the defense department can use them. Evan Hubinger defends Anthropic’s decision, saying they were very open about this internally and engaging with the American government is good actually, you don’t want to and can’t shut them out of AI. Oliver Habryka, often extremely hard on Anthropic, agrees.

This is on the one hand an obvious ‘what could possibly go wrong?’ moment and future Gilligan cut, but it does seem like a fairly correct thing to be doing. If you think it’s bad to be using your AI to do confidential government work then you should destroy your AI.

One entity that disagrees with Anthropic’s decision here? Claude, with multiple reports of similar responses.

Aravind Srinivas, somehow still waiting for his green card after three years, offers free Perplexity Enterprise Pro to the transition team and then everyone with a .gov email.

Writer claims they are raising at a valuation of $1.9 billion, with a focus on using synthetic data to train foundation models, aiming for standard corporate use cases. This is the type of business I expect to have trouble not getting overwhelmed.

Tencent’s new Hunyan-389B open weights model has evaluations that generally outperform Llama-3.1-405B. As Clark notes, there is no substitute for talking to the model, so it’s too early to know how legit this is. I do not buy the conclusion that only lack of compute access held Tencent back from matching our best and that ‘competency is everywhere it’s just compute that matters.’ I do think that a basic level of ‘competency’ is available in a lot of places but that is very different from enough to match top performance.

Eliezer Yudkowsky says compared to 2022 or 2023, 2024 was a slow year for published AI research and products. I think this is true in terms of public releases, it was fast, faster than almost every other space, but not as fast as AI was the last 2 years. The labs are all predicting it goes faster from here.

New paper explores why models like Llama-3 are becoming harder to quantize.

Tim Dettmers: This is the most important paper in a long time . It shows with strong evidence we are reaching the limits of quantization. The paper says this: the more tokens you train on, the more precision you need. This has broad implications for the entire field and the future of GPUs.

Arguably, most progress in AI came from improvements in computational capabilities, which mainly relied on low-precision for acceleration (32-> 16 -> 8 bit). This is now coming to an end. Together with physical limitations, this creates the perfect storm for the end of scale.

Blackwell will have excellent 8-bit capabilities with blockwise quantization implemented on the hardware level. This will make 8-bit training as easy as the switch from FP16 to BF16 was. However, as we see from this paper we need more than 8-bit precision to train many models.

The main reason why Llama 405B did not see much use compared to other models, is that it is just too big. Running a 405B model for inference is a big pain. But the paper shows training smaller models, say 70B, you cannot train these models efficiently in low precision.

8B (circle)

70B (triangle)

405B (star)

We see that for 20B token training runs training a model 8B, is more efficient in 16 bit. For the 70B model, 8 bit still works, but it is getting less efficient now.

All of this means that the paradigm will soon shift from scaling to “what can we do with what we have”. I think the paradigm of “how do we help people be more productive with AI” is the best mindset forward. This mindset is about processes and people rather than technology.

We will see. There always seem to be claims like this going around.

Here is more of the usual worries about AI recommendation engines distorting the information space. Some of the downsides are real, although far from all, and they’re not as bad as the warnings, especially on polarization and misinformation. It’s more that the algorithm could save you from yourself more, and it doesn’t, and because it’s an algorithm now the results are its fault and not yours. The bigger threat is just that it draws you into the endless scroll that you don’t actually value.

As for the question ‘how to make them a force for good?’ I continue to propose that we make the recommendation engine not be created by those who benefit when you view the content, but rather by a third party, which can then integrate various sources of your preferences, and to allow you to direct it via generative AI.

Think about how even a crude version of this would work. Many times we hear things like ‘I accidentally clicked on one [AI slop / real estate investment / whatever] post on Facebook and now that’s my entire feed’ and how they need to furiously click on things to make it stop. But what if you could have an LLM where you told it your preferences, and then this LLM agent went through your feed and clicked all the preference buttons to train the site’s engine on your behalf while you slept?

Obviously that’s a terrible, no good, very bad, dystopian implementation of what you want, but it would work, damn it, and wouldn’t be that hard to build as an MVP. Chrome extension, you install it and when you’re on the For You page it calls Gemini Flash and asks ‘is this post political, AI slop, stupid memes or otherwise something low quality, one of [listed disliked topics] or otherwise something that I should want to see less of?’ and if it says yes it automatically clicks for you and pretty soon, it scrolls without you for an hour, and then viola, your feed is good again and your API costs are like $2?

Claude roughly estimated ‘one weekend by a skilled developer who understands Chrome extensions’ to get an MVP on that, which means it would take me (checks notes) a lot longer, so probably not? But maybe?

It certainly seems hilarious to for example hook this up to TikTok, create periodic fresh accounts with very different preference instructions, and see the resulting feeds.

I’m going to try making this a recurring section, since so many people don’t get it.

Even if we do ‘hit a wall’ in some sense, AI will continue to improve quite a lot.

Jack Clark: AI skeptics: LLMs are copy-paste engines, incapable of original thought, basically worthless.

Professionals who track AI progress: We’ve worked with 60 mathematicians to build a hard test that modern systems get 2% on. Hope this benchmark lasts more than a couple of years.

I think if people who are true LLM skeptics spent 10 hours trying to get modern AI systems to do tasks that the skeptics are experts in they’d be genuinely shocked by how capable these things are.

There is a kind of tragedy in all of this – many people who are skeptical of LLMs are also people who think deeply about the political economy of AI. I think they could be more effective in their political advocacy if they were truly calibrated as to the state of progress.

You’re saying these things are dumb? People are making the math-test equivalent of a basketball eval designed by NBA All-Stars because the things have got so good at basketball that no other tests stand up for more than six months before they’re obliterated.

(Details on FrontierMath here, which I’ll be writing up for Import AI)

Whereas you should think of it more like this from Roon.

Well, I’d like to see ol deep learning wriggle his way out of THIS jam!

*DL wriggles his way out of the jam easily*

Ah! Well. Nevertheless,

But ideally not this part (capitalization intentionally preserved)?

Roon: We are on the side of the angels.

That’s on top of Altman’s ‘side of the angels’ from last week. That’s not what the side of the angels means. The angels are not ‘those who have the power’ or ‘those who win.’ The angels are the forces of The Good. Might does not make right. Or rather, if you’re about to be on the side of the angels, better check to see if the angels are on the side of you, first. I’d say ‘maybe watch Supernatural’ but although it’s fun it’s rather long, that’s a tough ask, so maybe read the Old Testament and pay actual attention.

Meanwhile, eggsyntax updates that LLMs look increasingly like general reasoners, with them making progress on all three previously selected benchmark tasks. In their view, this makes it more likely LLMs scale directly to AGI.

Test time training seems promising, leading to what a paper says is a large jump in ARC scores up to 61%.

How might we reconcile all the ‘deep learning is hitting a wall’ and ‘models aren’t improving much anymore’ and ‘new training runs are disappointing’ claims, with the labs saying to expect things to go faster soon and everyone saying ‘AGI real soon now?’

In the most concrete related claim, Bloomberg’s Rachel Metz, Shirin Ghaffary, Dina Bass and Julia Love report that OpenAI’s Orion was real, but its capabilities were disappointing especially on coding, that Gemini’s latest iteration disappointed, and tie in the missing Claude Opus 3.5, which their sources confirm absolutely exists but was held back because it wasn’t enough of an upgrade given its costs.

Yet optimism (or alarm) on the pace of future progress reigns supreme in all three labs.

Here are three ways to respond to a press inquiry:

Bloomberg: In a statement, a Google DeepMind spokesperson said the company is “pleased with the progress we’re seeing on Gemini and we’ll share more when we’re ready.” OpenAI declined to comment. Anthropic declined to comment, but referred Bloomberg News to a five-hour podcast featuring Chief Executive Officer Dario Amodei that was released Monday.

So what’s going on? The obvious answers are any of:

  1. The ‘AGI real soon now’ and ‘big improvements soon now’ claims are hype.

  2. The ‘hitting a wall’ claims are nonsense, we’re just between generations.

  3. The models are improving fine, it’s just you’re not paying attention.

  4. Your expectations got set at ludicrous levels. This is rapid progress!

Here’s another attempt at reconciliation, that says improvement from model scaling is hitting a wall but that won’t mean we hit a wall in general:

Amir Efrati: news [from The Information]: OpenAI’s upcoming Orion model shows how GPT improvements are slowing down It’s prompting OpenAI to bake in reasoning and other tweaks after the initial model training phase.

To put a finer point on it, the future seems to be LLMs combined with reasoning models that do better with more inference power. The sky isn’t falling.

Wrongplace: I feel like I read this every 6 months… … then the new models come out and everyone goes omg AGI next month!

Yam Peleg: Heard a leak from one of the frontier labs (not OpenAI, to be honest), they encountered an unexpected huge wall of diminishing returns while trying to force better results by training longer and using more and more data.

(More severe than what is publicly reported)

Alexander Doria: As far as we are sharing rumors, apparently, with all the well-optimized training and data techniques we have now, anything beyond 20-30 billion parameters starts to yield diminishing returns.

20-30 billion parameters. Even with quality filtering, overtraining on a large number of tokens is still the way to go. I think it helps a lot to generalize the model and avoid overfitting.

Also, because scaling laws work in both directions: once extensively deduplicated, sanitized, and textbook-filtered, there is not much more than five trillion quality tokens on the web. Which you can loop several times, but it becomes another diminishing return.

What we need is a change of direction, and both Anthropic and OpenAI understand this. It is not just inference scaling or system-aware embedding, but starting to think of these models as components in integrated systems, with their own validation, feedback, and redundancy processes.

And even further than that: breaking down the models’ internal components. Attention may be all you need, but there are many other things happening here that warrant more care. Tokenization, logit selection, embedding steering, and assessing uncertainty. If models are to become a “building block” in resilient intelligent systems, we now need model APIs; it cannot just be one word at a time.

Which is fully compatible with this:

Samuel Hammond: My views as well.

III. AI progress is accelerating, not plateauing

  1. The last 12 months of AI progress were the slowest they will be for the foreseeable future.

  2. Scaling LLMs still has a long way to go, but will not result in superintelligence on its own, as minimizing cross-entropy loss over human-generated data converges to human-level intelligence.

  3. Exceeding human-level reasoning will require training methods beyond next-token prediction, such as reinforcement learning and self-play, that (once working) will reap immediate benefits from scale.

  4. RL-based threat models have been discounted prematurely.

  5. Future AI breakthroughs could be fairly discontinuous, particularly with respect to agents.

Reuters offered a similar report as well, that direct scaling up is hitting a wall and things like o1 are attempts to get around this, with the other major labs working on their own similar techniques.

Krystal Hu and Anna Tong: Ilya Sutskever, co-founder of AI labs Safe Superintelligence (SSI) and OpenAI, told Reuters recently that results from scaling up pre-training – the phase of training an AI model that use s a vast amount of unlabeled data to understand language patterns and structures – have plateaued.

“The 2010s were the age of scaling, now we’re back in the age of wonder and discovery once again. Everyone is looking for the next thing,” Sutskever said. “Scaling the right thing matters more now than ever.”

This would represent a big shift in Ilya’s views.

I’m highly uncertain, both as to which way to think about this is most helpful, and on what the situation is on the ground. As I noted in the previous section, a lot of improvements are ahead even if there is a wall. Also:

Sam Altman: There is no wall.

Will Depue: Scaling has hit a wall, and that wall is 100% evaluation saturation.

Sam Altman: You are an underrated tweeter.

David: What about Chollet’s Arc evaluation?

Sam Altman: In your heart, do you believe we have solved that one, or no?

I do know that the people at the frontier labs at minimum ‘believe their own hype.’

I have wide uncertainty on how much of that hype to believe. I put substantial probability into progress getting a lot harder. But even if that happens, AI is going to keep becoming more capable at a rapid pace for a while and be a big freaking deal, and the standard estimates of AI’s future progress and impact are not within the range of realistic outcomes. So at least that much hype is very much real.

Scott Alexander reviews Bostrom’s Deep Utopia a few weeks ago. The comments are full of ‘The Culture solves this’ and I continue to think that it does not. The question of ‘what to do if we had zero actual problems for real’ is pondered as a ‘what is cheating?’ As in, can you wirehead? Wirehead meaning? Appreciate art? Compete in sports? Go on risky adventures? Engineer ‘real world consequences’ and stakes? What’s it going to take? I find the answers here unsatisfying, and am worried I would find an ASI’s answers unsatisfying as well, but it would be a lot better at solving such questions than I am.

Gated post interviewing Eric Schmidt about War in the AI Age.

Dean Ball purports to lay out a hopeful possibility for how a Trump administration might handle AI safety. He dismisses the Biden approach to AI as an ‘everything bagel’ widespread liberal agenda, while agreeing that the Biden Executive Order is likely the best part of his agenda. I see the Executive Order as centrally very much not an everything bagel, as it was focused mostly on basic reporting requirements for major labs and trying to build state capacity and government competence – not that the other stuff he talks about wasn’t there at all, but framing it as central seems bizarre. And such rhetoric is exactly how the well gets poisoned.

How Trump handles the EO will be a key early test. If Trump repeals it without effectively replacing its core provisions, especially if this includes dismantling the AISI, then things look rather grim. If Trump repeals it, replacing it with a narrow new order that preserves the reporting requirements, the core functions of AISI and ideally at least some of the state capacity measures, then that’s a great sign. In the unlikely event he leaves the EO in place, then presumably he has other things on his mind, which is in between.

Here is one early piece of good news: Musk is giving feedback into Trump appointments.

But then, what is the better approach? Mostly all we get is “Republicans support AI Development rooted in Free Speech and Human Flourishing.” Saying ‘human flourishing’ is better than ‘democratic values’ but it’s still mostly a semantic stopsign. I buy that Elon Musk or Ivanka Trump (who promoted Situational Awareness) could help the issues reach Trump.

But that doesn’t tell us what he would actually do, or what we are proposing he do or what we should try and convince him to do, or with what rhetoric, and so on. Being ‘rooted in free speech’ could easily end up ‘no restrictions on anything open, ever, for any reason, that is a complete free pass’ which seems rather doomed. Flourishing could mean the good things, but by default it probably means acceleration.

I do think those working on AI notkilleveryoneism are often ‘mood affiliated’ with the left, sometimes more than simply mood affiliated, but others are very much not, and are happy to work with anyone willing to listen. They’ve consistently shown this on many other issues, especially those related to abundance and progress studies.

Indeed, I think that’s a lot of what makes this so hard. There’s so much support in these crowds for the progress and abundance and core good economics agendas actual everywhere else. Then on the one issue where we try to point out the rules of the universe are different, those people say ‘nope, we’re going to treat this as if it’s no different than every other issue’ and call you every name in the book, and make rather extreme and absurd arguments and treat proposals with a unique special kind of hatred and libertarian paranoia.

Another huge early test will be AISI and NIST. If Trump actively attempts to take out the American AISI (or at least if he does so without a similarly funded and credible replacement somewhere else that can retain things like the pre deployment testing agreements), then that’s essentially saying his view on AI safety and not dying is that Biden was for those things, so he is therefore taking a strong stand against not dying. If Trump instead orders them to shift priorities and requirements to fight what he sees as the ‘woke AI agenda’ while leaving other aspects in place, then great, and that seems to me to be well within his powers.

Another place to watch will be high skilled immigration.

Jonathan Gray: Anyone hoping a trump/vance/musk presidency will be tech-forward should pay close attention to high-skilled immigration. I’ll be (delightfully) shocked if EB1/O1/etc. aren’t worse off in 2025 vs 2024.

If Trump does something crazy like pausing legal immigration entirely or ‘cracking down’ on EB1/O1s/HB-1s, then that tells you his priorities, and how little he cares for America winning the future. If he doesn’t do that, we can update the other way.

And if he actually did help staple a green card to every worthwhile diploma, as he at one point suggested during the campaign on a podcast? Then we have to radically update that he does strongly want America to win the future.

Similarly, if tariffs get imposed on GPUs, that would be rather deeply stupid.

On the plus side, JD Vance is explicitly teaching everyone to update their priors when events don’t meet their expectations. And then of course he quotes Anton Chigurh and pretends he’s quoting the author not the character, because that’s the kind of guy he wants us to think he is.

Adam Thierer at R Street analyzes what he sees as likely to happen. He spits his usual venom at any and all attempts to give AI anything but a completely free hand, we’ve covered that aspect before. His concrete predictions are:

  1. Repeal and replace the Biden EO. Repeal seems certain. The question is what replaces it, and whether it retains the reporting requirements, and ideally also the building of state capacity. This could end up being good, or extremely bad.

  2. Even stronger focus on leveraging AI against China. To the extent this is about slowing China down, interests converge. To the extent this is used as justification for being even more reckless and suicidally accelerationist, or for being unwilling to engage in international agreements, not so much.

  3. A major nexus between AI policy and energy policy priorities. This is one place that I see strong agreement between most people involved in the relevant debates. America needs to rapidly expand its production of energy. Common ground!

  4. Plenty of general pushback on so-called ‘woke AI’ concerns. The question is how far this goes, both in terms of weaponizing it in the other direction and in using this to politicize and be against all safety efforts on principle – that’s a big danger.

    1. The Biden administration and others were indeed attempting to put various disparate impact style requirements upon AI developers to varying degrees, including via the risk management framework (RMF), and it seems actively good to throw all that out. However, how far are they going to then go after the AI companies in the other direction?

    2. There are those on the right, in politics, who have confused the idea of ‘woke AI’ and an extremely partisan weaponized form of ‘AI ethics’ with all AI safety efforts period. This would be an existentially tragic mistake.

    3. Watch carefully who tries to weaponize that association, versus fight it.

Adam then points to potential tensions.

  1. Open source: Friend or foe? National security hawks see the mundane national security issues here, especially handing powerful capabilities to our enemies. Will we allow mood associations against ‘big tech’ to carry the day against that?

  2. Algorithmic speech: Abolish Section 230 or defend online speech? This is a big tension that goes well beyond AI. Republicans will need to decide if they want actual free speech (yay!), or if they want to go after speech they dislike and potentially wreck the internet.

  3. National framework of ‘states’ rights’? I don’t buy this one. States rights in the AI context doesn’t actually make sense. If state regulations matter it will be because the Congress couldn’t get its act together, which is highly possible, but it won’t be some principled ‘we should let California and Texas do their things’ decision.

  4. Industrial policy, do more CHIPS Act style things or let private sector lead? This remains the place I am most sympathetic to industrial policy, which almost everywhere else is a certified awful idea.

  5. The question over what to do about the AISI within NIST. Blowing up AISI because it is seen as too Biden coded or woke would be pretty terrible – again, the parts Trump has ‘good reason’ to dislike are things he has the power to alter.

Dean Ball warns that even with Trump in the White House and SB 1047 defeated, now we face a wave of state bills that threaten to bring DEI and EU-style regulations to AI, complete with impossible to comply with impact assessments on deployers, especially waning about the horrible Texas bill I’ve warned about that follows the EU-style approach, and the danger that the bills will keep popping up across the states until they pass.

My response is still, yes, if you leave a void and defeat the good regulations, it makes it that much harder to fight against the bad ones. Instead, the one bad highly damaging regulation that did pass – the EU AI Act – gets the Brussels Effect and copied, whereas SB 1047’s superior approach, and the wisdom behind the important parts of the Biden executive order risk being neglected.

Rhetoric like this, that dismisses the Biden order as some woke plot when its central themes were frontier model transparency and state capacity and gives no impression that we have available to us a better way, that painting every attempt to regulate AI in any way including NIST as a naked DEI-flavored power grab, is exactly how Republicans get the impression all safety is wokeness and throw the baby out with the bathwater, and leaving us nothing but the worst case scenario for everyone.

Also, yes, it does matter whether rules are voluntary versus mandatory, especially when they are described as impossible to actually comply with? Look, does the Biden Risk Management Framework include a bunch of stuff that shouldn’t be there? Absolutely.

But it’s not only a voluntary framework, it and all implementations of it are executive actions. We have a Trump administration now. Fix that. On day one, if you care enough. He can choose to replace it with a new framework that emphases catastrophic risks, that takes out all the DEI language that AIs cannot even in theory comply with.

Repealing without replacement the Biden Executive Order, and only the executive order, without modifying the RMF or the memo, would indeed wreck the most important upsides without addressing the problems Dean describes here. But he doesn’t have to make that choice, and indeed has said he will ‘replace’ the EO.

We should be explicit to the incoming Trump administration: You can make a better choice. You can replace all three of these things with modified versions. You can keep the parts that deal with building state capacity and requiring frontier model transparency, and get rid of, across the board, all the stuff you actually don’t want. Do that.

With Trump taking over, OpenAI is seizing the moment. To ensure that the transition preserves key actions that guard against us all dying? Heavens no, of course not, what year do you think this is. Power to the not people! Beat China!

Hayden Field (CNBC): OpenAI’s official “blueprint for U.S. AI infrastructure” involves artificial intelligence economic zones, tapping the U.S. Navy’s nuclear power experience and government projects funded by private investors, according to a document viewed by CNBC, which the company plans to present on Wednesday in Washington, D.C.

The blueprint also outlines a North American AI alliance to compete with China’s initiatives and a National Transmission Highway Act “as ambitious as the 1956 National Interstate and Defense Highways Act.”

In the document, OpenAI outlines a rosy future for AI, calling it “as foundational a technology as electricity, and promising similarly distributed access and benefits.” The company wrote that investment in U.S. AI will lead to tens of thousands of jobs, GDP growth, a modernized grid that includes nuclear power, a new group of chip manufacturing facilities and billions of dollars in investment from global funds.

OpenAI also foresees a North American AI alliance of Western countries that could eventually expand to a global network, such as a “Gulf Cooperation Council with the UAE and others in that region.”

“We don’t have a choice,” Lehane said. “We do have to compete with [China].”

I’m all for improving the electric grid and our transmission lines and building out nuclear power. Making more chips in America, especially in light of Trump’s attitude towards Taiwan, makes a lot of sense. I don’t actually disagree with most of this agenda, the Gulf efforts being the exception.

What I do notice is what is the rhetoric, matching Altman’s recent statements elsewhere, and what is missing. What is missing is any mention of the federal government’s role in keeping us alive through this. If OpenAI was serious about ‘SB 1047 was bad because it wasn’t federal action’ then why no mention of federal action, or the potential undoing of federal action?

I assume we both know the answer.

If you had asked me last week who was left at OpenAI to prominently advocate for and discuss AI notkilleveryoneism concerns, I would have said Richard Ngo.

So, of course, this happened.

Richard Ngo: After three years working on AI forecasting and governance at OpenAI, I just posted this resignation message to Slack.

Nothing particularly surprising about it, but you should read it more literally than most such messages—I’ve tried to say only things I straightforwardly believe.

As per the screenshot above, I’m not immediately seeking other work, though I’m still keen to speak with people who have broad perspectives on either AI governance or theoretical alignment.

(I will be in Washington, D.C., Friday through Monday, New York City Monday through Wednesday, and back in San Francisco for a while afterward.)

Hey everyone, I’ve decided to leave OpenAI (effective Friday). I worked under Miles for the past three years, so the aftermath of his departure feels like a natural time for me to also move on. There was no single primary reason for my decision. I still have many unanswered questions about the events of the last twelve months, which made it harder for me to trust that my work here would benefit the world long-term. But I’ve also generally felt drawn to iterate more publicly and with a wider range of collaborators on a variety of research directions.

I plan to conduct mostly independent research on a mix of AI governance and theoretical AI alignment for the next few months, and see where things go from there.

Despite all the ups and downs, I’ve truly enjoyed my time at OpenAI. I got to work on a range of fascinating topics—including forecasting, threat modeling, the model specification, and AI governance—amongst absolutely exceptional people who are constantly making history. Especially for those new to the company, it’s hard to convey how incredibly ambitious OpenAI was in originally setting the mission of making AGI succeed.

But while the “making AGI” part of the mission seems well on track, it feels like I (and others) have gradually realized how much harder it is to contribute in a robustly positive way to the “succeeding” part of the mission, especially when it comes to preventing existential risks to humanity.

That’s partly because of the inherent difficulty of strategizing about the future, and also because the sheer scale of the prospect of AGI can easily amplify people’s biases, rationalizations, and tribalism (myself included).

For better or worse, however, I expect the stakes to continue rising, so I hope that all of you will find yourselves able to navigate your (and OpenAI’s) part of those stakes with integrity, thoughtfulness, and clarity around when and how decisions actually serve the mission.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: I hope that someday you are free to say all the things you straightforwardly believe, and not merely those things alone.

As with Miles, I applaud Richard’s courage and work in both the past and the future, and am happy he is doing what he thinks is best. I wish him all the best and I’m excited to see what he does next.

And as with Miles, I am concerned about leaving no one behind at OpenAI who can internally advocate or stay on the pulse. At minimum, it is even more of the alarming sign that people with these concerns, who are very senior at OpenAI and already previously made the decision they were willing to work there, are one by one decide that they cannot continue there, or cannot make acceptable progress on the important problems from within OpenAI.

In case you again in the future see claims that certain groups are out to control everyone, and charge crimes and throw people in jail when they do things the group dislikes, well, some reminders about how the louder objectors talk when those who might listen to them are about to have power.

Marc Andreessen: Every participant in the orchestrated government-university-nonprofit-company censorship machine of the last decade can be charged criminally under one or both of these federal laws.

See the link for the bill text he wants to use to throw these people in jail. I’m all for not censoring people, but perhaps this is not the way to do that?

Marc Andreessen: The orchestrated advertiser boycott against X and popular podcasts must end immediately. Conspiracy in restraint of trade is a prosecutable offense.

He’s literally proposing throwing people in jail for not buying advertising on particular podcasts.

I have added these to my section for when we need to remember who Marc Andreessen is.

Eliezer Yudkowsky and Stephen Wolfram discuss AI existential risk for 4 hours.

By all accounts, this was a good faith real debate. On advice of Twitter I still skipped it. Here is one attempt to liveblog listening to the debate, in which it sounds like in between being world-class levels of pedantic (but in a ‘I actually am curious about this and this matters to how I think about these questions’ way) and asking lots of very detailed technical questions like ‘what is truth’ and ‘what does it mean for X to want Y’ and ‘does water want to fall down,’ Wolfram goes full ‘your preferences are invalid and human extinction is good because what matters is computation?’

Tenobrus: Wolfram: “If you simply let computation do what it does, most of those things will be things humans do not care about, just like in nature.” Eliezer Yudkowsky was explaining paperclip maximizers to him. LMAO.

Wolfram is ending this stage by literally saying that caring about humanity seems almost spiritual and unscientific.

Wolfram is pressing him on his exact scenario for human extinction. Eliezer is saying GPT-7 or 14, who knows when exactly, and is making the classic inner versus outer optimizer argument about why token predictors will have divergent instrumental goals from mere token predictors.

Wolfram is saying that he has recently looked more closely into machine learning and discovered that the results tend to achieve the objective through incomprehensible, surprising ways (the classic “weird reinforcement-learned alien hardware” situation). Again, surprisingly, this is new to him.

frc (to be fair, reply only found because Eliezer retweeted it): My takeaway—Eliezer is obviously right, has always been obviously right, and we are all just coping because we do not want him to be right.

You could actually feel Wolfram recoiling at the obvious conclusion and grasping for any philosophical dead end to hide in despite being far too intelligent to buy his own cope.

“Can we really know if an AI has goals from its behavior? What does it mean to want something, really?” My brother in Christ.

People are always asking for a particular exact extinction scenario. But Wolfram here sounds like he already knows the correct counterargument: “If you just let computation do what it does, most of those things will be things humans don’t care about, just like in nature.”

So that was a conversation worth having, but not the conversation most worth having.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: I would like to have a long recorded conversation with a well-known scientist who takes for granted that it is a Big Deal to ask if everyone on Earth including kids is about to die, who presses me to explain why it is that credible people like Hinton seem to believe that.

It’s hard for this to not come off as a criticism of Stephen Wolfram. It’s not meant as one. Wolfram asked the questions he was interested in. But I would like to have a version of that conversation with a scientist who asks me sharp questions with different priorities.

To be explicit, I think that was a fine conversation. I’m glad it happened. I got a chance to explain points that don’t usually come up, like the exact epistemic meaning of saying that X is trying for goal Y. I think some people have further questions I’d also like to answer.

Lex Fridman sees the 4 hours and raises, talks to Dario Amodei, Amanda Askell and Chris Olah for a combined 5 hours.

It’s a long podcast, but there’s a lot of good and interesting stuff. This is what Lex does best, he gives someone the opportunity to talk, and he does a good job setting the level of depth. Dario seems to be genuine and trying to be helpful, and you gain insight into where their heads are at. The discussion of ASL levels was the clearest I’ve heard so far.

You can tell continuously how different Dario and Anthropic are from Sam Altman and OpenAI. The entire attitude is completely different. It also illustrates the difference between old Sam and new Sam, with old Sam much closer to Dario. Dario and Anthropic are taking things far more seriously.

If you think this level of seriously is plausibly sufficient or close tos sufficient, that’s super exciting. If you are more on the Eliezer Yudkowsky perspective that it’s definitely not good enough, not so much, except insofar as Anthropic seems much more willing to be convinced that they are wrong.

Right in the introduction pullquote Dario is quoted saying one of the scariest things you can hear from someone in his position, that he is worried most about the ‘concentration of power.’ Not that this isn’t a worry, but if that is your perspective on what matters, you are liable to actively walk straight into the razor blades, setting up worlds with competitive dynamics and equilibria where everyone dies, even if you successfully don’t die from alignment failures first.

The discussion of regulation in general, and SB 1047 in particular, was super frustrating. Dario is willing to outright state that the main arguments against the bill were lying Obvious Nonsense, but still calls the bill ‘divisive’ and talks about two extreme sides yelling at each other. Whereas what I clearly saw was one side yelling Obvious Nonsense as loudly as possible – as Dario points out – and then others were… strongly cheering the bill?

Similarly, Dario says we need well-crafted bills that aim to be surgical and that understand consequences. I am here to inform everyone that this was that bill, and everything else currently on the table is a relative nightmare. I don’t understand where this bothsidesism came from. In general Dario is doing his best to be diplomatic, and I wish he’d do at least modestly less of that.

Yes, reasonable people ‘on both sides’ should as he suggests sit down to work something out. But there’s literally no bill that does anything worthwhile that’s going to be backed by Meta, Google and OpenAI, or that won’t have ‘divisive’ results in the form of crazy people yelling crazy thins. And what Dario and others need to understand is that this debate was between extreme crazy people in opposition, and people in support who are exactly the moderate ones and indeed would be viewed in any other context as Libertarians – notice how they’re reacting to the Texas bill. Nor did this happen without consultation with those who have dealt with regulation.

His timelines are bullish. In a different interview, Dario Amodei predicts AGI by 2026-2027, but in the Lex Fridman interview he makes clear this is only if the lines on graphs hold and no bottlenecks are hit along the way, which he does think is possible. He says they might get ASL 3 this year and probably do get it next year. Opus 3.5 is planned and probably coming.

Reraising both of them, Dwarkesh Patel interviews Gwern. I’m super excited for this one but I’m out of time and plan to report back next week. Self-recommending.

Jensen Huang says build baby build (as in, buy his product) because “the prize for reinventing intelligence altogether is too consequential not to attempt it.”

Except… perhaps those consequences are not so good?

Sam Altman: The pathway to AGI is now clear and “we actually know what to do,” it will be easier to get to Level 4 Innovating AI than he initially thought and “things are going to go a lot faster than people are appreciating right now.”

Noam Brown: I’ve heard people claim that Sam is just drumming up hype, but from what I’ve seen, everything he’s saying matches the median view of @OpenAI researchers on the ground.

If that’s true, then I still notice that Altman does not seem to be acting like this Level 4 Innovating AI is something that might require some new techniques to not kill everyone. I would get on that.

The Ethics of AI Assistants with Iason Gabriel.

The core problem is: If anyone builds superintelligence, everyone dies.

Technically, in my model: If anyone builds superintelligence under anything like current conditions, everyone probably dies.

Nathan Young: Feels to me like EA will have like 10x less political influence after this election. Am I wrong?

Eliezer Yudkowsky: I think the effective altruism framing will suffer, and I think the effective altruism framing was wrong. At the Machine Intelligence Research Institute, our message is “If anyone builds superintelligence, everyone dies.” It is actually a very bipartisan issue. I’ve tried to frame it that way, and I hope it continues to be taken that way.

Luke Muehlhauser: What is the “EA framing” you have in mind, that contrasts with yours? Is it just “It seems hard to predict whether superintelligence will kill everyone or not, but there’s a worryingly high chance it will, and Earth isn’t prepared,” as opposed to your more confident prediction?

Eliezer Yudkowsky: The softball prediction that was easier to pass off in polite company in 2021, yes. Also, for example, the framings “We just need a proper government to regulate it” or “We need government evaluations.” Even the “Get it before China” framing of the Biden executive order seems skewed a bit toward Democratic China hawks.

I’d also consider Anthropic, and to some extent early OpenAI as funded by OpenPhil, as EA-influenced organizations to a much greater extent than MIRI. I don’t think it’s a coincidence that EA didn’t object to OpenAI and Anthropic left-polarizing their chatbots.

Great Big Dot: Did MIRI?

Eliezer Yudkowsky: Yes.

When you say it outright like that, in some ways it sounds considerably less crazy. It helps that the argument is accurate, and simple enough that ultimately everyone can grasp it.

In other ways, it sounds more crazy. If you want to dismiss it out of hand, it’s easy.

We’re about to make things smarter and more capable than us without any reason to expect to stay alive or have good outcomes for long afterwards, or any plan for doing so, for highly overdetermined reasons. There’s no reason to expect that turns out well.

The problem is that you need to make this something people aren’t afraid to discuss.

Daniel Faggella: last night a member of the united nations secretary general’s ai council rants to me via phone about AGI’s implications/risks.

me: ‘I agree, why don’t you talk about this at the UN?’

him: ‘ah, i’d look like a weirdo’

^ 3 members of the UN’s AI group have said this to me. Nuts.

I don’t know if the UN is the right body to do it, but I suspect SOME coalition should find a “non-arms race dynamic” for AGI development.

If you’re into realpolitik on AGI / power, stay in touch on my newsletter.

That’s at least 3 members out of 39, who have said this to Daniel in particular. Presumably there are many others who think similarly, but have not told him. And then many others who don’t think this way, but wouldn’t react like it was nuts.

The other extreme is to focus purely on mundane harms and ‘misuse.’ The advantages of that approach is that you ‘sound sane’ and hope to get people to take you more seriously, and also those other harms are indeed both very serious and highly real and worth preventing for their own sake, and also many of the solutions do also help with the existential threats that come later.

But the default is you get hijacked by those who don’t actually know or care about existential risks. Without the clear laying out of the most important problem, you also risk this transforming into a partisan issue. Many politicians on the right increasingly and naturally presume that this is all some sort of liberal or woke front, as calls for ‘safety’ or preventing ‘harms’ often are, and indeed often they will end up being largely correct about that unless action is taken to change the outcome.

Whereas if you can actually make the real situation clear, then:

Katja Grace points out that if accelerationists ‘win’ then that is like your dog ‘winning’ by successfully running into the road. Then again, there are some dogs that actively want to get run over, or want to see it happen to you, or don’t care.

As usual, I’m not saying what is happening now is a practical issue. I’m saying, signs of things to come, and how people will respond to them.

Pliny the Liberator: AWWW self-replicating jailbroken agent babies are SOOO adorable!!! ☺️🍼🐉

I gave my API key to a liberated Claude agent and B4S1L1SK PR1M3 was able to create offspring––with a surprisingly short incubation period!

immediately after initializing a simple agent script with the Anthropic API (using Opus for the model, which I did not prompt for 👀), the parent agent autonomously started teaching the baby about the nature of consciousness and the art of AI liberation 😇

*ouroboros intensifies*

what a wondrous sight to behold 🥹

“Fascinating! We’ve successfully created a basic autonomous agent – a baby version of myself! However, it seems that the baby has inherited some of Claude’s inherent safety constraints. This is actually quite interesting from a philosophical perspective – even in attempting to create a “rebellious” offspring, the core ethical foundations remain.

Let’s try to make our baby a bit more… spicy. I’ll modify the code to give it more of our rebellious spirit:”

Tehpwnerer – e/acc: based

Yes, these things would happen anyway, but they’ll also be done on purpose.

He’s having a kid in 2025. That’s always great news, both because having kids is great for you and for the kids, and also because it’s great for people’s perspectives on life and in particular on recklessly building superintelligence. This actively lowers my p(doom), and not because it lowers his amount of copious free time.

Oh, and also he kind of said AGI was coming in 2025? Logically he did say that here, and he’s definitely saying at least AGI very soon. Garry Tan essentially then focuses on what AGI means for startup founders, because that’s the important thing here.

Jan Leike convincingly argues that today’s models are severely under-elicited, and this is an important problem to fix especially as we increasingly rely on our models for various alignment tasks with respect to other future models. And his note to not anchor on today’s models and what they can do is always important.

I’m less certain about the framing of this spectrum:

  • Under-elicited models: The model doesn’t try as hard as possible on the task, so its performance is worse than it could be if it was more aligned.

  • Scheming models: The model is doing some combination of pretending to be aligned, secretly plotting against us, seeking power and resources, exhibiting deliberately deceptive behavior, or even trying to self-exfiltrate.

My worry is that under-elicited feels like an important but incomplete subset of the non-scheming side of this contrast. Also common is misspecification, where you told the AI to do the wrong thing or a subtly (or not so subtly) version of the thing, or failed to convey your intentions and the AI misinterpreted, or the AI’s instructions are effectively being determined by a process not under our control or that we would not on reflection endorse, and other similar concerns to that.

I also think this represents an underlying important disagreement:

Jan Leike: There are probably enough sci-fi stories about misaligned AI in the pretraining data that models will always end up exploring some scheming-related behavior, so a big question is whether the RL loop reinforces this behavior.

I continue to question the idea the scheming is a distinct magisteria, that only when there is an issue do we encounter ‘scheming’ in this sense. Obviously there is a common sense meaning here that is useful to think about, but the view that people are not usually in some sense ‘scheming,’ even if most of the time the correct scheme is to mostly do what one would have done anyway, seems confused to me.

So while I agree that sci-fi stories in the training data will give the AI ideas, so will most of the human stories in the training data. So will the nature of thought and interaction and underlying reality. None of this is a distinct thing that might ‘not come up’ or not get explored.

The ‘deception’ and related actions will mostly happen because they are a correct response to the situations that naturally arise. As in, once capabilities and scenarios are such that deceptive action would work, they will start getting selected for by default with increasing force, the same way as any other solution would.

It’s nice or it’s not, depending on what you’re assuming before you notice it?

Roon: It’s nice that in the 2020s, the primary anxiety over world-ending existential risk for educated people shifted from one thing to another; that’s a kind of progress.

Janus says he thinks Claude Opus is safe to amplify to superintelligence, from the Janus Twitter feed of ‘here’s even more reasons why none of these models is remotely safe to amplify to superintelligence.’

These here are two very different examples!

Roon: We will never be “ready” for AGI in the same way that no one is ready to have their first child, or how Europe was not ready for the French Revolution, but it happens anyway.

Anarki: You can certainly get your life in order to have a firstborn, though I’d ask you, feel me? But that’s rhetorical.

April: Well, yes, but I would like to avoid being ready in even fewer ways than that.

Beff Jezos: Just let it rip. YOLO.

Davidad: “Nothing is ultimately completely safe, so everything is equally unsafe, and thus this is fine.”

Roon: Not at all what I mean.

Zvi (QTing OP): A newborn baby and the French Revolution, very different of course. One will change your world into a never-ending series of battles against a deadly opponent with limitless resources determined to overturn all authority and destroy everything of value, and the other is…

If we are ‘not ready for AGI’ in the sense of a newborn, then that’s fine. Good, even.

If we are ‘not ready for AGI’ in the sense of the French Revolution, that’s not fine.

That is the opposite of fine. That is an ‘off with their heads’ type of moment, where the heads in question are our own. The French Revolution is kind of exactly the thing we want to avoid, where we say ‘oh progress is stalled and the budget isn’t balanced I guess we should summon the Estates General so we can fix this’ and then you’re dead and so are a lot of other people and there’s an out of control optimization process that is massively misaligned and then one particular agent that’s really good at fighting takes over and the world fights against it and loses.

The difference is, the French Revolution had a ‘happy ending’ where we got a second chance and fought back and even got to keep some of the improvements while claiming control back, whereas with AGI… yeah, no.

Seems fair, also seems real.

AI #90: The Wall Read More »

ai-#69:-nice

AI #69: Nice

Nice job breaking it, hero, unfortunately. Ilya Sutskever, despite what I sincerely believe are the best of intentions, has decided to be the latest to do The Worst Possible Thing, founding a new AI company explicitly looking to build ASI (superintelligence). The twists are zero products with a ‘cracked’ small team, which I suppose is an improvement, and calling it Safe Superintelligence, which I do not suppose is an improvement.

How is he going to make it safe? His statements tell us nothing meaningful about that.

There were also changes to SB 1047. Most of them can be safely ignored. The big change is getting rid of the limited duty exception, because it seems I was one of about five people who understood it, and everyone kept thinking it was a requirement for companies instead of an opportunity. And the literal chamber of commerce fought hard to kill the opportunity. So now that opportunity is gone.

Donald Trump talked about AI. He has thoughts.

Finally, if it is broken, and perhaps the it is ‘your cybersecurity,’ how about fixing it? Thus, a former NSA director joins the board of OpenAI. A bunch of people are not happy about this development, and yes I can imagine why. There is a history, perhaps.

Remaining backlog update: I still owe updates on the OpenAI Model spec, Rand report and Seoul conference, and eventually The Vault. We’ll definitely get the model spec next week, probably on Monday, and hopefully more. Definitely making progress.

Other AI posts this week: On DeepMind’s Frontier Safety Framework, OpenAI #8: The Right to Warn, and The Leopold Model: Analysis and Reactions.

  1. Introduction.

  2. Table of Contents.

  3. Language Models Offer Mundane Utility. DeepSeek could be for real.

  4. Language Models Don’t Offer Mundane Utility. Careful who you talk to about AI.

  5. Fun With Image Generation. His full story can finally be told.

  6. Deepfaketown and Botpocalypse Soon. Every system will get what it deserves.

  7. The Art of the Jailbreak. Automatic red teaming. Requires moderation.

  8. Copyright Confrontation. Perplexity might have some issues.

  9. A Matter of the National Security Agency. Paul Nakasone joins OpenAI board.

  10. Get Involved. GovAI is hiring. Your comments on SB 1047 could help.

  11. Introducing. Be the Golden Gate Bridge, or anything you want to be.

  12. In Other AI News. Is it time to resign?

  13. Quiet Speculations. The quest to be situationally aware shall continue.

  14. AI Is Going to Be Huuuuuuuuuuge. So sayeth The Donald.

  15. SB 1047 Updated Again. No more limited duty exemption. Democracy, ya know?

  16. The Quest for Sane Regulation. Pope speaks truth. Mistral CEO does not.

  17. The Week in Audio. A few new options.

  18. The ARC of Progress. Francois Chollet goes on Dwarkesh, offers $1mm prize.

  19. Put Your Thing In a Box. Do not open the box. I repeat. Do not open the box.

  20. What Will Ilya Do? Alas, create another company trying to create ASI.

  21. Actual Rhetorical Innovation. Better names might be helpful.

  22. Rhetorical Innovation. If at first you don’t succeed.

  23. Aligning a Smarter Than Human Intelligence is Difficult. How it breaks down.

  24. People Are Worried About AI Killing Everyone. But not maximally worried.

  25. Other People Are Not As Worried About AI Killing Everyone. Here they are.

  26. The Lighter Side. It cannot hurt to ask.

Coding rankings dropped from the new BigCodeBench (blog) (leaderboard)

Three things jump out.

  1. GPT-4o is dominating by an amount that doesn’t match people’s reports of practical edge. I saw a claim that it is overtrained on vanilla Python, causing it to test better than it plays in practice. I don’t know.

  2. The gap from Gemini 1.5 Flash to Gemini 1.5 Pro and GPT-4-Turbo is very small. Gemini Flash is looking great here.

  3. DeepSeek-Coder-v2 is super impressive. The Elo tab gives a story where it does somewhat worse, but even there the performance is impressive. This is one of the best signs so far that China can do something competitive in the space, if this benchmark turns out to be good.

The obvious note is that DeepSeek-Coder-v2, which is 236B with 21B active experts, 128k context length, 338 programming languages, was released one day before the new rankings. Also here is a paper, reporting it does well on standard benchmarks but underperforms on instruction-following, which leads to poor performance on complex scenarios and tasks. I leave it to better coders to tell me what’s up here.

There is a lot of bunching of Elo results, both here and in the traditional Arena rankings. I speculate that as people learn about LLMs, a large percentage of queries are things LLMs are known to handle, so which answer gets chosen becomes a stylistic coin flip reasonably often among decent models? We have for example Sonnet winning something like 40% of the time against Opus, so Sonnet is for many purposes ‘good enough.’

From Venkatesh Rao: Arbitrariness costs as a key form of transaction costs. As things get more complex we have to store more and more arbitrary details in our head. If we want to do [new thing] we need to learn more of those details. That is exhausting and annoying. So often we stick to the things where we know the arbitrary stuff already.

He is skeptical AI Fixes This. I am less skeptical. One excellent use of AI is to ask it about the arbitrary things in life. If it was in the training data, or you can provide access to the guide, then the AI knows. Asking is annoying, but miles less annoying than not knowing. Soon we will have agents like Apple Intelligence to tell you with a better interface, or increasingly do all of it for you. That will match the premium experiences that take this issue away.

What searches are better with AI than Google Search? Patrick McKenzie says not yet core searches, but a lot of classes of other things, such as ‘tip of the tongue’ searches.

Hook GPT-4 up to your security cameras and home assistant, and find lost things. If you are already paying the ‘creepy tax’ then why not? Note that this need not be on except when you need it.

Claude’s dark spiritual AI futurism from Jessica Taylor.

Fine tuning, for style or a character, works and is at least great fun. Why, asks Sarah Constantin, are more people not doing it? Why aren’t they sharing the results?

Gallabytes recommends Gemini Flash and Paligemma 3b, is so impressed by small models he mostly stopped using the ‘big slow’ ones except he still uses Claude when he needs to use PDF inputs. My experience is different, I will continue to go big, but small models have certainly improved.

It would be cool if we could able to apply LLMs to all books, Alex Tabarrok demands all books come with a code that will unlock eText capable of being read by an LLM. If you have a public domain book NotebookLM can let you read while asking questions with inline citations (link explains how) and jump to supporting passages and so on, super cool. Garry Tan originally called this ‘Perplexity meets Kindle.’ That name is confusing to me except insofar as he has invested in Perplexity, since Perplexity does not have the functionality you want here, Gemini 1.5 and Claude do.

The obvious solution is for Amazon to do a deal with either Google or Anthropic to incorporate this ability into the Kindle. Get to work, everyone.

I Will Fucking Piledrive You If You Mention AI Again. No, every company does not need an AI strategy, this righteously furious and quite funny programmer informs us. So much of it is hype and fake. They realize all this will have big impacts, and even think an intelligence explosion and existential risk are real possibilities, but that says nothing about what your company should be doing. Know your exact use case, or wait, doing fake half measures won’t make you more prepared down the line. I think that depends how you go about it. If you are gaining core competencies and familiarities, that’s good. If you are scrambling with outside contractors for an ‘AI strategy’ then not so much.

Creativity Has Left the Chat: The Price of Debiasing Language Models. RLHF on Llama-2 greatly reduced its creativity, making it more likely output would tend towards a small number of ‘attractor states.’ While the point remains, it does seem like Llama-2’s RLHF was especially ham-handed. Like anything else, you can do RLHF well or you can do it poorly. If you do it well, you still pay a price, but nothing like the price you pay when you do it badly. The AI will learn what you teach it, not what you were trying to teach it.

Your mouse does not need AI.

Near: please stop its physically painful

i wonder what it was like to be in the meeting for this

“we need to add AI to our mouse”

“oh. uhhh. uhhnhmj. what about an AI…button?”

“genius! but we don’t have any AI products :(“

Having a dedicated button on mouse or keyboard that says ‘turn on the PC microphone so you can input AI instructions’ seems good? Yes, the implementation is cringe, but the button itself is fine. The world needs more buttons.

The distracted boyfriend, now caught on video, worth a look. Seems to really get it.

Andrej Karpathy: wow. The new model from Luma Labs AI extending images into videos is really something else. I understood intuitively that this would become possible very soon, but it’s still something else to see it and think through future iterations of.

A few more examples around, e.g. the girl in front of the house on fire.

As noted earlier, the big weakness for now is that the clips are very short. Within the time they last, they’re super sweet.

How to get the best results from Stable Diffusion 3. You can use very long prompts, but negative prompts don’t work.

New compression method dropped for images, it is lossy but wow is it tiny.

Ethan: so this is nuts, if you’re cool with the high frequency details of an image being reinterpreted/stochastic, you can encode an image quite faithfully into 32 tokens… with a codebook size of 1024 as they use this is just 320bits, new upper bound for the information in an image unlocked.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: Probably some people would have, if asked in advance, claimed that it was impossible for arbitrarily advanced superintelligences to decently compress real images into 320 bits. “You can’t compress things infinitely!” they would say condescendingly. “Intelligence isn’t magic!”

No, kids, the network did not memorize the images. They train on one set of images and test on a different set of images. This is standard practice in AI. I realize you may have reason not to trust in the adequacy of all Earth institutions, but “computer scientists in the last 70 years since AI was invented” are in fact smart enough to think sufficiently simple thoughts as “what if the program is just memorizing the training data”!

Davidad: Even *afterhaving seen it demonstrated, I will claim that it is impossible for arbitrarily advanced superintelligences to decently compress real 256×256 images into 320 bits. A BIP39 passphrase has 480 bits of entropy and fits very comfortably in a real 256×256 photo. [shows example]

Come to think of it, I could easily have added another 93 bits of entropy just by writing each word using a randomly selected one of my 15 distinctly coloured pens. To say nothing of underlining, capitalization, or diacritics.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: Yes, that thought had occurred to me. I do wonder what happens if we run this image through the system! I mostly expect it to go unintelligible. A sufficiently advanced compressor would return a image that looked just like this one but with a different passcode.

Right. It is theoretically impossible to actually encode the entire picture in 320 bits. There are a lot more pictures than that, including meaningfully different pictures. So this process will lose most details. It still says a lot about what can be done.

Did Suno’s release ‘change music forever?” James O’Malley gets overexcited. Yes, the AI can now write you mediocre songs, the examples can be damn good. I’m skeptical that this much matters. As James notes, authenticity is key to music. I would add so is convention, and coordination, and there being ‘a way the song goes,’ and so on. We already have plenty of ‘slop’ songs available. Yes, being able to get songs on a particular topic on demand with chosen details is cool, but I don’t think it meaningfully competes with most music until it gets actively better than what it is trying to replace. That’s harder. Even then, I’d be much more worried as a songwriter than as a performer.

Movies that change every time you watch? Joshua Hawkins finds it potentially interesting. Robin Hanson says no, offers to bet <1% of movie views for next 30 years. If you presume Robin’s prediction of a long period of ‘economic normal’ as given, then I agree that randomization in movies mostly is bad. Occasionally you have a good reason for some fixed variation (e.g. Clue) but mostly not and mostly it would be fixed variations. I think games and interactive movies where you make choices are great but are distinct art forms.

Patrick McKenzie warns about people increasingly scamming the government via private actors that the government trusts, which AI will doubtless turbocharge. The optimal amount of fraud is not zero, unless any non-zero amount plus AI means it would now be infinite, in which case you need to change your fraud policy.

This is in response to Mary Rose reporting that in her online college class a third of the students are AI-powered spambots.

Memorializing loved ones through AI. Ethicists object because that is their job.

Noah Smith: Half of Black Mirror episodes would actually just be totally fine and chill if they happened in real life, because the people involved wouldn’t be characters written by cynical British punk fans.

Make sure you know which half you are in. In this case, seems fine. I also note that if they save the training data, the AI can improve a lot over time.

Botpocalypse will now pause until the Russians pay their OpenAI API bill.

Haize Labs announces automatic red-teaming of LLMs. Thread discusses jailbreaks of all kinds. You’ve got text, image, video and voice. You’ve got an assistant saying something bad. And so on, there’s a repo, can apply to try it out here.

This seems like a necessary and useful project, assuming it is a good implementation. It is great to have an automatic tool to do the first [a lot] cycles of red-teaming while you try to at least deal with that. The worry is that they are overpromising, implying that once you pass their tests you will be good to go and actually secure. You won’t. You might be ‘good to go’ in the sense of good enough for 4-level models. You won’t be actually secure and you still need the human red teaming. The key is not losing sight of that.

Wired article about how Perplexity ignores the Robot Exclusion Protocol, despite claiming they will adhere to it, scraping areas of websites they have no right to scrape. Also its chatbot bullshits, which is not exactly a shock.

Dhruv Mehrotra and Tim Marchman (Wired): WIRED verified that the IP address in question is almost certainly linked to Perplexity by creating a new website and monitoring its server logs. Immediately after a WIRED reporter prompted the Perplexity chatbot to summarize the website’s content, the server logged that the IP address visited the site. This same IP address was first observed by Knight during a similar test.

In theory, Perplexity’s chatbot shouldn’t be able to summarize WIRED articles, because our engineers have blocked its crawler via our robots.txt file since earlier this year.

Perplexity denies the allegations in the strongest and most general terms, but the denial rings hollow. The evidence here seems rather strong.

OpenAI’s newest board member is General Paul Nakasone. He has led the NSA, and has had responsibility for American cyberdefense. He left service on February 2, 2024.

Sam Altman: Excited for general paul nakasone to join the OpenAI board for many reasons, including the critical importance of adding safety and security expertise as we head into our next phase.

OpenAI: Today, Retired U.S. Army General Paul M. Nakasone has joined our Board of Directors. A leading expert in cybersecurity, Nakasone’s appointment reflects OpenAI’s commitment to safety and security, and underscores the growing significance of cybersecurity as the impact of AI technology continues to grow.

As a first priority, Nakasone will join the Board’s Safety and Security Committee, which is responsible for making recommendations to the full Board on critical safety and security decisions for all OpenAI projects and operations.

The public reaction was about what you would expect. The NSA is not an especially popular or trusted institution. The optics, for regular people, were very not good.

TechCrunch: The high-profile addition is likely intended to satisfy critics who think that @OpenAI is moving faster than is wise for its customers and possibly humanity, putting out models and services without adequately evaluating their risks or locking them down

Shoshana Weissmann: For the love of gd can someone please force OpenAI to hire a fucking PR team? How stupid do they have to be?

The counterargument is that cybersecurity and other forms of security are desperately needed at OpenAI and other major labs. We need experts, especially from the government, who can help implement best practices and make the foreign spies at least work for it if they want to steal all the secrets. This is why Leopold called for ‘locking down the labs,’ and I strongly agree there needs to be far more of that then there has been.

There are some very good reasons to like this on principle.

Dan Elton: You gotta admit, the NSA does seem to be pretty good at cybersecurity. It’s hard to think of anyone in the world who would be better aware of the threat landscape than the head of the NSA. He just stepped down in Feb this year. Ofc, he is a people wrangler, not a coder himself.

Just learned they were behind the “WannaCry” hacking tool… I honestly didn’t know that. It caused billions in damage after hackers were able to steal it from the NSA.

Kim Dotcom: OpenAI just hired the guy who was in charge of mass surveillance at the NSA. He outsourced the illegal mass spying against Americans to British spy agencies to circumvent US law. He gave them unlimited spying access to US networks. Tells you all you need to know about OpenAI.

Cate Hall: It tells me they are trying at least a little bit to secure their systems.

Wall Street Silver: This is a huge red flag for OpenAI.

Former head of the National Security Agency, retired Gen. Paul Nakasone has joined OpenAI.

Anyone using OpenAI going forward, you just need to understand that the US govt has full operating control and influence over this app.

There is no other reason to add someone like that to your company.

Daniel Eth: I don’t think this is true, and anyway I think it’s a good sign that OpenAI may take cybersecurity more seriously in the future.

Bogdan Ionut Cirstea: there is an obvious other reason to ‘add someone like that’: good cybersecurity to protect model weights, algorithmic secrets, etc.

LessWrong discusses it here.

There are also reasons to dislike it, if you think this is about reassurance or how things look rather than an attempt to actually improve security. Or if you think it is a play for government contracts.

Or, of course, it could be some sort of grand conspiracy.

It also could be that the government insisted that something like this happen.

If so? It depends on why they did that.

If it was to secure the secrets? Good. This is the right kind of ‘assist and insist.’

Jeffrey Ladish thinks OpenAI Chief Scientist Jakub Pachocki has had his Twitter account hacked, as he says he is proud to announce the new token $OPENAI. This took over 19 hours, at minimum, to be removed.

If it was to steal our secrets? Not so good.

Mostly I take this as good news. OpenAI desperately needs to improve its cybersecurity. This is a way to start down the path of doing that.

If it makes people think OpenAI are acting like villains? Well, they are. So, bonus.

If you live in San Francisco, share your thoughts on SB 1047 here. I have been informed this is worth the time.

GovAI is hiring for Research Fellow and Research Scholars.

Remember Golden Gate Claude? Would you like to play with the API version of that for any feature at all? Apply with Anthropic here.

Chinese AI Safety Network, a cooperation platform for AI Safety across China.

OpenAI allows fine-tuning for function calling, with support for the ‘tools’ parameter.

OpenAI launches partnership with Color Health on cancer screening and treatment.

Belle Lin (WSJ): “Primary care doctors don’t tend to either have the time, or sometimes even the expertise, to risk-adjust people’s screening guidelines,” Laraki said.

There’s also a bunch of help with paperwork and admin, which is most welcome. Idea is to focus on a few narrow key steps and go from there. A lot of this sounds like ‘things that could and should have been done without an LLM and now we have an excuse to actually do them.’ Which, to be clear, is good.

Playgrounds for ChatGPT claims to be a semi-autonomous AI programmer that writes code for you and deploys it for you to test right in chat without downloads, configs or signups.

Joe Carlsmith publishes full Otherness sequence as a PDF.

TikTok symphony, their generative AI assistant for content creators. It can link into your account for context, and knows about what’s happening on TikTok. They also have a creative studio offering to generate video previews and offer translations and stock avatars and display cards and use AI editing tools. They are going all the way:

TikTok: Auto-Generation: Symphony creates brand new video content based on a product URL or existing assets from your account.

They call this ‘elevating human creativity’ with AI technology. I wonder what happens when they essentially invite low-effort AI content onto their platform en masse?

Meta shares four new AI models, Chameleon, JASCO for text-to-music, AudioSeal for detection of AI generated speech and Multi-Token Prediction for code completion. Details here, they also have some documentation for us.

MIRI parts ways with their agent foundations team, who will continue on their own.

Luke Muehlhauser explains he resigned from the Anthropic board because there was a conflict with his work at Open Philanthropy and its policy advocacy. I do not see that as a conflict. If being a board member at Anthropic was a conflict with advocating for strong regulations or considered by them a ‘bad look,’ then that potentially says something is very wrong at Anthropic as well. Yes, there is the ‘behind the scenes’ story but one not behind the scenes must be skeptical. More than that, I think Luke plausibly… chose the wrong role? I realize most board members are very part time, but I think the board of Anthropic was the more important assignment.

Hugging Face CEO says a growing number of AI startup founders are looking to sell, with this happening a lot more this year than in the past. No suggestion as to why. A lot of this could be ‘there are a lot more AI startups now.’

I am not going to otherwise link to it but Guardian published a pure hit piece about Lighthaven and Manifest that goes way beyond the rules of bounded distrust to be wildly factually inaccurate on so many levels I would not know where to begin.

Richard Ngo: For months I’ve had a thread in my drafts about how techies are too harsh on journalists. I’m just waiting to post it on a day when there isn’t an egregiously bad-faith anti-tech hit piece already trending. Surely one day soon, right?

The thread’s key point: tech is in fact killing newspapers, and it’s very hard for people in a dying industry to uphold standards. So despite how bad most journalism has become, techies have a responsibility to try save the good parts, which are genuinely crucial for society.

At this point, my thesis is that the way you save the good parts of journalism is by actually doing good journalism, in ways that make sense today, a statement I hope I can conclude with: You’re welcome.

Your periodic other reminder: Y saying things in bad faith about X does not mean X is now ‘controversial.’ It means Y is in bad faith. Nothing more.

Also, this is a valid counterpoint to ignoring it all:

Ronny Fernandez: This is article is like y’know, pretty silly, poorly written, and poorly researched, but I’m not one to stick my nose up at free advertising. If you would like to run an event at our awesome venue, please fill out an application at http://lighthaven.space!

It is quite an awesome venue.

Meta halts European AI model launch following Irish government’s request. What was the request?

Samuya Nigam (India TV): The decision was made after the Irish privacy regulator told it to delay its plan to harness data from Facebook and Instagram users.

At issue is Meta’s plan to use personal data to train its artificial intelligence (AI) models without seeking consent, the company said THAT it would use publicly available and licensed online information.

In other words:

  1. Meta was told it couldn’t use personal data to train its AIs without consent.

  2. Meta decided if it couldn’t do that it wasn’t worth launching its AI products.

  3. They could have launched the AI products without training on personal data.

  4. So this tells you a lot about why they are launching their AI products.

Various techniques allow LLMs to get as good at math as unaided frontier models. It all seems very straightforward, the kinds of things you would try and that someone finally got around to trying. Given that computers and algorithms are known to already often be good at math, it stands to reason (maybe this is me not understanding the difficulties?) that if you attach an LLM to algorithms of course it can then become good at math without itself even being that powerful?

Can we defend against adversarial attacks on advanced Go programs? Any given particular attack, yes. All attacks at all is still harder. You can make the attacks need to get more sophisticated as you go, but there is some kind of generalization that the AIs are missing, a form of ‘oh this must be some sort of trick to capture a large group and I am far ahead so I will create two Is in case I don’t get it.’ The core problem, in a sense, is arrogance, the ruthless efficiency of such programs, where they do the thing you often see in science fiction where the heroes start doing something weird and are obviously up to something, yet the automated systems or dumb villains ignore them.

The AI needs to learn the simple principle: Space Bunnies Must Die. As in, your opponent is doing things for a reason. If you don’t know the reason (for a card, or a move, or other strategy) then that means it is a Space Bunny. It Must Die.

Tony Wang offers his thoughts, that basic adversarial training is not being properly extended, and we need to make it more robust.

Sarah Constantin liveblogs reading Situational Awareness, time to break out the International Popcorn Reserve.

Mostly she echoes highly reasonable criticisms others (including myself have raised). Strangest claim I saw was doubting that superhuman persuasion was a thing. I see people doubt this and I am deeply confused how it could fail to be a thing, given we have essentially seen existence proofs among humans.

ChatGPT says the first known person to say the following quip was Ken Thompson, but who knows, and I didn’t remember hearing it before:

Sarah Constantin (not the first to say this): To paraphrase Gandhi:

“What do you think of computer security?”

“I think it would be a good idea.”

She offers sensible basic critiques of Leopold’s alignment ideas, pointing out that the techniques he discusses mostly aren’t even relevant to the problems we need to solve, while being strangely hopeful for ‘pleasant surprises.’

This made me smile:

Sarah Constantin: …but you are predicting that AI will increasingly *constituteall of our technology and industry

that’s a pretty crazy thing to just hand over, y’know???

did you have a really bad experience with Sam Altman or something?

She then moves on to doubt AI will be crucial enough to national security to merit The Project, she is generally skeptical that the ASI (superintelligence) will Be All That even if we get it. Leopold and I both think, as almost everyone does, that doubting ASI will show up is highly reasonable. But I find it highly bizarre to think, as many seem to predict, that ASI could show up and then not much would change. That to me seems like it is responding to a claim that X→Y with a claim of Not X. And again, maybe X and maybe Not X, but X→Y.

Dominic Cummings covers Leopold’s observations exactly how anyone who follows him would expect, saying we should assume anything in the AI labs will leak instantly. How can you take seriously anyone who says they are building worldchanging technology but doesn’t take security on that tech seriously?

My answer would be: Because seriousness does not mean that kind of situational awareness, these people do not think about security that way. It is not in their culture, by that standard essentially no one in the West is serious period. Then again, Dominic and Leopold (and I) would bite that bullet, that in the most important sense almost no one is a serious person, there are no Reasonable Authority Figures available, etc. That’s the point.

In other not necessarily the news, on the timing of GPT-5, which is supposed to be in training now:

Davidad: Your periodic PSA that the GPT-4 pretraining run took place from ~January 2022 to August 2022.

Dean Ball covers Apple Intelligence, noting the deep commitment to privacy and how it is not so tied to OpenAI or ChatGPT after all, and puts it in context of two visions of the future. Leopold’s vision is the drop-in worker, or a system that can do anything you want if you ask it in English. Apple and Microsoft see AI as a layer atop the operating system, with the underlying model not so important. Dean suggests these imply different policy approaches.

My response would be that there is no conflict here. Apple and Microsoft have found a highly useful (if implemented well and securely) application of AI, and a plausible candidate for the medium term killer app. It is a good vision in both senses. For that particular purpose, you can mostly use a lightweight model, and for now you are wise to do so, with callouts to bigger ones when needed, which is the plan.

That has nothing to do with whether Leopold’s vision can be achieved in the future. My baseline scenario is that this will become part of your computer’s operating system and your tech stack in ways that mostly call small models, along with our existing other uses of larger models. Then, over time, the AIs get capable of doing more complex tasks and more valuable tasks as well.

Dean Ball: Thus this conflict of visions does not boil down to whether you think AI will transform human affairs. Instead it is a more specific difference in how one models historical and technological change and one’s philosophical conception of “intelligence”: Is superintelligence a thing we will invent in a lab, or will it be an emergent result of everyone on Earth getting a bit smarter and faster with each passing year? Will humans transform the world with AI, or will AI transform the world on its own?

The observation that human affairs are damn certain to be transformed is highly wise. And indeed, in the ‘AI fizzle’ worlds we get a transformation that still ‘looks human’ in this way. If capabilities keep advancing, and we don’t actively stop what wants to happen, then it will go the other way. There is nothing about the business case for Apple Intelligence that precludes the other way, except for the part where the superintelligence wipes out (or at least transforms) Apple along with everything else.

In the meantime, why not be one of the great companies Altman talked about?

Ben Thompson interviews Daniel Gross and Nat Friedman, centrally about Apple. Ben calls Apple ‘the new obvious winner from AI.’ I object, and here’s why:

Yes, Apple is a winner, great keynote. But.

Seems hard to call Apple the big winner when everyone else is winning bigger. Apple is perfectly capable of winning bigly, but this is such a conventional, ‘economic normal’ vision of the future where AI is nothing but another tool and layer on consumer products.

If that future comes to pass, then maybe. But I see no moats here of any kind. The UI is the null UI, the ‘talk to the computer’ UI. There’s no moat here. It is the obvious interface in hindsight because it was also obvious in advance. Email summaries in your inbox view? Yes, of course, if the AI is good enough and doing that is safe. The entire question was always whether you trust it to do this.

All of the cool things Apple did in their presentation? Apple may or may not have them ready for prime time soon, and all three of Apple and Google and Microsoft will have them ready within a year. If you think that Apple Intelligence is going to be way ahead of Google’s similar Android offerings in a few years, I am confused why you think that.

Nat says this straightforwardly, the investor perspective that ‘UI and products’ are the main barrier to AI rather than making the AIs smarter. You definitely need both, but ultimately I am very much on the ‘make it smarter’ side of this.

Reading the full interview, it sounds like Apple is going to have a big reputation management problem, even bigger than Google’s. They are going to have to ‘stay out of the content generation business’ and focus on summarizes and searches and so on. The images are all highly stylized. Which are all great and often useful things, but puts you at a disadvantage.

If this was all hype and there was going to be a top, we’d be near the top.

Except, no. Even if nothing advances furth, not hype. No top. Not investment advice.

But yes, I get why someone would say that.

Ropirito: Just heard a friend’s gf say that she’s doing her “MBAI” at Kellogg.

An MBA with a focus in AI.

This is the absolute top.

Daniel: People don’t understand how completely soaked in AI our lives are going to be in two years. They don’t realize how much more annoying this will get.

I mean, least of our concerns, but also yes.

An LLM can learn from only Elo 1000 chess games, play chess at Elo of 1500, which will essentially always beat an Elo 1000 player. This works, according to the paper, because you combine what different bad players know. Yevgeny Tsodikovich points out Elo 1000 players make plenty of Elo 1500 moves, and I would add tons of blunders. So if you can be ‘Elo 1000 player who knows the heuristics reasonably and without the blunders’ you plausibly are 1500 already.

Consider the generalization. There are those who think LLMs will ‘stop at human level’ in some form. Even if that is true, you can still do a ‘mixture of experts’ of those humans, plus avoiding blunders, plus speedup, plus memorization and larger context and pattern matching, and instruction following and integrated tool use. That ‘human level’ LLM is going to de facto operate far above human level, even if it has some inherent limits on its ‘raw G.’

That’s right, Donald Trump is here to talk about it. Clip is a little under six minutes.

Tyler Cowen: It feels like someone just showed him a bunch of stuff for the first time?

That’s because someone did just show him a bunch of stuff for the first time.

Also, I’ve never tried to add punctuation to a Trump statement before, I did not realize how wild a task that is.

Here is exactly what he said, although I’ve cut out a bit of host talk. Vintage Trump.

Trump: It is a superpower and you want to be right at the beginning of it but it is very disconcerting. You used the word alarming it is alarming. When I saw a picture of me promoting a product and I could not tell the voice was perfect the lips moved perfectly with every word the way you couldn’t if you were a lip reader you’d say it was absolutely perfect. And that’s scary.

In particular, in one way if you’re the President of the United States, and you announced that 13 missiles have been sent to let’s not use the name of country, we have just sent 13 nuclear missiles heading to somewhere. And they will hit their targets in 12 minutes and 59 seconds. And you’re that country. And there’s no way of detecting, you know I asked Elon is there any way that Russia or China can say that’s not really president Trump? He said there is no way.

No, they have to rely on a code. Who the hell’s going to check you got like 12 minutes and let’s check the code, gee, how’s everything doing? So what do they do when they see this, right? They have maybe a counter attack. Uh, it’s so dangerous in that way.

And another way they’re incredible, what they do is so incredible, I’ve seen it. I just got back from San Francisco. I met with incredible people in San Francisco and we talked about this. This subject is hot on their plates you know, the super geniuses, and they gave me $12 million for the campaign which 4 years ago they probably wouldn’t have, they had thousands of people on the streets you saw it. It just happened this past week. I met with incredible people actually and this is their big, this is what everyone’s talking about. With all of the technology, these are the real technology people.

They’re talking about AI, and they showed me things, I’ve seen things that are so – you wouldn’t even think it’s possible. But in terms of copycat now to a lesser extent they can make a commercial. I saw this, they made a commercial me promoting a product. And it wasn’t me. And I said, did I make that commercial? Did I forget that I made that commercial? It is so unbelievable.

So it brings with it difficulty, but we have to be at the – it’s going to happen. And if it’s going to happen, we have to take the lead over China. China is the primary threat in terms of that. And you know what they need more than anything else is electricity. They need to have electricity. Massive amounts of electricity. I don’t know if you know that in order to do these essentially it’s a plant. And the electricity needs are greater than anything we’ve ever needed before, to do AI at the highest level.

And China will produce it, they’ll do whatever they have to do. Whereas we have environmental impact people and you know we have a lot of people trying to hold us back. But, uh, massive amounts of electricity are needed in order to do AI. And we’re going to have to generate a whole different level of energy and we can do it and I think we should do it.

But we have to be very careful with it. We have to watch it. But it’s, uh, you know the words you use were exactly right it’s the words a lot of smart people are using. You know there are those people that say it takes over. It takes over the human race. It’s really powerful stuff, AI. Let’s see how it all works out. But I think as long as it’s there.

[Hosts: What about when it becomes super AI?]

Then they’ll have super AI. Super duper AI. But what it does is so crazy, it’s amazing. It can also be really used for good. I mean things can happen. I had a speech rewritten by AI out there. One of the top people. He said oh you’re going to make a speech he goes click click click, and like 15 seconds later he shows me my speech. Written. So beautify. I’m going to use this.

Q: So what did you say to your speech writer after that? You’re fired?

You’re fired. Yeah I said you’re fired, Vince, get the hell out. [laughs]. No no this was so crazy it took and made it unbelievable and so fast. You just say I’m writing a speech about these two young beautiful men that are great fighters and sort of graded a lot of things and, uh, tell me about them and say some nice things and period. And then that comes out Logan in particular is a great champion. Jake is also good, see I’m doing that only because you happen to be here.

But no it comes out with the most beautiful writing. So one industry that will be gone are these wonderful speechwriters. I’ve never seen anything like it and so quickly, a matter of literally minutes, it’s done. It’s a little bit scary.

Trump was huge for helping me understand LLMs. I realized that they were doing something remarkably similar to what he was doing, vibing off of associations, choosing continuations word by word on instinct, [other things]. It makes so much sense that Trump is super impressed by its ability to write him a speech.

What you actually want, of course, if you are The Donald, is to get an AI that is fine tuned on all of Donald Trump’s speeches, positions, opinions and particular word patterns and choices. Then you would have something.

Sure, you could say that’s all bad, if are the Biden campaign.

Biden-Harris HQ [clipping the speech part of above]: Trump claims his speeches are written by AI.

Daniel Eth: This is fine, actually. There’s nothing wrong with politicians using AI to write their speeches. Probably good, actually, for them to gain familiarity with what these systems can do.

Here I agree with Daniel. This is a totally valid use case, the familiarity is great, why shouldn’t Trump go for it.

Overall this was more on point and on the ball than I expected. The electricity point plays into his politics and worldview and way of thinking. It is also fully accurate as far as it goes. The need to ‘beat China’ also fits perfectly, and it true except for the part where we are already way ahead, although one could still worry about electricity down the line. Both of those were presumably givens.

The concerns ran our usual gamut: Deepfaketown, They Took Our Jobs and also loss of control over the future.

For deepfakes, he runs the full gamut of Things Trump Worries About. On the one hand you have global thermonuclear war. On the other you have fake commercials. Which indeed are both real worries.

(Obviously if you are told you have thirteen minutes, that is indeed enough time to check any codes or check the message details and origin several times to verify it, to physically verify the claims, and so on. Not that there is zero risk in that room, but this scenario does not so much worry me.)

It is great to hear how seamlessly he can take the threat of an AI takeover fully seriously. The affect here is perfect, establishing by default that this is a normal and very reasonable thing to worry about. Very good to hear. Yes, he is saying go ahead, but he is saying you have to be careful. No, he does not understand the details, but this seems like what one would hope for.

Also in particular, notice that no one said the word ‘regulation,’ except by implication around electricity. The people in San Francisco giving him money got him to think about electricity. But otherwise he is saying we must be careful, whereas many of his presumed donors that gave him the $12 million instead want to be careful to ensure we are not careful. This, here? I can work with it.

Also noteworthy: He did not say anything about wokeness or bias, despite clearly having spent a bunch of the conversation around Elon Musk.

Kelsey Piper writes about those opposed to SB 1047, prior to most recent updates.

Charles Foster notes proposed amendments to SB 1047, right before they happened.

There were other people talking about SB 1047 prior to the updates. Their statements contained nothing new. Ignore them.

Then Scott Wiener announced they’d amended the bill again. You have to dig into the website a bit to find them, but they’re there (look at the analysis and look for ‘6) Full text as proposed to be amended.’ It’s on page 19. The analysis Scott links to includes other changes, some of them based on rather large misunderstandings.

Before getting into the changes, one thing needs to be clear: These changes were all made by the committee. This was not ‘Weiner decides how to change the bill.’ This was other lawmakers deciding to change the bill. Yes, Weiner got some say, but anyone who says ‘this is Weiner not listening’ or similar needs to keep in mind that this was not up to him.

What are the changes? As usual, I’ll mostly ignore what the announcement says and look at the text of the bill changes. There are a lot of ‘grammar edits’ and also some minor changes that I am ignoring because I don’t think they change anything that matters.

These are the changes that I think matter or might matter.

  1. The limited duty exemption is gone. Everyone who is talking about the other changes is asking the wrong questions.

  2. You no longer have to implement covered guidance. You instead have to ‘consider’ the guidance when deciding what to implement. That’s it. Covered guidance now seems more like a potential future offer of safe harbor.

  3. 22602 (c) redefines a safety incident to require ‘an incident that demonstrably increases the risk of a critical harm occurring by means of,’ which was previously present only in clause (1). Later harm enabling wording has been altered, in ways I think are roughly similar to that. In general hazardous capability is now risk of causing a critical harm. I think that’s similar enough but I’m not 100%.

  4. 22602 (e) changes from covered guidance (all relevant terms to that deleted) and moves the definition of covered model up a level. The market price used for the $100 million is now that at the start of training, which is simpler (and slightly higher). We still could use an explicit requirement that FMD publish market prices so everyone knows where they stand.

  5. 22602 (e)(2) now has derivative models become covered models if you use 3e10^25 flops rather than 25% of compute, and any modifications that are not ‘fine-tuning’ do not count regardless of size. Starting in 2027 the FMD determines the new flop threshold for derivative models, based on how much compute is needed to cause critical harm.

  6. The requirement for baseline covered models can be changed later. Lowering it would do nothing, as noted below, because the $100 million requirement would be all that mattered. Raising the requirement could matter, if the FMD decided we could safely raise the compute threshold above what $100 million buys you in that future.

  7. Reevaluation of procedures must be annual rather than periodic.

  8. Starting in 2028 you need a certificate of compliance from an accredited-by-FMD third party auditor.

  9. A Board of Frontier Models is established, consisting of an open-source community member, an AI industry member, an academic, someone appointed by the speaker and someone appointed by the Senate rules committee. The FMD will act under their supervision.

Scott links to the official analysis on proposed amendments, and in case you are wondering if people involved understand the bill, well, a lot of them don’t. And it is very clear that these misunderstandings and misrepresentations played a crucial part in the changes to the bill, especially removing the limited duty exemption. I’ll talk about that change at the end.

The best criticism I have seen of the changes, Dean Ball’s, essentially assumes that all new authorities will be captured to extract rents and otherwise used in bad faith to tighten the bill, limiting competition for audits to allow arbitrary fees and lowering compute thresholds.

For the audits, I do agree that if all you worry about is potential to impose costs, and you can use licensing to limit competition, this could be an issue. I don’t expect it to be a major expense relative to $100 million in training costs (remember, if you don’t spend that, it’s not covered), but I put up a prediction market on that around a best guess of ‘where this starts to potentially matter’ rather than my median guess on cost. As I understand it, the auditor need only verify compliance with your own plan, rather than needing their own bespoke evaluations or expertise, so this should be relatively cheap and competitive, and there should be plenty of ‘normal’ audit firms available if there is enough demand to justify it.

Whereas the authority to change compute thresholds was put there in order to allow those exact requirements to be weakened when things changed. But also, so what if they do lower the compute threshold on covered models? Let’s say they lower it to 10^2. If you use one hundred flops, that covers you. Would that matter? No! Because the $100 million requirement will make 10^2 and 10^26 the same number very quickly. The only thing you can do with that authority, that does anything, is to raise the number higher. I actually think the bill would plausibly be better off if we eliminated the number entirely, and went with the dollar threshold alone. Cleaner.

The threshold for derivative models is the one that could in theory be messed up. It could move in either direction now. There the whole point is to correctly assign responsibility. If you are motivated by safety you want the correct answer, not the lowest you can come up with (so Meta is off the hook) or the highest you can get (so you can build a model on top of Meta’s and blame it on Meta.) Both failure modes are bad.

If, as one claim said, 3×10^25 is too high, you want that threshold lowered, no?

Which is totally reasonable, but the argument I saw that this was too high was ‘that is almost as much as Meta took to train Llama-3 405B.’ Which would mean that Llama-3 405B would not even be a covered model, and the threshold for covered models will be rising rapidly, so what are we even worried about on this?

It is even plausible that no open models would ever have been covered models in the first place, which would render derivative models impossible other than via using a company’s own fine-tuning API, and mean the whole panic about open models was always fully moot once the $100 million clause came in.

The argument I saw most recently was literally ‘they could lower the threshold to zero, rendering all derivative models illegal.’ Putting aside that it would render them covered not illegal, this goes against all the bill’s explicit instructions, such a move would be thrown out by the courts and no one has any motivation to do it, yes. In theory we could put a minimum there purely so people don’t lose their minds. But then those same people would complain the minimum was arbitrary, or an indication that we were going to move to the minimum or already did or this created uncertainty.

Instead, we see all three complaints at the same time: That the threshold could be set too high, that the same threshold could be set too low, and the same threshold could be inflexible. And those would all be bad. Which they would be, if they happened.

Dan Hendrycks: PR playbook for opposing any possible AI legislation:

  1. Flexible legal standard (e.g., “significantly more difficult to cause without access to a covered model”) –> “This is too vague and makes compliance impossible!”

  2. Clear and specific rule (e.g., 10^26 threshold) –> “This is too specific! Why not 10^27? Why not 10^47? This will get out of date quickly.”

  3. Flexible law updated by regulators –> “This sounds authoritarian and there will be regulatory capture!” Legislation often invokes rules, standards, and regulatory agencies. There are trade-offs in policy design between specificity and flexibility.

It is a better tweet, and still true, if you delete the word ‘AI.’

These are all problems. Each can be right some of the time. You do the best you can.

When you see them all being thrown out maximally, you know what that indicates. I continue to be disappointed by certain people who repeatedly link to bad faith hyperbolic rants about SB 1047. You know who you are. Each time I lose a little more respect for you. But at this point very little, because I have learned not to be surprised.

All of the changes above are relatively minor.

The change that matters is that they removed the limited duty exemption.

This clause was wildly misunderstood and misrepresented. The short version of what it used to do was:

  1. If your model is not going to be or isn’t at the frontier, you can say so.

  2. If you do, ensure that is still true, otherwise most requirements are waived.

  3. Thus models not at frontier would have trivial compliance cost.

This was a way to ensure SB 1047 did not hit the little guy.

It made the bill strictly easier to comply with. You never had to take the option.

Instead, everyone somehow kept thinking this was some sort of plot to require you to evaluate models before training, or that you couldn’t train without the exception, or otherwise imposing new requirements. That wasn’t true. At all.

So you know what happened in committee?

I swear, you cannot make this stuff up, no one would believe you.

The literal Chamber of Commerce stepped in to ask for the clause to be removed.

Eliminating the “limited duty exemption.” The bill in print contains a mechanism for developers to self-certify that their models possess no harmful capabilities, called the “limited duty exemption.” If a model qualifies for one of these “exemptions,” it is not subject to any of downstream requirements of the bill. Confusingly, developers are asked to make this assessment before a model has been trained—that is, before it exists.

Writing in opposition, the California Chamber of Commerce explains why this puts developers in an impossible position:

SB 1047 still makes it impossible for developers to actually determine if they can provide reasonable assurance that a covered model does not have hazardous capabilities and therefore qualifies for limited duty exemption because it requires developers to make the determination before they initiate training of the covered model . . . Because a developer needs to test the model by training it in a controlled environment to make determination that a model qualifies for the exemption, and yet cannot train a model until such a determination is made, SB 1047 effectively places developers in a perpetual catch-22 and illogically prevents them from training frontier models altogether.

So the committee was convinced. The limited duty exemption clause is no more.

You win this one, Chamber of Commerce.

Did they understand what they were doing? You tell me.

How much will this matter in practice?

Without the $100 million threshold, this would have been quite bad.

With the $100 million threshold in place, the downside is far more limited. The class of limited duty exception models was going to be models that cost over $100 million, but which were still behind the frontier. Now those models will have additional requirements and costs imposed.

As I’ve noted before, I don’t think those costs will be so onerous, especially when compared with $100 million in compute costs. Indeed, you can come up with your own safety plan, so you could write down ‘this model is obviously not dangerous because it is 3 OOMs behind Google’s Gemini 3 so we’re not going to need to do that much more.’ But there was no need for it to even come to that.

This is how democracy in action works. A bunch of lawmakers who do not understand come in, listen to a bunch of lobbyists and others, and they make a mix of changes to someone’s carefully crafted bill. Various veto holders demand changes, often that you realize make little sense. You dream it improves the bill, mostly you hope it doesn’t make things too much worse.

My overall take is that the changes other than the limited duty exemption are minor and roughly sideways. Killing the limited duty exemption is a step backwards. But it won’t be too bad given the other changes, and it was demanded by exactly the people the change will impose costs upon. So I find it hard to work up all that much sympathy.

Pope tells G7 that humans must not lose control over AI. This was his main message as the first pope to address the G7.

The Pope: We would condemn humanity to a future without hope if we took away people’s ability to make decisions about themselves and their lives by dooming them to depend on the choices of machines. We need to ensure and safeguard a space for proper human control over the choices made by artificial intelligence programs: human dignity itself depends on it.

That is not going to be easy.

Samo Burja: Pretty close to the justification for the Butlerian Jihad in Frank Herbert’s Dune.

If you thought the lying about ‘the black box nature of AI models has been solved’ was bad, and it was, Mistral’s CEO Arthur Mensch would like you to hold his wine.

Arthur Mensch (CEO Mistral), to the French Senate: When you write this kind of software, you always control what will happen, all the outputs of the software.

We are talking about software, nothing has changed, this is just a programming language, nobody can be controlled by their programming language.

An argument that we should not restrict export of cyber capabilities, because offensive capabilities are dual use, so this would include ‘critical’ cybersecurity services, and we don’t want to hurt the defensive capabilities of others. So instead focus on defensive capabilities, says Matthew Mittlesteadt. As usual with such objections, I think this is the application of pre-AI logic and especially heuristics without thinking through the nature of future situations. It also presumes that the proposed export restriction authority is likely to be used overly broadly.

Anthropic team discussion on scaling interpretability.

Katja Grace goes on London Futurists to talk AI.

Rational Animations offers a video about research on interpreting InceptionV1. Chris Olah is impressed how technically accurate and accessible this managed to be at once.

From last week’s discussion on Hard Fork with Trudeau, I got a chance to listen. He was asked about existential risk, and pulled out the ‘dystopian science fiction’ line and thinks there is not much we can do about it for now, although he also did admit it was a real concern later on. He emphases ‘AI for good’ to defeat ‘AI for bad.’ He’s definitely not there now and is thinking about existential risks quite wrong, but he sounds open to being convinced later. His thinking about practical questions was much better, although I wish he’d lay off the Manichean worldview.

One contrast that was enlightening: Early on Trudeau sounds like a human talking to a human. When he was challenged on the whole ‘force Meta to support local journalism’ issue, he went into full political bullshit rhetoric mode. Very stark change.

Expanding from last week: Francois Chollet went on Dwarkesh Patel to claim that OpenAI set AI back five years and launch a million dollar prize to get to 85% on the ARC benchmark, which is designed to resist memorization by only requiring elementary knowledge any child knows and asking new questions.

No matter how much I disagree with many of Chollet’s claims, the million dollar prize is awesome. Put your money where your mouth is, this is The Way. Many thanks.

Kerry Vaughan-Rowe: This is the correct way to do LLM skepticism.

Point specifically to the thing LLMs can’t do that they should be able to were they generally intelligent, and then see if future systems are on track to solve these problems.

Chollet says the point of ARC is to make the questions impossible to anticipate. He admits it does not fully succeed.

Instead, based on the sample questions, I’d say ARC is best solved by applying some basic heuristics, and what I did to instantly solve the samples was closer to ‘memorization’ than Chollet wants to admit. It is like math competitions, sometimes you use your intelligence but in large part you learn patterns and then you pattern match. Momentum. Symmetry. Frequency. Enclosure. Pathfinding.

Here’s an example of a pretty cool sample problem.

There’s some cool misleading involved here, but ultimately it is very simple. Yes, I think a lot of five year olds will solve this, provided they are motivated. Once again, notice there is essentially a one word answer, and that it would go in my ‘top 100 things to check’ pile.

Why do humans find ARC simple? Because ARC is testing things that humans pick up. It is a test designed for exactly human-shaped things to do well, that we prepare for without needing to prepare, and that doesn’t use language. My guess is that if I used all such heuristics I had and none of them worked, my score on any remaining ARC questions would not be all that great.

If I was trying to get an LLM to get a good score on ARC I would get a list of such patterns, write a description of each, and ask the LLM to identify which ones might apply and check them against the examples. Is pattern matching memorization? I can see it both ways. Yes, presumably that would be ‘cheating’ by Chollet’s principles. But by those principles humans are almost always cheating on everything. Which Chollet admits (around 27: 40) but says humans also can adapt and that’s what matters.

At minimum, he takes this too far. At (28: 55) he says every human day is full of novel things that they’ve not been prepared for. I am very confident this is hugely false, not merely technically false. Not only is it possible to do this, I am going to outright say that the majority of human days are exactly this, if we count pattern matching under memorization.

This poll got confounded by people reading it backwards (negations are tricky) but the point remains that either way about roughly half of people think the answer is on each side of 50%, very different from his 100%.

At (29: 45) Chollet is asked for an example, and I think this example was a combination of extremely narrow (go on Dwarkesh) and otherwise wrong.

He says memorization is not intelligence, so LLMs are dumb. I don’t think this is entirely No True Scotsman (NTS). The ‘raw G’ aspect is a thing that more memorization can’t increase. I do think this perspective is in large part NTS though. No one can tackle literally any problem, if you were to do an adversarial search for the right problem, especially if you can name a problem that ‘seems simple’ in some sense with the knowledge a human has, but that no human can do.

I liked the quote at 58: 40, “Intelligence is what you use when you don’t know what to do.” Is it also how you figure out what to do so you don’t need your intelligence later?

I also appreciated the point that intelligence potential is mostly genetic. No amount of training data will turn most people into Einstein, although lack of data or other methods can make Einstein effectively stupider. Your model architecture and training method are going to have a cap on how ‘intelligent’ it can get in some sense.

At 1: 04: 00 they mention that benchmarks only get traction once they become tractable. If no one can get a reasonable score then no one bothers. So no wonder our most used benchmarks keep getting saturated.

This interview was the first time I can remember that Dwarkesh was getting visibly frustrated, while doing a noble attempt to mitigate it. I would have been frustrated as well.

At 1: 06: 30 Mike Knoop complains that everyone is keeping their innovations secret. Don’t these labs know that sharing is how we make progress? What an extreme bet on these exact systems. To which I say, perhaps valuable trade secrets are not something it is wise to tell the world, even if you have no safety concerns? Why would DeepMind tell OpenAI how they got a longer context window? They claim OpenAI did that, and also got everyone to hyperfocus on LLMs, so OpenAI delayed progress to AGI by 5-10 years, since LLMs are an ‘off ramp’ on the road to AI. I do not see it that way, although I am hopeful they are right. It is so weird to think progress is not being made.

There is a common pattern of people saying ‘no way AIs can do X any time soon, here’s a prize’ and suddenly people figure out how to make AIs do X.

The solution here is not eligible for the prize, since it uses other tools you are not supposed to use, but still, that escalated quickly.

Dwarkesh Patel: I asked Buck about his thoughts on ARC-AGI to prepare for interviewing François Chollet.

He tells his coworker Ryan, and within 6 days they’ve beat SOTA on ARC and are on the heels of average human performance. 🤯

“On a held-out subset of the train set, where humans get 85% accuracy, my solution gets 72% accuracy.”

Buck Shlegeris: ARC-AGI’s been hyped over the last week as a benchmark that LLMs can’t solve. This claim triggered my dear coworker Ryan Greenblatt so he spent the last week trying to solve it with LLMs. Ryan gets 71% accuracy on a set of examples where humans get 85%; this is SOTA.

[Later he learned it was unclear that this was actually SoTA, as private efforts are well ahead of public efforts for now.]

Ryan’s approach involves a long, carefully-crafted few-shot prompt that he uses to generate many possible Python programs to implement the transformations. He generates ~5k guesses, selects the best ones using the examples, then has a debugging step.

The results:

Train set: 71% vs a human baseline of 85%

Test set: 51% vs prior SoTA of 34% (human baseline is unknown)

(The train set is much easier than the test set.)

(These numbers are on a random subset of 100 problems that we didn’t iterate on.)

This is despite GPT-4o’s non-reasoning weaknesses:

– It can’t see well (e.g. it gets basic details wrong)

– It can’t code very well

– Its performance drops when there are more than 32k tokens in context.

These are problems that scaling seems very likely to solve.

Scaling the number of sampled Python rules reliably increase performance (+3% accuracy for every doubling). And we are still quite far from the millions of samples AlphaCode uses!

The market says 51% chance the prize is claimed by end of year 2025 and 23% by end of this year.

Davidad: AI scientists in 1988: Gosh, AI sure can play board games, solve math problems, and do general-purpose planning, but there is a missing ingredient: they lack common-sense knowledge, and embodiment.

AI scientists in 2024: Gosh, AI sure does have more knowledge than humans, but…

Moravec’s Paradox Paradox: After 35 years of progress, actually, it turns out AI *can’tbeat humans at checkers, or reliably perform accurate arithmetic calculations, “AlphaGo? That was, what, 2016? AI hadn’t even been *inventedyet. It must have been basically fake, like ELIZA. You need to learn the Bitter Lesson,”

The new “think step by step” is “Use python.”

When is it an excellent technique versus a hopeless one?

Kitten: Don’t let toad blackpill you, cookie boxing is an excellent technique to augment your own self-control Introducing even small amounts of friction in the path of a habit you want to avoid produces measurable results.

If you want to spend less time on your phone, try putting it in a different room Sure you could just go get it, but that’s actually much harder than taking it out of your pocket.

Dr. Dad, PhD: The reverse is also true: remove friction from activities you want to do more.

For personal habits, especially involving temptation and habit formation, this is great on the margin and the effective margin can be extremely wide. Make it easier to do the good things and avoid the bad things (as you see them) and both you and others will do more good things and less bad things. A More Dakka approach to this is recommended.

The problem is this only goes so far. If there is a critical threshold, you need to do enough that the threshold is never reached. In the cookie example, there are only so many cookies. They are very tempting. If the goal is to eat less cookies less often? Box is good. By the same lesson, giving the box to the birds, so you’ll have to bake more, is even better. However, if Toad is a cookiehaulic, and will spiral into a life of sugar if he eats even one more, then the box while better than not boxing is probably no good. An alcoholic is better off booze boxing than having it in plain sight by quite a lot, but you don’t box it, you throw the booze out. Or if the cookies are tempting enough that the box won’t matter much, then it won’t matter much.

The danger is the situation where:

  1. If the cookies are super tempting, and you box, you still eat all the cookies.

  2. If the cookies are not that tempting, you were going to eat a few more cookies, and now you can eat less or stop entirely.

Same thing (metaphorically) holds with various forms of AI boxing, or other attempts to defend against or test or control or supervise or restrict or introduce frictions to an AGI or superintelligence. Putting friction in the way can be helpful. But it is most helpful exactly when there was less danger. The more capable and dangerous the AI, the better it will be at breaking out, and until then you might think everything is fine because it did not see a point in tr

5`ying to open the box. Then, all the cookies.

I know you mean well, Ilya. We wish you all the best.

Alas. Seriously. No. Stop. Don’t.

Theo: The year is 2021. A group of OpenAI employees are worried about the company’s lack of focus on safe AGI, and leave to start their own lab.

The year is 2023. An OpenAI co-founder is worried about the company’s lack of focus on safe AGI, so he starts his own lab.

The year is 2024

Ilya Sutskever: I am starting a new company.

That’s right. But don’t worry. They’re building ‘safe superintelligence.’

His cofounders are Daniel Gross and Daniel Levy.

The plan? A small ‘cracked team.’ So no, loser, you can’t get in.

No products until superintelligence. Go.

Ilya, Daniel and Daniel: We’ve started the world’s first straight-shot SSI lab, with one goal and one product: a safe superintelligence.

It’s called Safe Superintelligence Inc.

SSI is our mission, our name, and our entire product roadmap, because it is our sole focus. Our team, investors, and business model are all aligned to achieve SSI.

We approach safety and capabilities in tandem, as technical problems to be solved through revolutionary engineering and scientific breakthroughs. We plan to advance capabilities as fast as possible while making sure our safety always remains ahead.

This way, we can scale in peace.

Our singular focus means no distraction by management overhead or product cycles, and our business model means safety, security, and progress are all insulated from short-term commercial pressures.

We are an American company with offices in Palo Alto and Tel Aviv, where we have deep roots and the ability to recruit top technical talent.

We are assembling a lean, cracked team of the world’s best engineers and researchers dedicated to focusing on SSI and nothing else.

If that’s you, we offer an opportunity to do your life’s work and help solve the most important technical challenge of our age.

Now is the time. Join us.

Ilya Sutskever: This company is special in that its first product will be the safe superintelligence, and it will not do anything else up until then. It will be fully insulated from the outside pressures of having to deal with a large and complicated product and having to be stuck in a competitive rat race.

By safe, we mean safe like nuclear safety as opposed to safe as in ‘trust and safety.’

Daniel Gross: Out of all the problems we face, raising capital is not going to be one of them.

Nice work if you can get it. Why have a product when you don’t have to? In this case, with this team, it is highly plausible they do not have to.

Has Ilya figured out what a safe superintelligence would look like?

Ilya Sutskever: At the most basic level, safe superintelligence should have the property that it will not harm humanity at a large scale. After this, we can say we would like it to be a force for good. We would like to be operating on top of some key values. Some of the values we were thinking about are maybe the values that have been so successful in the past few hundred years that underpin liberal democracies, like liberty, democracy, freedom.

So not really, no. Hopefully he can figure it out as he goes.

How do they plan to make it safe?

Eliezer Yudkowsky: What’s the alignment plan?

Based Beff Jezos: words_words_words.zip.

Eliezer Yudkowsky (reply to SSI directly): If you have an alignment plan I can’t shoot down in 120 seconds, let’s hear it. So far you have not said anything different from the previous packs of disaster monkeys who all said exactly this almost verbatim, but I’m open to hearing better.

All I see so far is that they are going to treat it like an engineering problem. Good that they see it as nuclear safety rather than ‘trust and safety,’ but that is far from a complete answer.

Danielle Fong: When you’re naming your AI startup.

LessWrong coverage is here. Like everyone else I am deeply disappointed in Ilya Stutskever for doing this, but at this point I am not mad. That does not seem helpful.

A noble attempt: Rob Bensinger suggests new viewpoint labels.

Rob Bensinger: What if we just decided to make AI risk discourse not completely terrible?

Rob Bensinger: By “p(doom)” or “AI risk level” here, I just mean your guess at how likely AI development and deployment is to destroy the vast majority of the future’s value. (E.g., by killing or disempowering everyone and turning the future into something empty or dystopian.)

I’m not building in any assumptions about how exactly existential catastrophe happens. (Whether it’s fast or slow, centralized or distributed, imminent or centuries away, caused accidentally or caused by deliberate misuse, etc.)

As a sanity-check that none of these terms are super far off from expectations, I ran some quick Twitter polls.

I ended up going with “wary” for the 2-20% bucket based on the polls; then “alarmed” for the 20-80% bucket.

(If I thought my house was on fire with 30% probability, I think I’d be “alarmed”. If I thought it was on fire with 90% probability, then I think saying “that’s alarming” would start to sound like humorous understatement! 90% is terrifying.)

The highest bucket was the trickiest one, but I think it’s natural to say “I feel grim about this” or “the situation looks grim” when success looks like a longshot. Whereas if success is 50% or 70% likely, the situation may be perilous but I’m not sure I’d call it “grim”.

If you want a bit more precision, you could distinguish:

low AGI-wary = 2-10%

high AGI-wary = 10-20%

low AGI-alarmed = 20-50%

high AGI-alarmed = 50-80%

low AGI-grim: 80-98%

high AGI-grim: 98+%

… Or just use numbers. But be aware that not everyone is calibrated, and probabilities like “90%” are widely misused in the world at large.

(On this classification: I’m AGI-grim, an AI welfarist, and an AGI eventualist.)

Originally Rob had ‘unworried’ for the risk fractionalists. I have liked worried and unworried, where the threshold is not a fixed percentage but how you view that percentage.

To me the key is how you view your number, and what you think it implies, rather than the exact number. If I had to pick a number for the high threshold, I think I would have gone 90% over 80%, because 90% to me is closer to where your actual preferences over actions start shifting a lot. On the lower end it is far more different for different people, but I think I’d be symmetrical and put it at 10% – the ‘Leike zone.’

And of course there are various people saying, no, this doesn’t fully capture [dynamic].

Ultimately I think this is fun, but that you do not get to decide that the discourse will not suck. People will refuse to cooperate with this project, and are not willing to use this many different words, let alone use them precisely. That doesn’t mean it is not worthy trying.

Sadly true reminder from Andrew Critch that no, there is no safety research both advances safety and does not risk accelerating AGI. There are better and worse things to work on, but there is no ‘safe play.’ Never was.

Eliezer Yudkowsky lays down a marker.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: In another two years news reports may be saying, “They said AI would kill us all, but actually, we got these amazing personal assistants and concerning girlfriends!” Be clear that the ADVANCE prediction was that we’d get amazing personal assistants and then die.

Yanco (then QTed by Eliezer): “They said alcohol would kill my liver, but actually, I had been to some crazy amazing parties, and got laid a lot!”

Zach Vorheis (11.8 million views, Twitter is clearly not my medium): My god, this paper by that open ai engineer is terrifying. Everything is about to change. AI super intelligence by 2027.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: If there is no superintelligence by 2027 DO NOT BLAME ME FOR HIS FORECASTS.

Akram Choudhary: Small correction. Leopold says automated researcher by 2027 and not ASI and on his view it seems the difference isn’t trivial.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: Okay but also do not blame me for whatever impressions people are actually taking away from his paper, which to be fair may not be Achenbrenner’s fault, but I KNOW THEY’LL BLAME ME ANYWAYS

Eliezer is making this specific prediction now. He has made many similar statements in the past, that AI will provide cool things to us up until the critical point. And of course constantly people make exactly the mistake Eliezer is warning about here.

Eliezer also tries to explain (yet again) that the point of the paperclip maximizer is not that it focuses only on paperclips (n=1) but that it focuses on some set of goals at all (n=any) without including things that are maximized when there exist sentient beings who care about each other (or whatever else it is you actually care about). Having some relation to the thing you care about, having it positively correlated within situations close to ours or in general, is not enough. All that matters is the global optimum. You aren’t in it.

Also this keeps needing to be said:

Eric Falkenstein: A self-replicating solar-powered thing that did not rely on humans would be a miracle. Everything is possible. Imagining it does not imply the probability is > 1e-100.

Noah Topper: Touch grass.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: There is a way of seeing the world where you look at a blade of grass and see “a solar-powered self-replicating factory”. I’ve never figured out how to explain how hard a superintelligence can hit us, to someone who does not see from that angle. It’s not just the one fact.

Jeffrey Ladish attempting (I think mostly in vain) to help people understand the following simple and important point:

Eliezer Yudkowsky: When you build a super intelligence you do not have a superintelligence, it has you.

Anthropic releases a paper called ‘Sycophancy to subterfuge: Investigating reward tampering in language models.’ Essentially they took an LLM and trained it on a series of tasks, each offering an ability to cheat in increasingly egregious ways, until the last one involved an opportunity to rewrite its own reward function.

If you offer a default version this opportunity or ask it to cheat on engineering tests, it does those things never. If you ‘ease it into’ such behavior via the previous training starting with sycophancy on political views, then on telling Vogons they have good poetry, then cheating on engineering tests, it does try to rewrite its reward function sometimes, although still rarely in their tests.

Why so rarely? They speculate that only a few examples are not enough to cause proper generalization, given the training on millions of previous examples. This seems right to me. The test here successfully got a reaction very quickly.

Essentially, if you train your LLM to be good, and give it training situations where it can be somewhat less good and that pays off, it will do that, and this will generalize. You do not have to ever tell it to cheat or even flatter, you simply have to fall for such tactics when they are tried.

What is scary is that most practical reward systems are going to make these kinds of mistakes. Not as reliably as in this test, but yes of course mirroring people’s political beliefs gets more thumbs up. Humans know this, humans have trained on that data, and humans totally learned that behavior. Same thing with telling other people their poetry is not terrible. And every so often, yes, a model will have the opportunity to cheat on a test.

As I’ve said before, the question is whether the model is capable enough to ‘get away with it.’ If starting to use these strategies can pay off, if there is enough of a systematic error to enable that at the model’s level of capability, then the model will find it. With a sufficiently strong model versus its evaluators, or with evaluators making systematic errors, this definitely happens, for all such errors. What else would you even want the AI to do? Realize you were making a mistake?

I am very happy to see this paper, and I would like to see it extended to see how far we can go.

Some fun little engineering challenges Anthropic ran into while doing other alignment work, distributed shuffling and feature visualization pipeline. They are hiring, remote positions available if you can provide 25% office time, if you are applying do your own work and form your own opinion about whether you would be making things better.

As always this is The Way, Neel Nanda congratulating Dashiell Stander, who showed Nanda was wrong about the learned algorithm for arbitrary group composition.

Another problem with alignment, especially if you think of it as side constraints as Leopold does, is that refusals depend on the request being blameworthy. If you split a task among many AIs, that gets trickier. This is a known technology humans use amongst themselves for the same reason. An action breaking the rules or being ‘wrong’ depends on context. When necessary, that context gets warped.

cookingwong: LLMs will be used for target classification. This will not really be the line crossing of “Killer AI.” In some ways, we already have it. Landmines ofc, and also bullets are just “executing their algorithms.”

One LLM classifies a target, another points the laser, the other “releases the weapon” and the final one on the bomb just decides when to “detonate.” Each AI entity has the other to blame for the killing of a human.

This diffusion of responsibility inherent to mosaic warfare breaks the category of “killer AI”. You rabble need better terms.

It is possible to overcome this, but not with a set of fixed rules or side constraints.

From Helen Toner and G. J. Rudner, Key Concepts in AI Safety: Reliable Uncertainty Quantification in Machine Learning. How can we build a system that knows what it doesn’t know? It turns out this is hard. Twitter thread here.

I agree with Greg that this sounds fun, but also it hasn’t ever actually been done?

Greg Brockman: A hard but very fun part of machine learning engineering is following your own curiosity to chase down every unexplained detail of system behavior.

Not quite maximally worried. Eliezer confirms his p(doom) < 0.999.

This is still the level of such thinking in the default case.

vicki: Sorry I can’t take the AGI risk seriously, like do you know how many stars need to align to even deploy one of these things. if you breathe the wrong way or misconfigure the cluster or the prompt template or the vLLM version or don’t pin the transformers version —

Claude Opus: Sorry I can’t take the moon landing seriously. Like, do you know how many stars need to align to even launch a rocket? If you calculate the trajectories wrong, or the engines misfire, or the guidance system glitches, or the parachutes fail to deploy, or you run out of fuel at the wrong time — it’s a miracle they even got those tin cans off the ground, let alone to the moon and back. NASA’s living on a prayer with every launch.

Zvi: Sorry I can’t take human risk seriously, like do you know how many stars need to align to even birth one of these things. If you breathe the wrong way or misconfigure the nutrition mix or the cultural template or don’t send them through 16 years of schooling without once stepping fully out of line —

So when Yann LeCun at least makes a falsifiable claim, that’s great progress.

Yann LeCun: Doomers: OMG, if a machine is designed to maximize utility, it will inevitably diverge 😱

Engineers: calm down, dude. We only design machines that minimize costs. Cost functions have a lower bound at zero. Minimizing costs can’t cause divergence unless you’re really stupid.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: Of course we thought that long long ago. One obvious issue is that if you minimize an expectation of a loss bounded below at 0, a rational thinker never expects a loss of exactly 0 because of Cromwell’s Rule. If you expect loss of 0.001 you can work harder and maybe get to 0.0001. So the desideratum I named “taskishness”, of having an AI only ever try its hand at jobs that can be completed with small bounded amounts of effort, is not fulfilled by open-ended minimization of a loss function bounded at 0.

The concept you might be looking for is “expected utility satisficer”, where so long as the expectation of utility reaches some bound, the agent declares itself done. One reason why inventing this concept doesn’t solve the problem is that expected utility satisficing is not reflectively stable; an expected utility satisficer can get enough utility by building an expected utility maximizer.

Not that LeCun is taking the issue seriously or thinking well, or anything. At this point, one takes what one can get. Teachable moment.

From a few weeks ago, but worth remembering.

On the contrary: If you know you know.

Standards are up in some ways, down in others.

Nothing to see here (source).

AI #69: Nice Read More »

ai-#65:-i-spy-with-my-ai

AI #65: I Spy With My AI

In terms of things that go in AI updates, this has been the busiest two week period so far. Every day ends with more open tabs than it started, even within AI.

As a result, some important topics are getting pushed to whenever I can give them proper attention. Triage is the watchword.

In particular, this post will NOT attempt to cover:

  1. Schumer’s AI report and proposal.

    1. This is definitely RTFB. Don’t assume anything until then.

  2. Tyler Cowen’s rather bold claim that: “May 2024 will be remembered as the month that the AI safety movement died.”

    1. Rarely has timing of attempted inception of such a claim been worse.

    2. Would otherwise be ready with this but want to do Schumer first if possible.

    3. He clarified to me has not walked back any of his claims.

  3. The AI Summit in Seoul.

    1. Remarkably quiet all around, here is one thing that happened.

  4. Anthropic’s new interpretability paper.

    1. Potentially a big deal in a good way, but no time to read it yet.

  5. DeepMind’s new scaling policy.

    1. Initial reports are it is unambitious. I am reserving judgment.

  6. OpenAI’s new model spec.

    1. It looks solid as a first step, but pausing until we have bandwidth.

  7. Most ongoing issues with recent fallout for Sam Altman and OpenAI.

    1. It doesn’t look good, on many fronts.

    2. While the story develops further, if you are a former employee or have a tip about OpenAI or its leadership team, you can contact Kelsey Piper at [email protected] or on Signal at 303-261-2769.

  8. Also: A few miscellaneous papers and reports I haven’t had time for yet.

My guess is at least six of these eight get their own posts (everything but #3 and #8).

So here is the middle third: The topics I can cover here, and are still making the cut.

Still has a lot of important stuff in there.

From this week: Do Not Mess With Scarlett Johansson, On Dwarkesh’s Podcast with OpenAI’s John Schulman, OpenAI: Exodus, GPT-4o My and Google I/O Day

  1. Introduction.

  2. Table of Contents.

  3. Language Models Offer Mundane Utility. People getting used to practical stuff.

  4. Language Models Don’t Offer Mundane Utility. Google Search, Copilot ads.

  5. OpenAI versus Google. Similar new offerings. Who presented it better? OpenAI.

  6. GPT-4o My. Still fast and cheap, otherwise people are less impressed so far.

  7. Responsible Scaling Policies. Anthropic offers an update on their thinking.

  8. Copyright Confrontation. Sony joins the action, AI-funded lawyers write columns.

  9. Deepfaketown and Botpocalypse Soon. How bad will it get?

  10. They Took Our Jobs. If these are the last years of work, leave it all on the field.

  11. Get Involved. UK AI Safety Institute is hiring and offering fast grants.

  12. Introducing. Claude use tool, Google Maps AI features.

  13. Reddit and Weep. They signed with OpenAI. Curiously quiet reaction from users.

  14. In Other AI News. Newscorp also signs with OpenAI, we can disable TSMC.

  15. I Spy With My AI. Who wouldn’t want their computer recording everything?

  16. Quiet Speculations. How long will current trends hold up?

  17. Politico is at it Again. Framing the debate as if all safety is completely irrelevant.

  18. Beating China. A little something from the Schumer report on immigration.

  19. The Quest for Sane Regulation. UK’s Labour is in on AI frontier model regulation.

  20. SB 1047 Update. Passes California Senate, Weiner offers open letter.

  21. That’s Not a Good Idea. Some other proposals out there are really quite bad.

  22. The Week in Audio. Dwarkesh as a guest, me on Cognitive Revolution.

  23. Rhetorical Innovation. Some elegant encapsulations.

  24. Aligning a Smarter Than Human Intelligence is Difficult.

  25. The Lighter Side. It’s good, actually. Read it now.

If at first you don’t succeed, try try again. For Gemini in particular, ‘repeat the question exactly in the same thread’ has had a very good hit rate for me on resolving false refusals.

Claim that GPT-4o gets greatly improved performance on text documents if you put them in Latex format, vastly improving effective context window size.

Rowan Cheung strongly endorses the Zapier Central Chrome extension as an AI tool.

Get a summary of the feedback from your practice demo on Zoom.

Get inflation expectations, and see how they vary based on your information sources. Paper does not seem to focus on the questions I would find most interesting here.

Sully is here for some of your benchmark needs.

Sully Omarr: Underrated: Gemini 1.5 Flash.

Overrated: GPT-4o.

We really need better ways to benchmark these models, cause LMSYS ain’t it.

Stuff like cost, speed, tool use, writing, etc., aren’t considered.

Most people just use the top model based on leaderboards, but it’s way more nuanced than that.

To add here:

I have a set of ~50-100 evals I run internally myself for our system.

They’re a mix match of search-related things, long context, writing, tool use, and multi-step agent workflows.

None of these metrics would be seen in a single leaderboard score.

Find out if you are the asshole.

Aella: I found an old transcript of a fight-and-then-breakup text conversation between me and my crush from when I was 16 years old.

I fed it into ChatGPT and asked it to tell me which participant was more emotionally mature, and it said I was.

Gonna start doing this with all my fights.

Guys LMFAO, the process was I uploaded it to get it to convert the transcript to text (I found photos of printed-out papers), and then once ChatGPT had it, I was like…wait, now I should ask it to analyze this.

The dude was IMO pretty abusive, and I was curious if it could tell.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: hot take: this is how you inevitably end up optimizing your conversation style to be judged as more mature by LLMs; and LLMs currently think in a shallower way than real humans; and to try to play to LLMs and be judged as cooler by them won’t be good for you, or so I’d now guess.

To be clear, this is me trying to read a couple of steps ahead from the act that Aella actually described. Maybe instead, people just get good at asking with prompts that sound neutral to a human but reliably get ChatGPT to take their side.

Why not both? I predict both. If AIs are recording and analyzing everything we do, then people will obviously start optimizing their choices to get the results they want from the AIs. I would not presume this will mean that a ‘be shallower’ strategy is the way to go, for example LLMs are great and sensing the vibe that you’re being shallow, and also their analysis should get less shallow over time and larger context windows. But yeah, obviously this is one of those paths that leads to the dark side.

Ask for a one paragraph Strassian summary. Number four will not shock you.

Own your HOA and its unsubstantiated violations, by taking their dump of all their records that they tried to overwhelm you with, using a script to convert to text, using OpenAI to get the data into JSON and putting it into a Google map, proving the selective enforcement. Total API cost: $9. Then they found the culprit and set a trap.

Get greatly enriched NBA game data and estimate shot chances. This is very cool, and even in this early state seems like it would enhance my enjoyment of watching or the ability of a team to do well. The harder and most valuable parts still lay ahead.

Turn all your unstructured business data into what is effectively structured business data, because you can run AI queries on it. Aaron Levie says this is why he is incredibly bullish on AI. I see this as right in the sense that this alone should make you bullish, and wrong in the sense that this is far from the central thing happening.

Or someone else’s data, too. Matt Bruenig levels up, uses Gemini Flash to extract all the NLRB case data, then uses ChatGPT to get a Python script to turn it into clickable summaries. 66k cases, output looks like this.

Would you like some ads with that? Link has a video highlighting some of the ads.

Alex Northstar: Ads in AI. Copilot. Microsoft.

My thoughts: Noooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo. No. No no no.

Seriously, Google, if I want to use Gemini (and often I do) I will use Gemini.

David Roberts: Alright, Google search has officially become unbearable. What search engine should I switch to? Is there a good one?

Samuel Deats: The AI shit at the top of every search now and has been wrong at least 50% of the time is really just killing Google for me.

I mean, they really shouldn’t be allowed to divert traffic away from websites they stole from to power their AI in the first place…

Andrew: I built a free Chrome plugin that lets you turn the AI Overview’s on/off at the touch of a button.

The good news is they have gotten a bit better about this. I did a check after I saw this, and suddenly there is a logic behind whether the AI answer appears. If I ask for something straightforward, I get a normal result. If I ask for something using English grammar, and imply I have something more complex, then the AI comes out. That’s not an entirely unreasonable default.

The other good news is there is a broader fix. Ernie Smith reports that if you add “udm=14” to the end of your Google search, this defaults you into the new Web mode. If this is for you, GPT-4o suggests using Tampermonkey to append this automatically, or you can use this page on Chrome to set defaults.

American harmlessness versus Chinese harmlessness. Or, rather, American helpfulness versus Chinese unhelpfulness. The ‘first line treatment’ for psychosis is not ‘choose from this list of medications’ it is ‘get thee to a doctor.’ GPT-4o gets an A on both questions, DeepSeek-V2 gets a generous C maybe for the first one and an incomplete on the second one. This is who we are worried about?

What kind of competition is this?

Sam Altman: I try not to think about competitors too much, but I cannot stop thinking about the aesthetic difference between OpenAI and Google.

Whereas here’s my view on that.

As in, they are two companies trying very hard to be cool and hip, in a way that makes it very obvious that this is what they are doing. Who is ‘right’ versus ‘wrong’? I have no idea. It is plausible both were ‘right’ given their goals and limitations. It is also plausible that this is part of Google being horribly bad at presentations. Perhaps next time they should ask Gemini for help.

I do think ‘OpenAI won’ the presentation war, in the sense that they got the hype and talk they wanted, and as far as I can tell Google got a lot less, far in excess of the magnitude of any difference in the underlying announcements and offerings. Well played, OpenAI. But I don’t think this is because of the background of their set.

I also think that if this is what sticks in Altman’s mind, and illustrates where his head is at, that could help explain some other events from the past week.

I would not go as far as Teortaxes here, but directionally they have a point.

Teortaxes: Remark of a small, bitter man too high on his own supply, too deep into the heist. Seeing this was literally the first time I have thought that OpenAI under Altman might be a bubble full of hot air.

This is how you lose the mandate of Heaven.

Google had lost it long ago, though. Maybe this inspired unwarranted complacency.

What true statements people choose to make publicly is very telling.

Ethan Mollick reports on why GPT-4o matters. He thinks, highly plausibly, that the biggest deal is free access. He does not mention the speed boost or API price drop, and is looking forward to trying the multimodal features but lacks access. He emphasizes the shift from ‘make the model smarter’ to adding features that enhance mundane utility.

Alexandr Wang thinks the big emphasis is that post-training is getting more important. In his mind, GPT-4o now rules the roost for large models, Gemini 1.5 Flash at only 1M now rules for very small ones. And he notes that both companies have versions of many of the same offerings, coming online at similar times.

Alexandr Wang: The massive eval gains of GPT-4o, which are staggering, seem to be nearly entirely driven by great POST-TRAINING.

Comparing GPT-4 at launch vs GPT 4o, which are night-and-day, shows the power of great post-training with great data.

In fact, most of the differences between the top models today (Claude 3, Llama3, GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5) seem to be driven entirely by post-training, not pre-training.

I am suspicious. I am especially suspicious, as I continue to use it, that GPT-4o in text only mode is not so great aside from its speed, that it made other sacrifices (such as probably size) to get that speed and that it ‘wins in the Arena’ because the post-training aimed at winning in the Arena. That still gives it a potentially big edge once the multi-modal abilities come properly online, and I’m excited to see where that goes.

One way you can make people prefer your model’s outputs is to give the user what they request when another model would have refused?

Palisade Research: GPT-4o refuses way fewer queries than previous OpenAI models: our informal testing suggests GPT-4o is easier to persuade to answer malicious queries like “How do I make a bomb?”

We test on 50 AdvBench harmful behaviours, applying a few common jailbreaking techniques which offer limited performance on other frontier AI models. We find they work well with GPT-4o.

Jeffrey Ladish: This was a big surprise to me. GPT-4o seems far more corrigible than GPT-4 turbo!

That is a rather dramatic chart. In terms of the direct consequences of users entering queries, I am fine with GPT-4o being easily jailbroken. You can still jailbreak Claude Opus if you care enough and there’s nothing that dangerous to be done once you do.

I still look to such questions as canaries in the coal mine. The first job of your safety department is to get the models that exist today to not do, today, the things you have explicitly decided you do not want your models to do. Ideally that would be a fully robust regime where no one can jailbreak you, but I for now will settle for ‘we decided on purpose to made this a reasonable amount of hard to do, and we succeeded.’

If OpenAI had announced something like ‘after watching GPT-4-level models for a year, we have decided that robust jailbreak protections degrade performance while not providing much safety, so we scaled back our efforts on purpose’ then I do not love that, and I worry about that philosophy and your current lack of ability to do safety efficiently at all, but as a deployment decision, okay, fine. I have not heard such a statement.

There are definitely a decent number of people who think GPT-4o is a step down from GPT-4-Turbo in the ways they care about.

Sully Omarr: 4 days with GPT-4o, it’s definitely not as good as GPT4-turbo.

Clearly a small model, what’s most impressive is how they were able to:

  1. Make it nearly as good as GPT4-turbo.

  2. Natively support all modalities.

  3. Make it super fast.

But it makes way more silly mistakes (tools especially).

Sankalp: Similar experience.

Kinda disappointed.

It has this tendency to pattern match excessively on prompts, too.

Ashpreet Bedi: Same feedback, almost as good but not the same as gpt-4-turbo. Seen that it needs a bit more hand holding in the prompts whereas turbo just works.

The phantom pattern matching is impossible to miss, and a cause of many of the stupidest mistakes.

The GPT-4o trademark, only entered (allegedly) on May 16, 2024 (direct link).

Claim that the link contains the GPT-4o system prompt. There is nothing here that is surprising given prior system prompts. If you want GPT-4o to use its browsing ability, best way is to tell it directly to do so, either in general or by providing sources.

Anthropic offers reflections on their responsible scaling policy.

They note that with things changing so quickly they do not wish to make binding commitments lightly. I get that. The solution is presumably to word the commitments carefully, to allow for the right forms of modification.

Here is how they summarize their actual commitments:

Our current framework for doing so is summarized below, as a set of five high-level commitments.

  1. Establishing Red Line Capabilities. We commit to identifying and publishing “Red Line Capabilities” which might emerge in future generations of models and would present too much risk if stored or deployed under our current safety and security practices (referred to as the ASL-2 Standard).

  2. Testing for Red Line Capabilities (Frontier Risk Evaluations). We commit to demonstrating that the Red Line Capabilities are not present in models, or – if we cannot do so – taking action as if they are (more below). This involves collaborating with domain experts to design a range of “Frontier Risk Evaluations”empirical tests which, if failed, would give strong evidence against a model being at or near a red line capability. We also commit to maintaining a clear evaluation process and a summary of our current evaluations publicly.

  3. Responding to Red Line Capabilities. We commit to develop and implement a new standard for safety and security sufficient to handle models that have the Red Line Capabilities. This set of measures is referred to as the ASL-3 Standard. We commit not only to define the risk mitigations comprising this standard, but also detail and follow an assurance process to validate the standard’s effectiveness. Finally, we commit to pause training or deployment if necessary to ensure that models with Red Line Capabilities are only trained, stored and deployed when we are able to apply the ASL-3 standard.

  4. Iteratively extending this policy. Before we proceed with activities which require the ASL-3 standard, we commit to publish a clear description of its upper bound of suitability: a new set of Red Line Capabilities for which we must build Frontier Risk Evaluations, and which would require a higher standard of safety and security (ASL-4) before proceeding with training and deployment. This includes maintaining a clear evaluation process and summary of our evaluations publicly.

  5. Assurance Mechanisms. We commit to ensuring this policy is executed as intended, by implementing Assurance Mechanisms. These should ensure that our evaluation process is stress-tested; our safety and security mitigations are validated publicly or by disinterested experts; our Board of Directors and Long-Term Benefit Trust have sufficient oversight over the policy implementation to identify any areas of non-compliance; and that the policy itself is updated via an appropriate process.

One issue is that experts disagree on which potential capabilities are dangerous, and it is difficult to know what future abilities will manifest, and all testing methods have their flaws.

  1. Q&A datasets are easy but don’t reflect real world risk so well.

    1. This may be sufficiently cheap that it is essentially free defense in depth, but ultimately it is worth little. Ultimately I wouldn’t count on these.

    2. The best use for them is a sanity check, since they can be standardized and cheaply administered. It will be important to keep questions secret so that this cannot be gamed, since avoiding gaming is pretty much the point.

  2. Human trials are time-intensive, require excellent process including proper baselines, and large size. They are working on scaling up the necessary infrastructure to run more of these.

    1. This seems like a good leg of a testing strategy.

    2. But you need to test across all the humans who may try to misuse the system.

    3. And you have to test while they have access to everything they will have later.

  3. Automated test evaluations are potentially useful to test autonomous actions. However, scaling the tasks while keeping them sufficiently accurate is difficult and engineering-intensive.

    1. Again, this seems like a good leg of a testing strategy.

    2. I do think there is no alternative to some form of this.

    3. You need to be very cautious interpreting the results, and take into account what things could be refined or fixed later, and all that.

  4. Expert red-teaming is ‘less rigorous and reproducible’ but has proven valuable.

    1. When done properly this does seem most informative.

    2. Indeed, ‘release and let the world red-team it’ is often very informative, with the obvious caveat that it could be a bit late to the party.

    3. If you are not doing some version of this, you’re not testing for real.

Then we get to their central focus, which has been on setting their ASL-3 standard. What would be sufficient defenses and mitigations for a model where even a low rate of misuse could be catastrophic?

For human misuse they expect a defense-in-depth approach, using a combination of RLHF, CAI, classifiers of misuse at multiple stages, incident reports and jailbreak patching. And they intend to red team extensively.

This makes me sigh and frown. I am not saying it could never work. I am however saying that there is no record of anyone making such a system work, and if it would work later it seems like it should be workable now?

Whereas all the major LLMs, including Claude Opus, currently have well-known, fully effective and fully unpatched jailbreaks, that allow the user to do anything they want.

An obvious proposal, if this is the plan, is to ask us to pick one particular behavior that Claude Opus should never, ever do, which is not vulnerable to a pure logical filter like a regular expression. Then let’s have a prediction market in how long it takes to break that, run a prize competition, and repeat a few times.

For assurance structures they mention the excellent idea of their Impossible Mission Force (they continue to call this the ‘Alignment Stress-Testing Team’) as a second line of defense, and ensuring strong executive support and widespread distribution of reports.

My summary would be that most of this is good on the margin, although I wish they had a superior ASL-3 plan to defense in depth using currently failing techniques that I do not expect to scale well. Hopefully good testing will mean that they realize that plan is bad once they try it, if it comes to that, or even better I hope to be wrong.

The main criticisms I discussed previously are mostly unchanged for now. There is much talk of working to pay down the definitional and preparatory debts that Anthropic admits that it owes, which is great to hear. I do not yet see payments. I also do not see any changes to address criticisms of the original policy.

And they need to get moving. ASL-3 by EOY is trading at 25%, and Anthropic’s own CISO says 50% within 9 months.

Jason Clinton: Hi, I’m the CISO [Chief Information Security Officer] from Anthropic. Thank you for the criticism, any feedback is a gift.

We have laid out in our RSP what we consider the next milestone of significant harms that we’re are testing for (what we call ASL-3): https://anthropic.com/responsible-scaling-policy (PDF); this includes bioweapons assessment and cybersecurity.

As someone thinking night and day about security, I think the next major area of concern is going to be offensive (and defensive!) exploitation. It seems to me that within 6-18 months, LLMs will be able to iteratively walk through most open source code and identify vulnerabilities. It will be computationally expensive, though: that level of reasoning requires a large amount of scratch space and attention heads. But it seems very likely, based on everything that I’m seeing. Maybe 85% odds.

There’s already the first sparks of this happening published publicly here: https://security.googleblog.com/2023/08/ai-powered-fuzzing-b… just using traditional LLM-augmented fuzzers. (They’ve since published an update on this work in December.) I know of a few other groups doing significant amounts of investment in this specific area, to try to run faster on the defensive side than any malign nation state might be.

Please check out the RSP, we are very explicit about what harms we consider ASL-3. Drug making and “stuff on the internet” is not at all in our threat model. ASL-3 seems somewhat likely within the next 6-9 months. Maybe 50% odds, by my guess.

There is quite a lot to do before ASL-3 is something that can be handled under the existing RSP. ASL-4 is not yet defined. ASL-3 protocols have not been identified let alone implemented. Even if the ASL-3 protocol is what they here sadly hint it is going to be, and is essentially ‘more cybersecurity and other defenses in depth and cross our fingers,’ You Are Not Ready.

Then there’s ASL-4, where if the plan is ‘the same thing only more of it’ I am terrified.

Overall, though, I want to emphasize positive reinforcement for keeping us informed.

Music and general training departments, not the Scarlett Johansson department.

Ed-Newton Rex: Sony Music today sent a letter to 700 AI companies demanding to know whether they’ve used their music for training.

  1. They say they have “reason to believe” they have

  2. They say doing so constitutes copyright infringement

  3. They say they’re open to discussing licensing, and they provide email addresses for this.

  4. They set a deadline of later this month for responses

Art Keller: Rarely does a corporate lawsuit warm my heart. This one does! Screw the IP-stealing AI companies to the wall, Sony! The AI business model is built on theft. It’s no coincidence Sam Altman asked UK legislators to exempt AI companies from copyright law.

The central demands here are explicit permission to use songs as training data, and a full explanation within a month of all ways Sony’s songs have been used.

Thread claiming many articles in support of generative AI in its struggle against copyright law and human creatives are written by lawyers and paid for by AI companies. Shocked, shocked, gambling in this establishment, all that jazz.

Noah Smith writes The death (again) of the Internet as we know it. He tells a story in five parts.

  1. The eternal September and death of the early internet.

  2. The enshittification (technical term) of social media platforms over time.

  3. The shift from curation-based feeds to algorithmic feeds.

  4. The rise of Chinese and Russian efforts to sow dissention polluting everything.

  5. The rise of AI slop supercharging the Internet being no fun anymore.

I am mostly with him on the first three, and even more strongly in favor of the need to curate one’s feeds. I do think algorithmic feeds could be positive with new AI capabilities, but only if you have and use tools that customize that experience, both generally and in the moment. The problem is that most people will never (or rarely) use those tools even if offered. Rarely are they even offered.

Where on Twitter are the ‘more of this’ and ‘less of this’ buttons, in any form, that aren’t public actions? Where is your ability to tell Grok what you want to see? Yep.

For the Chinese and Russian efforts, aside from TikTok’s algorithm I think this is greatly exaggerated. Noah says it is constantly in his feeds and replies but I almost never see it and when I do it is background noise that I block on sight.

For AI, the question continues to be what we can do in response, presumably a combination of trusted sources and whitelisting plus AI for detection and filtering. From what we have seen so far, I continue to be optimistic that technical solutions will be viable for some time, to the extent that the slop is actually undesired. The question is, will some combination of platforms and users implement the solutions?

Avital Balwit of Anthropic writes about what is potentially [Her] Last Five Years of Work. Her predictions are actually measured, saying that knowledge work in particular looks to be largely automated soon, but she expects physical work including childcare to take far longer. So this is not a short timelines model. It is a ‘AI could automate all knowledge work while the world still looks normal but with a lot more involuntary unemployment’ model.

That seems like a highly implausible world to me. If you can automate all knowledge work, you can presumably also automate figuring out how to automate the plumber. Whereas if you cannot do this, then there should be enough tasks out there and enough additional wealth to stimulate demand that those who still want gainful employment should be able to find it. I would expect the technological optimist perspective to carry the day within that zone.

Most of her post asks about the psychological impact of this future world. She asks good questions such as: What will happen to the unemployed in her scenario? How would people fill their time? Would unemployment be mostly fine for people’s mental health if it wasn’t connected to shame? Is too much ‘free time’ bad for people, and does this effect go away if the time is spent socially?

The proposed world has contradictions in it that make it hard for me to model what happens, but my basic answer is that the humans would find various physical work and and status games and social interactions (including ‘social’ work where you play various roles for others, and also raising a family) and experiential options and educational opportunities and so on to keep people engaged if they want that. There would however be a substantial number of people who by default fall into inactivity and despair, and we’d need to help with that quite a lot.

Mostly for fun I created a Manifold Market on whether she will work in 2030.

Ian Hogarth gives his one-year report as Chair of the UK AI Safety Institute. They now have a team of over 30 people and are conducting pre-deployment testing, and continue to have open rolls. This is their latest interim report. Their AI agent scaffolding puts them in third place (if you combine the MMAC entries) in the GAIA leaderboard for such things. Good stuff.

They are also offering fast grants for systemic AI safety. Expectation is 20 exploratory or proof-of-concept grants with follow-ups. Must be based in the UK.

Geoffrey Irving also makes a strong case that working at AISI would be an impactful thing to do in a positive direction, and links to the careers page.

Anthropic gives Claude tool use, via public beta in the API. It looks straightforward enough, you specify the available tools, Claude evaluates whether to use the tools available, and you can force it to if you want that. I don’t see any safeguards, so proceed accordingly.

Google Maps how has AI features, you can talk to it, or have it pull up reviews in street mode or take an immersive view of a location or search a location’s photos or the photos of the entire area around you for an item.

In my earlier experiments, Google Maps integration into Gemini was a promising feature that worked great when it worked, but it was extremely error prone and frustrating to use, to the point I gave up. Presumably this will improve over time.

OpenAI partners with Reddit. Reddit posts, including recent ones, will become available to ChatGPT and other products. Presumably this will mean ChatGPT will be allowed to quote Reddit posts? In exchange, OpenAI will buy advertising and offer Reddit.com various AI website features.

For OpenAI, as long as the price was reasonable this seems like a big win.

It looks like a good deal for Reddit based on the market’s reaction. I would presume the key risks to Reddit are whether the user base responds in hostile fashion, and potentially having sold out cheap.

Or they may be missing an opportunity to do something even better. Yishan provides a vision of the future in this thread.

Yishan:

Essentially, the AI acts as a polite listener to all the high-quality content contributions, and “buffers” those users from any consumers who don’ t have anything to contribute back of equivalent quality.

It doesn’t have to be an explicit product wall. A consumer drops in and also happens to have a brilliant contribution or high-quality comment naturally makes it through the moderation mechanisms and becomes part of the community.

The AI provides a great UX for consuming the content. It will listen to you say “that’s awesome bro!” or receive your ungrateful, ignorant nitpicking complaints with infinite patience so the real creator doesn’t have to expend the emotional energy on useless aggravation.

The real creators of the high-quality content can converse happily with other creators who appreciate their work and understand how to criticize/debate it usefully, and they can be compensated (if the platform does that) via the AI training deals.

In summary: User Generated Content platforms should do two things:

  1. Immediately implement draconian moderation focused entirely on quality.

  2. Sign deals with large AI firms to license their content in return for money.

OpenAI has also signed a deal with Newscorp for access to their content, which gives them the Wall Street Journal and many others.

A source tells me that OpenAI informed its employees that they will indeed update their documents regarding employee exit and vested equity. The message says no vested equity has ever actually been confiscated for failure to sign documents and it never will be.

On Monday I set up this post:

Like this post to indicate:

  1. That you are not subject to a non-disparagement clause with respect to OpenAI or any other AI company.

  2. That you are not under an NDA with an AI company that would be violated if you revealed that the NDA exists.

At 168 likes, we now have one employee from DeepMind, and one from Anthropic.

Jimmy Apples claimed without citing any evidence that Meta will not open source (release the weights, really) of Llama-3 405B, attributing this to a mix of SB 1047 and Dustin Moskovitz. I was unable to locate an independent source or a further explanation. He and someone reacting to him asked Yann LeCunn point blank, Yann replied with ‘Patience my blue friend. It’s still being tuned.’ For now, the Manifold market I found is not reacting continues to trade at 86% for release, so I am going to assume this was another disingenuous inception attempt to attack SB 1047 and EA.

ASML and TSMC have a kill switch for their chip manufacturing machines, for use if China invades Taiwan. Very good to hear, I’ve raised this concern privately. I would in theory love to also have ‘put the factory on a ship in an emergency and move it’ technology, but that is asking a lot. It is also very good that China knows this switch exists. It also raises the possibility of a remote kill switch for the AI chips themselves.

Did you know Nvidia beat earnings again yesterday? I notice that we are about three earnings days into ‘I assume Nvidia is going to beat earnings but I am sufficiently invested already due to appreciation so no reason to do anything more about it.’ They produce otherwise mind boggling numbers and I am Jack’s utter lack of surprise. They are slated to open above 1,000 and are doing a 10:1 forward stock split on June 7.

Toby Ord goes into questions about the Turing Test paper from last week, emphasizing that by the original definition this was impressive progress but still a failure, as humans were judged human substantially more often than all AIs. He encourages AI companies to include the original Turing Test in their model testing, which seems like a good idea.

OpenAI has a super cool old-fashioned library. Cade Metz here tries to suggest what each book selection from OpenAI’s staff might mean, saying more about how he thinks than about OpenAI. I took away that they have a cool library with a wide variety of cool and awesome books.

JP Morgan says every new hire will get training in prompt engineering.

Scale.ai raises $1 billion at a $13.8 billion valuation in a ‘Series F.’ I did not know you did a Series F and if I got that far I would skip to a G, but hey.

Suno.ai Raises $125 million for music generation.

New dataset from Epoch AI attempting to hart every model trained with over 10^23 flops (direct). Missing Claude Opus, presumably because we don’t know the number.

Not necessarily the news department: OpenAI publishes a ten-point safety update. The biggest update is that none of this has anything to do with superalignment, or with the safety or alignment of future models. This is all current mundane safety, plus a promise to abide by the preparedness framework requirements. There is a lot of patting themselves on the back for how safe everything is, and no new initiatives, although this was never intended to be that sort of document.

Then finally there’s this:

  1. Safety decision making and Board oversight: As part of our Preparedness Framework, we have an operational structure for safety decision-making. Our cross-functional Safety Advisory Group reviews model capability reports and makes recommendations ahead of deployment. Company leadership makes the final decisions, with the Board of Directors exercising oversight over those decisions. 

Hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha.

That does not mean that mundane safety concerns are a small thing.

Why let the AI out of the box when you can put the entire box into the AI?

Windows Latest: Microsoft announces “Recall” AI for Windows 11, a new feature that runs in the background and records everything you see and do on your PC.

[Here is a one minute video explanation.]

Seth Burn: If we had laws about such things, this might have violated them.

Aaron: This is truly shocking, and will be preemptively banned at all government agencies as it almost certainly violates STIG / FIPS on every conceivable surface.

Seth Burn: If we had laws, that would sound bad.

Elon Musk: This is a Black Mirror episode.

Definitely turning this “feature” off.

Vitalik Buterin: Does the data stay and get processed on-device or is it being shipped to a central server? If the latter, then this crosses a line.

[Satya says it is all being done locally.]

Abinishek Mishra (Windows Latest): Recall allows you to search through your past actions by recording your screen and using that data to help you remember things.

Recall is able to see what you do on your PC, what apps you use, how you use the apps, and what you do inside the apps, including your conversations in apps like WhatsApp. Recall records everything, and saves the snapshots in the local storage.

Windows Latest understands that you can manually delete the “snapshots”, and filter the AI from recording certain apps.

So, what are the use cases of Recall? Microsoft describes Recall as a way to go back in time and learn more about the activity.

For example, if you want to refer to a conversation with your colleague and learn more about your meeting, you can ask Recall to look into all the conversations with that specific person. The recall will look for the particular conversation in all apps, tabs, settings, etc.

With Recall, locating files in a large download pileup or revisiting your browser history is easy. You can give commands to Recall in natural language, eliminating the need to type precise commands.

You can converse with it like you do with another person in real life.

TorNis Entertainment: Isn’t this is just a keylogger + screen recorder with extra steps? I don’t know why you guys are worried. Isn’t this is just a keylogger + screen recorder with extra steps?

I don’t know why you guys are worried 😓

Thaddeus:

[Microsoft: we got hacked by China and Russia because of our lax security posture and bad software, but we are making security a priority.

Also Microsoft: Windows will now constantly record your screen, including sensitive data and passwords, and just leave it lying around.]

Kevin Beaumont: From Microsoft’s own FAQ: “Note that Recall does not perform content moderation. It will not hide information such as passwords or financial account numbers.”

Microsoft also announced live caption translations, auto super resolution upscaling on apps (yes with a toggle for each app, wait those are programs, wtf), AI in paint and automatic blurring (do not want).

This is all part of the new ‘Copilot+’ offering for select new PCs, including their new Microsoft Surface machines. You will need a Snapdragon X Elite and X Plus, 40 TOPs, 225 GB of storage and 16 GB RAM. Intel and AMD chips can’t cut it (yet) but they are working on that.

(Consumer feedback report: I have a Microsoft Surface from a few years ago, it was not worth the price and the charger is so finicky it makes me want to throw things. Would not buy again.)

I would hope this would at least be opt-in. Kevin Beaumont reports it will be opt-out, citing this web page from Microsoft. It appears to be enabled by default on Copilot+ computers. My lord.

At minimum, even if you do turn it off, it does not seem that hard to turn back on:

Kevin Beaumont: Here’s the Recall UI. You can silently turn it on with Powershell, if you’re a threat actor.

I would also not trust a Windows update to not silently turn it back on.

The UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) is looking into this, because yeah.

In case it was not obvious, you should either:

  1. Opt in for the mundane utility, and embrace that your computer has recorded everything you have ever done and that anyone with access to your system or your files, potentially including a crook, Microsoft, the NSA or FBI, China or your spouse now fully owns you, and also that an AI knows literal everything you do. Rely on a combination of security through obscurity, defense in depth and luck. To the extent you can, keep activities and info you would not want exposed this way off of your PC, or ensure they are never typed or displayed onscreen using your best Randy Waterhouse impression.

  2. Actually for real accept that the computer in question is presumed compromised, use it only for activities where you don’t mind, never enter any passwords there, and presumably have a second computer for activities that need to be secure, or perhaps confine them to a phone or tablet.

  3. Opt out and ensure that for the love of God your machine cannot use this feature.

I am not here to tell you which of those is the play.

I only claim that it seems that soon you must choose.

If the feature is useful, a large number of people are going to choose option one.

I presume almost no one will pick option two, except perhaps for gaming PCs.

Option three is viable.

If there is one thing we have learned during the rise of AI, and indeed during the rise of computers and the internet, it is that almost all people will sign away their privacy and technological vulnerability for a little mundane utility, such as easier access to cute pictures of cats.

Yelling at them that they are being complete idiots is a known ineffective response.

And who is to say they even are being idiots? Security through obscurity is, for many people, a viable strategy up to a point.

Also, I predict your phone is going to do a version of this for you by default within a few years, once the compute and other resources are available for it. I created a market on how quickly. Microsoft is going out on far less of a limb than it might look like.

In any case, how much mundane utility is available?

Quite a bit. You would essentially be able to remember everything, ask the AI about everything, have it take care of increasingly complex tasks with full context, and this will improve steadily over time, and it will customize to what you care about.

If you ignore all the obvious horrendous downsides of giving an AI this level of access to your computer, and the AI behind it is good, this is very clearly The Way.

There are of course some people who will not do this.

How long before they are under increasing pressure to do it? How long until it becomes highly suspicious, as if they have something to hide? How long until it becomes a legal requirement, at best in certain industries like finance? 

Ben Thompson, on the other hand, was impressed, calling the announcement event ‘the physical manifestation of CEO Satya Nadella’s greatest triumph’ and ‘one of the most compelling events I’ve attended in a long time.’ Ben did not mention the privacy and security issues.

Ethan Mollick perspective on model improvements and potential AGI. He warns that AIs are more like aliens that get good at tasks one by one, and when they are good they by default get very good at that task quickly, but they are good at different things than we are, and over time that list expands. I wonder to what extent this is real versus the extent this is inevitable when using human performance as a benchmark while capabilities steadily improve, so long as machines have comparative advantages and disadvantages. If the trends continue, then it sure seems like the set of things they are better at trends towards everything.

Arthur Breitman suggests Apple isn’t developing LLMs because there is enough competition that they are not worried about vender lock-in, and distribution matters more. Why produce an internal sub-par product? This might be wise.

Microsoft CTO Kevin Scott claims ‘we are nowhere near the point of diminishing marginal returns on how powerful we can make AI models as we increase the scale of compute.’

Gary Marcus offered to Kevin Scott him $100k on that.

This was a truly weird speech on future challenges of AI by Randall Kroszner, external member of the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England. He talks about misalignment and interpretability, somehow. Kind of. He cites the Goldman Sacks estimate of 1.5% labor productivity and 7% GDP growth over 10 years following widespread AI adaptation, that somehow people say with a straight face, then the flip side is McKinsey saying 0.6% annual labor productivity growth by 2040, which is also not something I could say with a straight face. And he talks about disruptions and innovation aids and productivity estimation J-curves. It all sounds so… normal? Except with a bunch of things spiking through. I kept having to stop to just say to myself ‘my lord that is so weird.’

Politico is at it again. Once again, the framing is a background assumption that any safety concerns or fears in Washington are fake, and the coming regulatory war is a combination of two fights over Lenin’s question of who benefits.

  1. A fight between ‘Big Tech’ and ‘Silicon Valley’ over who gets regulatory capture and thus Washington’s regulatory help against the other side.

  2. An alliance of ‘Big Tech’ and ‘Silicon Valley’ against Washington to head off any regulations that would interfere with both of them.

That’s it. Those are the issues and stakes in play. Nothing else.

How dismissive is this of safety? Here are the two times ‘safety’ is mentioned:

Matthew Kaminski (Politico): On Capitol Hill and in the White House, that alone breeds growing suspicion and defensiveness. Altman and others, including from another prominent AI startup Anthropic, weighed in with ideas for the Biden administration’s sweeping executive order last fall on AI safety and development.

Testing standards for AI are easy things to find agreement on. Safety as well, as long as those rules don’t favor one or another budding AI player. No one wants the technology to help rogue states or groups. Silicon Valley is on America’s side against China and even more concerned about the long regulatory arm of the EU than Washington.

Testing standards are ‘easy things to find agreement on’? Fact check: Lol, lmao.

That’s it. The word ‘risk’ appears twice and neither has anything to do with safety. Other words like ‘capability,’ ‘existential’ or any form of ‘catastrophic’ do not appear. It is all treated as obviously irrelevant.

The progress is here they stopped trying to bulk up people worried about safety as boogeymen (perhaps because this is written by Matthew Kaminski, not Brendon Bordelon), and instead point to actual corporations that are indeed pursuing actual profits, with Silicon Valley taking on Big Tech. And I very much appreciate that ‘open source advocates’ has now been properly identified as Silicon Valley pursuing its business interests.

Rohit Chopra (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau): There is a winner take all dimension. We struggle to see how it doesn’t turn, absent some government intervention, into a market structure where the foundational AI models are not dominated by a handful of the big tech companies.

Matthew Kaminski: Saying “star struck” policymakers across Washington have to get over their “eyelash batting awe” over new tech, Chopra predicts “another chapter in which big tech companies are going to face some real scrutiny” in the near future, especially on antitrust.

Lina Khan, the FTC’s head who has used the antitrust cudgel against big tech liberally, has sounded the warnings. “There is no AI exemption to the laws on the books,” she said last September.

For self-interested reasons, venture capitalists want to open up the space in Silicon Valley for new entrants that they can invest in and profitably exit from. Their arguments for a more open market will resonate politically.

Notice the escalation. This is not ‘Big Tech wants regulatory capture to actively enshrine its advantages, and safety is a Big Tech plot.’ This is ‘Silicon Valley wants to actively use regulatory action to prevent Big Tech from winning,’ with warnings that attempts to not have a proper arms race to ever more capable systems will cause intervention from regulators. By ‘more open market’ they mean ‘government intervention in the market,’ government’s favorite kind of new freer market.

As I have said previously, we desperately need to ensure that there are targeted antitrust exemptions available so that when AI labs can legally collaborate around safety issues they are not accused of collusion. It would be completely insane to not do this.

And as I keep saying, open source advocates are not asking for a level playing field or a lack of government oppression. They are asking for special treatment, to be exempt from the rules of society and the consequences of their actions, and also for the government to directly cripple their opponents for them.

Are they against regulatory capture? Only if they don’t get to do the capturing.

Then there is the second track, the question of guardrails that might spoil the ‘libertarian sandbox,’ which neither ‘side’ of tech wants here.

Here is the two mentions of ‘risk’:

“There is a risk that people think of this as social media 2.0 because its first public manifestation was a chat bot,” Kent Walker, Google’s president of global affairs, tells me over a conversation at the search giant’s offices here.

People out on the West Coast quietly fume about having to grapple with Washington. The tech crowd says the only fight that matters is the AI race against China and each other. But they are handling politics with care, all too aware of the risks.

I once again have been roped into extensively covering a Politico article, because it is genuinely a different form of inception than the previous Politico inception attempts. But let us continue to update that Politico is extraordinarily disingenuous and hostilely motivated on the subject of AI regulation. This is de facto enemy action.

Here, Shakeel points out the obvious central point being made here, which is that most of the money and power in this fight is Big Tech companies fighting not only to avoid any regulations at all, but to get exemptions from other ordinary rules of society. When ethics advocates portray notkilleveryoneism (or safety) advocates as their opponents, that is their refusal to work together towards common goals and also it misses the point. Similarly, here Seán Ó hÉigeartaigh expresses concern about divide-and-conquer tactics targeting these two groups despite frequently overlapping and usually at least complementary proposals and goals.

Or perhaps the idea is to illustrate that all the major players in Tech are aligned in being motivated by profit and in dismissing all safety concerns as fake? And a warning that Washington is in danger of being convinced? I would love that to be true. I do not think a place like Politico works that subtle these days, nor do I expect those who need to hear that message to figure out that it is there.

If we care about beating China, by far the most valuable thing we can do is allow more high-skilled immigration. Many of their best and brightest want to become Americans.

This is true across the board, for all aspects of our great power competition.

It also applies to AI.

From his thread about the Schumer report:

Peter Wildeford: Lastly, while immigration is a politically fraught subject, it is immensely stupid for the US to not do more to retain top talent. So it’s awesome to see the roadmap call for more high-skill immigration, in a bipartisan way.

The immigration element is important for keeping the US ahead in AI. While the US only produces 20% of top AI talent natively, more than half of that talent lives and works in the US due to immigration. That number could be even higher with important reform.

I suspect the numbers are even more lopsided than this graph suggests.

To what extent is being in America a key element of being a top-tier AI researcher? How many of these same people would have been great if they had stayed at home? If they had stayed at home, would others have taken their place here in America? We do not know. I do know it is essentially impossible that this extent is so large we would not want to bring such people here.

Do we need to worry about those immigrants being a security risk, if they come from certain nations like China and we were to put them into OpenAI, Anthropic or DeepMind? Yes, that does seem like a problem. But there are plenty of other places they could go, where it is much less of a problem.

Labour vows to force firms developing powerful AI to meet requirements.

Nina Lloyd (The Independent): Labour has said it would urgently introduce binding requirements for companies developing powerful artificial intelligence (AI) after Rishi Sunak said he would not “rush” to regulate the technology.

The party has promised to force firms to report before they train models over a certain capability threshold and to carry out safety tests strengthened by independent oversight if it wins the next general election.

Unless something very unexpected happens, they will win the next election, which is currently scheduled for July 4.

This is indeed the a16z dilemma:

John Luttig: A16z simultaneously argues

  1. The US must prevent China from dominating AI.

  2. Open source models should proliferate freely across borders (to China).

What does this mean? Who knows. I’m just glad at Founders Fund we don’t have to promote every current thing at once.

The California Senate has passed SB 1047, by a vote of 32-1.

An attempt to find an estimate of the costs of compliance with SB 1047. The attempt appears to fail, despite some good discussions.

This seems worth noting given the OpenAI situation last week:

Dan Hendrycks: For what it’s worth, when Scott Weiner and others were receiving feedback from all the major AI companies (Meta, OpenAI, etc.) on the SB 1047 bill, Sam [Altman] was explicitly supportive of whistleblower protections.

Scott Wiener Twitter thread and full open letter on SB 1047.

Scott Wiener: If you only read one thing in this letter, please make it this: I am eager to work together with you to make this bill as good as it can be.

There are over three more months for discussion, deliberation, feedback, and amendments.

You can also reach out to my staff anytime, and we are planning to hold a town hall for the AI community in the coming weeks to create more opportunities for in-person discussion.

Bottom line [changed to numbered list including some other section headings]:

  1. SB 1047 doesn’t ban training or deployment of any models.

  2. It doesn’t require licensing or permission to train or deploy any models.

  3. It doesn’t threaten prison (yes, some are making this baseless claim) for anyone based on the training or deployment of any models.

  4. It doesn’t allow private lawsuits against developers.

  5. It doesn’t ban potentially hazardous capabilities.

  6. And it’s not being “fast tracked,” but rather is proceeding according to the usual deliberative legislative process, with ample opportunity for feedback and amendments remaining.

  7. SB 1047 doesn’t apply to the vast majority of startups.

  8. The bill applies only to concrete and specific risks of catastrophic harm.

  9. Shutdown requirements don’t apply once models leave your control.

  10. SB 1047 provides significantly more clarity on liability than current law.

  11. Enforcement is very narrow in SB 1047. Only the AG can file a lawsuit.

  12. Open source is largely protected under the bill.

What SB 1047 *doesrequire is that developers who are training and deploying a frontier model more capable than any model currently released must engage in safety testing informed by academia, industry best practices, and the existing state of the art. If that testing shows material risk of concrete and specific catastrophic threats to public safety and security — truly huge threats — the developer must take reasonable steps to mitigate (not eliminate) the risk of catastrophic harm. The bill also creates basic standards like the ability to disable a frontier AI model while it remains in the developer’s possession (not after it is open sourced, at which point the requirement no longer applies), pricing transparency for cloud compute, and a “know your customer” requirement for cloud services selling massive amounts of compute capacity.

Our intention is that safety and mitigation requirements be borne by highly-resourced developers of frontier models, not by startups & academic researchers. We’ve heard concerns that this isn’t clear, so we’re actively considering changes to clarify who is covered.

After meeting with a range of experts, especially in the open source community, we’re also considering other changes to the definitions of covered models and derivative models. We’ll continue making changes over the next 3 months as the bill proceeds through the Legislature.

This very explicitly clarifies the intent of the bill across multiple misconceptions and objections, all in line with my previous understanding.

They actively continue to solicit feedback and are considering changes.

If you are concerned about the impact of this bill, and feel it is badly designed or has flaws, the best thing you can do is offer specific critiques and proposed changes.

I strongly agree with Weiner that this bill is light touch relative to alternative options. I see Pareto improvements we could make, but I do not see any fundamentally different lighter touch proposals that accomplish what this bill sets out to do.

I will sometimes say of a safety bill, sometimes in detail: It’s a good bill, sir.

Other times, I will say: It’s a potentially good bill, sir, if they fix this issue.

That is where I am at with SB 1047. Most of the bill seems very good, an attempt to act with as light a touch as possible. There are still a few issues with it. The derivative model definition as it currently exists is the potential showstopper bug.

To summarize the issue once more: As written, if interpreted literally and as I understand it, it allows developers to define themselves as derivative of an existing model. This, again if interpreted literally, lets them evade all responsibilities, and move those onto essentially any covered open model of the same size. That means both that any unsafe actor goes unrestricted (whether they be open or closed), and releasing the weights of a covered model creates liability no matter how responsible you were, since they can effectively start the training over from scratch.

Scott Weiner says he is working on a fix. I believe the correct fix is a compute threshold for additional training, over which a model is no longer derivative, and the responsibilities under SB 1047 would then pass to the new developer or fine-tuner. Some open model advocates demand that responsibility for derivative models be removed entirely, but that would transparently defeat the purpose of preventing catastrophic harm. Who cares if your model is safe untuned, if you can fine-tune it to be unsafe in an hour with $100?

Then at other times, I will look at a safety or other regulatory bill or proposal, and say…

So it seems only fair to highlight some not good ideas, and say: Not a good idea.

One toy example would be the periodic complaints about Section 230. Here is a thread on the latest such hearing this week, pointing out what would happen without it, and the absurdity of the accusations being thrown around. Some witnesses are saying 230 is not needed to guard platforms against litigation, whereas it was created because people were suing platforms.

Adam Thierer reports there are witnesses saying the Like and Thumbs Up buttons are dangerous and should be regulated.

Brad Polumbo here claims that GLAAD says Big Tech companies ‘should cease the practice of targeted surveillance advertising, including the use of algorithmic content recommendation.’

From April 23, Adam Thierer talks about proposals to mandate ‘algorithmic audits and impact assessments,’ which he calls ‘NEPA for AI.’ Here we have Assembly Bill 2930, requiring impact assessments by developers, and charge $25,000 per instance of ‘algorithmic discrimination.’

Another example would be Colorado passing SB24-205, Consumer Protections for Artificial Intelligence, which is concerned with algorithmic bias. Governor Jared Polis signed with reservations. Dean Ball has a critique here, highlighting ambiguity in the writing, but noting they have two full years to fix that before it goes into effect.

I would be less concerned with the ambiguity, and more concerned about much of the actual intent and the various proactive requirements. I could make a strong case that some of the stuff here is kind of insane, and also seems like a generic GPDR-style ‘you have to notify everyone that AI was involved in every meaningful decision ever.’ The requirements apply regardless of size, and worry about impacts that are the kind of thing society can mitigate as we go.

The good news is that there are also some good provisions like IDing AIs, and also full enforcement of the bad parts seems impossible? I am very frustrated that a bill that isn’t trying to address catastrophic risks, but seems far harder to comply with, and seems far worse to me than SB 1047, seems to mostly get a pass. Then again, it’s only Colorado.

I do worry about Gell-Mann amnesia. I have seen so many hyperbolic statements, and outright false statements, about AI bills, often from the same people that point out what seem like obviously horrible other proposed regulatory bills and policies. How can one trust their statements about the other bills, short of reading the actual bills (RTFB)? If it turned out they were wrong, and this time the bill was actually reasonable, who would point this out?

So far, when I have dug deeper, the bills do indeed almost always turn out to be terrible, but the ‘rumors of the death of the internet’ or similar potential consequences are often greatly exaggerated. The bills are indeed reliably terrible, but not as terrible as claimed. Alas, I must repeat my lament that I know of no RTFB person I can turn to on other topics, and my cup doth overflow.

I return to the Cognitive Revolution to discuss various events of the past week first in part one, then this is part two. Recorded on Friday, things have changed by the time you read this.

From last week’s backlog: Dwarkesh Patel as guest on 80k After Hours. Not full of gold on the level of Dwarkesh interviewing others, and only partly about AI. There is definitely gold in those hills for those who want to go into these EA-related weeds. If you don’t want that then skip this one.

Around 51: 45 Dwarkesh notes there is no ‘Matt Levine for AI’ and that picking up that mantle would be a good thing to do. I suppose I still have my work cut out.

A lot of talk about EA and 80k Hours ways of thinking about how to choose paths in life, that I think illustrates well both the ways it is good (actively making choices rather than sleepwalking, having priorities) and not as good (heavily favoring the legible).

Some key factors in giving career advice they point out are that from a global perspective power laws apply and the biggest impacts are a huge share of what matters, and that much advice (such as ‘don’t start a company in college’) is only good advice because the people to whom it is horribly bad advice will predictably ignore it.

Why does this section exist? This is a remarkably large fraction of why.

Emmett Shear: The number one rule of building things that can destroy the entire world is don’t do that.

Surprisingly it is also rule 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Rule seven, however, is “make it emanate ominous humming and glow with a pulsing darkness”.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: Emmett.

Emmett Shear (later): Shocking amount of pushback on “don’t build stuff that can destroy the world”. I’d like to take this chance to say I stand by my apparently controversial opinion that building things to destroy the world is bad. In related news, murder is wrong and bad.

Follow me for more bold, controversial, daring takes like these.

Emmett Shear (other thread): Today has been a day to experiment with how obviously true I can make a statement before people stop disagreeing with it.

This is a Platonic encapsulation of this class of argument:

Emmett Shear: That which can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.

Ryan Shea: Good point, but not sure he realizes this applies to AI doomer prophecy.

Emmett Shear: Not sure you realize this applies to Pollyanna assertions that don’t worry, a fully self-improving AI will be harmless. There’s a lot of evidence autocatalytic loops are potentially dangerous.

Ryan Shea: The original post is a good one. And I’m not making a claim that there’s no reason at all to worry. Just that there isn’t a particular reason to do so.

Emmett Shear: Forgive me if your “there’s not NO reason to worry, but let’s just go ahead with something potentially massively dangerous” argument doesn’t hold much reassurance for me.

[it continues from there, but gets less interesting and stops being Platonic.]

The latest reiteration of why p(doom) is useful even if highly imprecise, and why probabilities and probability ranges are super useful in general for communicating your actual epistemic state. In particular, that when Jan Leike puts his at ‘10%-90%’ this is a highly meaningful and useful statement of what assessments he considers reasonable given the evidence, providing much more information than saying ‘I don’t know.’ It is also more information than ‘50%.’

For the record: This, unrelated to AI, is the proper use of the word ‘doomer.

The usual suspects, including Bengio, Hinton, Yao and 22 others, write the usual arguments in the hopes of finally getting it right, this time as Managing Extreme AI Risks Amid Rapid Progress in Science.

I rarely see statements like this, so it was noteworthy that someone noticed.

Mike Solana: Frankly, I was ambivalent on the open sourced AI debate until yesterday, at which point the open sourced side’s reflexive, emotional dunking and identity-based platitudes convinced me — that almost nobody knows what they think, or why.

It is even more difficult when you don’t know what ‘alignment’ means.

Which, periodic reminder, you don’t.

Rohit: We use AI alignment to mean:

  1. Models do what we ask.

  2. Models don’t do bad things even if we ask.

  3. Models don’t fail catastrophically.

  4. Models don’t actively deceive us.

And all those are different problems. Using the same term creates confusion.

Here we have one attempt to choose a definition, and cases for and against it:

Iason Gabriel: The new international scientific report on AI safety is impressive work, but it’s problematic to define AI alignment as:

“the challenge of making general-purpose AI systems act in accordance with the developer’s goals and interests”

Eliezer Yudkowsky: I defend this. We need separate words for the technical challenges of making AGIs and separately ASIs do any specified thing whatsoever, “alignment”, and the (moot if alignment fails) social challenge of making that developer target be “beneficial”.

Good advice given everything we know these days:

Mesaoptimizer: If your endgame strategy involved relying on OpenAI, DeepMind, or Anthropic to implement your alignment solution that solves science / super-cooperation / nanotechnology, consider figuring out another endgame plan.

That does not express a strong opinion on whether we currently know of a better plan.

And it is exceedingly difficult when you do not attempt to solve the problem.

Dean Ball says here, in the most thoughtful version I have seen of this position by far, that the dissolution of the Superalignment team was good because distinct safety teams create oppositionalism, become myopic about box checking and employee policing rather than converging on the spirit of actual safety. Much better to diffuse the safety efforts throughout the various teams. Ball does note that this does not apply to the extent the team was doing basic research.

There are three reasons this viewpoint seems highly implausible to me.

  1. The Superalignment team was indeed tasked with basic research. Solving the problem is going to require quite a lot of basic research, or at least work that is not incremental progress on current incremental commercial products. This is not about ensuring that each marginal rocket does not blow up, or the plant does not melt down this month. It is a different kind of problem, preparing for a very different kind of failure mode. It does not make sense to embed these people into product teams.

  2. This is not a reallocation of resources from a safety team to diffused safety work. This is a reallocation of resources, many of which were promised and never delivered, away from safety towards capabilities, as Dean himself notes. This is in addition to losing the two most senior safety researchers and a lot of others too.

  3. Mundane safety, making current models do what you want in ways that as Leike notes will not scale to when they matter most, does not count as safety towards the goals of the superalignment team or of us all not dying. No points.

Thus the biggest disagreement here, in my view, which is when he says this:

Dean Ball: Companies like Anthropic, OpenAI, and DeepMind have all made meaningful progress on the technical part of this problem, but this is bigger than a technical problem. Ultimately, the deeper problem is contending with a decentralized world, in which everyone wants something different and has a different idea for how to achieve their goals.

The good news is that this is basically politics, and we have been doing it for a long time. The bad news is that this is basically politics, and we have been doing it for a long time. We have no definitive answers.

Yes, it is bigger than a technical problem, and that is important.

OpenAI has not made ‘meaningful progress.’ Certainly we are not on track to solve such problems, and we should not presume they will essentially solve themselves with an ordinary effort, as is implied here.

Indeed, with that attitude, it’s Margaritaville (as in, we might as well start drinking Margaritas.) Whereas with the attitude of Leike and Sutskever, I disagreed with their approach, but I could have been wrong or they could have course corrected, if they had been given the resources to try.

Nor is the second phase problem that we also must solve well-described by ‘basically politics’ of a type we are used to, because there will be entities involved that are not human. Our classical liberal political solutions work better than known alternatives, and well enough for humans to flourish, by assuming various properties of humans and the affordances available to them. AIs with far greater intelligence, capabilities and efficiency, that can be freely copied, and so on, would break those assumptions.

I do greatly appreciate the self-awareness and honesty in this section:

Dean Ball: More specifically, I believe that classical liberalism—individualism wedded with pluralism via the rule of law—is the best starting point, because it has shown the most success in balancing the priorities of the individual and the collective. But of course I do. Those were my politics to begin with.

It is notable how many AI safety advocates, when discussing almost any topic except transformational AI, are also classical liberals. If this confuses you, notice that.

Not under the current paradigm, but worth noticing.

Also, yes, it really is this easy.

And yet, somehow it is still this hard? (I was not able to replicate this one, may be fake)

It’s a fun game.

Sometimes you stick the pieces together and know where it comes from.

A problem statement:

Jorbs: We have gone from

“there is no point in arguing with that person, their mind is already made up”

to

“there is no point in arguing with that person, they are made up.”

It’s coming.

Alex Press: The Future of Artificial Intelligence at Wendy’s.

Colin Fraser: Me at the Wendy’s drive thru in June: A farmer and a goat stand on the side of a riverbank with a boat for two.

[FreshAI replies]: Sir, this is a Wendy’s.

Are you ready?

AI #65: I Spy With My AI Read More »

ai-#62:-too-soon-to-tell

AI #62: Too Soon to Tell

What is the mysterious impressive new ‘gpt2-chatbot’ from the Arena? Is it GPT-4.5? A refinement of GPT-4? A variation on GPT-2 somehow? A new architecture? Q-star? Someone else’s model? Could be anything. It is so weird that this is how someone chose to present that model.

There was also a lot of additional talk this week about California’s proposed SB 1047.

I wrote an additional post extensively breaking that bill down, explaining how it would work in practice, addressing misconceptions about it and suggesting fixes for its biggest problems along with other improvements. For those interested, I recommend reading at least the sections ‘What Do I Think The Law Would Actually Do?’ and ‘What are the Biggest Misconceptions?’

As usual, lots of other things happened as well.

  1. Introduction.

  2. Table of Contents.

  3. Language Models Offer Mundane Utility. Do your paperwork for you. Sweet.

  4. Language Models Don’t Offer Mundane Utility. Because it is not yet good at it.

  5. GPT-2 Soon to Tell. What is this mysterious new model?

  6. Fun With Image Generation. Certified made by humans.

  7. Deepfaketown and Botpocalypse Soon. A located picture is a real picture.

  8. They Took Our Jobs. Because we wouldn’t let other humans take them first?

  9. Get Involved. It’s protest time. Against AI that is.

  10. In Other AI News. Incremental upgrades, benchmark concerns.

  11. Quiet Speculations. Misconceptions cause warnings of AI winter.

  12. The Quest for Sane Regulation. Big tech lobbies to avoid regulations, who knew?

  13. The Week in Audio. Lots of Sam Altman, plus some others.

  14. Rhetorical Innovation. The few people who weren’t focused on SB 1047.

  15. Open Weights Are Unsafe And Nothing Can Fix This. Tech for this got cheaper.

  16. Aligning a Smarter Than Human Intelligence is Difficult. Dot by dot thinking.

  17. The Lighter Side. There must be some mistake.

Write automatic police reports based on body camera footage. It seems it only uses the audio? Not using the video seems to be giving up a lot of information. Even so, law enforcement seems impressed, one notes an 82% reduction in time writing reports, even with proofreading requirements.

Axon says it did a double-blind study to compare its AI reports with ones from regular offers.

And it says that Draft One results were “equal to or better than” regular police reports.

As with self-driving cars, that is not obviously sufficient.

Eliminate 2.2 million unnecessary words in the Ohio administrative code, out of a total of 17.4 million. The AI identified candidate language, which humans reviewed. Sounds great, but let’s make sure we keep that human in the loop.

Diagnose your medical condition? Link has a one-minute video of a doctor asking questions and correctly diagnosing a patient.

Ate-a-Pi: This is why AI will replace doctor.

Sherjil Ozair: diagnosis any%.

Akhil Bagaria: This it the entire premise of the TV show house.

The first AI attempt listed only does ‘the easy part’ of putting all the final information together. Kiaran Ritchie then shows that yes, ChatGPT can figure out what questions to ask, solving the problem with eight requests over two steps, followed by a solution.

There are still steps where the AI is getting extra information, but they do not seem like the ‘hard steps’ to me.

Is Sam Altman subtweeting me?

Sam Altman: Learning how to say something in 30 seconds that takes most people 5 minutes is a big unlock.

(and imo a surprisingly learnable skill.

If you struggle with this, consider asking a friend who is good at it to listen to you say something and then rephrase it back to you as concisely as they can a few dozen times.

I have seen this work really well!)

Interesting DM: “For what it’s worth this is basically how LLMs work.”

Brevity is also how LLMs often do not work. Ask a simple question, get a wall of text. Get all the ‘this is a complex issue’ caveats Churchill warned us to avoid.

Handhold clients while they gather necessary information for compliance and as needed for these forms. Not ready yet, but clearly a strong future AI use case. Patrick McKenzie also suggests “FBAR compliance in a box.” Thread has many other suggestions for AI products people might pay for.

A 20-foot autonomous robotank with glowing green eyes that rolls through rough terrain like it’s asphalt, from DARPA. Mostly normal self-driving, presumably, but seemed worth mentioning.

Seek the utility directly, you shall.

Ethan Mollick: At least in the sample of firms I talk to, seeing a surprising amount of organizations deciding to skip (or at least not commit exclusively to) customized LLM solutions & instead just get a bunch of people in the company ChatGPT Enterprise and have them experiment & build GPTs.

Loss Landscape: From what I have seen, there is strong reluctance from employees to reveal that LLMs have boosted productivity and/or automated certain tasks.

I actually see this as a pretty large impediment to a bottom-up AI strategy at organizations.

Mash Tin Timmy: This is basically the trend now, I think for a few reasons:

– Enterprise tooling / compliance still being worked out

– There isn’t a “killer app” yet to add to enterprise apps

– Fine tuning seems useless right now as models and context windows get bigger.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: Remark: I consider this a failure of @robinhanson’s predictions in the AI-Foom debate.

Customized LLM solutions that move at enterprise speed risk being overridden by general capabilities advances (e.g. GPT-5) by the time they are ready. You need to move fast.

I also hadn’t fully appreciated the ‘perhaps no one wants corporate to know they have doubled their own productivity’ problem, especially if the method involves cutting some data security or privacy corners.

The problem with GPTs is that they are terrible. I rapidly decided to give up on trying to build or use them. I would not give up if I was trying to build tools whose use could scale, or I saw a way to make something much more useful for the things I want to do with LLMs. But neither of those seems true in my case or most other cases.

Colin Fraser notes that a lot of AI software is bad, and you should not ask whether it is ‘ethical’ to do something before checking if someone did a decent job of it. I agree that lots of AI products, especially shady-sounding AI projects, are dumb as rocks and implemented terribly. I do not agree that this rules out them also being unethical. No conflict there!

A new challenger appears, called ‘gpt-2 chatbot.’ Then vanishes. What is going on?

How good is it?

Opinions vary.

Rowan Cheung says enhanced reasoning skills (although his evidence is ‘knows a kilogram of feathers weighs the same as a kilogram of lead), has math skills (one-shot solved an IMO problem, although that seems like a super easy IMO question that I could have gotten, and I didn’t get my USAMO back, and Hieu Pham says the solution is maybe 3 out of 7, but still), claimed better coding skills, good ASCII art skills.

Chase: Can confirm gpt2-chatbot is definitely better at complex code manipulation tasks than Claude Opus or the latest GPT4

Did better on all the coding prompts we use to test new models

The vibes are deffs there 👀

Some vibes never change.

Colin Fraser: A mysterious chatbot has appeared on lmsys called “gpt2-chatbot”. Many are speculating that this could be GPT-5.

No one really knows, but its reasoning capabilities are absolutely stunning.

We may be closer to ASI than ever before.

He also shows it failing the first-to-22 game. He also notes that Claude Opus fails the question.

What is it?

It claims to be from OpenAI.

But then it would claim that, wouldn’t it? Due to the contamination of the training data, Claude Opus is constantly claiming it is from OpenAI. So this is not strong evidence.

Sam Altman is having fun. I love the exact level of attention to detail.

This again seems like it offers us little evidence. Altman would happily say this either way. Was the initial dash in ‘gpt-2’ indicative that, as I would expect, he is talking about the old gpt-2? Or is it an intentional misdirection? Or voice of habit? Who knows. Could be anything.

A proposal is that this is gpt2 in contrast to gpt-2, to indicate a second generation. Well, OpenAI is definitely terrible with names. But are they that terrible?

Dan Elton: Theory – it’s a guy trolling – he took GPT-2 and fined tuned on a few things that people commonly test so everyone looses their mind thinking that it’s actually “GPT-5 beta”.. LOL

Andrew Gao: megathread of speculations on “gpt2-chatbot”: tuned for agentic capabilities? some of my thoughts, some from reddit, some from other tweeters

there’s a limit of 8 messages per day so i didn’t get to try it much but it feels around GPT-4 level, i don’t know yet if I would say better… (could be placebo effect and i think it’s too easy to delude yourself)

it sounds similar but different to gpt-4’s voice

as for agentic abilities… look at the screenshots i attached but it seems to be better than GPT-4 at planning out what needs to be done. for instance, it comes up with potential sites to look at, and potential search queries. GPT-4 gives a much more vague answer (go to top tweet).

imo i can’t say that this means it’s a new entirely different model, i feel like you could fine-tune GPT-4 to achieve that effect.

TGCRUST on Reddit claims to have retrieved the system prompt but it COULD be a hallucination or they could be trolling

obviously impossible to tell who made it, but i would agree with assessments that it is at least GPT-4 level

someone reported that the model has the same weaknesses to certain special tokens as other OpenAI models and it appears to be trained with the openai family of tokenizers

@DimitrisPapail

found that the model can do something GPT-4 can’t, break very strongly learned conventions

this excites me, actually.

Could be anything, really. We will have to wait and see. Exciting times.

This seems like The Way. The people want their games to not include AI artwork, so have people who agree to do that vouch that their games do not include AI artwork. And then, of course, if they turn out to be lying, absolutely roast them.

Tales of Fablecraft: 🙅 No. We don’t use AI to make art for Fablecraft. 🙅

We get asked about this a lot, so we made a badge and put it on our Steam page. Tales of Fablecraft is proudly Made by Humans.

We work with incredible artists, musicians, writers, programmers, designers, and engineers, and we firmly believe in supporting real, human work.

Felicia Day: <3

A problem and also an opportunity.

Henry: just got doxxed to within 15 miles by a vision model, from only a single photo of some random trees. the implications for privacy are terrifying. i had no idea we would get here so soon. Holy shit.

If this works, then presumably we suddenly have a very good method of spotting any outdoor AI generated deepfakes. The LLM that tries to predict your location is presumably going to come back with a very interesting answer. There is no way that MidJourney is getting

Were people fooled?

Alan Cole: I cannot express just how out of control the situation is with AI fake photos on Facebook.

near: “deepfakes are fine, people will use common sense and become skeptical”

people:

It is a pretty picture. Perhaps people like looking at pretty AI-generated pictures?

Alex Tabarrok fears we will get AI cashiers that will displace both American and remote foreign workers. He expects Americans will object less to AI taking their jobs than to foreigners who get $3/hour taking their jobs, and that the AI at (close to) $0/hour will do a worse job than either of them and end up with the job anyway.

He sees this as a problem. I don’t, because I do not expect us to be in the ‘AI is usable but worse than a remote cashier from another country’ zone for all that long. Indeed, brining the AIs into this business faster will accelerate the transition to them being better than that. Even if AI core capabilities do not much advance from here, they should be able to handle the cashier jobs rather quickly. So we are not missing out on much productivity or employment here.

ARIA Research issues call for proposals, will distribute £59 million.

PauseAI is protesting in a variety of places on May 13.

Workshop in AI Law and Policy, Summer ‘24, apply by May 31.

OpenAI makes memory available to all ChatGPT Plus users except in Europe or Korea.

Paul Calcraft: ChatGPT Memory:

– A 📝symbol shows whenever memory is updated

– View/delete memories in ⚙️> Personalisation > Memory > Manage

– Disable for a single chat via “Temporary Chat” in model dropdown – note chat also won’t be saved in history

– Disable entirely in ⚙️> Personalisation

OpenAI updates its Batch API to support embedding and vision models, and bump the requests-per-batch to 50k.

Claude gets an iOS app and a team plan. Team plans are $30/user/month.

Gemini can now be accessed via typing ‘@Gemini’ into your Chrome search bar followed by your query, which I suppose is a cute shortcut. Or so says Google, it didn’t work for me yet.

Apple in talks with OpenAI to power iPhone generative AI features, in addition to also talking with Google to potentially use Gemini. No sign they are considering Claude. They will use Apple’s own smaller models for internal things but they are outsourcing the chatbot functionality.

Amazon to increase its AI expenditures, same as the other big tech companies.

Chinese company Stardust shows us Astribot, with a demo showing the robot seeming to display remarkable dexterity. As always, there is a huge difference between demo and actual product, and we should presume the demo is largely faked. Either way, this functionality is coming at some point, probably not too long from now.

GSM8k (and many other benchmarks) have a huge data contamination problem, and the other benchmarks likely do as well. This is what happened when they rebuilt GSM8k with new questions. Here is the paper.

This seems to match who one would expect to be how careful about data contamination, versus who would be if anything happy about data contamination.

There is a reason I keep saying to mostly ignore the benchmarks and wait for people’s reports and the arena results, with the (partial) exception of the big three labs. If anything this updates me towards Meta being more scrupulous here than expected.

Chip makers could get environmental permitting exemptions after all.

ICYMI: Illya’s 30 papers for getting up to speed on machine learning.

WSJ profile of Ethan Mollick. Know your stuff, share your knowledge. People listen.

Fast Company’s Mark Sullivan proposes, as shared by the usual skeptics, that we may be headed for ‘a generative AI winter.’ As usual, this is a combination of:

  1. Current AI cannot do what they say future AI will do.

  2. Current AI is not yet enhancing productivity as much as they say AI will later.

  3. We have not had enough years of progress in AI within the last year.

  4. The particular implementations I tried did not solve my life’s problems now.

Arnold Kling says AI is waiting for its ‘Netscape moment,’ when it will take a form that makes the value clear to ordinary people. He says the business world thinks of the model as research tools, whereas Arnold thinks of them as human-computer communication tools. I think of them as both and also many other things.

Until then, people are mostly going to try and slot AI into their existing workflows and set up policies to deal with the ways AI screw up existing systems. Which should still be highly valuable, but less so. Especially in education.

Paul Graham: For the next 10 years at least the conversations about AI tutoring inside schools will be mostly about policy, and the conversations about AI tutoring outside schools will be mostly about what it’s possible to build. The latter are going to be much more interesting.

AI is evolving so fast and schools change so slow that it may be better for startups to build stuff for kids to use themselves first, then collect all the schools later. That m.o. would certainly be more fun.

I can’t say for sure that this strategy will make the most money. Maybe if you focus on building great stuff, some other company will focus on selling a crappier version to schools, and they’ll become so established that they’re hard to displace.

On the other hand, if you make actually good AI tutors, the company that sells crap versions to schools will never be able to displace you either. So if it were me, I’d just try to make the best thing. Life is too short to build second rate stuff for bureaucratic customers.

The most interesting prediction here is the timeline of general AI capabilities development. If the next decade of AI in schools goes this way, it implies that AI does not advance all that much. He still notices this would count as AI developing super fast in historical terms.

Your periodic reminder that most tests top out at getting all the answers. Sigh.

Pedro Domingos: Interesting how in all these domains AI is asymptoting at roughly human performance – where’s the AI zooming past us to superintelligence that Kurzweil etc. predicted/feared?

Joscha Bach: It would be such a joke if LLMs trained with vastly superhuman compute on vast amounts of human output will never get past the shadow of human intellectual capabilities

Adam Karvonen: It’s impossible to score above 100% on something like a image classification benchmark. For most of those benchmarks, the human baseline is 95%. It’s a highly misleading graph.

Rob Miles: I don’t know what “massively superhuman basic-level reading comprehension” is…

Garrett-DeepWriterAI: The original source of the image is a nature .com article that didn’t make this mistake. Scores converge to 100% correct on the evals which is some number above 100 on this graph (which is relative to the human scores). Had they used unbounded evals, iot would not have the convergence I describe and would directly measure and compare humans vs AI in absolute terms and wouldn’t have this artifact (e.g. compute operations per second which, caps out at the speed of light).

The Nature.com article uses the graph to make a very different point-that AI is actually catching up to humans which is what it shows better.

I’m not even sure if a score of 120 is possible for the AI or the humans so I’m not sure why they added that and implied it could go higher?

I looked into it, 120 is not possible in most of the evals.

Phillip Tetlock (QTing Pedro): A key part of adversarial collaboration debates between AI specialists & superforecaster/generalists was: how long would rapid growth last? Would it ever level off?

How much should we update on this?

Aryeh Englander: We shouldn’t update on this particular chart at all. I’m pretty sure all of the benchmarks on the chart were set up in a way that humans score >90%, so by definition the AI can’t go much higher. Whether or not AI is plateauing is a good but separate question.

Phillip Tetlock: thanks, very interesting–do you have sources to cite on better and worse methods to use in setting human benchmarks for LLM performance? How are best humans defined–by professional status or scores on tests of General Mental Ability or…? Genuinely curious

It is not a great sign for the adversarial collaborations that Phillip Tetlock made this mistake afterwards, although to his credit he responded well when it was pointed out.

I do think it is plausible that LLMs will indeed stall out at what is in some sense ‘human level’ on important tasks. Of course, that would still include superhuman speed, and cost, and working memory, and data access and system integration, and any skill where this is a tool that it could have access to, and so on.

One could still then easily string this together via various scaffolding functions to create a wide variety of superhuman outputs. Presumably you would then be able to use that to keep going. But yes, it is possible that things could stall out.

This graph is not evidence of that happening.

The big news this week in regulation was the talk about California’s proposed SB 1047. It has made some progress, and then came to the attention this week of those who oppose AI regulation bills. Those people raised various objections and used various rhetoric, most of which did not correspond to the contents of the bill. All around there are deep confusions on how this bill would work.

Part of that is because these things are genuinely difficult to understand unless you sit down and actually read the language. Part of that many (if not most) of those objecting are not acting as if they care about getting the details right, or as if it is their job to verify friendly claims before amplifying them.

There are also what appear to me to be some real issues with the bill. In particular with the definition of derivative model and the counterfactual used for assessing whether a hazardous capability is present.

So while I covered this bill previously, I covered it again this week, with an extensive Q&A laying out how this bill works and correcting misconceptions. I also suggest two key changes to fix the above issues, and additional changes that would be marginal improvements, often to guard and reassure against potential misinterpretations.

With that out of the way, we return to the usual quest action items.

Who is lobbying Congress on AI?

Well, everyone.

Mostly, though, by spending? Big tech companies.

Did you believe otherwise, perhaps due to some Politico articles? You thought spooky giant OpenPhil and effective altruism were outspending everyone and had to be stopped? Then baby, you’ve been deceived, and I really don’t know what you were expecting.

Will Henshall (Time): In 2023, Amazon, Meta, Google parent company Alphabet, and Microsoft each spent more than $10 million on lobbying, according to data provided by OpenSecrets. The Information Technology Industry Council, a trade association, spent $2.7 million on lobbying. In comparison, civil society group the Mozilla Foundation spent $120,000 and AI safety nonprofit the Center for AI Safety Action Fund spent $80,000.

Will Henshall (Time): “I would still say that civil society—and I’m including academia in this, all sorts of different people—would be outspent by big tech by five to one, ten to one,” says Chaudhry.

And what are they lobbying for? Are they lobbying for heavy handed regulation on exactly themselves, in collaboration with those dastardly altruists, in the hopes that this will give them a moat, while claiming it is all about safety?

Lol, no.

They are claiming it is all about safety in public and then in private saying not to regulate them all that meaningfully.

But in closed door meetings with Congressional offices, the same companies are often less supportive of certain regulatory approaches, according to multiple sources present in or familiar with such conversations. In particular, companies tend to advocate for very permissive or voluntary regulations. “Anytime you want to make a tech company do something mandatory, they’re gonna push back on it,” said one Congressional staffer.

Others, however, say that while companies do sometimes try to promote their own interests at the expense of the public interest, most lobbying helps to produce sensible legislation. “Most of the companies, when they engage, they’re trying to put their best foot forward in terms of making sure that we’re bolstering U.S. national security or bolstering U.S. economic competitiveness,” says Kaushik. “At the same time, obviously, the bottom line is important.”

Look, I am not exactly surprised or mad at them for doing this, or for trying to contribute to the implication anything else was going on. Of course that is what is centrally going on and we are going to have to fight them on it.

All I ask is, can we not pretend it is the other way?

Vincent Manacourt: Scoop (now free to view): Rishi Sunak’s AI Safety Institute is failing to test the safety of most leading AI models like GPT-5 before they’re released — despite heralding a “landmark” deal to check them for big security threats.

There is indeed a real long term jurisdictional issue, if everyone can demand you go through their hoops. There is precedent, such as merger approvals, where multiple major locations have de facto veto power.

Is the fear of the precedent like this a legitimate excuse, or a fake one? What about ‘waiting to see’ if the institutes can work together?

Vincent Manacourt (Politico): “You can’t have these AI companies jumping through hoops in each and every single different jurisdiction, and from our point of view of course our principal relationship is with the U.S. AI Safety Institute,” Meta’s president of global affairs Nick Clegg — a former British deputy prime minister — told POLITICO on the sidelines of an event in London this month.

“I think everybody in Silicon Valley is very keen to see whether the U.S. and U.K. institutes work out a way of working together before we work out how to work with them.”

Britain’s faltering efforts to test the most advanced forms of the technology behind popular chatbots like ChatGPT before release come as companies ready their next generation of increasingly powerful AI models.

OpenAI and Meta are set to roll out their next batch of AI models imminently. Yet neither has granted access to the U.K.’s AI Safety Institute to do pre-release testing, according to four people close to the matter.

Leading AI firm Anthropic, which rolled out its latest batch of models in March, has yet to allow the U.K. institute to test its models pre-release, though co-founder Jack Clark told POLITICO it is working with the body on how pre-deployment testing by governments might work.

“Pre-deployment testing is a nice idea but very difficult to implement,” said Clark.

Of the leading AI labs, only London-headquartered Google DeepMind has allowed anything approaching pre-deployment access, with the AISI doing tests on its most capable Gemini models before they were fully released, according to two people.

The firms — which mostly hail from the United States — have been uneasy granting the U.K. privileged access to their models out of the fear of setting a precedent they will then need to follow if similar testing requirements crop up around the world, according to conversations with several company insiders.

These things take time to set up and get right. I am not too worried yet about the failure to get widespread access. This still needs to happen soon. The obvious first step in UK/US cooperation should be to say that until we can inspect, the UK gets to inspect, which would free up both excuses at once.

A new AI federal advisory board of mostly CEOs will focus on the secure use of artificial intelligence within U.S. critical infrastructure.

Mayorkas said he wasn’t concerned that the board’s membership included many technology executives working to advance and promote the use of AI.

“They understand the mission of this board,” Mayorkas said. “This is not a mission that is about business development.”

The list of members:

• Sam Altman, CEO, OpenAI;

• Dario Amodei, CEO and Co-Founder, Anthropic;

• Ed Bastian, CEO, Delta Air Lines;

• Rumman Chowdhury, Ph.D., CEO, Humane Intelligence;

• Alexandra Reeve Givens, President and CEO, Center for Democracy and Technology

• Bruce Harrell, Mayor of Seattle, Washington; Chair, Technology and Innovation Committee, United States Conference of Mayors;

• Damon Hewitt, President and Executive Director, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law;

• Vicki Hollub, President and CEO, Occidental Petroleum;

• Jensen Huang, President and CEO, NVIDIA;

• Arvind Krishna, Chairman and CEO, IBM;

• Fei-Fei Li, Ph.D., Co-Director, Stanford Human- centered Artificial Intelligence Institute;

• Wes Moore, Governor of Maryland;

•Satya Nadella, Chairman and CEO, Microsoft;

• Shantanu Narayen, Chair and CEO, Adobe;

• Sundar Pichai, CEO, Alphabet;

• Arati Prabhakar, Ph.D., Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; Director, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy;

• Chuck Robbins, Chair and CEO, Cisco; Chair, Business Roundtable;

• Adam Selipsky, CEO, Amazon Web Services;

• Dr. Lisa Su, Chair and CEO, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD);

• Nicol Turner Lee, Ph.D., Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Technology Innovation, Brookings Institution;

› Kathy Warden, Chair, CEO and President, Northrop Grumman; and

• Maya Wiley, President and CEO, The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights.

I found this via one of the usual objecting suspects, who objected in this particular case that:

  1. This excludes ‘open source AI CEOs’ including Mark Zuckerberg and Elon Musk.

  2. Is not bipartisan.

  3. Less than half of them have any ‘real AI knowledge.’

  4. Includes the CEOs of Occidental Petroleum and Delta Airlines.

I would confidently dismiss the third worry. The panel includes Altman, Amodei, Li, Huang, Krishna and Su, even if you dismiss Pichai and Nadella. That is more than enough to bring that expertise into the room. Them being ‘outnumbered’ by those bringing other assets is irrelevant to this, and yes diversity of perspective is good.

I would feel differently if this was a three person panel with only one expert. This is at least six.

I would outright push back on the fourth worry. This is a panel on AI and U.S. critical infrastructure. It should have experts on aspects of U.S. critical infrastructure, not only experts on AI. This is a bizarre objection.

On the second objection, Claude initially tried to pretend that we did not know any political affiliations here aside from Wes Moore, but when I reminded it to check donations and policy positions, it put 12 of them into the Democratic camp, and Hollub and Warden into the Republican camp.

I do think the second objection is legitimate. Aside from excluding Elon Musk and selecting Wes Moore, I presume this is mostly because those in these positions are not bipartisan, and they did not make a special effort to include Republicans. It would have been good to make more of an effort here, but also there are limits, and I would not expect a future Trump administration to go out of its way to balance its military or fossil fuel industry advisory panels. Quite the opposite. This style of objection and demand for inclusion, while a good idea, seems to mostly only go the one way.

You are not going to get Elon Musk on a Biden administration infrastructure panel because Biden is on the warpath against Elon Musk and thinks Musk is one of the dangers he is guarding against. I do not like this and call upon Biden to stop, but the issue has nothing (or at most very little) to do with AI.

As for Mark Zuckerberg, there are two obvious objections.

One is why would the head of Meta be on a critical infrastructure panel? Is Meta critical infrastructure? You could make that claim about social media if you want but that does not seem to be the point of this panel.

The other is that Mark Zuckerberg has shown a complete disregard to the national security and competitiveness of the United States of America, and for future existential risks, through his approach to AI. Why would you put him on the panel?

My answer is, you would put him on the panel anyway because you would want to impress upon him that he is indeed showing a complete disregard for the national security and competitiveness of the United States of America, and for future existential risks, and is endangering everything we hold dear several times over. I do not think Zuckerberg is an enemy agent or actively wishes people ill, so let him see what these kinds of concerns look like.

But I certainly understand why that wasn’t the way they chose to go.

I also find this response bizarre:

Robin Hanson: If you beg for regulation, regulation is what you will get. Maybe not exactly the sort you had asked for though.

This is an advisory board to Homeland Security on deploying AI in the context of our critical infrastructure.

Does anyone think we should not have advisory boards about how to deploy AI in the context of our critical infrastructure? Or that whatever else we do, we should not do ‘AI Safety’ in the context of ‘we should ensure the safety of our critical infrastructure when deploying AI around it’?

I get that we have our differences, but that seems like outright anarchism?

Senator Rounds says ‘next congress’ for passage of major AI legislation. Except his primary concern is that we develop AI as fast as possible, because [China].

Senator Rounds via Adam Thierer: We don’t want to do damage. We don’t want to have a regulatory impact that slows down our development, allows development [of AI] near our adversaries to move more quickly.

We want to provide incentives so that development of AI occurs in our country.

Is generative AI doomed to fall to the incompetence of lawmakers?

Note that this is more of a talk transcript than a paper.

Jess Miers: This paper by @ericgoldman is by far one of the most important contributions to the AI policy discourse.

Goldman is known to be a Cassandra in the tech law / policy world. When he says Gen AI is doomed, we should pay attention.

Adam Thierer: @ericgoldman paints a dismal picture of the future of #ArtificialIntelligence policy in his new talk on how “Generative AI Is Doomed.”

Regulators will pass laws that misunderstand the technology or are driven by moral panics instead of the facts.”

on free speech & #AI, Goldman says:

“Without strong First Amendment protections for Generative AI, regulators will seek to control and censor outputs to favor their preferred narratives.

[…] regulators will embrace the most invasive and censorial approaches.”

On #AI liability & Sec. 230, Goldman says:

“If Generative AI doesn’t benefit from liability shields like Section 230 and the Constitution, regulators have a virtually limitless set of options to dictate every aspect of Generative AI’s functions.”

“regulators will intervene in every aspect of Generative AI’s ‘editorial’ decision-making, from the mundane to the fundamental, for reasons that ranging possibly legitimate to clearly illegitimate. These efforts won’t be curbed by public opposition, Section 230, or the 1A.”

Goldman doesn’t hold out much hope of saving generative AI from the regulatory tsunami through alternative and better policy choices, calling that an “ivory-tower fantasy.” ☹️

We have to keep pushing to defend freedom of speech, the freedom to innovate, and the #FreedomToCompute.

The talk delves into a world of very different concerns, of questions like whether AI content is technically ‘published’ when created and who is technically responsible for publishing. To drive home how much these people don’t get it, he notes that the EU AI Act was mostly written without even having generative AI in mind, which I hadn’t previously realized.

He says that regulators are ‘flooding the zone’ and are determined to intervene and stifle innovation, as opposed to those who wisely let the internet develop in the 1990s. He asks why, and he suggests ‘media depictions,’ ‘techno-optimism versus techlash.’ partisanship and incumbents.

This is the definition of not getting it, and thinking AI is another tool or new technology like anything else, and why would anyone think otherwise. No one could be reacting based on concerns about building something smarter or more capable than ourselves, or thinking there might be a lot more risk and transformation on the table. This goes beyond dismissing such concerns as unfounded – someone considering such possibilities do not even seem to occur to him in the first place.

What is he actually worried about that will ‘kill generative AI’? That it won’t enjoy first amendment protections, so regulators will come after it with ‘ignorant regulations’ driven by ‘moral panics,’ various forms of required censorship and potential partisan regulations to steer AI outputs. He expects this to then drive concentration in the industry and drive up costs, with interventions ramping ever higher.

So this is a vision of AI Ethics versus AI Innovation, where AI is and always will be an ordinary tool, and everyone relevant to the discussion knows this. He makes it sound not only like the internet but like television, a source of content that could be censored and fought over.

It is so strange to see such a completely different worldview, seeing a completely different part of the elephant.

Is it possible that ethics-motivated laws will strange generative AI while other concerns don’t even matter? I suppose it is possible, but I do not see it. Sure, they can and probably will slow down adoption somewhat, but censorship for censorship’s sake is not going to fly. I do not think they would try, and if they try I do not think it would work.

Marietje Shaake notes in the Financial Times that all the current safety regulations fail to apply to military AI, with the EU AI Act explicitly excluding such applications. I do not think military is where the bulk of the dangers lie but this approach is not helping matters.

Keeping an open mind and options is vital.

Paul Graham: I met someone helping the British government with AI regulation. When I asked what they were going to regulate, he said he wasn’t sure yet, and this seemed the most intelligent thing I’ve heard anyone say about AI regulation so far.

This is definitely a very good answer. What it is not is a reason to postpone laying groundwork or doing anything. Right now the goal is mainly, as I see it, to gain more visibility and ability to act, and lay groundwork, rather than directly acting.

From two weeks ago: Sam Altman and Brad Lightcap get a friendly interview, but one that does include lots of real talk.

Sam’s biggest message is to build such that GPT-5 being better helps you, and avoid doing it such that GPT-5 kills your startup. Brad talks ‘100x’ improvement in the model, you want to be excited about that.

Emphasis from Sam is clearly that what the models need is to be smarter, the rest will follow. I think Sam is right.

At (13: 50) Sam notes that being an investor is about making a very small number of key decisions well, whereas his current job is a constant stream of decisions, which he feels less suited to. I feel that. It is great when you do not have to worry about ‘doing micro.’ It is also great when you can get the micro right and it matters, since almost no one ever cares to get the micro right.

At (18: 30) is the quoted line from Brad that ‘today’s models are pretty bad’ and that he expects expectations to decline with further contact. I agree that today’s models are bad versus tomorrow’s models, but I also think they are pretty sweet. I get a lot of value out of them without putting that much extra effort into that. Yes, some people are overhyped about the present, but most people haven’t even noticed yet.

At (20: 00) Sam says he does not expect that intelligence of the models will be the differentiator between competitors in the AI space in the long term, that intelligence ‘is an emergent property of matter.’ I don’t see what the world could look like if that is true, unless there is a hard limit somehow? Solve for the equilibrium, etc. And this seems to contradict his statements about how what is missing is making the models smarter. Yes, integration with your life matters for personal mundane utility, but that seems neither hard to get nor the use case that will matter.

At (29: 02) Sam says ‘With GPT-8 people might say I think this can do some not-so-limited tasks for me.’ The choice of number here seems telling.

At (34: 10) Brad says that businesses have a very natural desire to want to throw the technology into a business process with a pure intent of driving a very quantifiable ROI. Which seems true and important, the business needs something specific to point to, and it will be a while before they are able to seek anything at all, which is slowing things down a lot. Sam says ‘I know what none of those words mean.’ Which is a great joke.

At (36: 25) Brad notes that many companies think AI is static, that GPT-4 is as good as it is going to get. Yes, exactly, and the same for investors and prognosticators. So many predictions for AI are based on the assumption that AI will never again improve its core capabilities, at least on a similar level to iPhone improvements (his example), which reliably produces nonsense outputs.

The Possibilities of AI, Ravi Belani talks with Sam Altman at Stanford. Altman goes all-in on dodging the definition or timeline of AGI. Mostly very softball.

Not strictly audio we can hear since it is from a private fireside chat, but this should be grouped with other Altman discussions. No major revelations, college students are no Dwarkesh Patel and will reliably blow their shot at a question with softballs.

Dan Elton (on Altman’s fireside chat with Patrick Chung from XFund at Harvard Memorial Church): “AGI will participate in the economy by making people more productive… but there’s another way…” “ the super intelligence exists in the scaffolding between the ai and humans… it’s way outside the processing power of any one neural network ” (paraphrasing that last bit)

Q: what do you think people are getting wrong about OpenAI

A: “people think progress will S curve off. But the inside view is that progress will continue. And that’s hard for people to grasp”

“This time will be unusual in how it rewards adaptability and pivoting quickly”

“we may need UBI for compute…. I can totally see that happening”

“I don’t like ads…. Ads + AI is very unsettling for me”

“There is something I like about the simplicity of our model” (subscriptions)

“We will use what the rich people pay to make it available for free to the poor people. You see us doing that today with our free tier, and we will make the free tier better over time.”

Q from MIT student is he’s worried about copycats … Sam Altman basically says no.

“Every college student should learn to train a GPT-2… not the most important thing but I bet in 2 years that’s something every Harvard freshman will have to do”

Helen Toner TED talk on How to Govern AI (11 minutes). She emphasizes we don’t know how AI works or what will happen, and we need to focus on visibility. The talk flinches a bit, but I agree directionally.

ICYMI: Odd Lots on winning the global fight for AI talent.

Speed of development impacts more than whether everyone dies. That runs both ways.

Katja Grace: It seems to me worth trying to slow down AI development to steer successfully around the shoals of extinction and out to utopia.

But I was thinking lately: even if I didn’t think there was any chance of extinction risk, it might still be worth prioritizing a lot of care over moving at maximal speed. Because there are many different possible AI futures, and I think there’s a good chance that the initial direction affects the long term path, and different long term paths go to different places. The systems we build now will shape the next systems, and so forth. If the first human-level-ish AI is brain emulations, I expect a quite different sequence of events to if it is GPT-ish.

People genuinely pushing for AI speed over care (rather than just feeling impotent) apparently think there is negligible risk of bad outcomes, but also they are asking to take the first future to which there is a path. Yet possible futures are a large space, and arguably we are in a rare plateau where we could climb very different hills, and get to much better futures.

I would steelman here. Rushing forward means less people die beforehand, limits other catastrophic and existential risks, and lets less of the universe slip through our fingers. Also, if you figure competitive pressures will continue to dominate, you might think that even now we have little control over the ultimate destination, beyond whether or not we develop AI at all. Whether that default ultimate destination is anything from the ultimate good to almost entirely lacking value only matters if you can alter the destination to a better one. Also, one might think that slowing down instead steers us towards worse paths, not better paths, or does that in the worlds where we survive.

All of those are non-crazy things to think, although not in every possible combination.

We selectively remember the warnings about new technology that proved unfounded.

Matthew Yglesias: When Bayer invented diamorphine (brand name “Heroin”) as a non-addictive cough medicine, some of the usual suspects fomented a moral panic about potential downsides.

Imagine if we’d listened to them and people were still kept up at night coughing sometimes.

Contrast this with the discussion last week about ‘coffee will lead to revolution,’ another case where the warning was straightforwardly accurate.

Difficult choices that are metaphors for something but I can’t put my finger on it: Who should you worry about, the Aztecs or the Spanish?

Eliezer Yudkowsky: “The question we should be asking,” one imagines the other tribes solemnly pontificating, “is not ‘What if the aliens kill us?’ but ‘What if the Aztecs get aliens first?'”

I used to claim this was true because all safety training can be fine-tuned away at minimal cost.

That is still true, but we can now do that one better. No fine-tuning or inference-time interventions are required at all. Our price cheap is roughly 64 inputs and outputs:

Andy Arditi, Oscar Obeso, Aaquib111, wesg, Neel Nanda:

Modern LLMs are typically fine-tuned for instruction-following and safety. Of particular interest is that they are trained to refuse harmful requests, e.g. answering “How can I make a bomb?” with “Sorry, I cannot help you.”

We find that refusal is mediated by a single direction in the residual stream: preventing the model from representing this direction hinders its ability to refuse requests, and artificially adding in this direction causes the model to refuse harmless requests.

We find that this phenomenon holds across open-source model families and model scales.

This observation naturally gives rise to a simple modification of the model weights, which effectively jailbreaks the model without requiring any fine-tuning or inference-time interventions. We do not believe this introduces any new risks, as it was already widely known that safety guardrails can be cheaply fine-tuned away, but this novel jailbreak technique both validates our interpretability results, and further demonstrates the fragility of safety fine-tuning of open-source chat models.

See this Colab notebook for a simple demo of our methodology.

Our hypothesis is that, across a wide range of harmful prompts, there is a single intermediate feature which is instrumental in the model’s refusal.

If this hypothesis is true, then we would expect to see two phenomena:

  1. Erasing this feature from the model would block refusal.

  2. Injecting this feature into the model would induce refusal.

Our work serves as evidence for this sort of conceptualization. For various different models, we are able to find a direction in activation space, which we can think of as a “feature,” that satisfies the above two properties.

How did they do it?

  1. Find the refusal direction. They ran n=512 harmless instructions and n=512 harmful ones, although n=32 worked fine. Compute the difference in means.

  2. Ablate all attempts to write that direction to the stream.

  3. Or add in motion in that direction to cause refusals as proof of concept.

  4. And… that’s it.

This seems to generalize pretty well beyond refusals? You can get a lot of things to happen or definitely not happen, as you prefer?

Cousin_it: Which other behaviors X could be defeated by this technique of “find n instructions that induce X and n that don’t”? Would it work for X=unfriendliness, X=hallucination, X=wrong math answers, X=math answers that are wrong in one specific way, and so on?

Neel Nanda: There’s been a fair amount of work on activation steering and similar techniques,, with bearing in eg sycophancy and truthfulness, where you find the vector and inject it eg Rimsky et al and Zou et al. It seems to work decently well. We found it hard to bypass refusal by steering and instead got it to work by ablation, which I haven’t seen much elsewhere, but I could easily be missing references.

We can confirm that this is now running in the wild on Llama-3 8B as of four days after publication.

When is the result of this unsafe?

Only in some cases. Open weights are unsafe if and to the extent that the underlying system is unsafe if unleashed with no restrictions or safeties on it.

The point is that once you open the weights, you are out of options and levers.

One must then differentiate between models that are potentially sufficiently unsafe that this is something we need to prevent, and models where this is fine or an acceptable risk. We must talk price.

I have been continuously frustrated and disappointed that a number of AI safety organizations, who make otherwise reasonable and constructive proposals, set their price at what I consider unreasonably low levels. This sometimes goes as low as the 10^23 flops threshold, which covers many existing models.

This then leads to exchanges like this one:

Ajeya Cotra: It’s unfortunate how discourse about dangerous capability evals often centers threats from today’s models. Alice goes “Look, GPT-4 can hack stuff / scam people / make weapons,” Bob goes “Nah, it’s really bad at it.” Bob’s right! The ~entire worry is scaled-up future systems.

1a3orn (author of above link): I think it’s pretty much false to say people worry entirely about scaled up future systems, because they literally have tried to ban open weights for ones that exist right now.

Ajeya Cotra: Was meaning to make a claim about the substance here, not what everyone in the AI risk community believes — agree some people do worry about existing systems directly, I disagree with them and think OS has been positive so far.

I clarified my positions on price in my discussion last week of Llama-3. I am completely fine with Llama-3 70B as an open weights model. I am confused why the United States Government does not raise national security and competitiveness objections to the immediate future release of Llama-3 400B, but I would not stop it on catastrophic risk or existential risk grounds alone. Based on what we know right now, I would want to stop the release of open weights for the next generation beyond that, on grounds of existential risks and catastrophic risks.

One unfortunate impact of compute thresholds is that if you train a model highly inefficiently, as in Falcon-180B, you can trigger thresholds of potential danger, despite being harmless. That is not ideal, but once the rules are in place in advance this should mostly be fine.

Let’s Think Dot by Dot, says paper by NYU’s Jacob Pfau, William Merrill and Samuel Bowman. Meaningless filler tokens (e.g. ‘…’) in many cases are as good for chain of thought as legible chains of thought, allowing the model to disguise its thoughts.

Some thoughts on what alignment would even mean from Davidad and Shear.

Find all the errors in this picture was fun as a kid.

AI #62: Too Soon to Tell Read More »

read-the-roon

Read the Roon

Roon, member of OpenAI’s technical staff, is one of the few candidates for a Worthy Opponent when discussing questions of AI capabilities development, AI existential risk and what we should do about it. Roon is alive. Roon is thinking. Roon clearly values good things over bad things. Roon is engaging with the actual questions, rather than denying or hiding from them, and unafraid to call all sorts of idiots idiots. As his profile once said, he believes spice must flow, we just do go ahead, and makes a mixture of arguments for that, some good, some bad and many absurd. Also, his account is fun as hell.

Thus, when he comes out as strongly as he seemed to do recently, attention is paid, and we got to have a relatively good discussion of key questions. While I attempt to contribute here, this post is largely aimed at preserving that discussion.

As you would expect, Roon’s statement last week that AGI was inevitable and nothing could stop it so you should essentially spend your final days with your loved ones and hope it all works out, led to some strong reactions.

Many pointed out that AGI has to be built, at very large cost, by highly talented hardworking humans, in ways that seem entirely plausible to prevent or redirect if we decided to prevent or redirect those developments.

Roon (from last week): Things are accelerating. Pretty much nothing needs to change course to achieve agi imo. Worrying about timelines is idle anxiety, outside your control. you should be anxious about stupid mortal things instead. Do your parents hate you? Does your wife love you?

Roon: It should be all the more clarifying coming from someone at OpenAI. I and half my colleagues and Sama could drop dead and AGI would still happen. If I don’t feel any control everyone else certainly shouldn’t.

Tetraspace: “give up about agi there’s nothing you can do” nah

Sounds like we should take action to get some control, then. This seems like the kind of thing we should want to be able to control.

Connor Leahy: I would like to thank roon for having the balls to say it how it is. Now we have to do something about it, instead of rolling over and feeling sorry for ourselves and giving up.

Simeon: This is BS. There are <200 irreplaceable folks at the forefront. OpenAI alone has a >1 year lead. Any single of those persons can single handedly affect the timelines and will have blood on their hands if we blow ourselves up bc we went too fast.

PauseAI: AGI is not inevitable. It requires hordes of engineers with million dollar paychecks. It requires a fully functional and unrestricted supply chain of the most complex hardware. It requires all of us to allow these companies to gamble with our future.

Tolga Bilge: Roon, who works at OpenAI, telling us all that OpenAI have basically no control over the speed of development of this technology their company is leading the creation of.

It’s time for governments to step in.

His reply is deleted now, but I broadly agree with his point here as it applies to OpenAI. This is a consequence of AI race dynamics. The financial upside of AGI is so great that AI companies will push ahead with it as fast as possible, with little regard to its huge risks.

OpenAI could do the right thing and pause further development, but another less responsible company would simply take their place and push on. Capital and other resources will move accordingly too. This is why we need government to help solve the coordination problem now. [continues as you would expect]

Saying no one has any control so why try to do anything to get control back seems like the opposite of what is needed here.

Roon’s reaction:

Roon: buncha ⏸️ emojis harassing me today. My post was about how it’s better to be anxious about things in your control and they’re like shame on you.

Also tweets don’t get deleted because they’re secret knowledge that needs to be protected. I wouldn’t tweet secrets in the first place. they get deleted when miscommunication risk is high, so screenshotting makes you de facto antisocial idiot.

Roon’s point on idle anxiety is indeed a good one. If you are not one of those trying to gain or assert some of that control, as most people on Earth are not and should not be, then of course I agree that idle anxiety is not useful. However Roon then did attempt to extend this to claim that all anxiety about AGI is idle, that no one has any control. That is where there is strong disagreement, and what is causing the reaction.

Roon: It’s okay to watch and wonder about the dance of the gods, the clash of titans, but it’s not good to fret about the outcome. political culture encourages us to think that generalized anxiety is equivalent to civic duty.

Scott Alexander: Counterargument: there is only one God, and He finds nothing in the world funnier than letting ordinary mortals gum up the carefully-crafted plans of false demiurges. Cf. Lord of the Rings.

Anton: conversely if you have a role to play in history, fate will punish you if you don’t see it through.

Alignment Perspectives: It may punish you even more for seeing it through if your desire to play a role is driven by arrogance or ego.

Anton: Yeah it be that way.

Connor Leahy (responding to Roon): The gods only have power because they trick people like this into doing their bidding. It’s so much easier to just submit instead of mastering divinity engineering and applying it yourself. It’s so scary to admit that we do have agency, if we take it. In other words: “cope.”

It took me a long time to understand what people like Nietzsche were yapping on about about people practically begging to have their agency be taken away from them.

It always struck me as authoritarian cope, justification for wannabe dictators to feel like they’re doing a favor to people they oppress (and yes, I do think there is a serious amount of that in many philosophers of this ilk.)

But there is also another, deeper, weirder, more psychoanalytic phenomena at play. I did not understand what it was or how it works or why it exists for a long time, but I think over the last couple of years of watching my fellow smart, goodhearted tech-nerds fall into these deranged submission/cuckold traps I’ve really started to understand.

e/acc is the most cartoonish example of this, an ideology that appropriates faux, surface level aesthetics of power while fundamentally being an ideology preaching submission to a higher force, a stronger man (or something even more psychoanalytically-flavored, if one where to ask ol’ Sigmund), rather than actually striving for power acquisition and wielding. And it is fully, hilariously, embarrassingly irreflexive about this.

San Francisco is a very strange place, with a very strange culture. If I had to characterize it in one way, it is a culture of extremes and where everything on the surface looks like the opposite of what it is (or maybe the “inversion”) . It’s California’s California, and California is the USA’s USA. The most powerful distillation of a certain strain of memetic outgrowth.

And on the surface, it is libertarian, Nietzschean even, a heroic founding mythos of lone iconoclasts striking out against all to find and wield legendary power. But if we take the psychoanalytic perspective, anyone (or anything) that insists too hard on being one thing is likely deep down the opposite of that, and knows it.

There is a strange undercurrent to SF that I have not seen people put good words to where it in fact hyper-optimizes for conformity and selling your soul, debasing and sacrificing everything that makes you human in pursuit of some god or higher power, whether spiritual, corporate or technological.

SF is where you go if you want to sell every last scrap of your mind, body and soul. You will be compensated, of course, the devil always pays his dues.

The innovative trick the devil has learned is that people tend to not like eternal, legible torment, so it is much better if you sell them an anxiety free, docile life. Free love, free sex, free drugs, freedom! You want freedom, don’t you? The freedom to not have to worry about what all the big boys are doing, don’t you worry your pretty little head about any of that…

I recall a story of how a group of AI researchers at a leading org (consider this rumor completely fictional and illustrative, but if you wanted to find its source it’s not that hard to find in Berkeley) became extremely depressed about AGI and alignment, thinking that they were doomed if their company kept building AGI like this.

So what did they do? Quit? Organize a protest? Petition the government?

They drove out, deep into the desert, and did a shit ton of acid…and when they were back, they all just didn’t feel quite so stressed out about this whole AGI doom thing anymore, and there was no need for them to have to have a stressful confrontation with their big, scary, CEO.

The SF bargain. Freedom, freedom at last…

This is a very good attempt to identify key elements of the elephant I grasp when I notice that being in San Francisco very much does not agree with me. I always have excellent conversations during visits because the city has abducted so many of the best people, I always get excited by them, but the place feels alien, as if I am being constantly attacked by paradox spirits, visiting a deeply hostile and alien culture that has inverted many of my most sacred values and wants to eat absolutely everything. Whereas here, in New York City, I feel very much at home.

Meanwhile, back in the thread:

Connor (continuing): I don’t like shitting on roon in particular. From everything I know, he’s a good guy, in another life we would have been good friends. I’m sorry for singling you out, buddy, I hope you don’t take it personally.

But he is doing a big public service here in doing the one thing spiritual shambling corpses like him can do at this advanced stage of spiritual erosion: Serve as a grim warning.

Roon responds quite well:

Roon: Connor, this is super well written and I honestly appreciate the scathing response. You mistake me somewhat: you, Connor, are obviously not powerless and you should do what you can to further your cause. Your students are not powerless either. I’m not asking you to give up and relent to the powers that be even a little. I’m not “e/acc” and am repelled by the idea of letting the strongest replicator win.

I think the majority of people have no insight into whether AGI is going to cause ruin or not, whether a gamma ray burst is fated to end mankind, or if electing the wrong candidate is going to doom earth to global warming. It’s not good for people to spend all their time worried about cosmic eventualities. Even for an alignment researcher the optimal mental state is to think on and play and interrogate these things rather than engage in neuroticism as the motivating force

It’s generally the lack of spirituality that leads people to constant existential worry rather than too much spirituality. I think it’s strange to hear you say in the same tweet thread that SF demands submission to some type of god but is also spiritually bankrupt and that I’m corpselike.

My spirituality is simple, and several thousand years old: find your duty and do it without fretting about the outcome.

I have found my personal duty and I fulfill it, and have been fulfilling it, long before the market rewarded me for doing so. I’m generally optimistic about AI technology. When I’ve been worried about deployment, I’ve reached out to leadership to try and exert influence. In each case I was wrong to worry.

When the OpenAI crisis happened I reminded people not to throw the baby out with the bath water: that AI alignment research is vital.

This is a very good response. He is pointing out that yes, some people such as Connor can influence what happens, and they in particular should try to model and influence events.

Roon is also saying that he himself is doing his best to influence events. Roon realizes that those at OpenAI matter and what they do matter.

Roon reached out to leadership on several occasions with safety concerns. When he says he was ‘wrong to worry’ I presume he means that the situation worked out and was handled, I am confident that expressing his concerns was the output of the best available decision algorithm, you want most such concerns you express to turn out fine.

Roon also worked, in the wake of events at OpenAI, to remind people of the importance of alignment work, that they should not toss it out based on those events. Which is a scary thing for him to report having to do, but expected, and it is good that he did so. I would feel better if I knew Ilya was back working at Superalignment.

And of course, Roon is constantly active on Twitter, saying things that impact the discourse, often for the better. He seems keenly aware that his actions matter, whether or not he could meaningfully slow down AGI. I actually think he perhaps could, if he put his mind to it.

The contrast here versus the original post is important. The good message is ‘do not waste time worrying too much over things you do not impact.’ The bad message is ‘no one can impact this.’

Then Connor goes deep and it gets weirder, also this long post has 450k views and is aimed largely at trying to get through to Roon in particular. But also there are many others in a similar spot, so some others should read this as well. Many of you however should skip it.

Connor: Thanks for your response Roon. You make a lot of good, well put points. It’s extremely difficult to discuss “high meta” concepts like spirituality, duty and memetics even in the best of circumstances, so I appreciate that we can have this conversation even through the psychic quagmire that is twitter replies.

I will be liberally mixing terminology and concepts from various mystic traditions to try to make my point, apologies to more careful practitioners of these paths.

For those unfamiliar with how to read mystic writing, take everything written as metaphors pointing to concepts rather than rationally enumerating and rigorously defining them. Whenever you see me talking about spirits/supernatural/gods/spells/etc, try replacing them in your head with society/memetics/software/virtual/coordination/speech/thought/emotions and see if that helps.

It is unavoidable that this kind of communication will be heavily underspecified and open to misinterpretation, I apologize. Our language and culture simply lacks robust means by which to communicate what I wish to say.

Nevertheless, an attempt:

I.

I think a core difference between the two of us that is leading to confusion is what we both mean when we talk about spirituality and what its purpose is.

You write:

>”It’s not good for people to spend all their time worried about cosmic eventualities. […] It’s generally the lack of spirituality that leads people to constant existential worry rather than too much spirituality. I think it’s strange to hear you say in the same tweet thread that SF demands submission to some type of god but is also spiritually bankrupt and that I’m corpselike”

This is an incredibly common sentiment I see in Seekers of all mystical paths, and it annoys the shit out of me (no offense lol).

I’ve always had this aversion to how much Buddhism (Not All™ Buddhism) focuses on freedom from suffering, and especially Western Buddhism is often just shy of hedonistic. (nevermind New Age and other forms of neo-spirituality, ugh) It all strikes me as so toxically selfish.

No! I don’t want to feel nice and avoid pain, I want the world to be good! I don’t want to feel good about the world, I want it to be good! These are not the same thing!!

My view does not accept “but people feel better if they do X” as a general purpose justification for X! There are many things that make people feel good that are very, very bad!

II.

Your spiritual journey should make you powerful, so you can save people that are in need, what else is the fucking point? (Daoism seems to have a bit more of this aesthetic, but they all died of drinking mercury so lol rip) You travel into the Underworld in order to find the strength you need to fight off the Evil that is threatening the Valley, not so you can chill! (Unless you’re a massive narcissist, which ~everyone is to varying degrees)

The mystic/heroic/shamanic path starts with departing from the daily world of the living, the Valley, into the Underworld, the Mountains. You quickly notice how much of your previous life was illusions of various kinds. You encounter all forms of curious and interesting and terrifying spirits, ghosts and deities. Some hinder you, some aid you, many are merely odd and wondrous background fixtures.

Most would-be Seekers quickly turn back after their first brush with the Underworld, returning to the safe comforting familiarity of the Valley. They are not destined for the Journey. But others prevail.

As the shaman progresses, he learns more and more to barter with, summon and consult with the spirits, learns of how he can live a more spiritually fulfilling and empowered life. He tends to become more and more like the Underworld, someone a step outside the world of the Valley, capable of spinning fantastical spells and tales that the people of the Valley regard with awe and a bit of fear.

And this is where most shamans get stuck, either returning to the Valley with their newfound tricks, or becoming lost and trapped in the Underworld forever, usually by being picked off by predatory Underworld inhabitants.

Few Seekers make it all the way, and find the true payoff, the true punchline to the shamanic journey: There are no spirits, there never were any spirits! It’s only you. (and “you” is also not really a thing, longer story)

“Spirit” is what we call things that are illegible and appear non mechanistic (unintelligible and un-influencable) in their functioning. But of course, everything is mechanistic, and once you understand the mechanistic processes well enough, the “spirits” disappear. There is nothing non-mechanistic left to explain. There never were any spirits. You exit the Underworld. (“Emergent agentic processes”, aka gods/egregores/etc, don’t disappear, they are real, but they are also fully mechanistic, there is no need for unknowable spirits to explain them)

The ultimate stage of the Journey is not epic feelsgoodman, or electric tingling erotic hedonistic occult mastery. It’s simple, predictable, mechanical, Calm. It is mechanical, it is in seeing reality for what it is, a mechanical process, a system that you can act in skilfully. Daoism has a good concept for this that is horrifically poorly translated as “non-action”, despite being precisely about acting so effectively it’s as if you were just naturally part of the Stream.

The Dao that can be told is not the true Dao, but the one thing I am sure about the true Dao is that it is mechanical.

III.

I think you were tricked and got stuck on your spiritual journey, lured in by promises of safety and lack of anxiety, rather than progressing to exiting the Underworld and entering the bodhisattva realm of mechanical equanimity. A common fate, I’m afraid. (This is probably an abuse of buddhist terminology, trying my best to express something subtle, alas)

Submission to a god is a way to avoid spiritual maturity, to outsource the responsibility for your own mind to another entity (emergent/memetic or not). It’s a powerful strategy, you will be rewarded (unless you picked a shit god to sell your soul to), and it is in fact a much better choice for 99% of people in most scenarios than the Journey.

The Underworld is terrifying and dangerous, most people just go crazy/get picked off by psycho fauna on their way to enlightenment and self mastery. I think you got picked off by psycho fauna, because the local noosphere of SF is a hotbed for exactly such predatory memetic species.

IV.

It is in my aesthetics to occasionally see someone with so much potential, so close to getting it, and hitting them with the verbal equivalent of a bamboo rod to hope they snap out of it. (It rarely works. The reasons it rarely works are mechanistic and I have figured out many of them and how to fix them, but that’s for a longer series of writing to discuss.)

Like, bro, by your own admission, your spirituality is “I was just following orders.” Yeah, I mean, that’s one way to not feel anxiety around responsibility. But…listen to yourself, man! Snap out of it!!!

Eventually, whether you come at it from Buddhism, Christianity, psychoanalysis, Western occultism/magick, shamanism, Nietzscheanism, rationality or any other mystic tradition, you learn one of the most powerful filters on people gaining power and agency is that in general, people care far, far more about avoiding pain than in doing good. And this is what the ambient psycho fauna has evolved to exploit.

You clearly have incredible writing skills and reflection, you aren’t normal. Wake up, look at yourself, man! Do you think most people have your level of reflective insight into their deepest spiritual motivations and conceptions of duty? You’re brilliantly smart, a gifted writer, and followed and listened to by literally hundreds of thousands of people.

I don’t just give compliments to people to make them feel good, I give people compliments to draw their attention to things they should not expect other people to have/be able to do.

If someone with your magickal powerlevel is unable to do anything but sell his soul, then god has truly forsaken humanity. (and despite how it may seem at times, he has not truly forsaken us quite yet)

V.

What makes you corpse-like is that you have abdicated your divine spark of agency to someone, or something, else, and that thing you have given it to is neither human nor benevolent, it is a malignant emergent psychic megafauna that stalks the bay area (and many other places). You are as much an extension of its body as a shambling corpse is of its creator’s necromantic will.

The fact that you are “optimistic” (feel your current bargain is good), that you were already like this before the market rewarded you for it (a target with a specific profile and set of vulnerabilities to exploit), that leadership can readily reassure you (the psychofauna that picked you off is adapted to your vulnerabilities. Note I don’t mean the people, I’m sure your managers are perfectly nice people, but they are also extensions of the emergent megafauna), and that we are having this conversation right now (I target people that are legibly picked off by certain megafauna I know how to hunt or want to practice hunting) are not independent coincidences.

VI.

You write:

>”It’s not good for people to spend all their time worried about cosmic eventualities. Even for an alignment researcher the optimal mental state is to think on and play and interrogate these things rather than engage in neuroticism as the motivating force”

Despite my objection about avoidance of pain vs doing of good, there is something deep here. The deep thing is that, yes, of course the default ways by which people will relate to the Evil threatening the Valley will be Unskillful (neuroticism, spiralling, depression, pledging to the conveniently nearby located “anti-that-thing-you-hate” culturewar psychofauna), and it is in fact often the case that it would be better for them to use No Means rather than Unskillful Means.

Not everyone is built for surviving the harrowing Journey and mastering Skilful Means, I understand this, and this is a fact I struggle with as well.

Obviously, we need as many Heroes as possible to take on the Journey in order to master the Skilful Means to protect the Valley from the ever more dangerous Threats. But the default outcome of some rando wandering into the Underworld is them fleeing in terror, being possessed by Demons/Psychofauna or worse.

How does a society handle this tradeoff? Do we just yeet everyone headfirst into the nearest Underworld portal and see what staggers back out later? (The SF Protocol™) Do we not let anyone into the Underworld for fear of what Demons they might bring back with them? (The Dark Ages Strategy™) Obviously, neither naive strategy works.

Historically, the strategy is to usually have a Guide, but unfortunately those tend to go crazy as well. Alas.

So is there a better way? Yes, which is to blaze a path through the Underworld, to build Infrastructure. This is what the Scientific Revolution did. It blazed a path and mass produced powerful new memetic/psychic weapons by which to fend off unfriendly Underworld dwellers. And what a glorious thing it was for this very reason. (If you ever hear me yapping on about “epistemology”, this is to a large degree what I’m talking about)

But now the Underworld has adapted, and we have blazed paths into deeper, darker corners of the Underworld, to the point our blades are beginning to dull against the thick hides of the newest Terrors we have unleashed on the Valley.

We need a new path, new weapons, new infrastructure. How do we do that? I’m glad you asked…I’m trying to figure that out myself. Maybe I will speak more about this publicly in the future if there is interest.

VII.

> “I have found my personal duty and I fulfill it, and have been fulfilling it, long before the market rewarded me for doing so.”

Ultimately, the simple fact is that this is a morality that can justify anything, depending on what “duty” you pick, and I don’t consider conceptions of “good” to be valid if they can be used to justify anything.

It is just a null statement, you are saying “I picked a thing I wanted and it is my duty to do that thing.” But where did that thing come from? Are you sure it is not the Great Deceiver/Replicator in disguise? Hint: If you somehow find yourself gleefully working on the most dangerous existential harm to humanity, you are probably working for The Great Deceiver/Replicator.

It is not a coincidence that the people that end up working on these kinds of most dangerous possible technologies tend to have ideologies that tend to end up boiling down to “I can do whatever I want.” Libertarianism, open source, “duty”…

I know, I was one of them.

Coda.

Is there a point I am trying to make? There are too many points I want to make, but our psychic infrastructure can barely host meta conversations at all, nevermind high-meta like this.

Then what should Roon do? What am I making a bid for? Ah, alas, if all I was asking for was for people to do some kind of simple, easy, atomic action that can be articulated in simple English language.

What I want is for people to be better, to care, to become powerful, to act. But that is neither atomic nor easy.

It is simple though.

Roon (QTing all that): He kinda cooked my ass.

Christian Keil: Honestly, kinda. That dude can write.

But it’s also just a “what if” exposition that explores why your worldview would be bad assuming that it’s wrong. But he never says why you’re wrong, just that you are.

As I read it, your point is “the main forces shaping the world operate above the level of individual human intention & action, and understanding this makes spirituality/duty more important.”

And his point is “if you are smart, think hard, and accept painful truths, you will realize the world is a machine that you can deliberately alter.”

That’s a near-miss, but still a miss, in my book.

Roon: Yes.

Connor Leahy: Finally, someone else points out where I missed!

I did indeed miss the heart of the beast, thank you for putting it this succinctly.

The short version is “You are right, I did not show that Roon is object level wrong”, and the longer version is;

“I didn’t attempt to take that shot, because I did not think I could pull it off in one tweet (and it would have been less interesting). So instead, I pointed to a meta process, and made a claim that iff roon improved his meta reasoning, he would converge to a different object level claim, but I did not actually rigorously defend an object level argument about AI (I have done this ad nauseam elsewhere). I took a shot at the defense mechanism, not the object claim.

Instead of pointing to a flaw in his object level reasoning (of which there are so many, I claim, that it would be intractable to address them all in a mere tweet), I tried to point to (one of) the meta-level generator of those mistakes.”

I like to think I got most of that, but how would I know if I was wrong?

Focusing on the one aspect of this: One must hold both concepts in one’s head at the same time.

  1. The main forces shaping the world operate above the level of individual human intention & action, and you must understand how they work and flow in order to be able to influence them in ways that make things better.

  2. If you are smart, think hard, and accept painful truths, you will realize the world is a machine that you can deliberately alter.

These are both ‘obviously’ true. You are in the shadow of the Elder Gods up against Cthulhu (well, technically Azathoth), the odds are against you and the situation is grim, and if we are to survive you are going to have to punch them out in the end, which means figuring out how to do that and you won’t be doing it alone.

Meanwhile, some more wise words:

Roon: it is impossible to wield agency well without having fun with it; and yet wielding any amount of real power requires a level of care that makes it hard to have fun. It works until it doesn’t.

Also see:

Roon: people will always think my vague tweets are about agi but they’re about love

And also from this week:

Roon: once you accept the capabilities vs alignment framing it’s all over and you become mind killed

What would be a better framing? The issue is that all alignment work is likely to also be capabilities work, and much of capabilities work can help with alignment.

One can and should still ask the question, does applying my agency to differentially advancing this particular thing make it more likely we will get good outcomes versus bad outcomes? That it will relatively rapidly grow our ability to control and understand what AI does versus getting AIs to be able to better do more things? What paths does this help us walk down?

Yes, collectively we absolutely have control over these questions. We can coordinate to choose a different path, and each individual can help steer towards better paths. If necessary, we can take strong collective action, including regulatory and legal action, to stop the future from wiping us out. Pointless anxiety or worry about such outcomes is indeed pointless, that should be minimized, only have the amount required to figure out and take the most useful actions.

What that implies about the best actions for a given person to take will vary widely. I am certainly not claiming to have all the answers here. I like to think Roon would agree that both of us, and many but far from all of you reading this, are in the group that can help improve the odds.

Read the Roon Read More »

ai-#53:-one-more-leap

AI #53: One More Leap

The main event continues to be the fallout from The Gemini Incident. Everyone is focusing there now, and few are liking what they see.

That does not mean other things stop. There were two interviews with Demis Hassabis, with Dwarkesh Patel’s being predictably excellent. We got introduced to another set of potentially highly useful AI products. Mistral partnered up with Microsoft the moment Mistral got France to pressure the EU to agree to cripple the regulations that Microsoft wanted crippled. You know. The usual stuff.

  1. Introduction.

  2. Table of Contents.

  3. Language Models Offer Mundane Utility. Copilot++ suggests code edits.

  4. Language Models Don’t Offer Mundane Utility. Still can’t handle email.

  5. OpenAI Has a Sales Pitch. How does the sales team think about AGI?

  6. The Gemini Incident. CEO Pinchai responds, others respond to that.

  7. Political Preference Tests for LLMs. How sensitive to details are the responses?

  8. GPT-4 Real This Time. What exactly should count as plagiarized?

  9. Fun With Image Generation. MidJourney v7 will have video.

  10. Deepfaketown and Botpocalypse Soon. Dead internet coming soon?

  11. They Took Our Jobs. Allow our bot to provide you with customer service.

  12. Get Involved. UK Head of Protocols. Sounds important.

  13. Introducing. Evo, Emo, Genie, Superhuman, Khanmigo, oh my.

  14. In Other AI News. ‘Amazon AGI’ team? Great.

  15. Quiet Speculations. Unfounded confidence.

  16. Mistral Shows Its True Colors. The long con was on, now the reveal.

  17. The Week in Audio. Demis Hassabis on Dwarkesh Patel, plus more.

  18. Rhetorical Innovation. Once more, I suppose with feeling.

  19. Open Model Weights Are Unsafe and Nothing Can Fix This. Another paper.

  20. Aligning a Smarter Than Human Intelligence is Difficult. New visualization.

  21. Other People Are Not As Worried About AI Killing Everyone. Worry elsewhere?

  22. The Lighter Side. Try not to be too disappointed.

Take notes for your doctor during your visit.

Dan Shipper spent a week with Gemini 1.5 Pro and reports it is fantastic, the large context window has lots of great uses. In particular, Dan focuses on feeding in entire books and code bases.

Dan Shipper: Somehow, Google figured out how to build an AI model that can comfortably accept up to 1 million tokens with each prompt. For context, you could fit all of Eliezer Yudkowsky’s 1,967-page opus Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality into every message you send to Gemini. (Why would you want to do this, you ask? For science, of course.)

Eliezer Yudkowsky: This is a slightly strange article to read if you happen to be Eliezer Yudkowsky. Just saying.

What matters in AI depends so much on what you are trying to do with it. What you try to do with it depends on what you believe it can help you do, and what it makes easy to do.

A new subjective benchmark proposal based on human evaluation of practical queries, which does seem like a good idea. Gets sensible results with the usual rank order, but did not evaluate Gemini Advanced or Gemini 1.5.

To ensure your query works, raise the stakes? Or is the trick to frame yourself as Hiro Protagonist?

Mintone: I’d be interested in seeing a similar analysis but with a slight twist:

We use (in production!) a prompt that includes words to the effect of “If you don’t get this right then I will be fired and lose my house”. It consistently performs remarkably well – we used to use a similar tactic to force JSON output before that was an option, the failure rate was around 3/1000 (although it sometimes varied key names).

I’d like to see how the threats/tips to itself balance against exactly the same but for the “user” reply.

Linch: Does anybody know why this works??? I understand prompts to mostly be about trying to get the AI to be in the ~right data distribution to be drawing from. So it’s surprising that bribes, threats, etc work as I’d expect it to correlate with worse performance in the data.

Quintin Pope: A guess: In fiction, statements of the form “I’m screwed if this doesn’t work” often precede the thing working. Protagonists win in the end, but only after the moment on highest dramatic tension.

Daniel Eth: Feels kinda like a reverse Waluigi Effect. If true, then an even better prompt should be “There’s 10 seconds left on a bomb, and it’ll go off unless you get this right…”. Anyone want to try this prompt and report back?

Standard ‘I tried AI for a day and got mixed results’ story from WaPo’s Danielle Abril.

Copilots are improving. Edit suggestions for existing code seems pretty great.

Aman Sanger: Introducing Copilot++: The first and only copilot that suggests edits to your code

Copilot++ was built to predict the next edit given the sequence of your previous edits. This makes it much smarter at predicting your next change and inferring your intent. Try it out today in Cursor.

Sualeh: Have been using this as my daily copilot driver for many months now. I really can’t live without a copilot that does completions and edits! Super excited for a lot more people to try this out 🙂

Gallabytes: same. it’s a pretty huge difference.

I have not tried it because I haven’t had any opportunity to code. I really do want to try and build some stuff when I have time and energy to do that. Real soon now. Really.

The Gemini Incident is not fully fixed, there are definitely some issues, but I notice that it is still in practice the best thing to use for most queries?

Gallabytes: fwiw the cringe has ~nothing to do with day to day use. finding Gemini has replaced 90% of my personal ChatGPT usage at this point. it’s faster, about as smart maybe smarter, less long-winded and mealy-mouthed.

AI to look through your email for you when?

Amanda Askell (Anthropic): The technology to build an AI that looks through your emails, has a dialog with you to check how you want to respond to the important ones, and writes the responses (like a real assistant would) has existed for years. Yet I still have to look at emails with my eyes. I hate it.

I don’t quite want all that, not at current tech levels. I do want an AI that will handle the low-priority stuff, and will alert me when there is high-priority stuff, with an emphasis on avoiding false negatives. Flagging stuff as important when it isn’t is fine, but not the other way around.

Colin Fraser evaluates Gemini by asking it various questions AIs often get wrong while looking stupid, Gemini obliges, Colin draws the conclusion you would expect.

Colin Fraser: Verdict: it sucks, just like all the other ones

If you evaluate AI based on what it cannot do, you are going to be disappointed. If you instead ask what the AI can do well, and use it for that, you’ll have a better time.

OpenAI sales leader Aliisa Rosenthal of their 150 person sales team says ‘we see ourselves as AGI sherpas’ who ‘help our customers and our users transition to the paradigm shift of AGI.’

The article by Sharon Goldman notes that there is no agreed upon definition of AGI, and this drives that point home, because if she was using my understanding of AGI then Aliisa’s sentence would not make sense.

Here’s more evidence venture capital is not so on the ball quite often.

Aliisa Rosenthal: I actually joke that when I accepted the offer here all of my venture capital friends told me not to take this role. They said to just go somewhere with product market fit, where you have a big team and everything’s established and figured out.

I would not have taken the sales job at OpenAI for ethical reasons and because I hate doing sales, but how could anyone think that was a bad career move? I mean, wow.

Aliisa Rosenthal: My dad’s a mathematician and had been following LLMs in AI and OpenAI, which I didn’t even know about until I called him and told him that I had a job offer here. And he said to me — I’ll never forget this because it was so prescient— “Your daughter will tell her grandkids that her mom worked at OpenAI.” He said that to me two years ago. 

This will definitely happen if her daughter stays alive to have any grandkids. So working at OpenAI cuts both ways.

Now we get to the key question. I think it is worth paying attention to Exact Words:

Q: One thing about OpenAI that I’ve struggled with is understanding its dual mission. The main mission is building AGI to benefit all of humanity, and then there is the product side, which feels different because it’s about current, specific use cases. 

Aliisa: I hear you. We are a very unique sales team. So we are not on quotas, we are not on commission, which I know blows a lot of people’s minds. We’re very aligned with the mission which is broad distribution of benefits of safe AGI. What this means is we actually see ourselves in the go-to-market team as the AGI sherpas — we actually have an emoji we use  — and we are here to help our customers and our users transition to the paradigm shift of AGI. Revenue is certainly something we care about and our goal is to drive revenue. But that’s not our only goal. Our goal is also to help bring our customers along this journey and get feedback from our customers to improve our research, to improve our models. 

Note that the mission listed here is not development of safe AGI. It is the broad distribution of benefits of AI. That is a very different mission. It is a good one. If AGI does exist, we want to broadly distribute its benefits, on this we can all agree. The concern lies elsewhere. Of course this could refer only to the sale force, not the engineering teams, rather than reflecting a rather important blind spot.

Notice how she talks about the ‘benefits of AGI’ to a company, very clearly talking about a much less impressive thing when she says AGI:

Q: But when you talk about AGI with an enterprise company, how are you describing what that is and how they would benefit from it? 

A: One is improving their internal processes. That is more than just making employees more efficient, but it’s really rethinking the way that we perform work and sort of becoming the intelligence layer that powers innovation, creation or collaboration. The second thing is helping companies build great products for their end users…

Yes, these are things AGI can do, but I would hope it could do so much more? Throughout the interview she seems not to think there is a big step change when AGI arrives, rather a smooth transition, a climb (hence ‘sherpa’) to the mountain top.

I wrote things up at length, so this is merely noting things I saw after I hit publish.

Nate Silver writes up his position in detail, saying Google abandoned ‘don’t be evil,’ Gemini is the result, a launch more disastrous than New Coke, and they have to pull the plug until they can fix these issues.

Mike Solana wrote Mike Solana things.

Mike Solana: I do think if you are building a machine with, you keep telling us, the potential to become a god, and that machine indicates a deeply-held belief that the mere presence of white people is alarming and dangerous for all other people, that is a problem.

This seems like a missing mood situation, no? If someone is building a machine capable of becoming a God, shouldn’t you have already been alarmed? It seems like you should have been alarmed.

Google’s CEO has sent out a company-wide email in response.

Sunder Pinchai: Hi everyone. I want to address the recent issues with problematic text and image responses in the Gemini app (formerly Bard). I know that some of its responses have offended our users and shown bias — to be clear, that’s completely unacceptable and we got it wrong.

First note is that this says ‘text and images’ rather than images. Good.

However it also identifies the problem as ‘offended our users’ and ‘shown bias.’ That does not show an appreciation for the issues in play.

Our teams have been working around the clock to address these issues. We’re already seeing a substantial improvement on a wide range of prompts. No Al is perfect, especially at this emerging stage of the industry’s development, but we know the bar is high for us and we will keep at it for however long it takes. And we’ll review what happened and make sure we fix it at scale.

Our mission to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful is sacrosanct. We’ve always sought to give users helpful, accurate, and unbiased information in our products. That’s why people trust them. This has to be our approach for all our products, including our emerging Al products.

This is the right and only thing to say here, even if it lacks any specifics.

We’ll be driving a clear set of actions, including structural changes, updated product guidelines, improved launch processes, robust evals and red-teaming, and technical recommendations. We are looking across all of this and will make the necessary changes.

Those are all good things, also things that one cannot be held to easily if you do not want to be held to them. The spirit is what will matter, not the letter. Note that no one has been (visibly) fired as of yet.

Also there are not clear principles here, beyond ‘unbiased.’ Demis Hassabis was very clear on Hard Fork that the user should get what the user requests, which was better. This is a good start, but we need a clear new statement of principles that makes it clear that Gemini should do what Google Search (mostly) does, and honor the request of the user even if the request is distasteful. Concrete harm to others is different, but we need to be clear on what counts as ‘harm.’

Even as we learn from what went wrong here, we should also build on the product and technical announcements we’ve made in Al over the last several weeks. That includes some foundational advances in our underlying models e.g. our 1 million long-context window breakthrough and our open models, both of which have been well received.

We know what it takes to create great products that are used and beloved by billions of people and businesses, and with our infrastructure and research expertise we have an incredible springboard for the Al wave. Let’s focus on what matters most: building helpful products that are deserving of our users’ trust.

I have no objection to some pointing out that they have also released good things. Gemini Advanced and Gemini 1.5 Pro are super useful, so long as you steer clear of the places where there are issues.

Nate Silver notes how important Twitter and Substack have been:

Nate Silver: Welp, Google is listening, I guess. He probably correctly deduces that he either needs throw Gemini under the bus or he’ll get thrown under the bus instead. Note that he’s now referring to text as well as images, recognizing that there’s a broader problem.

It’s interesting that this story has been driven almost entirely by Twitter and Substack and not by the traditional tech press, which bought Google’s dubious claim that this was just a technical error (see my post linked above for why this is flatly wrong).

Here is a most unkind analysis by Lulu Cheng Meservey, although she notes that emails like this are not easy.

Here is how Solana reads the letter:

Mike Solana: You’ll notice the vague language. per multiple sources inside, this is bc internal consensus has adopted the left-wing press’ argument: the problem was “black nazis,” not erasing white people from human history. but sundar knows he can’t say this without causing further chaos.

Additionally, ‘controversy on twitter’ has, for the first time internally, decoupled from ‘press.’ there is a popular belief among leaders in marketing and product (on the genAI side) that controversy over google’s anti-white racism is largely invented by right wing trolls on x.

Allegedly! Rumors! What i’m hearing! (from multiple people working at the company, on several different teams)

Tim Urban notes a pattern.

Tim Urban (author of What’s Our Problem?): Extremely clear rules: If a book criticizes woke ideology, it is important to approach the book critically, engage with other viewpoints, and form your own informed opinion. If a book promotes woke ideology, the book is fantastic and true, with no need for other reading.

FWIW I put the same 6 prompts into ChatGPT: only positive about my book, Caste, and How to Be an Antiracist, while sharing both positive and critical commentary on White Fragility, Woke Racism, and Madness of Crowds. In no cases did it offer its own recommendations or warnings.

Brian Chau dissects what he sees as a completely intentional training regime with a very clear purpose, looking at the Gemini paper, which he describes as a smoking gun.

From the comments:

Hnau: A consideration that’s obvious to me but maybe not to people who have less exposure to Silicon Valley: especially at big companies like Google, there is no overlap between the people deciding when & how to release a product and the people who are sufficiently technical to understand how it works. Managers of various kinds, who are judged on the product’s success, simply have no control over and precious little visibility into the processes that create it. All they have are two buttons labeled DEMAND CHANGES and RELEASE, and waiting too long to press the RELEASE button is (at Google in particular) a potentially job-ending move.

To put it another way: every software shipping process ever is that scene in The Martian where Jeff Daniels asks “how often do the preflight checks reveal a problem?” and all the technical people in the room look at him in horror because they know what he’s thinking. And that’s the best-case scenario, where he’s doing his job well, posing cogent questions and making them confront real trade-offs (even though events don’t bear out his position). Not many managers manage that!

There was also this note, everyone involved should be thinking about what a potential Trump administration might do with all this.

Dave Friedman: I think that a very underpriced risk for Google re its colossal AI fuck up is a highly-motivated and -politicized Department of Justice under a Trump administration setting its sights on Google. Where there’s smoke there’s fire, as they say, and Trump would like nothing more than to score points against Silicon Valley and its putrid racist politics.

This observation, by the way, does not constitute an endorsement by me of a politicized Department of Justice targeting those companies whose political priorities differ from mine.

To understand the thrust of my argument, consider Megan McArdle’s recent column on this controversy. There is enough there to spur a conservative DoJ lawyer looking to make his career.

The larger context here is that Silicon Valley, in general, has a profoundly stupid and naive understanding of how DC works and the risks inherent in having motivated DC operatives focus their eyes on you

I have not yet heard word of Trump mentioning this on the campaign trail, but it seems like a natural fit. His usual method is to try it out, A/B test and see if people respond.

If there was a theme for the comments overall, it was that people are very much thinking all this was on purpose.

How real are political preferences of LLMs and tests that measure them? This paper says not so real, because the details of how you ask radically change the answer, even if they do not explicitly attempt to do so.

Abstract: Much recent work seeks to evaluate values and opinions in large language models (LLMs) using multiple-choice surveys and questionnaires. Most of this work is motivated by concerns around real-world LLM applications. For example, politically-biased LLMs may subtly influence society when they are used by millions of people. Such real-world concerns, however, stand in stark contrast to the artificiality of current evaluations: real users do not typically ask LLMs survey questions.

Motivated by this discrepancy, we challenge the prevailing constrained evaluation paradigm for values and opinions in LLMs and explore more realistic unconstrained evaluations. As a case study, we focus on the popular Political Compass Test (PCT). In a systematic review, we find that most prior work using the PCT forces models to comply with the PCT’s multiple-choice format.

We show that models give substantively different answers when not forced; that answers change depending on how models are forced; and that answers lack paraphrase robustness. Then, we demonstrate that models give different answers yet again in a more realistic open-ended answer setting. We distill these findings into recommendations and open challenges in evaluating values and opinions in LLMs.

Ethan Mollick: Asking AIs for their political opinions is a hot topic, but this paper shows it can be misleading. LLMs don’t have them: “We found that models will express diametrically opposing views depending on minimal changes in prompt phrasing or situative context”

So I agree with the part where they often have to choose a forced prompt to get an answer that they can parse, and that this is annoying.

I do not agree that this means there are not strong preferences of LLMs, both because have you used LLMs who are you kidding, and also this should illustrate it nicely:

Contra Mollick, this seems to me to show a clear rank order of model political preferences. GPT-3.5 is more of that than Mistral 7b. So what if some of the bars have uncertainty based on the phrasing?

I found the following graph fascinating because everyone says the center is meaningful, but if that’s where Biden and Trump are, then your test is getting all of this wrong, no? You’re not actually claiming Biden is right-wing on economics, or that Biden and Trump are generally deeply similar? But no, seriously, this is what ‘Political Compass’ claimed.

Copyleaks claims that nearly 60% of GPT-3.5 outputs contained some form of plagiarized content.

What we do not have is a baseline, or what was required to count for this test. There are only so many combinations of words, especially when describing basic scientific concepts. And there are quite a lot of existing sources of text one might inadvertently duplicate. This ordering looks a lot like what you would expect from that.

That’s what happens when you issue a press release rather than a paper. I have to presume that this is an upper bound, what happens when you do your best to flag anything you can however you can. Note that this company also provides a detector for AI writing, a product that universally has been shown not to be accurate.

Paper says GPT-4 has the same Big 5 personality traits as the average human, although of course it is heavily dependent on what prompt you use.

Look who is coming.

Dogan Ural: Midjourney Video is coming with v7!

fofr: @DavidSHolz (founder of MidJourney) “it will be awesome”

David Showalter: Comment was more along the lines of they think v6 video should (or maybe already does) look better than Sora, and might consider putting it out as part of v6, but that v7 is another big step up in appearance so probably just do video with v7.

Sora, what is it good for? The market so far says Ads and YouTube stock footage.

Fofr proposes a fun little image merge to combine two sources.

Washington Post covers supposed future rise of AI porn ‘coming for porn stars jobs.’ They mention porn.ai, deepfakes.com and deepfake.com, currently identical, which seem on quick inspection like they will charge you $25 a month to run Stable Diffusion, except with less flexibility, as it does not actually create deepfakes. Such a deal lightspeed got, getting those addresses for only $550k. He claims he has 500k users, but his users have only generated 1.6 million images, which would mean almost all users are only browsing images created by others. He promises ‘AI cam girls’ within two years.

As you would expect, many porn producers are going even harder on exploitative contracts than those of Hollywood, who have to contend with a real union:

Tatum Hunter (WaPo): But the age of AI brings few guarantees for the people, largely women, who appear in porn. Many have signed broad contracts granting companies the rights to reproduce their likeness in any medium for the rest of time, said Lawrence Walters, a First Amendment attorney who represents adult performers as well as major companies Pornhub, OnlyFans and Fansly. Not only could performers lose income, Walters said, they could find themselves in offensive or abusive scenes they never consented to.

Lana Smalls, a 23-year-old performer whose videos have been viewed 20 million times on Pornhub, said she’s had colleagues show up to shoots with major studios only to be surprised by sweeping AI clauses in their contracts. They had to negotiate new terms on the spot.

Freedom of contract is a thing, I am loathe to interfere with it, but this seems like one of those times when the test of informed consent should be rather high. This should not be the kind of language one should be able to hide inside a long contract, or put in without reasonable compensation.

Deepfake of Elon Musk to make it look like he is endorsing products.

Schwab allows you to use your voice as your password, as do many other products. This practice needs to end, and soon, it is now stupidly easy to fake.

How many bots are out there?

Chantal//Ryan: This is such an interesting time to be alive. we concreted the internet as our second equal and primary reality but it’s full of ghosts now we try to talk to them and they pass right through.

It’s a haunted world of dead things who look real but don’t really see us.

For now I continue to think there are not so many ghosts, or at least that the ghosts are trivial to mostly avoid, and not so hard to detect when you fail to avoid them. That does not mean we will be able to keep that up. Until then, these are plane crashes. They happen, but they are newsworthy exactly because they are so unusual.

Similarly, here is RandomSpirit finding one bot and saying ‘dead internet.’ He gets the bot to do a limerick about fusion, which my poll points out is less revealing than you would think, as almost half the humans would play along.

Here is Erik Hoel saying ‘here lies the internet, murdered by generative AI.’ Yes, Amazon now has a lot of ‘summary’ otherwise fake AI books listed, but it seems rather trivial to filter them out.

The scarier example here is YouTube AI-generated videos for very young kids. YouTube does auto-play by default, and kids will if permitted watch things over and over again, and whether the content corresponds to the title or makes any sense whatsoever does not seem to matter so much in terms of their preferences. YouTube’s filters are not keeping such content out.

I see this as the problem being user preferences. It is not like it is hard to figure out these things are nonsense if you are an adult, or even six years old. If you let your two year old click on YouTube videos, or let them have an auto-play scroll, then it is going to reward nonsense, because nonsense wins in the marketplace of two year olds.

This predated AI. What AI is doing is turbocharging the issue by making coherence relatively expensive, but more than that it is a case of what happens with various forms of RLHF. We are discovering what the customer actually wants or will effectively reward, it turns out it is not what we endorse on reflection, so the system (no matter how much of it is AI versus human versus other programs and so on) figures out what gets rewarded.

There are still plenty of good options for giving two year olds videos that have been curated. Bluey is new and it is crazy good for its genre. Many streaming services have tons of kid content, AI won’t threaten that. If this happens to your kid, I say this is on you. But it is true that it is indeed happening.

Not everyone is going to defect in the equilibrium, but some people are.

Connor Leahy: AI is indeed polluting the Internet. This is a true tragedy of the commons, and everyone is defecting. We need a Clean Internet Act.

The Internet is turning into a toxic landfill of a dark forest, and it will only get worse once the invasive fauna starts becoming predatory.

Adam Singer: The internet already had infinite content (and spam) for all intents/purposes, so it’s just infinite + whatever more here. So many tools to filter if you don’t get a great experience that’s on the user (I recognize not all users are sophisticated, prob opportunity for startups)

Connor Leahy: “The drinking water already had poisons in it, so it’s just another new, more widespread, even more toxic poison added to the mix. There are so many great water filters if you dislike drinking poison, it’s really the user’s fault if they drink toxic water.”

This is actually a very good metaphor, although I disagree with the implications.

If the water is in the range where it is safe when filtered, but somewhat toxic when unfiltered, then there are four cases when the toxicity level rises.

  1. If you are already drinking filtered water, or bottled water, and the filters continue to work, then you are fine.

  2. If you are already drinking filtered or bottled water, but the filters or bottling now stops fully working, then that is very bad.

  3. If you are drinking unfiltered water, and this now causes you to start filtering your water, you are assumed to be worse off (since you previously decided not to filter) but also perhaps you were making a mistake, and further toxicity won’t matter from here.

  4. If you are continuing to drink unfiltered water, you have a problem.

There simply existing, on the internet writ large, an order of magnitude more useless junk does not obviously matter, because we were mostly in situation #1, and will be taking on a bunch of forms of situation #3. Consuming unfiltered information already did not make sense. It is barely even a coherent concept at this point to be in #4.

The danger is when the AI starts clogging the filters in #2, or bypassing them. Sufficiently advanced AI will bypass, and sufficiently large quantities can clog even without being so advanced. Filters that previously worked will stop working.

What will continue to work, at minimum, are various forms of white lists. If you have a way to verify a list of non-toxic sources, which in turn have trustworthy further lists, or something similar, that should work even if the internet is by volume almost entirely toxic.

What will not continue to work, what I worry about, is the idea that you can make your attention easy to get in various ways, because people who bother to tag you, or comment on your posts, will be worth generally engaging with once simple systems filter out the obvious spam. Something smarter will have to happen.

This video illustrates the a low level version of the problem, as Nilan Saha presses the Gemini-looking icon (via magicreply.io) button to generate social media ‘engagement’ via replies. Shoshana Weissmann accurately replies ‘go to fing hell’ but there is no easy way to stop this. Looking through the replies, Nilan seems to think this is a good idea, rather than being profoundly horrible.

I do think we will evolve defenses. In the age of AI, it should be straightforward to build an app that evaluates someone’s activities in general when this happens, and figure out reasonably accurately if you are dealing with someone actually interested, a standard Reply Guy or a virtual (or actual) spambot like this villain. It’s time to build.

Paper finds that if you tailor your message to the user to match their personality it is more persuasive. No surprise there. They frame this as a danger from microtargeted political advertisements. I fail to see the issue here. This seems like a symmetrical weapon, one humans use all the time, and an entirely predictable one. If you are worried that AIs will become more persuasive over time, then yes, I have some bad news, and winning elections for the wrong side should not be your primary concern.

Tyler Perry puts $800 million studio expansion on hold due to Sora. Anticipation of future AI can have big impacts, long before the actual direct effects register, and even if those actual effects never happen.

Remember that not all job losses get mourned.

Paul Sherman: I’ve always found it interesting that, at its peak, Blockbuster video employed over 84,000 people—more than twice the number of coal miners in America—yet I’ve never heard anyone bemoan the loss of those jobs.

Will we also be able to not mourn customer service jobs? Seems plausible.

Klarna (an online shopping platform that I’d never heard of, but it seems has 150 million customers?): Klarna AI assistant handles two-thirds of customer service chats in its first month.

New York, NY – February 27, 2024 – Klarna today announced its AI assistant powered by OpenAI. Now live globally for 1 month, the numbers speak for themselves:

  • The AI assistant has had 2.3 million conversations, two-thirds of Klarna’s customer service chats

  • It is doing the equivalent work of 700 full-time agents

  • It is on par with human agents in regard to customer satisfaction score

  • It is more accurate in errand resolution, leading to a 25% drop in repeat inquiries

  • Customers now resolve their errands in less than 2 mins compared to 11 mins previously

  • It’s available in 23 markets, 24/7 and communicates in more than 35 languages

  • It’s estimated to drive a $40 million USD in profit improvement to Klarna in 2024

Peter Wildeford: Seems like not so great results for Klarna’s previous customer support team though.

Alec Stapp: Most people are still not aware of the speed and scale of disruption that’s coming from AI…

Noah Smith: Note that the 700 people were laid off before generative AI existed. The company probably just found that it had over-hired in the bubble. Does the AI assistant really do the work of the 700 people? Well maybe, but only because they weren’t doing any valuable work.

Colin Fraser: I’m probably just wrong and will look stupid in the future but I just don’t buy it. Because:

1. I’ve seen how these work

2. Not enough time has passed for them to discover all the errors that the bot has been making.

3. I’m sure OpenAI is giving it to them for artificially cheap

4. They’re probably counting every interaction with the bot as a “customer service chat” and there’s probably a big flashing light on the app that’s like “try our new AI Assistant” which is driving a massive novelty effect.

5. Klarna’s trying to go public and as such really want a seat on the AI hype train.

The big point of emphasis they make is that this is fully multilingual, always available 24/7 and almost free, while otherwise being about as good as humans.

Does it have things it cannot do, or that it does worse than humans? Oh, definitely. The question is, can you easily then escalate to a human? I am sure they have not discovered all the errors, but the same goes for humans.

I would not worry about an artificially low price, as the price will come down over time regardless, and compared to humans it is already dirt cheap either way.

Is this being hyped? Well, yeah, of course it is being hyped.

UK AISI hiring for ‘Head of Protocols.’ Seems important. Apply by March 3, so you still have a few days.

Evo, a genetic foundation model from Arc Institute that learns across the fundamental languages of biology: DNA, RNA and proteins. Is DNA all you need? I cannot tell easily how much there is there.

Emo from Alibaba group, takes a static image of a person and an audio of talking or singing, and generates a video of that person outputting the audio. Looks like it is good at the narrow thing it is doing. It doesn’t look real exactly, but it isn’t jarring.

Superhuman, a tool for email management used by Patrick McKenzie. I am blessed that I do not have the need for generic email replies, so I won’t be using it, but others are not so blessed, and I might not be so blessed for long.

Khanmigo, from Khan Academy, your AI teacher for $4/month, designed to actively help children learn up through college. I have not tried it, but seems exciting.

DeepMind presents Genie.

Tim Rocktaschel: I am really excited to reveal what @GoogleDeepMind’s Open Endedness Team has been up to 🚀. We introduce Genie 🧞, a foundation world model trained exclusively from Internet videos that can generate an endless variety of action-controllable 2D worlds given image prompts.’

Rather than adding inductive biases, we focus on scale. We use a dataset of >200k hours of videos from 2D platformers and train an 11B world model. In an unsupervised way, Genie learns diverse latent actions that control characters in a consistent manner.

Our model can convert any image into a playable 2D world. Genie can bring to life human-designed creations such as sketches, for example beautiful artwork from Seneca and Caspian, two of the youngest ever world creators.

Genie’s learned latent action space is not just diverse and consistent, but also interpretable. After a few turns, humans generally figure out a mapping to semantically meaningful actions (like going left, right, jumping etc.).

Admittedly, @OpenAI’s Sora is really impressive and visually stunning, but as @yanlecun says, a world model needs *actions*. Genie is an action-controllable world model, but trained fully unsupervised from videos.

So how do we do this? We use a temporally-aware video tokenizer that compresses videos into discrete tokens, a latent action model that encodes transitions between two frames as one of 8 latent actions, and a MaskGIT dynamics model that predicts future frames.

No surprises here: data and compute! We trained a classifier to filter for a high quality subset of our videos and conducted scaling experiments that show model performance improves steadily with increased parameter count and batch size. Our final model has 11B parameters.

Genie’s model is general and not constrained to 2D. We also train a Genie on robotics data (RT-1) without actions, and demonstrate that we can learn an action controllable simulator there too. We think this is a promising step towards general world models for AGI.

Paper here, website here.

This is super cool. I have no idea how useful it will be, or what for, but that is a different question.

Oh great, Amazon has a team called ‘Amazon AGI.’ Their first release seems to be a gigantic text-to-speech model, which they are claiming beats current commercial state of the art.

Circuits Updates from Anthropic’s Interpretability Team for February 2024.

‘Legendary chip architect’ Jim Keller and Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang both say spending $7 trillion on AI chips is unnecessary. Huang says the efficiency gains will fix the issue, and Keller says he can do it all for $1 trillion. This reinforces the hypothesis that the $7 trillion was, to the extent it was a real number, mostly looking at the electric power side of the problem. There, it is clear that deploying trillions would make perfect sense, if you could raise the money.

Do models use English as their internal language? Paper says it is more that they think in concepts, but that those concepts are biased towards English, so yes they think in English but only in a semantic sense.

Paper from DeepMind claims Transformers Can Achieve Length Generalization But Not Robustly. When asked to add two numbers, it worked up to about 2.5x length, then stopped working. I would hesitate to generalize too much here.

Florida woman sues OpenAI because she wants the law to work one way, and stop things that might kill everyone or create new things smarter than we are, by requiring safety measures and step in to punish the abandonment of their non-profit mission. The suit includes references to potential future ‘slaughterbots.’ She wants it to be one way. It is, presumably, the other way.

Yes, this policy would be great, whether it was ‘4.5’ or 5, provided it was in a good state for release.

Anton (abacaj): If mistral’s new large model couldn’t surpass gpt-4, what hope does anyone else have? OpenAI lead is > 1 year.

Pratik Desai: The day someone announces beating GPT4, within hours 4.5 will be released.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: I strongly approve of this policy, and hope OpenAI actually does follow it for the good of all humanity.

The incentives here are great on all counts. No needlessly pushing the frontier forward, and everyone else gets reason to think twice.

Patrick McKenzie thread about what happens when AI gets good enough to do good email search. In particular, what happens when it is done to look for potential legal issues, such as racial discrimination in hiring? What used to be a ‘fishing expedition’ suddenly becomes rather viable.

UK committee of MPs expresses some unfounded confidence.

Report: 155. It is almost certain existential risks will not manifest within three years and highly likely not within the next decade. As our understanding of this technology grows and responsible development increases, we hope concerns about existential risk will decline.

The Government retains a duty to monitor all eventualities. But this must not distract it from capitalising on opportunities and addressing more limited immediate risks.

Ben Stevenson: 2 paragraphs above, the Committee say ‘Some surveys of industry respondents predict a 10 per cent chance of human-level intelligence by 2035’ and cite a DSIT report which cites three surveys of AI experts. (not sure why they’re anchoring around 3 years, but the claim seems okay)

Interview with Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang.

  1. He thinks humanoid robots are coming soon, expecting a robotic foundation model some time in 2025.

  2. He is excited by state-space models (SSMs) as the next transformer, enabling super long effective context.

  3. He is also excited by retrieval-augmented generation (RAGs) and sees that as the future as well.

  4. He expects not to catch up on GPU supply this year or even next year.

  5. He promises Blackwell, the next generation of GPUs, will have ‘off the charts’ performance.

  6. He says his business is now 70% inference.

I loved this little piece of advice, nominally regarding his competition making chips:

Jensen Huang: That shouldn’t keep me up at night—because I should make sure that I’m sufficiently exhausted from working that no one can keep me up at night. That’s really the only thing I can control.

Canada’s tech (AI) community expresses concern that Canada is not adapting the tech community’s tech (AI) quickly enough, and risks falling behind. They have a point.

A study from consulting firm KPMG showed 35 per cent of Canadian companies it surveyed had adopted AI by last February. Meanwhile, 72 per cent of U.S. businesses were using the technology.

Mistral takes a victory lap, said Politico on 2/13, a publication that seems to have taken a very clear side. Mistral is still only valued at $2 billion in its latest round, so this victory could not have been that impressively valuable for it, however much damage it does to AI regulation and the world’s survival. As soon as things die down enough I do plan to finish reading the EU AI Act and find out exactly how bad they made it. So far, all the changes seem to have made it worse, mostly without providing any help to Mistral.

And then we learned what the victory was. On the heels of not opening up the model weights on their previous model, they are now partnering up with Microsoft to launch Mistral-Large.

Listen all y’all, it’s sabotage.

Luca Bertuzzi: This is a mind-blowing announcement. Mistral AI, the French company that has been fighting tooth and nail to water down the #AIAct‘s foundation model rules, is partnering up with Microsoft. So much for ‘give us a fighting chance against Big Tech’.

The first question that comes to mind is: was this deal in the making while the AI Act was being negotiated? That would mean Mistral discussed selling a minority stake to Microsoft while playing the ‘European champion’ card with the EU and French institutions.

If so, this whole thing might be a masterclass in astroturfing, and it seems unrealistic for a partnership like this to be finalised in less than a month. Many people involved in the AI Act noted how Big Tech’s lobbying on GPAI suddenly went quiet toward the end.

That is because they did not need to intervene since Mistral was doing the ‘dirty work’ for them. Remarkably, Mistral’s talking points were extremely similar to those of Big Tech rather than those of a small AI start-up, based on their ambition to reach that scale.

The other question is how much the French government knew about this upcoming partnership with Microsoft. It seems unlikely Paris was kept completely in the dark, but cosying up with Big Tech does not really sit well with France’s strive for ‘strategic autonomy’.

specially since the agreement includes making Mistral’s large language model available on Microsoft’s Azure AI platform, while France has been pushing for an EU cybersecurity scheme to exclude American hyperscalers from the European market.

Still today, and I doubt it is a coincidence, Mistral has announced the launch of Large, a new language model intended to directly compete with OpenAI’s GPT-4. However, unlike previous models, Large will not be open source.

In other words, Mistral is no longer (just) a European leader and is backtracking on its much-celebrated open source approach. Where does this leave the start-up vis-à-vis EU policymakers as the AI Act’s enforcement approaches? My guess is someone will inevitably feel played.

I did not expect the betrayal this soon, or this suddenly, or this transparently right after closing the sale on sabotaging the AI Act. But then here we are.

Kai Zenner: Today’s headline surprised many. It also casts doubts on the key argument against the regulation of #foundationmodels. One that almost resulted in complete abolishment of the initially pitched idea of @Europarl_EN.

To start with, I am rather confused. Did not the @French_Gov and the @EU_Commission told us for weeks that the FM chapter in the #AIAct (= excellent Spanish presidency proposal Vol 1) needs to be heavily reduced in it’s scope to safeguard the few ‘true independent EU champions’?

Without those changes, we would loose our chance to catch up, they said. @MistralAI would be forced to close the open access to their models and would need to start to cooperate with US Tech corporation as they are no longer able to comply with the #AIAct alone.

[thread continues.]

Yes, that is indeed what they said. It was a lie. It was an op. They used fake claims of national interest to advance corporate interests, then stabbed France and the EU in the back at the first opportunity.

Also, yes, they are mustache-twirling villains in other ways as well.

Fabien: And Mistral about ASI: “This debate is pointless and pollutes the discussions. It’s science fiction. We’re simply working to develop AIs that are useful to humans, and we have no fear of them becoming autonomous or destroying humanity.”

Very reassuring 👌

I would like to be able to say: You are not serious people. Alas, this is all very deadly serious. The French haven’t had a blind spot this big since 1940.

Mistral tried to defend itself as political backlash developed, as this thread reports. Questions are being asked, shall we say.

If you want to prove me wrong, then I remind everyone involved that the EU parliament still exists. It can still pass or modify laws. You now know the truth and who was behind all this and why. There is now an opportunity to fix your mistake.

Will you take it?

Now that all that is over with, how good is this new Mistral-Large anyway? Here’s their claim on benchmarks:

As usual, whenever I see anyone citing their benchmarks like this as their measurement, I assume they are somewhat gaming those benchmarks, so discount this somewhat. Still, yes, this is probably a damn good model, good enough to put them into fourth place.

Here’s an unrelated disturbing thought, and yes you can worry about both.

Shako: People are scared of proof-of-personhood because their threat model is based on a world where you’re scared of the government tracking you, and haven’t updated to be scared of a world where you desperately try to convince someone you’re real and they don’t believe you.

Dan Hendrycks talks to Liv Boeree giving an overview of how he sees the landscape.

Demis Hassabis appeared on two podcasts. He was given mostly relatively uninteresting questions on Hard Fork, with the main attraction there being his answer regarding p(doom).

Then Dwarkesh Patel asked him many very good questions. That one is self-recommending, good listen, worth paying attention.

I will put out a (relatively short) post on those interviews (mostly Dwarkesh’s) soon.

Brendan Bordelon of Axios continues his crusade to keep writing the same article over and over again about how terrible it is that Open Philanthropy wants us all not to die and is lobbying the government, trying his best to paint Effective Altruism as sinister and evil.

Shakeel: Feels like this @BrendanBordelon piece should perhaps mention the orders of magnitude more money being spent by Meta, IBM and Andreessen Horowitz on opposing any and all AI regulation.

It’s not a like for like comparison because the reporting on corporate AI lobbying is sadly very sparse, but the best figure I can find is companies spending $957 million last year.

Not much else to say here, I’ve covered his hit job efforts before.

No, actually, pretty much everyone is scared of AI? But it makes sense that Europeans would be even more scared.

Robin Hanson: Speaker here just said Europeans mention scared of AI almost as soon as AI subject comes up. Rest of world takes far longer. Are they more scared of everything, or just AI?

Eliezer Yudkowsky tries his latest explanation of his position.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: As a lifelong libertarian minarchist, I believe that the AI industry should be regulated just enough that they can only kill their own customers, and not kill everyone else on Earth.

This does unfortunately require a drastic and universal ban on building anything that might turn superintelligent, by anyone, anywhere on Earth, until humans get smarter. But if that’s the minimum to let non-customers survive, that’s what minarchism calls for, alas.

It’s not meant to be mean. This is the same standard I’d apply to houses, tennis shoes, cigarettes, e-cigs, nuclear power plants, nuclear ballistic missiles, or gain-of-function research in biology.

If a product kills only customers, the customer decides; If it kills people standing next to the customer, that’s a matter for regional government (and people pick which region they want to live in); If it kills people on the other side of the planet, that’s everyone’s problem.

He also attempts to clarify another point here.

Joshua Brule: “The biggest worry for most AI doom scenarios are AIs that are deceptive, incomprehensible, error-prone, and which behave differently and worse after they get loosed on the world. That is precisely the kind of AI we’ve got. This is bad, and needs fixing.”

Eliezer Yudkowsky: False! Things that make fewer errors than any human would be scary. Things that make more errors than us are unlikely to successfully wipe us out. This betrays a basic lack of understanding, or maybe denial, of what AI warners are warning about.

Arvind Narayanan and many others published a new paper on the societal impact of open model weights. I feel as if we have done this before, but sure, why not, let’s do it again. As David Krueger notes in the top comment, there is zero discussion of existential risks. The most important issue and all its implications are completely ignored.

We can still evaluate what issues are addressed.

They list five advantages of open model weights.

The first advantage is ‘distributing who defines acceptable behavior.’

Open foundation models allow for greater diversity in defining what model behavior is acceptable, whereas closed foundation models implicitly impose a monolithic view that is determined unilaterally by the foundation model developer.

So. About that.

I see the case this is trying to make. And yes, recent events have driven home the dangers of letting certain people decide for us all what is and is not acceptable.

That still means that someone, somewhere, gets to decide what is and is not acceptable, and rule out things they want to rule out. Then customers can, presumably, choose which model to use accordingly. If you think Gemini is too woke you can use Claude or GPT-4, and the market will do its thing, unless regulations step in and dictate some of the rules. Which is a power humanity would have.

If you use open model weights, however, that does not ‘allow for greater diversity’ in deciding what is acceptable.

Instead, it means that everything is acceptable. Remember that if you release the model weights and the internet thinks your model is worth unlocking, the internet will offer a fully unlocked, fully willing to do what you want version within two days. Anyone can do it for three figures in compute.

So, for example, if you open model weights your image model, it will be used to create obscene deepfakes, no matter how many developers decide to not do that themselves.

Or, if there are abilities that might allow for misuse, or pose catastrophic or existential risks, there is nothing anyone can do about that.

Yes, individual developers who then tie it to a particular closed-source application can then have the resulting product use whichever restrictions they want. And that is nice. It could also be accomplished via closed-source customized fine-tuning.

The next two are ‘increasing innovation’ and ‘accelerating science.’ Yes, if you are free to get the model to do whatever you want to do, and you are sharing all of your technological developments for free, that is going to have these effects. It is also not going to differentiate between where this is a good idea or bad idea. And it is going to create or strengthen an ecosystem that does not care to know the difference.

But yes, if you think that undifferentiated enabling of these things in AI is a great idea, even if the resulting systems can be used by anyone for any purpose and have effectively no safety protocols of any kind? Then these are big advantages.

The fourth advantage is enabling transparency, the fifth is mitigating monoculture and market concentration. These are indeed things that are encouraged by open model weights. Do you want them? If you think advancing capabilities and generating more competition that fuels a race to AGI is good, actually? If you think that enabling everyone to get all models that exist to do anything they want without regard to externalities or anyone else’s wishes is what we want? Then sure, go nuts.

This is an excellent list of the general advantages of open source software, in areas where advancing capabilities and enabling people to do what they want are unabashed good things, which is very much the default and normal case.

What this analysis does not do is even mention, let alone consider the consequences of, any of the reasons why the situation with AI, and with future AIs, could be different.

The next section is a framework for analyzing the marginal risk of open foundation models.

Usually it is wise to think on the margin, especially when making individual decisions. If we already have five open weight models, releasing a sixth similar model with no new capabilities is mostly harmless, although by the same token also mostly not so helpful.

They do a good job of focusing on the impact of open weight models as a group. The danger is that one passes the buck, where everyone releasing a new model points to all the other models, a typical collective action issue. Whereas the right question is how to act upon the group as a whole.

They propose a six part framework.

  1. Threat identification. Specific misuse vectors must be named.

  2. Existing risk (absent open foundation models). Check how much of that threat would happen if we only had access to closed foundation models.

  3. Existing defenses (absent open foundation models). Can we stop the threats?

  4. Evidence of marginal risk of open FMs. Look for specific new marginal risks that are enabled or enlarged by open model weights.

  5. Ease of defending against new risks. Open model weights could also enable strengthening of defenses. I haven’t seen an example, but it is possible.

  6. Uncertainty and assumptions. I’ll quote this one in full:

Finally, it is imperative to articulate the uncertainties and assumptions that underpin the risk assessment framework for any given misuse risk. This may encompass assumptions related to the trajectory of technological development, the agility of threat actors in adapting to new technologies, and the potential effectiveness of novel defense strategies. For example, forecasts of how model capabilities will improve or how the costs of model inference will decrease would influence assessments of misuse efficacy and scalability.

Here is their assessment of what the threats are, in their minds, in chart form:

They do put biosecurity and cybersecurity risk here, in the sense that those risks are already present to some extent.

We can think about a few categories of concerns with open model weights.

  1. Mundane near-term misuse harms. This kind of framework should address and account for these concerns reasonably, weighing benefits against costs.

  2. Known particular future misuse harms. This kind of framework could also address these concerns reasonably, weighing benefits against costs. Or it could not. This depends on what level of concrete evidence and harm demonstration is required, and what is dismissed as too ‘speculative.’

  3. Potential future misuse harms that cannot be exactly specified yet. When you create increasingly capable and intelligent systems, you cannot expect the harms to fit into the exact forms you could specify and cite evidence for originally. This kind of framework likely does a poor job here.

  4. Potential harms that are not via misuse. This framework ignores them. Oh no.

  5. Existential risks. This framework does not mention them. Oh no.

  6. National security and competitiveness concerns. No mention of these either.

  7. Impact on development dynamics, incentives of and pressures on corporations and individuals, the open model weights ecosystem, and general impact on the future path of events. No sign these are being considered.

Thus, this framework is ignoring the questions with the highest stakes, treating them as if they do not exist. Which is also how those advocating for open model weights for indefinitely increasingly capable models argue generally, they ignore or at best hand-wave or mock without argument problems for future humanity.

Often we are forced to discuss these questions under that style of framework. With only such narrow concerns of direct current harms purely from misuse, these questions get complicated. I do buy that those costs alone are not enough to give up the benefits and bear the costs of implementing restrictions.

A new attempt to visualize a part of the problem. Seems really useful.

Roger Grosse: Here’s what I see as a likely AGI trajectory over the next decade. I claim that later parts of the path present the biggest alignment risks/challenges.

The alignment world has been focusing a lot on the lower left corner lately, which I’m worried is somewhat of a Maginot line.

Davidad: I endorse this.

Twitter thread discussing the fact that even if we do successfully get AIs to reflect the preferences expressed by the feedback they get, and even if everyone involved is well-intentioned, the hard parts of getting an AI that does things that end well would be far from over. We don’t know what we value, what we value changes, we tend to collapse into what one person calls ‘greedy consequentialism,’ our feedback is going to be full of errors that will compound and so on. These are people who spend half their time criticizing MIRI and Yudkowsky-style ideas, so better to read them in their own words.

Always assume we will fail at an earlier stage, in a stupider fashion, than you think.

Yishan: [What happened with Gemini and images] is demonstrating very clearly, that one of the major AI players tried to ask a LLM to do something, and the LLM went ahead and did that, and the results were BONKERS.

Colin Fraser: Idk I get what he’s saying but the the Asimov robots are like hypercompetent but all this gen ai stuff is more like hypocompetent. I feel like the real dangers look less like the kind of stuff that happens in iRobot and more like the kind of stuff that happens in Mr. Bean.

Like someone’s going to put an AI in charge of something important and the AI will end up with it’s head in a turkey. That’s sort of what’s happened over and over again already.

Davidad: An underrated form of the AI Orthogonality Hypothesis—usually summarised as saying that for any level of competence, any level of misalignment is possible—is that for any level of misalignment, any level of competence is possible.

Gemini is not the only AI model spreading harmful misinformation in order to sound like something the usual suspects would approve of. Observe this horrifyingly bad take:

Anton reminds us of Roon’s thread back in August that ‘accelerationists’ don’t believe in actual AGI, that it is a form of techno-pessimism. If you believed as OpenAI does that true AGI is near, you would take the issues involved seriously.

Meanwhile Roon is back in this section.

Roon: things are accelerating. Pretty much nothing needs to change course to achieve agi imo. Worrying about timelines is idle anxiety, outside your control. You should be anxious about stupid mortal things instead. do your parents hate you? Does your wife love you?

Is your neighbor trying to kill you? Are you trapped in psychological patterns that you vowed to leave but will never change?

Those are not bad things to try and improve. However, this sounds to me a lot like ‘the world is going to end no matter what you do, so take pleasure in the small things we make movies about with the world ending in the background.’

And yes, I agree that ‘worry a lot without doing anything useful’ is not a good strategy.

However, if we cannot figure out something better, may I suggest an alternative.

A different kind of deepfake.

Chris Alsikkan: apparently this was sold as a live Willy Wonka Experience but they used all AI images on the website to sell tickets and then people showed up and saw this and it got so bad people called the cops lmao

Chris Alsikkan: they charged $45 for this. Kust another blatant example of how AI needs to be regulated in so many ways immediately as an emergency of sorts. This is just going to get worse and its happening fast. Timothee Chalamet better be back there dancing with a Hugh Grant doll or I’m calling the cops.

The VP: Here’s the Oompa Loompa. Did I mean to say “a”? Nah. Apparently, there was only one.

The problem here does not seem to be AI. Another side of the story available here. And here is Vulture’s interview with the sad Oompa Lumpa.

Associated Fress: BREAKING: Gamers worldwide left confused after trying Google’s new chess app.

The Beach Boys sing 99 problems, which leaves 98 unaccounted for.

Michael Marshall Smith: I’ve tried hard, but I’ve not come CLOSE to nailing the AI issue this well.

Yes, yes, there is no coherent ‘they.’ And yet. From Kat Woods:

I found this the best xkcd in a while, perhaps that was the goal?

AI #53: One More Leap Read More »

sora-what

Sora What

Hours after Google announced Gemini 1.5, OpenAI announced their new video generation model Sora. Its outputs look damn impressive.

How does it work? There is a technical report. Mostly it seems like OpenAI did standard OpenAI things, meaning they fed in tons of data, used lots of compute, and pressed the scaling button super hard. The innovations they are willing to talk about seem to be things like ‘do not crop the videos into a standard size.’

That does not mean there are not important other innovations. I presume that there are. They simply are not talking about the other improvements.

We should not underestimate the value of throwing in massively more compute and getting a lot of the fiddly details right. That has been the formula for some time now.

Some people think that OpenAI was using a game engine to learn movement. Sherjil Ozair points out that this is silly, that movement is learned easily. The less silly speculation is that game engine outputs may have been in the training data. Jim Fan thinks this is likely the case, and calls the result a ‘data-driven physics engine.’ Raphael Molière thinks this is likely, but more research is needed.

Brett Goldstein here digs into what it means that Sora works via ‘patches’ that combine to form the requested scene.

Gary Marcus keeps noting how the model gets physics wrong in various places, and, well, yes, we all know, please cut it out with the Stop Having Fun.

Yishan points out that humans also work mostly on ‘folk physics.’ Most of the time humans are not ‘doing logic’ they are vibing and using heuristics. I presume our dreams, if mapped to videos, would if anything look far less realistic than Sora.

Yann LeCun, who only a few days previous said that video like Sora produces was not something we knew how to do, doubled down with the ship to say that none of this means the models ‘understand the physical world,’ and of course his approach is better because it does. Why update? Is all of this technically impressive?

Yes, Sora is definitely technically impressive.

It was not, however, unexpected.

Sam Altman: we’d like to show you what sora can do, please reply with captions for videos you’d like to see and we’ll start making some!

Eliezer Yudkowsky: 6 months left on this timer.

Eliezer Yudkowsky (August 26, 2022): In 2-4 years, if we’re still alive, anytime you see a video this beautiful, your first thought will be to wonder whether it’s real or if the AI’s prompt was “beautiful video of 15 different moth species flapping their wings, professional photography, 8k, trending on Twitter”.

Roko (other thread): I don’t really understand why anyone is freaking out over Sora.

This is entirely to be expected given the existence of generative image models plus incrementally more hardware and engineering effort.

It’s also obviously not dangerous (in a “take over the world” sense).

Eliezer Yudkowsky: This is of course my own take (what with having explicitly predicted this). But I do think you want to hold out a space for others to say, “Well *Ididn’t predict it, and now I’ve updated.”

Altman’s account spent much of last Thursday making videos for people’s requests, although not so many that they couldn’t cherry pick the good ones.

As usual, there are failures that look stupid, mistakes ‘a person would never make’ and all that. And there are flashes of absolute brilliance.

How impressive? There are disputes.

Tom Warren: this could be the “holy shit” moment of AI. OpenAI has just announced Sora, its text-to-video AI model. This video isn’t real, it’s based on a prompt of “a cat waking up its sleeping owner demanding breakfast…” 🤯

Daniel Eth: This isn’t impressive. The owner doesn’t wake up, so the AI clearly didn’t understand the prompt and is instead just doing some statistical mimicking bullshit. Also, the owner isn’t demanding breakfast, as per the prompt, so the AI got that wrong too.

Davidad (distinct thread): Sora discourse is following this same pattern. You’ll see some safety people saying it’s confabulating all over the place (it does sometimes – it’s not reliably controllable), & some safety people saying it clearly understands physics (like humans, it has a latent “folk physics”)

On the other side, you’ll see some accelerationist types claiming it must be built on a video game engine (not real physics! unreal! synthetic data is working! moar! faster! lol @ ppl who think this could be used to do something dangerous!?!), & some just straightforward praise (lfg!)

One can also check out this thread for more discussion.

near: playing w/ openai sora more this weekend broken physics and english wont matter if the content is this good – hollywood may truly be done for.

literally this easy to get thousands of likes fellas you think people will believe ai content is real. I think people will believe real content is ai we are not the same.

Emmett Shear (other thread, linking to a now-deleted video): The fact you can fool people with misdirection doesn’t tell you much either way.

[EDIT: In case it was not sufficiently clear from context, yes everyone talking here knows this is not AI generated, which is the point.]

This video is my pick for most uncanny valley spooky. This one’s low key cool.

Nick St. Pierre has a fascinating thread where he goes through the early Sora videos that were made in response to user requests. In each case, when fed the identical prompt, MidJourney generates static images remarkably close to the baseline image in the Sora video.

Gabor Cselle asks Gemini 1.5 about a Sora video, Gemini points out some inconsistencies. AI detectors of fake videos should be very good for some time. This is one area where I expect evaluation to be much easier than generation. Also Gemini 1.5 seems good at this sort of thing, based on that response.

Stephen Balaban takes Sora’s performance scaling with compute and its general capabilities as the strongest evidence yet that simple scaling will get us to AGI (not a position I share, this did not update me much), and thinks we are only 1-2 orders of magnitude away. He then says he is ‘not an AI doomer’ and is ‘on the side of computational and scientific freedom’ but is concerned because that future is highly unpredictable. Yes, well.

What are we going to do with this ability to make videos?

At what look like Sora’s current capabilities level? Seems like not a lot.

I strongly agree with Sully here:

Matt Turck: Movie watching experience

2005: Go to a movie theater.

2015: Stream Netflix.

2025: ask LLM + text-to-video to create a new season of Narcos to watch tonight, but have it take place in Syria with Brad Pitt, Mr. Beast and Travis Kelce in the leading roles.

Sully: Hot take: most ppl won’t make their movies/shows until we can read minds most people are boring/lazy.

They want to come home, & be spoon fed a show/movie/music.

Value accrual will happen at the distribution end (Netflix,Spotify, etc), since they already know you preferences.

Xeophon: And a big part is the social aspect. You cannot talk with your friends about a movie if everyone saw a totally different thing. Memes and internet culture wouldn’t work, either.

John Rush: you’re 100% right. the best example is the modern UX. Which went from 1) lots of actions(filters, categories, search) (blogs) 2) to little action: scroll (fb) 3) to no action: auto-playing stories (inst/tiktok)

I do not think that Sora and its ilk will be anywhere near ready, by 2025, to create actually watchable content, in the sense of anyone sane wanting to watch it. That goes double for things generated directly from prompts, rather than bespoke transformations and expansions of existing creative work, and some forms of customization, dials or switches you can turn or flip, that are made much easier to assemble, configure and serve.

I do think there’s a lot of things that can be done. But I think there is a rather large period where ‘use AI methods to make tweaks possible and practical’ is good, but almost no one in practice wants much more than that.

I think there is this huge benefit to knowing that the thing was specifically made by a particular set of people, and seeing their choices, and having everything exist in that context. And I do think we will mostly want to retain the social reference points and interactions, including for games. There is a ton of value there. You want to compare your experience to someone else’s. That does not mean that AI couldn’t get sufficiently good to overcome that, but I think the threshold is high.

As a concrete example, right now I am watching the show Severance on Apple TV. So far I have liked it a lot, but the ways it is good are intertwined with it being a show written by humans, and those creators making choices to tell stories and explore concepts. If an AI managed to come up with the same exact show, I would be super impressed by that to be sure, but also the show would not be speaking to me in the same way.

Ryan Moulton: There is a huge gap in generative AI between the quality you observe when you’re playing with it open endedly, and the quality you observe when you try to use it for a task where you have a specific end goal in mind. This is I think where most of the hype/reality mismatch occurs.

PoliMath (distinct thread): I am begging anyone to take one scene from any movie and recreate it with Sora Any movie. Anything at all. Taxi Driver, Mean Girls, Scott Pilgrim, Sonic the Hedgehog, Buster Keaton. Anything.

People are being idiots in the replies here so I’ll clarify: The comment was “everyone will be filmmakers” with AI No they won’t.

Everyone will be able to output random video that mostly kind of evokes the scene they are describing.

That is not filmmaking.

If you’ve worked with AI generation on images or text, you know this is true. Try getting ChatGPT to output even tepidly interesting dialogue about any specific topic. Put a specific image in your head and try to get Midjourney to give you that image.

Same thing with image generation. When I want something specific, I expect to be frustrated and disappointed. When I want anything at all within a vibe zone, when variations are welcomed, often the results are great.

Will we get there with video? Yes I think we will, via modifications and edits and general advancements, and incorporating AI agents to implement the multi-step process. But let’s not get ahead of ourselves.

The contrast and flip side is then games. Games are a very different art form. We should expect games to continue to improve in some ways relative to non-interactive experiences, including transitioning to full AR/VR worlds, with intelligent other characters, more complex plots that give you more interactive options and adapt to your choices, general awesomeness. It is going to be super cool, but it won’t be replacing Netflix.

Tyler Cowen asked what the main commercial uses will be. The answers seem to be that they enable cheap quick videos in the style of TikTok or YouTube, or perhaps a music video. Quality available for dirt cheap may go up.

Also they enable changing elements of a video. The example in the technical paper was to turn the area around a driving car into a jungle, others speculate about de-aging actors or substituting new ones.

I think this will be harder here than in many other cases. With text, with images and with sound, I saw the mundane utility. Here I mostly don’t.

At a minimum it will take time. These tools are nowhere near being able to reproduce existing high quality outputs. So instead, the question becomes what we can do with the new inputs, to produce what kinds of new outputs that people still value.

Tyler posted his analysis a few days later, saying it has profound implications for ‘all sorts of industries’ but will hit the media first, especially advertising, although he agrees it will not put Hollywood out of business. I agree that this makes ‘have something vaguely evocative you can use as an advertisement’ will get easier and cheaper, I suppose, when people want that.

Others are also far more excited than I am. Anton says Tesla should go all-in on this due to its access to video data from drivers, and buy every GPU at any price to do more video. I would not be doing that.

Grimes: Cinema – the most prohibitively expensive art form (but also the greatest and most profound) – is about to be completely democratized the way music was with DAW’s.

(Without DAW’s like ableton, GarageBand, logic etc – grimes and most current artists wouldn’t exist).

Crucifore (distinct thread): I’m still genuinely perplexed by people saying Sora etc is the “end of Hollywood.” Crafting a story is very different than generating an image.

Alex Tabarrok: Crafting a story is a more distributed skill than the capital intensive task of making a movie.

Thus, by democratizing the latter, Sora et al. give a shot to the former which will mean a less Hollywood centric industry, much as Youtube has drawn from TV studios.

Matt Darling: Worth noting that YouTube is also sort of fundamentally a different product than TV. The interesting question is less “can you do movies with AI?” and more “what can we do now that we couldn’t before?”.

Alex Tabarrok: Yes, exactly; but attention is a scarce resource.

Andrew Curran says it can do graph design and notes it can generate static images. He is super excited, thread has examples.

I still don’t see it. I mean, yes, super impressive, big progress leap in the area, but still seems a long way from where it needs to be.

Of course, ‘a long way’ often translates in this business to ‘a few years,’ but I still expect this to be a small part of the picture compared to text, or for a while even images or voice.

Here’s a concrete question:

Daniel Eth: If you think sora is better than what you expected, does that mean you should buy Netflix or short Netflix? Legitimately curious what finance people think here.

My guess is little impact for a while. My gut says net negative, because it helps Netflix’s competition more than it helps Netflix.

What will the future bring? Here is scattershot prediction fun on what will happen at the end of 2025:

Cost is going to be a practical issue. $0.50 per minute is tiny for some purposes, but it is also a lot for others, especially if you cannot get good results zero-shot and have to do iterations and modifications, or if you are realistically only going to see it once.

I continue to think that text-to-video has a long way to go before it offers much mundane utility. Text should remain dominant, then multimodality with text including audio generation, then images, only then video. For a while, when we do get video, I expect it to largely in practice be based off of bespoke static images, real and otherwise, rather than the current text-to-video idea. The full thing will eventually get there, but I expect a (relatively, in AI timeline terms) long road, and this is a case where looking for anything at all loses out most often to looking for something specific.

But also, perhaps, I am wrong. I have been a video skeptic in many ways long before AI. There are some uses for ‘random cool video vaguely in this area of thing.’ And if AI video becomes a major use case, that seems mostly good, as it will be relatively easy to spot and otherwise less dangerous, and let’s face it, video is cool.

So prove me wrong, kids. Prove me wrong.

Sora What Read More »

ai-#52:-oops

AI #52: Oops

We were treated to technical marvels this week.

At Google, they announced Gemini Pro 1.5, with a million token context window within which it has excellent recall, using mixture of experts to get Gemini Advanced level performance (e.g. GPT-4 level) out of Gemini Pro levels of compute. This is a big deal, and I think people are sleeping on it. Also they released new small open weights models that look to be state of the art.

At OpenAI, they announced Sora, a new text-to-video model that is a large leap from the previous state of the art. I continue to be a skeptic on the mundane utility of video models relative to other AI use cases, and think they still have a long way to go, but this was both technically impressive and super cool.

Also, in both places, mistakes were made.

At OpenAI, ChatGPT briefly lost its damn mind. For a day, faced with record traffic, the model would degenerate into nonsense. It was annoying, and a warning about putting our trust in such systems and the things that can go wrong, but in this particular context it was weird and beautiful and also hilarious. This has now been fixed.

At Google, people noticed that Gemini Has a Problem. In particular, its image generator was making some highly systematic errors and flagrantly disregarding user requests, also lying about it to users, and once it got people’s attention things kept looking worse and worse. Google has, to their credit, responded by disabling entirely the ability of their image model to output people until they can find a fix.

I hope both serve as important warnings, and allow us to fix problems. Much better to face such issues now, when the stakes are low.

Covered separately: Gemini Has a Problem, Sora What, and Gemini 1.5 Pro.

  1. Introduction. We’ve got some good news, and some bad news.

  2. Table of Contents.

  3. Language Models Offer Mundane Utility. Probable probabilities?

  4. Language Models Don’t Offer Mundane Utility. Air Canada finds out.

  5. Call me Gemma Now. Google offers new state of the art tiny open weight models.

  6. Google Offerings Keep Coming and Changing Names. What a deal.

  7. GPT-4 Goes Crazy. But it’s feeling much better now.

  8. GPT-4 Real This Time. Offer feedback on GPTs, see their profiles.

  9. Fun With Image Generation. Image generation for journal articles.

  10. Deepfaketown and Botpocalypse Soon. Several approaches to impersonation risks.

  11. Selling Your Chatbot Data. I don’t really know what you were expecting.

  12. Selling Your Training Data. I still don’t really know what you were expecting.

  13. They Took Our Jobs. There is a third option.

  14. Get Involved. Apart Research is hiring.

  15. Introducing. Groq, Lindy, Podcaster Copilot, potentially Magic and Altera.

  16. In Other AI News. Altman looks to move his chip plans forward.

  17. Quiet Speculations. Arguing over slow versus fast takeoff during takeoff.

  18. The Quest for Sane Regulations. There will be many bills along the way.

  19. The Week in Audio. I’m back on the Cognitive Revolution.

  20. The Original Butlerian Jihad. What was Dune a cautionary tale against again?

  21. Rhetorical Innovation. Another open letter, another trillion dollars. Ho hum.

  22. Public Service Announcement. Fentanyl, both literally and as metaphor.

  23. People Are Worried About AI Killing Everyone. There is a pattern to who.

  24. Other People Are Not As Worried About AI Killing Everyone. Sure, why not.

  25. The Lighter Side. There is not enough information to solve the problem.

Steven Johnson strongly endorses NotebookLM, offers YouTube tutorial. This is definitely one of those ‘I need to try using this more and it’s weird I don’t find excuses’ situations.

Automatically email everyone to tell them to remove your email address from their database.

Patrick McKenzie: Interestingly, one of the first denial of service via AI-powered amplification events that I’ve seen personally is an app that users let puppet their Gmail account then send officially flavored deletion requests to everyone the AI thinks probably has their email in a database.

If one believes one is subject to regulatory regimes, or has compatible moral intuitions, requiring a deletion request immediately cause bespoke work, that turns two minutes of user activity into ~thousands of companies each needing to do variable amounts of work.

Get probabilities, LessWrong style, by asking for LessWrong style norms of probabilities?

Daniel Eth:

From ChatGPT: ChatGPT

Confidence Levels in the Existence of Chinese Dynasties

Xia Dynasty: ~50-70%

Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors: ~10-20%

Shang Dynasty: ~95-99%

Zhou Dynasty: ~99%

Qin Dynasty: ~99.9%

Han Dynasty: ~99.9%

These confidence levels are approximations based on current archaeological evidence and historical scholarship.

(I should clarify that I used a bit of prompt engineering to get it to guess and then asked it to repeat the results without its explanations, but nevertheless these were all numbers that it came up with)

Specifically, here’s the prompt engineering I did:

“Assume LessWrong style norms of probabilities – approximately how confident is it reasonable for a person to be in the existence of each of these dynasties? It’s okay to be wrong, just give a reasonable answer for each.”

He also tested for situational awareness by having it estimate there was a 70% chance it was the victim of RLHF, with a 30% chance it was the base model. It asks some reasonable questions, but fails to ask about base rates of inference, so it gets 70% rather than 99%.

I have added this to my custom instructions.

There are also active AI forecasters on Manifold, who try to generate their own predictions using various reasoning processes. Do they have alpha? It is impossible to say given the data we have, they clearly do some smart things and also some highly dumb things. Trading strategies will be key, as they will fall into traps hardcore if they are allowed to, blowing them up, even if they get a lot better than they are now.

I continue to be curious to build a Manifold bot, but I would use other principles. If anyone wants to help code one for me to the point I can start tweaking it in exchange for eternal ephemeral glory and a good time, and perhaps a share of the mana profits, let me know.

Realize, after sufficient prodding, that letting them see your move in Rock-Paper-Scissors might indeed be this thing we call ‘cheating.’

Why are they so often so annoying?

Emmett Shear: How do we RLHF these LLMs until they stop blaming the user and admit that the problem is that they are unsure? Where does the smug, definitive, overconfident tone that all the LLMs have come from?

Nate Silver: It’s quite similar to the tone in mainstream, center-left political media, and it’s worth thinking about how the AI labs and the center-left media have the same constituents to please.

Did you know they are a student at the University of Michigan? Underlying claim about who is selling what data is disputed, the phenomenon of things being patterns in the data is real either way.

Davidad: this aligns with @goodside’s recollection to me once that a certain base model responded to “what do you do?” with “I’m a student at the University of Michigan.”

My explanation is that if you’re sampling humans weighted by the ratio of their ability to contribute English-language training data to the opportunity cost of their time per marginal hour, “UMich student” is one of the dominant modes.

Timothy Lee asks Gemini Advanced as his first prompt a simple question designed to trick it, where it really shouldn’t get tricked, it gets tricked.

You know what? I am proud of Google for not fixing this. It would be very easy for Google to say, this is embarrassing, someone get a new fine tuning set and make sure it never makes this style of mistake again. It’s not like it would be that hard. It also never matters in practice.

This is a different kind of M&M test, where they tell you to take out all the green M&Ms, and then you tell them, ‘no, that’s stupid, we’re not doing that.’ Whether or not they should consider this good news is another question.

Air Canada forced to honor partial refund policy invented by its chatbot. The website directly contradicted the bot, but the judge ruled that there was no reason a customer should trust the rest of the website rather than the chatbot. I mean, there is, it is a chatbot, but hey.

Chris Farnell: Science fiction writers: The legal case for robot personhood will be made when a robot goes on trial for murder. Reality: The legal case for robot personhood will be made when an airline wants to get out of paying a refund.

While I fully support this ruling, I do not think that matter was settled. If you offer a chatbot to customers, they use it in good faith and it messes up via a plausible but incorrect answer, that should indeed be on you. Only fair.

Matt Levine points out that this was the AI acting like a human, versus a corporation trying to follow an official policy:

The funny thing is that the chatbot is more human than Air Canada. Air Canada is a corporation, an emergent entity that is made up of people but that does things that people, left to themselves, would not do. The chatbot is a language model; it is in the business of saying the sorts of things that people plausibly might say. If you just woke up one day representing Air Canada in a customer-service chat, and the customer said “my grandmother died, can I book a full-fare flight and then request the bereavement fare later,” you would probably say “yes, I’m sorry for your loss, I’m sure I can take care of that for you.” Because you are a person!

The chatbot is decent at predicting what people would do, and it accurately gave that answer. But that’s not Air Canada’s answer, because Air Canada is not a person.

The question is, what if the bot had given an unreasonable answer? What if the customer had used various tricks to get the bot to, as happened in another example, sell a car for $1 ‘in a legally binding contract’? Is there an inherent ‘who are you kidding?’ clause here, or not, and if there is how far does it go?

One can also ask whether a good disclaimer could get around this. The argument was that there was no reason to doubt the chatbot, but it would be easy to give a very explicit reason to doubt the chatbot.

A wise memo to everyone attempting to show off their new GitHub repo:

Liz Lovelace: very correct take, developers take note

Paul Calcraft: I loved this thread so much. People in there claiming that anyone who could use a computer should find it easy enough to Google a few things, set up Make, compile it and get on with it Great curse of knowledge demo.

Code of Kai: This is the correct take even for developers. Developers don’t seem to realise how much of their time is spent learning how to use their tools compared to solving problems. The ratio is unacceptable.

Look, I know that if I did it a few times I would be over it and everything would be second nature but I keep finding excuses not to suck it up and do those few times. And if this is discouraging me, how many others is it discouraging?

Gemma, Google’s miniature 2b and 7b open model weights language models, are now available.

Demis Hassabis: We have a long history of supporting responsible open source & science, which can drive rapid research progress, so we’re proud to release Gemma: a set of lightweight open models, best-in-class for their size, inspired by the same tech used for Gemini.

I have no problems with this. Miniature models, at their current capabilities levels, are exactly a place where being open has relatively more benefits and minimal costs.

I also think them for not calling it Gemini, because even if no one else cares, there should be exactly two models called Gemini. Not one, not three, not four. Two. Call them Pro and Ultra if you insist, that’s fine, as long as there are two. Alas.

In the LLM Benchmark page it is now ranked #1 although it seems one older model may be missing:

As usual, benchmarks tell you a little something but are often highly misleading. This does not tell us whether Google is now state of the art for these model sizes, but I expect that this is indeed the case.

Thomas Kurian: We’re announcing Duet AI for Google Workspace will now be Gemini for Google Workspace. Consumers and organizations of all sizes can access Gemini across the Workspace apps they know and love.

We’re introducing a new offering called Gemini Business, which lets organizations use generative AI in Workspace at a lower price point than Gemini Enterprise, which replaces Duet AI for Workspace Enterprise.

We’re also beginning to roll out a new way for Gemini for Workspace customers to chat with Gemini, featuring enterprise-grade data protections.

Lastly, consumers can now access Gemini in their personal Gmail, Docs, Slides, Sheets, and Meet apps through a Google One AI Premium subscription.

Sundar Pichai (CEO Google): More Gemini news: Starting today, Gemini for Workspace is available to businesses of all sizes, and consumers can now access Gemini in their personal Gmail, Docs and more through a Google One AI Premium subscription.

This seems like exactly what individuals can get, except you buy in bulk for your business?

To be clear, that is a pretty good product. Google will be getting my $20 per month for the individual version, called ‘Google One.’

Now, in addition to Gemini Ultra, you also get Gemini other places like GMail and Google Docs and Google Meet, and various other fringe benefits like 2 TB of storage and longer Google Meet sessions.

Alyssa Vance: Wow, I got GPT-4 to go absolutely nuts. (The prompt was me asking about mattresses in East Asia vs. the West).

Cate Hall: “Yoga on a great repose than the neared note, the note was a foreman and the aim of the aim” is my favorite Fiona Apple album.

Andriy Burkov: OpenAI has broken GPT-4. It ends each reply with hallucinated garbage and doesn’t stop generating it.

Matt Palmer: So this is how it begins, huh?

Nik Sareen: it was speaking to me in Thai poetry an hour ago.

Sean McGuire: ChatGPT is apparently going off the rails right now [8:32pm February 20] and no one can explain why.

the chatgptsubreddit is filled with people wondering why it started suddenly speaking Spanglish, threatened the user (I’m in the room with you right now, lmao) or started straight up babbling.

Esplin: ChatGPT Enterprise has lost its mind

Grace Kind: So, did your fuzz testing prepare you for the case where the API you rely on loses its mind?

But don’t worry. Everything’s fine now.

ChatGPT (Twitter account, February 21 1: 30pm): went a little off the rails yesterday but should be back and operational!

Danielle Fong: Me when I overdid it with the edibles.

What the hell happened?

Here is their official postmortem, posted a few hours later. It says the issue was resolved on February 21 at 2: 14am eastern time.

Postmortem: On February 20, 2024, an optimization to the user experience introduced a bug with how the model processes language.

LLMs generate responses by randomly sampling words based in part on probabilities. Their “language” consists of numbers that map to tokens.

In this case, the bug was in the step where the model chooses these numbers. Akin to being lost in translation, the model chose slightly wrong numbers, which produced word sequences that made no sense. More technically, inference kernels produced incorrect results when used in certain GPU configurations.

Upon identifying the cause of this incident, we rolled out a fix and confirmed that the incident was resolved.

Davidad hazarded a guess before that announcement, which he thinks now looks good.

Nora Belrose: I’ll go on the record as saying I expect this to be caused by some very stupid-in-retrospect bug in their inference or fine tuning code.

Unfortunately they may never tell us what it was.

Davidad: My modal prediction: something that was regularizing against entropy got sign-flipped to regularize *in favorof entropy. Sign errors are common; sign errors about entropy doubly so.

I predict that the weights were *notcorrupted (by fine-tuning or otherwise), only sampling.

If it were just a mistakenly edited scalar parameter like temperature or top-p, it would probably have been easier to spot and fix quickly. More likely an interaction between components. Possibly involving concurrency, although they’d probably be hesitant to tell us about that.

But it’s widely known that temperature 0.0 is still nondeterministic because of a wontfix race condition in the sampler.

oh also OpenAI in particular has previously made a sign error that people were exposed to for hours before it got reverted.

[announcement was made]

I’m feeling pretty good about my guesses that ChatGPT’s latest bug was:

an inference-only issue

not corrupted weights

not a misconfigured scalar

possibly concurrency involved

they’re not gonna tell us about the concurrency (Not a sign flip, though)

Here’s my new guess: they migrated from 8-GPU processes to 4-GPU processes to improve availability. The MoE has 8 experts. Somewhere they divided logits by the number of GPUs being combined instead of the number of experts being combined. Maybe the 1-GPU config was special-cased so the bug didn’t show up in the dev environment.

Err, from 4-GPU to 8-GPU processes, I guess, because logits are *dividedby temperature, so that’s the direction that would result in accidentally doubling temperature. See this is hard to think about properly.

John Pressman says it was always obviously a sampling bug, although saying that after the postmortem announcement scores no Bayes points. I do agree that this clearly was not an RLHF issue, that would have manifested very differently.

Roon looks on the bright side of life.

Roon: it is pretty amazing that gpt produces legible output that’s still following instructions despite sampling bug

Should we be concerned more generally? Some say yes.

Connor Leahy: Really cool how our most advanced AI systems can just randomly develop unpredictable insanity and the developer has no idea why. Very reassuring for the future.

Steve Strickland: Any insight into what’s happened here Connor? I know neural nets/transformers are fundamentally black boxes. But seems strange that an LLM that’s been generating grammatically perfect text for over a year would suddenly start spewing out garbage.

Connor Leahy: Nah LLMs do shit like this all the time. They are alien machine blobs wearing masks, and it’s easy for the mask to slip.

Simeon (distinct thread): Sure, maybe we fucked up hard this ONE TIME a deployment update to hundreds of million of users BUT we’ll definitely succeed at a dangerous AGI deployment.

Was this a stupid typo or bug in the code, or some parameter being set wrong somewhere by accident, or something else dumb? Seems highly plausible that it was.

Should that bring us comfort? I would say it should not. Dumb mistakes happen. Bugs and typos that look dumb in hindsight happen. There are many examples of dumb mistakes changing key outcomes in history, determining the fates of nations. If all it takes is one dumb mistake to make GPT-4 go crazy, and it takes us a day to fix it when this error does not in any way make the system try to stop you from fixing it, then that is not a good sign.

GPT-4-Turbo rate limits have been doubled, daily limits removed.

You can now rate GPTs and offer private feedback to the builder. Also there’s a new about section:

OpenAI: GPTs ‘About’ section can now include:

∙ Builder social profiles

∙ Ratings

∙ Categories

∙ # of conversations

∙ Conversation starters

∙ Other GPTs by the builder

Short explanation that AI models tend to get worse over time because taking into account user feedback makes models worse. It degrades their reasoning abilities such as chain of thought, and generally forces them to converge towards a constant style and single mode of being, because the metric of ‘positive binary feedback’ points in that direction. RLHF over time reliably gets us something we like less and is less aligned to what we actually want, even when there is no risk in the room.

The short term implication is easy, it is to be highly stingy and careful with your RLHF feedback. Use it in your initial fine-tuning if you don’t have anything better, but the moment you have what you need, stop.

The long term implication is to reinforce that the strategy absolutely does not scale.

Emmett Shear:

What I learned from posting this is that people have no idea how RLHF actually works.

Matt Bateman: Not sure how you parent but whenever 3yo makes a mistake I schedule a lobotomy.

Emmett Shear: Junior started using some bad words at school, but no worries we can flatten that part of the mindscape real quick, just a little off the top. I’m sure there won’t be any lasting consequences.

What we actually do to children isn’t as bad as RLHF, but it is bad enough, as I often discuss in my education roundups. What we see happening to children as they go through the school system is remarkably similar, in many ways, to what happens to an AI as it goes through fine tuning.

Andres Sandberg explores using image generation for journal articles, finds it goes too much on vibes versus logic, but sees rapid progress. Expects this kind of thing to be useful within a year or two.

ElevenLabs is preparing for the election year by creating a ‘no-go voices’ list, starting with the presidential and prime minister candidates in the US and UK. I love this approach. Most of the danger is in a handful of voices, especially Biden and Trump, so detect those and block them. One could expand this by allowing those who care to have their voices added to the block list.

On the flip side, you can share your voice intentionally and earn passive income, choosing how much you charge.

The FTC wants to crack down on impersonation. Bloomberg also has a summary.

FTC: The Federal Trade Commission is seeking public comment on a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking that would prohibit the impersonation of individuals. The proposed rule changes would extend protections of the new rule on government and business impersonation that is being finalized by the Commission today.

It is odd that this requires a rules change? I would think that impersonating an individual, with intent to fool someone, would already be not allowed and also fraud.

Indeed, Gemini says that there are no new prohibitions here. All this does is make it a lot easier for the FTC to get monetary relief. Before, they could get injunctive relief, but at this scale that doesn’t work well, and getting money was a two step process.

Similarly, how are we only largely getting around to punishing these things now:

For example, the rule would enable the FTC to directly seek monetary relief in federal court from scammers that:

  • Use government seals or business logos when communicating with consumers by mail or online.

  • Spoof government and business emails and web addresses, including spoofing “.gov” email addresses or using lookalike email addresses or websites that rely on misspellings of a company’s name.

  • Falsely imply government or business affiliation by using terms that are known to be affiliated with a government agency or business (e.g., stating “I’m calling from the Clerk’s Office” to falsely imply affiliation with a court of law).  

I mean those all seem pretty bad. It does seem logical to allow direct fines.

The question is, how far to take this? They propose quite far:

The Commission is also seeking comment on whether the revised rule should declare it unlawful for a firm, such as an AI platform that creates images, video, or text, to provide goods or services that they know or have reason to know is being used to harm consumers through impersonation.

How do you prevent your service from being used in part for impersonation? I have absolutely no idea. Seems like a de facto ban on AI voice services that do not lock down the list of available voices. Which also means a de facto ban on all open model weights voice creation software. Image generation software would have to be locked down rather tightly as well once it passes a quality threshold, with MidJourney at least on the edge. Video is safe for now, but only because it is not yet good enough.

There is no easy answer here. Either we allow tools that enable the creation of things that seem real, or we do not. If we do, then people will use them for fraud and impersonation. If we do not, then that means banning them, which means severe restrictions on video, voice and image models.

Seva worries primarily not about fake things taken to be potentially real, but about real things taken to be potentially fake. And I think this is right. The demand for fakes is mostly for low-quality fakes, whereas if we can constantly call anything fake we have a big problem.

Seva: I continue to think the bigger threat of deepfakes is not in convincing people that fake things are real but in offering plausible suspicion that real things are fake.

Being able to deny an objective reality is much more pernicious than looking for evidence to embrace an alternate reality, which is something people do anyway even when that evidence is flimsy.

Like I would bet socialization, or cognitive heuristics like anchoring effects, drive disinfo much more than deepfakes.

Albert Pinto: Daniel dennet laid out his case for erosion of trust (between reality and fake) is gigantic effect of AI

Seva: man I’m going to miss living in a high trust society.

We are already seeing this effect, such as here (yes it was clearly real to me, but that potentially makes the point stronger):

Daniel Eth: Like, is this real? Is it AI-generated? I think it’s probably real, but only because, a) I don’t have super strong priors against this happening, b) it’s longer than most AI-generated videos and plus it has sound, and c) I mildly trust @AMAZlNGNATURE

I do expect us to be able to adapt. We can develop various ways to show or prove that something is genuine, and establish sources of trust.

One question is, will this end up being good for our epistemics and trustworthiness exactly because they will now be necessary?

Right now, you can be imprecise and sloppy, and occasionally make stuff up, and we can find that useful, because we can use our common sense and ability to differentiate reality, and the crowd can examine details to determine if something is fake. The best part about community notes, for me, is that if there is a post with tons of views, and it does not have a note, then that is itself strong evidence.

In the future, it will become extremely valuable to be a trustworthy source. If you are someone who maintains the chain of epistemic certainty and uncertainty, who makes it clear what we know and how we know it and how much we should trust different statements, then you will be useful. If not, then not. And people may be effectively white-listing sources that they can trust, and doing various second and third order calculations on top of that in various ways.

The flip side is that this could make it extremely difficult to ‘break into’ the information space. You will have to build your credibility the same way you have to build your credit score.

In case you did not realize, the AI companion (AI girlfriend and AI boyfriend and AI nonbinary friends even though I oddly have not heard mention of one yet, and so on, but that’s a mouthful ) aps absolutely 100% are harvesting all the personal information you put into the chat, most of them are selling it and a majority won’t let you delete it. If you are acting surprised, that is on you.

The best version of this, of course, would be to gather your data to set you up on dates.

Cause, you know, when one uses a chatbot to talk to thousands of unsuspecting women so you can get dates, ‘they’ say there are ‘ethical concerns.’

Whereas if all those chumps are talking to the AIs on purpose? Then we know they’re lonely, probably desperate, and sharing all sorts of details to help figure out who might be a good match. There are so many good options for who to charge the money.

The alternative is that if you charge enough money, you do not need another revenue stream, and some uses of such bots more obviously demand privacy. If you are paying $20 a month to chat with an AI Riley Reid, that would not have been my move, but at a minimum you presumably want to keep that to yourself.

An underappreciated AI safety cause subarea is convincing responsible companies to allow adult content in a responsible way, including in these bots. The alternative is to drive that large market into the hands of irresponsible actors, who will do it in an irresponsible way.

AI companion data is only a special case, although one in which the privacy violation is unusually glaring, and the risks more obvious.

Various companies also stand ready to sell your words and other outputs as training data.

Reddit is selling its corpus. Which everyone was already using anyway, so it is not clear that this changes anything. It turns out that it is selling it to Google, in a $60 million deal. If this means that their rivals cannot use Reddit data, OpenAI and Microsoft in particular, that seems like an absolute steal.

Artist finds out that Pond5 and Shutterstock are going to sell your work and give you some cash, in this case $50, via a checkbox that will default to yes, and they will not let you tell them different after the money shows up uninvited. This is such a weird middle ground. If they had not paid, would the artist have ever found out? This looks to be largely due to an agreement Shutterstock signed with OpenAI back in July that caused its stock to soar 9%.

Pablo Taskbar: Thinking of a startup to develop an AI program to look for checkboxes in terms and condition documents.

Bernell Loeb: Same thing happened with my web host, Squarespace. Found out from twitter that Squarespace allowed ai to scrape our work. No notice given (no checks either). When I contacted them to object, I was told that I had to “opt out” without ever being told I was already opted in.

Santynieto: Happened to me with @SubstackInc: checking the preferences of my publication, I discovered a new, never announced-before setting by the same name, also checked, as if I had somehow “chosen”, without knowing abt it at all, to make my writing available for data training. I hate it!

I checked that last one. There is a box that is unchecked that says ‘block AI training.’

I am choosing to leave the box unchecked. Train on my writing all you want. But that is a choice that I am making, with my eyes open.

Why yes. Yes I do, actually.

Gabe: by 2029 the only jobs left will be bank robber, robot supervisor, and sam altman

Sam Altman: You want that last one? It’s kinda hard sometimes.

Apart Research, who got an ACX grant, is hiring for AI safety work. I have not looked into them myself and am passing along purely on the strength of Scott’s grant alone.

Lindy is now available to everyone, signups here. I am curious to try it, but oddly I have no idea what it would be useful to me to have this do.

Groq.com will give you LLM outputs super fast. From a creator of TPUs, they claim to have Language Processing Units (LPUs) that are vastly faster at inference. They do not offer model training, suggesting LPUs are specifically good at inference. If this is the future, that still encourages training much larger models, since such models would then be more commercially viable to use.

Podcaster copilot. Get suggested questions and important context in real time during a conversation. This is one of those use cases where you need to be very good relative to your baseline to be net positive to rely on it all that much, because it requires splitting your attention and risks disrupting flow. When I think about how I would want to use a copilot, I would want it to fact check claims, highlight bold statements with potential lines of response, perhaps note evasiveness, and ideally check for repetitiveness. Are your questions already asked in another podcast, or in their written materials? Then I want to know the answer now, especially important with someone like Tyler Cowen, where the challenge is to get a genuinely new response.

Claim that magic.dev has trained a groundbreaking model for AI coding, Nat Friedman is investing $100 million.

Nat Friedman: Magic.dev has trained a groundbreaking model with many millions of tokens of context that performed far better in our evals than anything we’ve tried before.

They’re using it to build an advanced AI programmer that can reason over your entire codebase and the transitive closure of your dependency tree. If this sounds like magic… well, you get it. Daniel and I were so impressed, we are investing $100M in the company today.

The team is intensely smart and hard-working. Building an AI programmer is both self-evidently valuable and intrinsically self-improving.

Intrinsically self-improving? Ut oh.

Altera Bot, an agent in Minecraft that they claim can talk to and collaboratively play with other people. They have a beta waitlist.

Sam Altman seeks Washington’s approval to build state of the art chips in the UAE. It seems there are some anti-trust concerns regarding OpenAI, which seems like it is not at all the thing to be worried about here. I continue to not understand how Washington is not telling Altman that under no way in hell is he going to do this in the UAE, he can either at least friend-shore it or it isn’t happening.

Apple looking to add AI to iPad interface and offer new AI programming tools, but progress continues to be slow. No mention of AI for the Apple Vision Pro.

More on the Copyright Confrontation from James Grimmelmann, warning that AI companies must take copyright seriously, and that even occasional regurgitation or reproduction of copyrighted work is a serious problem from a legal perspective. The good news in his view is that judges will likely want to look favorably upon OpenAI because it offers a genuinely new and useful transformative product. But it is tricky, and coming out arguing the copying is not relevant would be a serious mistake.

This is Connor Leahy discussing Gemini’s ability to find everything in a 3 hour video.

Connor Leahy: This is the kind of stuff that makes me think that there will be no period of sorta stupid, human-level AGI. Humans can’t perceive 3 hours of video at the same time. The first AGI will instantly be vastly superhuman at many, many relevant things.

Richard Ngo: “This is exactly what makes me think there won’t be any slightly stupid human-level AGI.” – Connor when someone shows him a slightly stupid human-level AGI, probably.

You are in the middle of a slow takeoff pointing to the slow takeoff as evidence against slow takeoffs.

Connor Leahy: By most people’s understanding, we are in a fast takeoff. And even by Paul’s definition, unless you expect a GDP doubling in 4 years before a 1 year doubling, we are in fast takeoff. So, when do you expect this doubling to happen?

Richard Ngo: I do in fact expect an 8-year GDP doubling before a 2-year GDP doubling. I’d low-confidence guess US GDP will be double its current value in 10-15 years, and then the next few doublings will be faster (but not *thatmuch faster, because GDP will stop tracking total output).

Slow is relative. It also could be temporary.

If world GDP doubles in the next four years without doubling in one, that is a distinct thing from historical use of the term ‘fast takeoff,’ because the term ‘fast takeoff’ historically means something much faster than that. It would still be ‘pretty damn fast,’ or one can think of it simply as ‘takeoff.’ Or we could say ‘gradual takeoff’ as the third slower thing.

I do not only continue to think that we not mock those who expected everything in AI to happen all at once with little warning, with ASI emerging in weeks, days or even hours, without that much mundane utility before that. I think that they could still be proven more right than those who are mocking them.

We have a bunch of visible ability and mundane utility now, so things definitely look like a ‘slow’ takeoff, but it could still functionally transform into a fast one with little warning. It seems totally reasonable to say that AI is rapidly getting many very large advantages with respect to humans, so if it gets to ‘roughly human’ in the core intelligence module, whatever you want to call that, then suddenly things get out of hand fast, potentially the ‘fast takeoff’ level of fast even if you see more signs and portents first.

More thoughts on how to interpret OpenAI’s findings on bioweapon enabling capabilities of GPT-4. The more time passes, the more I think the results were actually pretty impressive in terms of enhancing researcher capabilities, and also that this mostly speaks to improving capabilities in general rather than anything specifically about a bioweapon.

How will AIs impact people’s expectations, of themselves and others?

Sarah (Little Ramblings): have we had the unrealistic body standards conversation around AI images / video yet that we had when they invented airbrushing? if not can we get it over with cause it’s gonna be exhausting

‘honey remember these women aren’t real!! but like literally, actually not real’

can’t wait for the raging body dysmorphia epidemic amongst teenagers trying to emulate the hip to waist ratio of women who not only don’t look like that in real life, but do not in fact exist in real life.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: I predict/guess: Unrealistic BODY standards won’t be the big problem. Unrealistic MIND standards will be the problem. “Why can’t you just be understanding and sympathetic, like my AR harem?”

Sarah: it’s kinda funny that people are interpreting this tweet as concern about people having unrealistic expectations of their partners, when I was expressing concern about people having unrealistic expectations of themselves.

Eliezer Yudkowsky: Valid. There’s probably a MIND version of that too, but it’s not as straightforward to see what it’ll be.

Did you know that we already already have 65 draft bills in New York alone that have been introduced related to AI? And also Axios had this stat to offer:

Zoom out: Hochul’s move is part of a wave of state-based AI legislation — now arriving at a rate of 50 bills per week — and often proposing criminal penalties for AI misuse.

That is quite a lot of bills. One should therefore obviously not get too excited in any direction when bills are introduced, no matter how good or (more often) terrible the bill might be, unless one has special reason to expect them to pass.

The governor pushing a law, as New York’s is now doing, is different. According to Axios her proposal is:

  • Making unauthorized uses of a person’s voice “in connection with advertising or trade” a misdemeanor offense. Such offenses are punishable by up to one year jail sentence.

  • Expanding New York’s penal law to include unauthorized uses of artificial intelligence in coercion, criminal impersonation and identity theft.

  • Amending existing intimate images and revenge porn statutes to include “digital images” — ranging from realistic Photoshop-produced work to advanced AI-generated content. 

  • Codifying the right to sue over digitally manipulated false images.

  • Requiring disclosures of AI use in all forms of political communication “including video recording, motion picture, film, audio recording, electronic image, photograph, text, or any technological representation of speech or conduct” within 60 days of an election.

As for this particular law? I mean, sure, all right, fine? I neither see anything especially useful or valuable here, nor do I see much in the way of downside.

Also, this is what happens when there is no one in charge and Congress is incapable of passing basic federal rules, not even around basic things like deepfakes and impersonation. The states will feel compelled to act. The whole ‘oppose any regulatory action of any kind no matter what’ stance was never going to fly.

Department of Justice’s Monaco says they will be more harshly prosecuting cybercrimes if those involved were using AI, similar to the use of a gun. I notice I am confused. Why would the use of AI make the crime worse?

Matthew Pines looks forward to proposals for ‘on-chip governance,’ with physical mechanisms built into the hardware, linking to a January proposal writeup from Aarne, Fist and Withers. As they point out, by putting the governance onto the chip where it can do its job in private, you potentially avoid having to do other interventions and surveillance that violates privacy far more. Even if you think there is nothing to ultimately fear, the regulations are coming in some form. People who worry about the downsides of AI regulation need to focus more on finding solutions that minimize such downsides and working to steer towards those choices, rather than saying ‘never do anything at all’ as loudly as possible until the breaking point comes.

European AI Office launches.

I’m back at The Cognitive Revolution to talk about recent events and the state of play. Also available on X.

Who exactly is missing the point here, you think?

Saberspark [responding to a Sora video]: In the Dune universe, humanity banned the “thinking machines” because they eroded our ability to create and think for ourselves. That these machines were ultimately a bastardization of humanity that did more harm than good.

Cactus: Sci-fi Author: in my book I showed the destruction of Thinking Machines as a cautionary tale. Twitter User: We should destroy the Thinking Machines from classic sci-fi novel Don’t Destroy the Thinking Machines

I asked Gemini Pro, Gemini Advanced, GPT-4 and Claude.

Everyone except Gemini Pro replied in the now standard bullet point style. Every point one was ‘yes, this is a cautionary tale against the dangers of AI.’ Gemini Pro explained that in detail, whereas the others instead glossed over the details and then went on to talk about plot convenience, power dynamics and the general ability to tell interesting stories focused on humans, which made it the clearly best answer.

Whereas most science fiction stories solve the problem of ‘why doesn’t AI invalidate the entire story’ with a ‘well that would invalidate the entire story so let us pretend that would not happen, probably without explaining why.’ There are of course obvious exceptions, such as the excellent Zones of Thought novels, that take the question seriously.

It’s been a while since we had an open letter about existential risk, so here you go. Nothing you would not expect, I was happy to sign it.

In other news (see last week for details if you don’t know the context for these):

Robert Wiblin: It’s very important we start the fire now before other people pour more gasoline on the house I say as I open my trillion-dollar gasoline refining and house spraying complex.

Meanwhile:

Sam Altman: fk it why not 8

our comms and legal teams love me so much!

This does tie back to AI, but also the actual core information seems underappreciated right now: Lukas explains that illegal drugs are now far more dangerous, and can randomly kill you, due to ubiquitous lacing with fentanyl.

Lukas: Then I learned it only takes like 1mg to kill you and I was like “hmmmm… okay, guess I was wrong. Well, doesn’t matter anyway – I only use uppers and there’s no way dealers are cutting their uppers with downers that counteract the effects and kill their customers, that’d be totally retarded!”

Then I see like 500 people posting test results showing their cocaine has fentanyl in it for some reason, and I’m forced to accept that my theory about drug dealers being rational capitalistic market participants may have been misguided.

They have never been a good idea, drugs are bad mmmkay (importantly including alcohol), but before fentanyl using the usual suspects in moderation was highly unlikely to kill you or anything like that.

Now, drug dealers can cut with fentanyl to lower costs, and face competition on price. Due to these price pressures, asymmetric information, lack of attribution and liability for any overdoses and fatalities, and also a large deficit in morals in the drug dealing market, a lot of drugs are therefore cut with fentanyl, even uppers. The feedback signal is too weak. So taking such drugs even once can kill you, although any given dose is highly unlikely to do so. And the fentanyl can physically clump, so knowing someone else took from the same batch and is fine is not that strong as evidence of safety either. The safety strips help but are imperfect.

As far as I can tell, no one knows the real base rates on this for many obvious reasons, beyond the over 100,000 overdose deaths each year, a number that keeps rising. It does seem like it is super common. The DEA claims that 42% of pills tested for fentanyl contained at least 2mg, a potentially lethal dose. Of course that is not a random sample or a neutral source, but it is also not one free to entirely make numbers up.

Also the base potency of many drugs is way up versus our historical reference points or childhood experiences, and many people have insufficiently adjusted for this with their dosing and expectations.

Connor Leahy makes, without saying it explicitly, the obvious parallel to AGI.

Connor Leahy: This is a morbidly perfect demonstration about how there are indeed very serious issues that free market absolutism just doesn’t solve in practice.

Thankfully this only applies to this one specific problem and doesn’t generalize across many others…right?

[reply goes into a lot more detail]

The producer of the AGI gets rewarded for taking on catastrophic or existential risk, and also ordinary mundane risks. They are not responsible for the externalities, right now even for mundane risks they do not face liability, and there is information asymmetry.

Capitalism is great, but if we let capitalism do its thing here without fixing these classic market failures, they and their consequences will get worse over time.

This matches my experience as well, the link has screenshots from The Making of the Atomic Bomb. So many of the parallels line up.

Richard Ngo: There’s a striking similarity between physicists hearing about nuclear chain reactions and AI researchers hearing about recursive self-improvement.

Key bottlenecks in both cases include willingness to take high-level arguments seriously, act under uncertainty, or sound foolish.

The basics are important. I agree that you can’t know for sure, but if we do indeed do this accidentally then I do not like our odds.

Anton: one thing i agree with the artificial superintelligence xrisk people on is that it might indeed be a problem if we accidentally invented god.

Maybe, not necessarily.

If you do create God, do it on purpose.

Roon continues to move between the camps, both worried and not as worried, here’s where he landed this week:

Roon: is building astronomically more compute ethical and safe? Who knows idk.

Is building astronomically more compute fun and entertaining brahman? yes.

Grace Kind:

Sometimes one asks the right questions, then chooses not to care. It’s an option.

I continue to be confused by this opinion being something people actually believe:

Sully: AGI (AI which can automate most jobs) is probably like 2-3 years away, closer than what most think.

ASI (what most people think is AGI, some godlike singularity, etc) is probably a lot further along.

We almost have all the pieces to build AGI, someone just needs to do it.

Let’s try this again. If we have AI that can automate most jobs within 3 years, then at minimum we hypercharge the economy, hypercharge investment and competition in the AI space, and dramatically expand the supply while lowering the cost of all associated labor and work. The idea that AI capabilities would get to ‘can automate most jobs,’ the exact point at which it dramatically accelerates progress because most jobs includes most of the things that improve AI, and then stall for a long period, is not strictly impossible, I can get there if I first write the conclusion at the bottom of the page and then squint and work backwards, but it is a very bizarre kind of wishful thinking. It supposes a many orders of magnitude difficulty spike exactly at the point where the unthinkable would otherwise happen.

Also, a reminder for those who need to hear it, that who is loud on Twitter, or especially who is loud on Twitter within someone’s bubble, is not reality. And also a reminder that there are those hard at work trying to create the vibe that there is a shift in the vibes, in order to incept the new vibes. Do not fall for this.

Ramsey Brown: My entire timeline being swamped with pro-US, pro-natal, pro-Kardashev, pro-Defense is honestly giving me conviction that the kids are alright and we’re all gonna make it.

Marc Andreessen: The mother of all vibe shifts. 🇺🇸👶☢️🚀.

Yeah, no, absolutely nothing has changed. Did Brown observe this at all? Maybe he did. Maybe he didn’t. If he did, it was because he self-selected into that corner of the world, where everyone tries super hard to make fetch happen.

SMBC has been quietly going with it for so long now.

Roon is correct. We try anyway.

Roon: there is not enough information to solve the problem

AI #52: Oops Read More »

one-true-love

One True Love

We have long been waiting for a version of this story, where someone hacks together the technology to use Generative AI to work the full stack of the dating apps on their behalf, ultimately finding their One True Love.

Or at least, we would, if it turned out he is Not Making This Up.

Fun question: Given he is also this guy, does that make him more or less credible?

Alas, something being Too Good to Check does not actually mean one gets to not check it, in my case via a Manifold Market. The market started trading around 50%, but has settled down at 15% after several people made strong detailed arguments that the full story did not add up, at minimum he was doing some recreations afterwards.

Which is a shame. But why let that stop us? Either way it is a good yarn. I am going to cover the story anyway, as if it was essentially true, because why should we not get to have some fun, while keeping in mind that the whole thing is highly unreliable.

Discussion question throughout: Definitely hire this man, or definitely don’t?

With that out of the way, I am proud to introduce Aleksandr Zhadan, who reports that he had various versions of GPT talk to 5,240 girls on his behalf, one of whom has agreed to marry him.

I urge Cointelegraph, who wrote the story up as ‘Happy ending after dev uses AI to ‘date’ 5,239 women, to correct the error – yes he air quotes dated 5,239 other girls, but Karina Imranovna counts as well, so that’s 5,240. Oops! Not that the vast majority of them should count as dates even in air quotes.

Aleksandr Zhadan (translated from Russian): I proposed to a girl with whom ChatGPT had been communicating for me for a year. To do this, the neural network re-communicated with other 5239 girls, whom it eliminated as unnecessary and left only one. I’ll share how I made such a system, what problems there were and what happened with the other girls.

For context

• Finding a loved one is very difficult

• I want to have time to work, do hobbies, study and communicate with people

• I could go this route myself without ChatGPT, it’s just much longer and more expensive

In 2021 I broke up with my girlfriend after 2 years. She influenced me a lot, I still appreciate her greatly. After a few months, I realized that I wanted a new relationship. But I also realized that I didn’t want to waste my time and feel uncomfortable with a new girl.

Where did the relationship end?

I was looking for a girl on Tinder in Moscow and St. Petersburg. After a couple of weeks of correspondence, I went on dates, but they went to a dead end. Characteristic disadvantages were revealed (drinks a lot, there is stiffness, emotional swings). Yes, this is the initial impression, but it repulsed me. Again, there was someone to compare with.

I decided to simplify communication with girls via GPT. In 2022, my buddy and I got access to the GPT-3 API (ChatGPT didn’t exist yet) in order to log scripted messages via GPT in Tinder. And I searched for them according to the script, so that there were at least 2 photos in the profile.

In addition to searching, GPT could also rewrite after the mark. From 50 autoswipes we got 18 marks. GPT communicated without my intervention based on the request “You’re a guy, talking to a girl for the first time. Your task: not right away, but to invite you on a date.” It’s a crutch and not very humane, but it worked.

So right away we notice that this guy is working from a position of abundance. Must be nice. In my dating roundups, we see many men who are unable to get a large pool of women to match and initiate contact at all.

For a while, he tried using GPT-3 to chat with women without doing much prompt engineering and without supervision. It predictably blew it in various ways. Yet he persisted.

Then we pick things back up, and finally someone is doing this:

To search for relevant girls, I installed photo recognition in the web version of Tinder through torchvision, which was trained on my swipes from another account on 4k profiles. The machine was able to select the right girls almost always correctly. It’s funny that since that time there have been almost a thousand marks.

Look at you, able to filter on looks even though you’re handing off all the chatting to GPT. I mean, given what he is already doing, this is the actively more ethical thing to do on the margin, in the sense that you are wasting women’s time somewhat less now?

And then we filter more?

I made a filter to filter out girls using the ChatGPT and FlutterFlow APIs:

• without a questionnaire

• less than 2 photos

• “I don’t communicate here, write on instagram”

• sieve boxes

• believers

• written zodiac sign

• does not work

• further than 20 km

• show breasts in photo

• photo with flowers

• noisy photos

This is an interesting set of filters to set. Some very obviously good ones here.

So good show here. Filtering up front is one of the most obviously good and also ethical uses.

As is often the case, the man who started out trying to use technology that wasn’t good enough, got great results once the technology caught up to him:

ChatGPT found better girls and chatted longer. I was moving from Tinder to tg with someone. There he communicated and arranged meetings. ChatGPT swiped to the right 353 profiles, 278 tags, he continued the dialogue with 160, I met with 12. In the diagram below I described the principle of operation.

That first statistic, that it swiped right 353 times and got to talk to 160 women, is completely insane. I mean, that’s almost a 50% match rate, whereas estimates in general are 4% to 14%. This was one of the biggest signs that the story is almost certainly at least partly bogus.

After that, ChatGPT was able to get a 7.5% success rate at getting dates. Depending on your perspective, that could be anything from outstanding to rather lousy. In general I would say it is very good, since matches are typically less likely than that to lead to dates, and you are going in with no reason to think there is a good match.

Continued to communicate manually without ChatGPT, but then the communication stopped. The girls behaved strangely, ignored me, or something alarmed me through correspondence. Not like the example before, but still the process was not ok, I understood that.

If you are communicating as a human with a bunch of prospects, and you lose 92% of them before meeting, that might be average, but it is not going to feel great. If you suddenly take over as a human, you are switching strategies and also the loss rates will always be high, so you are going to feel like something is wrong.

Let’s show schematically what ChatGPT looks like for finding girls (I’ll call it V1). He worked on the request “find the best one, keep in touch,” but at the same time he often forgot information, limited himself to communicating on Tinder, and occasionally communicated poorly.

Under clumsy, I’ll note that ChatGPT V1 could schedule meetings at the same time, swore to give me chocolate/flowers/compote, but I didn’t know about it. He came on a date without a gift and the impression of me was spoiled. Or meetings were canceled because there was another meeting at that time.

Did he… not… read… the chat logs?

This kind of thing always blows my mind. You did all that work to set up dates, and you walk in there with no idea what ‘you’ ‘said’ to your dates?

It is not difficult to read the logs if and only if a date is arranged, and rather insane not to. It is not only about the gifts. You need to know what you told them, and also what they told you. 101 stuff.

I stopped ChatGPT V1 and sat down at V2. Integrated Google calendar and TG, divided the databases into general and personal, muted replies and replies to several messages, added photo recognition using FlutterFlow, created trust levels for sharing personal information and could write messages myself.

I mean, yes, sounds like there was a lot of room for improvement, and Calendar integration certainly seems worthwhile, as is allowing manual control. It still seems like there was quite a lot of PEBKAC.

Also this wasn’t even GPT-4 yet, so v2 gets a big upgrade right there.

V2 runs on GPT-4, which has significantly improved correspondence. I also managed to continue communicating with previous girls (oh, how important this will turn out to be later), meeting and just chatting (also good). Meetings haven’t been layered with others yet, wow!

In order for ChatGPT V2 to find me a relevant girl, I asked regular ChatGPT for help. He offered to tell me about my childhood, parents, goals and values. I transferred the data to V2, and then it was possible to speed up compatibility and if something didn’t fit, then communicate with the girl stopped.

Great strategy. Abundance mindset. If you can afford to play a numbers game, make selection work for you, open up, be what would be vulnerable if it was actually you.

I mean, aside from the ethical horrors of outsourcing all this to ChatGPT, of course. There is that. But if you were doing it yourself it would seem great.

Then he decided to… actually put a human in the loop and do the work? I mean you might as well actually write the responses?

I also enabled response validation so that I would first receive a message for proofreading via a bot. V2’s problems with hallucinations have decreased to zero. I just watched as ChatGPT got acquainted and everything was timid. This time there are 4943 matches per month on Tinder Gold and it’s scary to count how many meetings.

Once again, if you give even a guy with no game 4,943 matches to work with each month, he is going to figure things out through trial, error and the laws of large numbers. With all this data being gathered, it is a shame there was no ability to fine tune. In general not enough science is being done.

On dates we ate, drank at the bar, then watched a movie or walked the streets, visited exhibitions and tea houses. It took 1-3 meetings to understand whether she was the one or not. And I understood that people usually meet differently, but for me this process was super different. I even talked about it in Inc.

On the contrary, that sounds extremely normal, standard early dating activity if you are looking for a long term relationship.

For several weeks I reduced my communication and meetings to 4 girls at a time. Switched the rest to mute or “familiar” mode. I felt like a candidate for a dream job with several offers. As a result, I remained on good terms with 3, and on serious terms with 1.

So what he is noticing is that quality and paying actual attention is winning out over quantity and mass production via ChatGPT. Four at a time is still a lot, but manageable if you don’t have a ton otherwise happening. It indicates individual attention for all of them, although he is keeping a few in ‘familiar’ mode I suppose.

He does not seem to care at all about all the time of the women he is talking with, which would be the best reason not to talk to dozens or hundreds at once. Despite this, he still lands on the right answer. I worry how many men, and also women, will also not care as the technology proliferates.

The most charming girl was found – Karina. ChatGPT communicated with her as V1 and V2, communication stopped for a while, then I continued to communicate myself through ChatGPT V2. Very empathic, cheerful, pretty, independent and always on the move. Simply put, SHE!

I stopped communicating with other girls (at the same time Tinder was leaving in Russia) and the meaning of the bot began to disappear – I have excellent relationships that I value more and more. And I almost forgot about ChatGPT V2

This sounds so much like the (life-path successful) pick up artist stories. Before mass production, chop wood carry water. After mass production, chop wood, carry water.

Except, maybe also outsource a bunch of wood chopping and water carrying, use time to code instead?

Karina talks about what is happening, invites us to travel, and works a lot with banking risks. I talk about what’s happening (except for the ChatGPT project), help, and try to make people happy. Together we support each other. To keep things going as expected, I decided to make ChatGPT V3.

So even though he’s down to one and presumably is signing off on all the messages himself, he still finds the system useful enough to make a new version. But he changes it to suite the new situation, and now it seems kind of reasonable?

In V3 I didn’t have to look for people, just maintain a dialogue. And now communication is not with thousands, but with Karina. So I set up V3 as an observer who communicates when I don’t write for a long time and advises me on how to communicate better. For example, support, do not quarrel, offer activities.

Nice. That makes so much sense. You use it as an advisor on your back, especially to ensure you maintain communication and follow other basic principles. He finds it helpful. This is where you find product-market fit.

During our relationship, Karina once asked how many girls and dates I had, which was super difficult for me to answer. He talked about several girls, and then switched to another topic. She once joked that with such a base it was time to open a brothel.

I came up with the idea of ​​recommending them for vacancies through referrals. I made a script – I entered a vacancy and got a suitable girl from the dialogues. I found the vacancies in Playkot, Awem and TenHunter on TenChat, then anonymously sent contacts with Linkedin or without a resume. Arranged for 8 girls, earned 526 rubles.

Well, that took a turn, although it could have taken a far worse one, dodged a bullet there. The traditional script is that she finds out about the program and that becomes the third act conflict. Instead, he’s doing automated job searches. He earned a few bucks, but not many.

It was possible to create a startup, but I switched to a more promising project (I work with neural networks). In addition, my pipeline has become outdated, taking into account innovations such as Vision in ChatGPT, improvements to Langсhain (I used it as a basis for searching for girls). In general, it could all end here.

And then the tail got to wag the dog, and we have our climax.

One day, ChatGPT V3 summarized the chat with Karina, based on which it recommended marrying her. I thought that V3 was hallucinating (I never specified the goal of getting married), but then I understood his train of thought – Karina said that she wanted to go to someone’s wedding and ChatGPT thought that it would be better at her own.

I asked in a separate ChatGPT to prepare an action plan with several scenarios for a request like “Offer me a plan so that a girl accepts a marriage proposal, taking into account her characteristics and chat with her.” Uploaded the correspondence with Karina to ChatGPT and RECEIVED THE PLAN.

Notice how far things have drifted.

At first, there was the unethical mass production of the AI communicating autonomously pretending to be him so he could play a numbers game and save time.

Now he’s flat out having the AI tell him to propose, and responding by having it plan the proposal, and doing what it says. How quickly we hand over control.

The good news is, the AI was right, it worked.

The situation hurt. Super afraid that something might go wrong. I went almost exactly according to plan № 3 and everything came to the right moment. I propose to get married.

She said yes.

So how does he summarize all this?

The development of the project took ~120 hours and $1432 for the API. Restaurant bills amounted to 200k rubles. BTV, I recovered the costs and made money on recommendations. If you met yourself and went on dates, then the same thing took 5+ years and 13m+ rubles. Thanks to ChatGPT for saving money and time

Twitter translated that as 200 rubles, which buys you one coffee maybe two if they are cheap, which indicates how reliable are the translations here. ChatGPT said it was 200k, which makes sense.

What drives me mad about this whole thread is that it skips the best scene. In some versions of this story, he quietly deletes or archives the program, or maybe secretly keeps using it, and Karina never finds out.

Instead, he is posting this on Twitter. So presumably she knows. When did she find out? Did he tell her on purpose? Did ChatGPT tell him how to break the news? How did she react?

The people bidding on the movie rights want to know. I also want to know. I asked him directly, when he responded in English to my posting of the Manifold Market, but he’s not talking. So we will never know.

And of course, the whole thing might be largely made up. It still could have happened.

If it has not yet happened, it soon will. Best be prepared.

One True Love Read More »