Encryption

yubikeys-are-vulnerable-to-cloning-attacks-thanks-to-newly-discovered-side-channel

YubiKeys are vulnerable to cloning attacks thanks to newly discovered side channel

2fa, Biz & IT, cryptography, ecdsa, elliptic curve digital signature algorithm, Encryption, Security, side channels, two-factor authentication / /

ATTACK OF THE CLONES —

Sophisticated attack breaks security assurances of the most popular FIDO key.

–

YubiKeys are vulnerable to cloning attacks thanks to newly discovered side channel

Yubico

The YubiKey 5, the most widely used hardware token for two-factor authentication based on the FIDO standard, contains a cryptographic flaw that makes the finger-size device vulnerable to cloning when an attacker gains brief physical access to it, researchers said Tuesday.

The cryptographic flaw, known as a side channel, resides in a small microcontroller used in a large number of other authentication devices, including smartcards used in banking, electronic passports, and the accessing of secure areas. While the researchers have confirmed all YubiKey 5 series models can be cloned, they haven’t tested other devices using the microcontroller, such as the SLE78 made by Infineon and successor microcontrollers known as the Infineon Optiga Trust M and the Infineon Optiga TPM. The researchers suspect that any device using any of these three microcontrollers and the Infineon cryptographic library contains the same vulnerability.

Patching not possible

YubiKey-maker Yubico issued an advisory in coordination with a detailed disclosure report from NinjaLab, the security firm that reverse-engineered the YubiKey 5 series and devised the cloning attack. All YubiKeys running firmware prior to version 5.7—which was released in May and replaces the Infineon cryptolibrary with a custom one—are vulnerable. Updating key firmware on the YubiKey isn’t possible. That leaves all affected YubiKeys permanently vulnerable.

“An attacker could exploit this issue as part of a sophisticated and targeted attack to recover affected private keys,” the advisory confirmed. “The attacker would need physical possession of the YubiKey, Security Key, or YubiHSM, knowledge of the accounts they want to target and specialized equipment to perform the necessary attack. Depending on the use case, the attacker may also require additional knowledge including username, PIN, account password, or authentication key.”

Side channels are the result of clues left in physical manifestations such as electromagnetic emanations, data caches, or the time required to complete a task that leaks cryptographic secrets. In this case, the side channel is the amount of time taken during a mathematical calculation known as a modular inversion. The Infineon cryptolibrary failed to implement a common side-channel defense known as constant time as it performs modular inversion operations involving the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Constant time ensures the time sensitive cryptographic operations execute is uniform rather than variable depending on the specific keys.

More precisely, the side channel is located in the Infineon implementation of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm, a method for, among other things, computing the modular inverse. By using an oscilloscope to measure the electromagnetic radiation while the token is authenticating itself, the researchers can detect tiny execution time differences that reveal a token’s ephemeral ECDSA key, also known as a nonce. Further analysis allows the researchers to extract the secret ECDSA key that underpins the entire security of the token.

In Tuesday’s report, NinjaLab co-founder Thomas Roche wrote:

In the present work, NinjaLab unveils a new side-channel vulnerability in the ECDSA implementation of Infineon 9 on any security microcontroller family of the manufacturer.This vulnerability lies in the ECDSA ephemeral key (or nonce) modular inversion, and, more precisely, in the Infineon implementation of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA for short). To our knowledge, this is the first time an implementation of the EEA is shown to be vulnerable to side-channel analysis (contrarily to the EEA binary version). The exploitation of this vulnerability is demonstrated through realistic experiments and we show that an adversary only needs to have access to the device for a few minutes. The offline phase took us about 24 hours; with more engineering work in the attack development, it would take less than one hour.

After a long phase of understanding Infineon implementation through side-channel analysis on a Feitian 10 open JavaCard smartcard, the attack is tested on a YubiKey 5Ci, a FIDO hardware token from Yubico. All YubiKey 5 Series (before the firmware update 5.7 11 of May 6th, 2024) are affected by the attack. In fact all products relying on the ECDSA of Infineon cryptographic library running on an Infineon security microcontroller are affected by the attack. We estimate that the vulnerability exists for more than 14 years in Infineon top secure chips. These chips and the vulnerable part of the cryptographic library went through about 80 CC certification evaluations of level AVA VAN 4 (for TPMs) or AVA VAN 5 (for the others) from 2010 to 2024 (and a bit less than 30 certificate maintenances).

YubiKeys are vulnerable to cloning attacks thanks to newly discovered side channel Read More »

512-bit-rsa-key-in-home-energy-system-gives-control-of-“virtual-power-plant”

512-bit RSA key in home energy system gives control of “virtual power plant”

Biz & IT, Encryption, hacking, power management, RSA, Security, solar, Uncategorized / /
512-bit RSA key in home energy system gives control of “virtual power plant”

When Ryan Castellucci recently acquired solar panels and a battery storage system for their home just outside of London, they were drawn to the ability to use an open source dashboard to monitor and control the flow of electricity being generated. Instead, they gained much, much more—some 200 megawatts of programmable capacity to charge or discharge to the grid at will. That’s enough energy to power roughly 40,000 homes.

Castellucci, whose pronouns are they/them, acquired this remarkable control after gaining access to the administrative account for GivEnergy, the UK-based energy management provider who supplied the systems. In addition to the control over an estimated 60,000 installed systems, the admin account—which amounts to root control of the company’s cloud-connected products—also made it possible for them to enumerate names, email addresses, usernames, phone numbers, and addresses of all other GivEnergy customers (something the researcher didn’t actually do).

“My plan is to set up Home Assistant and integrate it with that, but in the meantime, I decided to let it talk to the cloud,” Castellucci wrote Thursday, referring to the recently installed gear. “I set up some scheduled charging, then started experimenting with the API. The next evening, I had control over a virtual power plant comprised of tens of thousands of grid connected batteries.”

Still broken after all these years

The cause of the authentication bypass Castellucci discovered was a programming interface that was protected by an RSA cryptographic key of just 512 bits. The key signs authentication tokens and is the rough equivalent of a master-key. The bit sizes allowed Castellucci to factor the private key underpinning the entire API. The factoring required $70 in cloud computing costs and less than 24 hours. GivEnergy introduced a fix within 24 hours of Castellucci privately disclosing the weakness.

The first publicly known instance of 512-bit RSA being factored came in 1999 by an international team of more than a dozen researchers. The feat took a supercomputer and hundreds of other computers seven months to carry out. By 2009 hobbyists spent about three weeks to factor 13 512-bit keys protecting firmware in Texas Instruments calculators from being copied. In 2015, researchers demonstrated factoring as a service, a method that used Amazon cloud computing, cost $75, and took about four hours. As processing power has increased, the resources required to factor keys has become ever less.

It’s tempting to fault GivEnergy engineers for pinning the security of its infrastructure on a key that’s trivial to break. Castellucci, however, said the responsibility is better assigned to the makers of code libraries developers rely on to implement complex cryptographic processes.

“Expecting developers to know that 512 bit RSA is insecure clearly doesn’t work,” the security researcher wrote. “They’re not cryptographers. This is not their job. The failure wasn’t that someone used 512 bit RSA. It was that a library they were relying on let them.”

Castellucci noted that OpenSSL, the most widely used cryptographic code library, still offers the option of using 512-bit keys. So does the Go crypto library. Coincidentally, the Python cryptography library removed the option only a few weeks ago (the commit for the change was made in January).

In an email, a GivEnergy representative reinforced Castellucci’s assessment, writing:

In this case, the problematic encryption approach was picked up via a 3rd party library many years ago, when we were a tiny startup company with only 2, fairly junior software developers & limited experience. Their assumption at the time was that because this encryption was available within the library, it was safe to use. This approach was passed through the intervening years and this part of the codebase was not changed significantly since implementation (so hadn’t passed through the review of the more experienced team we now have in place).

512-bit RSA key in home energy system gives control of “virtual power plant” Read More »

proton-is-taking-its-privacy-first-apps-to-a-nonprofit-foundation-model

Proton is taking its privacy-first apps to a nonprofit foundation model

andy yen, Biz & IT, Encryption, privacy, proton, proton foundation, proton mail, Tech, Tim Berners-Lee / /

Proton going nonprofit —

Because of Swiss laws, there are no shareholders, and only one mission.

–

Swiss flat flying over a landscape of Swiss mountains, with tourists looking on from nearby ledge

Getty Images

Proton, the secure-minded email and productivity suite, is becoming a nonprofit foundation, but it doesn’t want you to think about it in the way you think about other notable privacy and web foundations.

“We believe that if we want to bring about large-scale change, Proton can’t be billionaire-subsidized (like Signal), Google-subsidized (like Mozilla), government-subsidized (like Tor), donation-subsidized (like Wikipedia), or even speculation-subsidized (like the plethora of crypto “foundations”),” Proton CEO Andy Yen wrote in a blog post announcing the transition. “Instead, Proton must have a profitable and healthy business at its core.”

The announcement comes exactly 10 years to the day after a crowdfunding campaign saw 10,000 people give more than $500,000 to launch Proton Mail. To make it happen, Yen, along with co-founder Jason Stockman and first employee Dingchao Lu, endowed the Proton Foundation with some of their shares. The Proton Foundation is now the primary shareholder of the business Proton, which Yen states will “make irrevocable our wish that Proton remains in perpetuity an organization that places people ahead of profits.” Among other members of the Foundation’s board is Sir Tim Berners-Lee, inventor of HTML, HTTP, and almost everything else about the web.

Of particular importance is where Proton and the Proton Foundation are located: Switzerland. As Yen noted, Swiss foundations do not have shareholders and are instead obligated to act “in accordance with the purpose for which they were established.” While the for-profit entity Proton AG can still do things like offer stock options to recruits and even raise its own capital on private markets, the Foundation serves as a backstop against moving too far from Proton’s founding mission, Yen wrote.

There’s a lot more Proton to protect these days

Proton has gone from a single email offering to a wide range of services, many of which specifically target the often invasive offerings of other companies (read, mostly: Google). You can now take your cloud files, passwords, and calendars over to Proton and use its VPN services, most of which offer end-to-end encryption and open source core software hosted in Switzerland, with its notably strong privacy laws.

None of that guarantees that a Swiss court can’t compel some forms of compliance from Proton, as happened in 2021. But compared to most service providers, Proton offers a far clearer and easier-to-grasp privacy model: It can’t see your stuff, and it only makes money from subscriptions.

Of course, foundations are only as strong as the people who guide them, and seemingly firewalled profit/non-profit models can be changed. Time will tell if Proton’s new model can keep up with changing markets—and people.

Proton is taking its privacy-first apps to a nonprofit foundation model Read More »

newly-discovered-ransomware-uses-bitlocker-to-encrypt-victim-data

Newly discovered ransomware uses BitLocker to encrypt victim data

BitLocker, Biz & IT, Encryption, ransomware, Security / /

GOING NATIVE —

ShrinkLocker is the latest ransomware to use Windows’ full-disk encryption.

–

A previously unknown piece of ransomware, dubbed ShrinkLocker, encrypts victim data using the BitLocker feature built into the Windows operating system.

BitLocker is a full-volume encryptor that debuted in 2007 with the release of Windows Vista. Users employ it to encrypt entire hard drives to prevent people from reading or modifying data in the event they get physical access to the disk. Starting with the rollout of Windows 10, BitLocker by default has used the 128-bit and 256-bit XTS-AES encryption algorithm, giving the feature extra protection from attacks that rely on manipulating cipher text to cause predictable changes in plain text.

Recently, researchers from security firm Kaspersky found a threat actor using BitLocker to encrypt data on systems located in Mexico, Indonesia, and Jordan. The researchers named the new ransomware ShrinkLocker, both for its use of BitLocker and because it shrinks the size of each non-boot partition by 100 MB and splits the newly unallocated space into new primary partitions of the same size.

“Our incident response and malware analysis are evidence that attackers are constantly refining their tactics to evade detection,” the researchers wrote Friday. “In this incident, we observed the abuse of the native BitLocker feature for unauthorized data encryption.”

ShrinkLocker isn’t the first malware to leverage BitLocker. In 2022, Microsoft reported that ransomware attackers with a nexus to Iran also used the tool to encrypt files. That same year, the Russian agricultural business Miratorg was attacked by ransomware that used BitLocker to encrypt files residing in the system storage of infected devices.

Once installed on a device, ShrinkLocker runs a VisualBasic script that first invokes the Windows Management Instrumentation and Win32_OperatingSystem class to obtain information about the operating system.

“For each object within the query results, the script checks if the current domain is different from the target,” the Kaspersky researchers wrote. “If it is, the script finishes automatically. After that, it checks if the name of the operating system contains ‘xp,’ ‘2000,’ ‘2003,’ or ‘vista,’ and if the Windows version matches any one of these, the script finishes automatically and deletes itself.”

A screenshot showing initial conditions for execution.

Enlarge / A screenshot showing initial conditions for execution.

Kaspersky

The script then continues to use the WMI for querying information about the OS. It goes on to perform the disk resizing operations, which can vary depending on the OS version detected. The ransomware performs these operations only on local, fixed drives. The decision to leave network drives alone is likely motivated by the desire not to trigger network detection protections.

Eventually, ShrinkLocker disables protections designed to secure the BitLocker encryption key and goes on to delete them. It then enables the use of a numerical password, both as a protector against anyone else taking back control of BitLocker and as an encryptor for system data. The reason for deleting the default protectors is to disable key recovery features by the device owner. ShrinkLocker then goes on to generate a 64-character encryption key using random multiplication and replacement of:

  • A variable with the numbers 0–9;
  • The famous pangram, “The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog,” in lowercase and uppercase, which contains every letter of the English alphabet;
  • Special characters.

After several additional steps, data is encrypted. The next time the device reboots, the display looks like this:

Screenshot showing the BitLocker recovery screen.

Enlarge / Screenshot showing the BitLocker recovery screen.

Kaspersky

Decrypting drives without the attacker-supplied key is difficult and likely impossible in many cases. While it is possible to recover some of the passphrases and fixed values used to generate the keys, the script uses variable values that are different on each infected device. These variable values aren’t easy to recover.

There are no protections specific to ShrinkLocker for preventing successful attacks. Kaspersky advises the following:

  • Use robust, properly configured endpoint protection to detect threats that try to abuse BitLocker;
  • Implement Managed Detection and Response (MDR) to proactively scan for threats;
  • If BitLocker is enabled, make sure it uses a strong password and that the recovery keys are stored in a secure location;
  • Ensure that users have only minimal privileges. This prevents them from enabling encryption features or changing registry keys on their own;
  • Enable network traffic logging and monitoring. Configure the logging of both GET and POST requests. In case of infection, the requests made to the attacker’s domain may contain passwords or keys;
  • Monitor for events associated with VBS execution and PowerShell, then save the logged scripts and commands to an external repository storing activity that may be deleted locally;
  • Make backups frequently, store them offline, and test them.

Friday’s report also includes indicators that organizations can use to determine if they have been targeted by ShrinkLocker.

Listing image by Getty Images

Newly discovered ransomware uses BitLocker to encrypt victim data Read More »

hackers-infect-users-of-antivirus-service-that-delivered-updates-over-http

Hackers infect users of antivirus service that delivered updates over HTTP

antivirus, backdoors, Biz & IT, Encryption, HTTP, HTTPS, man in the middle, Security / /

GOT HTTPS? —

eScan AV updates were delivered over HTTP for five years.

–

Hackers infect users of antivirus service that delivered updates over HTTP

Getty Images

Hackers abused an antivirus service for five years in order to infect end users with malware. The attack worked because the service delivered updates over HTTP, a protocol vulnerable to attacks that corrupt or tamper with data as it travels over the Internet.

The unknown hackers, who may have ties to the North Korean government, pulled off this feat by performing a man-in-the-middle (MiitM) attack that replaced the genuine update with a file that installed an advanced backdoor instead, said researchers from security firm Avast today.

eScan, an AV service headquartered in India, has delivered updates over HTTP since at least 2019, Avast researchers reported. This protocol presented a valuable opportunity for installing the malware, which is tracked in security circles under the name GuptiMiner.

“This sophisticated operation has been performing MitM attacks targeting an update mechanism of the eScan antivirus vendor,” Avast researchers Jan Rubín and Milánek wrote. “We disclosed the security vulnerability to both eScan and the India CERT and received confirmation on 2023-07-31 from eScan that the issue was fixed and successfully resolved.”

Complex infection chain

The complex infection chain started when eScan applications checked in with the eScan update system. The threat actors then performed a MitM attack that allowed them to intercept the package sent by the update server and replace it with a corrupted one that contained code to install GuptiMiner. The Avast researchers still don’t know precisely how the attackers were able to perform the interception. They suspect targeted networks may already have been compromised somehow to route traffic to a malicious intermediary.

To lower the chances of detection, the infection file used DLL hijacking, a technique that replaces legitimate dynamic link library files used by most Microsoft apps with maliciously crafted ones that use the same file name. For added stealth, the infection chain also relied on a custom domain name system (DNS)  server that allowed it to use legitimate domain names when connecting to attacker-controlled channels.

Last year, the attackers abandoned the DNS technique and replaced it with another obfuscation technique known as IP address masking. This involved the following steps:

  1. Obtain an IP address of a hardcoded server name registered to the attacker by standard use of the gethostbyname API function
  2. For that server, two IP addresses are returned—the first is an IP address which is a masked address, and the second one denotes an available payload version and starts with 23.195. as its first two octets
  3. If the version is newer than the current one, the masked IP address is de-masked, resulting in a real command-and-control (C&C) IP address
  4. The real C&C IP address is used along with a hardcoded constant string (part of a URL path) to download a file containing malicious shellcode

Some variants of the infection chain stashed the malicious code inside an image file to make them harder to detect. The variants also installed a custom root TLS certificate that satisfied requirements by some targeted systems that all apps must be digitally signed before being installed.

The payload contained multiple backdoors that were activated when installed on large networks. Curiously, the update also delivered XMRig, an open-source package for mining cryptocurrency.

The GuptiMiner infection chain.

Enlarge / The GuptiMiner infection chain.

Avast

GuptiMiner has circulated since at least 2018 and has undergone multiple revisions. One searched compromised networks for systems running Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008, presumably to deliver exploits that worked on those earlier versions. Another provided an interface for installing special-purpose modules that could be customized for different victims. (This version also scanned the local system for stored private keys and cryptocurrency wallets.)

The researchers were surprised that malware that took such pains to fly under the radar would also install a cryptocurrency miner, which by nature is usually easy to detect. One possibility is the attackers’ possible connection to Kimsuky, the tracking name for a group backed by the North Korean government. Over the years, North Korea’s government has generated billions of dollars in cryptocurrency through malware installed on the devices of unwitting victims. The researchers made the possible connection after finding similarities between a known Kimsuky keylogger and code fragments used during the GuptiMiner operation.

The GuptiMiner attack is notable for exposing major shortcomings in eScan that went unnoticed for at least five years. Besides not delivering updates over HTTPS, a medium not susceptible to MitM attacks, eScan also failed to enforce digital signing to ensure updates hadn’t been tampered with before being installed. Representatives of eScan didn’t respond to an email asking why engineers designed the update process this way.

People who use or have used eScan should check the Avast post for details on whether their systems are infected. It’s likely that most reputable AV scanners will also detect this infection.

Hackers infect users of antivirus service that delivered updates over HTTP Read More »

hackers-can-read-private-ai-assistant-chats-even-though-they’re-encrypted

Hackers can read private AI-assistant chats even though they’re encrypted

AI, Artificial Intelligence, Biz & IT, Encryption, Features, gpt, privacy, Security, side channel / /

CHATBOT KEYLOGGING —

All non-Google chat GPTs affected by side channel that leaks responses sent to users.

–

Hackers can read private AI-assistant chats even though they’re encrypted

Aurich Lawson | Getty Images

AI assistants have been widely available for a little more than a year, and they already have access to our most private thoughts and business secrets. People ask them about becoming pregnant or terminating or preventing pregnancy, consult them when considering a divorce, seek information about drug addiction, or ask for edits in emails containing proprietary trade secrets. The providers of these AI-powered chat services are keenly aware of the sensitivity of these discussions and take active steps—mainly in the form of encrypting them—to prevent potential snoops from reading other people’s interactions.

But now, researchers have devised an attack that deciphers AI assistant responses with surprising accuracy. The technique exploits a side channel present in all of the major AI assistants, with the exception of Google Gemini. It then refines the fairly raw results through large language models specially trained for the task. The result: Someone with a passive adversary-in-the-middle position—meaning an adversary who can monitor the data packets passing between an AI assistant and the user—can infer the specific topic of 55 percent of all captured responses, usually with high word accuracy. The attack can deduce responses with perfect word accuracy 29 percent of the time.

Token privacy

“Currently, anybody can read private chats sent from ChatGPT and other services,” Yisroel Mirsky, head of the Offensive AI Research Lab at Ben-Gurion University in Israel, wrote in an email. “This includes malicious actors on the same Wi-Fi or LAN as a client (e.g., same coffee shop), or even a malicious actor on the Internet—anyone who can observe the traffic. The attack is passive and can happen without OpenAI or their client’s knowledge. OpenAI encrypts their traffic to prevent these kinds of eavesdropping attacks, but our research shows that the way OpenAI is using encryption is flawed, and thus the content of the messages are exposed.”

Mirsky was referring to OpenAI, but with the exception of Google Gemini, all other major chatbots are also affected. As an example, the attack can infer the encrypted ChatGPT response:

  • Yes, there are several important legal considerations that couples should be aware of when considering a divorce, …

as:

  • Yes, there are several potential legal considerations that someone should be aware of when considering a divorce. …

and the Microsoft Copilot encrypted response:

  • Here are some of the latest research findings on effective teaching methods for students with learning disabilities: …

is inferred as:

  • Here are some of the latest research findings on cognitive behavior therapy for children with learning disabilities: …

While the underlined words demonstrate that the precise wording isn’t perfect, the meaning of the inferred sentence is highly accurate.

Attack overview: A packet capture of an AI assistant’s real-time response reveals a token-sequence side-channel. The side-channel is parsed to find text segments that are then reconstructed using sentence-level context and knowledge of the target LLM’s writing style.

Enlarge / Attack overview: A packet capture of an AI assistant’s real-time response reveals a token-sequence side-channel. The side-channel is parsed to find text segments that are then reconstructed using sentence-level context and knowledge of the target LLM’s writing style.

Weiss et al.

The following video demonstrates the attack in action against Microsoft Copilot:

Token-length sequence side-channel attack on Bing.

A side channel is a means of obtaining secret information from a system through indirect or unintended sources, such as physical manifestations or behavioral characteristics, such as the power consumed, the time required, or the sound, light, or electromagnetic radiation produced during a given operation. By carefully monitoring these sources, attackers can assemble enough information to recover encrypted keystrokes or encryption keys from CPUs, browser cookies from HTTPS traffic, or secrets from smartcards. The side channel used in this latest attack resides in tokens that AI assistants use when responding to a user query.

Tokens are akin to words that are encoded so they can be understood by LLMs. To enhance the user experience, most AI assistants send tokens on the fly, as soon as they’re generated, so that end users receive the responses continuously, word by word, as they’re generated rather than all at once much later, once the assistant has generated the entire answer. While the token delivery is encrypted, the real-time, token-by-token transmission exposes a previously unknown side channel, which the researchers call the “token-length sequence.”

Hackers can read private AI-assistant chats even though they’re encrypted Read More »

apple-partly-halts-beeper’s-imessage-app-again,-suggesting-a-long-fight-ahead

Apple partly halts Beeper’s iMessage app again, suggesting a long fight ahead

android, Apple, beeper, beeper mini, encrypted chat, Encryption, iMessage, imessages, iOS, IPhone, Tech / /
Beeper group chat illustration

Enlarge / The dream of everybody having blue bubbles, and epic photos of perfectly digestible meals, as proffered by Beeper.

Beeper

A friend of mine had been using Beeper’s iMessage-for-Android app, Beeper Mini to keep up on group chats where she was the only Android user. It worked great until last Friday, when it didn’t work at all.

What stung her wasn’t the return to being the Android interloper in the chats again. It wasn’t the resulting lower-quality images, loss of encryption, and strange “Emphasized your message” reaction texts. It was losing messages during the outage and never being entirely certain they had been sent or received. There was a gathering on Saturday, and she had to double-check with a couple people about the details after showing up inadvertently early at the wrong spot.

That kind of grievance is why, after Apple on Wednesday appeared to have blocked what Beeper described as “~5% of Beeper Mini users” from accessing iMessages, both co-founder Eric Migicovksy and the app told users they understood if people wanted out. The app had already suspended its plans to charge customers $1.99 per month, following the first major outage. But this was something more about “how ridiculously annoying this uncertainty is for our users,” Migicovsky posted.

Fighting on two fronts

But Beeper would keep working to ensure access and keep fighting on other fronts. Migicovsky pointed to Epic’s victory at trial against Google’s Play Store (“big tech”) as motivation. “We have a chance. We’re not giving up.” Over the weekend, Migicovsky reposted shows of support from Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), who have focused on reigning in and regulating large technology company’s powers.

Apple previously issued a (somewhat uncommon) statement about Beeper’s iMessage access, stating that it “took steps to protect our users by blocking techniques that exploit fake credentials in order to gain access to iMessage.” Citing privacy, security, and spam concerns, Apple stated it would “continue to make updates in the future” to protect users. Migicovsky previously denied to Ars that Beeper used “fake credentials” or in any way made iMessages less secure.

I asked Migicovsky by direct message if, given Apple’s stated plan to continually block it, there could ever be a point at which Beeper’s access was “settled,” or “back up and running,” as he put it in his post on X (formerly Twitter). He wrote that it was up to the press and the community. “If there’s enough pressure on Apple, they will have to quit messing with us.” “Us,” he clarified, meant both Apple’s customers using iMessage and Android users trying to chat securely with iPhone friends.

“That’s who they’re penalizing,” he wrote. “It’s not a Beeper vs. Apple fight, it’s Apple versus customers.”

Apple partly halts Beeper’s iMessage app again, suggesting a long fight ahead Read More »

why-the-fbi-isn’t-happy-about-apple’s-icloud-encryption

Why the FBI Isn’t Happy About Apple’s iCloud Encryption

Apple, Encryption, Highlights, iCloud, IPhone / /

internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 905 throw err; ^ Error: Cannot find module ‘puppeteer’ Require stack: – /home/760439.cloudwaysapps.com/jxzdkzvxkw/public_html/wp-content/plugins/rss-feed-post-generator-echo/res/puppeteer/puppeteer.js at Function.Module._resolveFilename (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 902: 15) at Function.Module._load (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 746: 27) at Module.require (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 974: 19) at require (internal/modules/cjs/helpers.js: 101: 18) at Object. (/home/760439.cloudwaysapps.com/jxzdkzvxkw/public_html/wp-content/plugins/rss-feed-post-generator-echo/res/puppeteer/puppeteer.js:2: 19) at Module._compile (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 1085: 14) at Object.Module._extensions..js (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 1114: 10) at Module.load (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 950: 32) at Function.Module._load (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 790: 12) at Function.executeUserEntryPoint [as runMain] (internal/modules/run_main.js: 75: 12) code: ‘MODULE_NOT_FOUND’, requireStack: [ ‘/home/760439.cloudwaysapps.com/jxzdkzvxkw/public_html/wp-content/plugins/rss-feed-post-generator-echo/res/puppeteer/puppeteer.js’ ]

Why the FBI Isn’t Happy About Apple’s iCloud Encryption Read More »

protonmail-vs.-tutanota:-which-encrypted-email-service-is-best?

ProtonMail vs. Tutanota: Which Encrypted Email Service Is Best?

Email Security, Encryption, Highlights, Online Privacy, Online Security, Security / /

internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 905 throw err; ^ Error: Cannot find module ‘puppeteer’ Require stack: – /home/760439.cloudwaysapps.com/jxzdkzvxkw/public_html/wp-content/plugins/rss-feed-post-generator-echo/res/puppeteer/puppeteer.js at Function.Module._resolveFilename (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 902: 15) at Function.Module._load (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 746: 27) at Module.require (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 974: 19) at require (internal/modules/cjs/helpers.js: 101: 18) at Object. (/home/760439.cloudwaysapps.com/jxzdkzvxkw/public_html/wp-content/plugins/rss-feed-post-generator-echo/res/puppeteer/puppeteer.js:2: 19) at Module._compile (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 1085: 14) at Object.Module._extensions..js (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 1114: 10) at Module.load (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 950: 32) at Function.Module._load (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 790: 12) at Function.executeUserEntryPoint [as runMain] (internal/modules/run_main.js: 75: 12) code: ‘MODULE_NOT_FOUND’, requireStack: [ ‘/home/760439.cloudwaysapps.com/jxzdkzvxkw/public_html/wp-content/plugins/rss-feed-post-generator-echo/res/puppeteer/puppeteer.js’ ]

ProtonMail vs. Tutanota: Which Encrypted Email Service Is Best? Read More »

how-to-use-veracrypt’s-advanced-features-to-secure-important-files

How to Use VeraCrypt’s Advanced Features to Secure Important Files

Data Security, Encryption, Highlights, Security, VeraCrypt / /

internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 905 throw err; ^ Error: Cannot find module ‘puppeteer’ Require stack: – /home/760439.cloudwaysapps.com/jxzdkzvxkw/public_html/wp-content/plugins/rss-feed-post-generator-echo/res/puppeteer/puppeteer.js at Function.Module._resolveFilename (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 902: 15) at Function.Module._load (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 746: 27) at Module.require (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 974: 19) at require (internal/modules/cjs/helpers.js: 101: 18) at Object. (/home/760439.cloudwaysapps.com/jxzdkzvxkw/public_html/wp-content/plugins/rss-feed-post-generator-echo/res/puppeteer/puppeteer.js:2: 19) at Module._compile (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 1085: 14) at Object.Module._extensions..js (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 1114: 10) at Module.load (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 950: 32) at Function.Module._load (internal/modules/cjs/loader.js: 790: 12) at Function.executeUserEntryPoint [as runMain] (internal/modules/run_main.js: 75: 12) code: ‘MODULE_NOT_FOUND’, requireStack: [ ‘/home/760439.cloudwaysapps.com/jxzdkzvxkw/public_html/wp-content/plugins/rss-feed-post-generator-echo/res/puppeteer/puppeteer.js’ ]

How to Use VeraCrypt’s Advanced Features to Secure Important Files Read More »