Boeing

ding-dong!-the-exploration-upper-stage-is-dead

Ding-dong! The Exploration Upper Stage is dead

Now, you might think NASA would ask industry for solutions to this problem. After all, United Launch Alliance was developing a more powerful upper stage for its Vulcan rocket, the Centaur V, that used the same propellant as the core stage of the SLS rocket. And Blue Origin was also developing a powerful upper stage engine, the BE-3U, powered by hydrogen. These options were cheaper, available, and … summarily ignored.

10 years, billions of dollars, and not much to show for it

Congress, smelling jobs, wanted NASA to develop a brand new upper stage. So in 2016, lawmakers allocated $85 million for preliminary work on the upper stage, and have since awarded more than $3.5 billion.

For the development of a rocket’s second stage.

With engines (RL-10s) that have been flying in space for six decades.

And after all of this, a decade later, the upper stage remains years from being ready to fly.

In some ways, the Exploration Upper Stage was the perfect vehicle for pork. It not only spread largesse among Boeing and Aerojet Rocketdyne (for the engines), but it also necessitated a massive new launch tower in Florida. That was good for the Exploration Ground Systems program at Kennedy Space Center.

The original cost estimates of these projects are always instructive to look back on. Boeing’s initial contract to build the Exploration Upper Stage started at $962 million, and NASA planned to launch the rocket on the second flight of the SLS in 2021. Oops. As for the launch tower, the initial estimate for its cost was $383 million, but as of late, it was heading north of $2 billion. So we are talking billions and billions and billions of dollars for a relatively straightforward upper stage, using off-the-shelf engines and a large launch tower.

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NASA shakes up its Artemis program to speed up lunar return


“Launching SLS every three and a half years or so is not a recipe for success.”

Artist’s illustration of the Boeing-developed Exploration Upper Stage, with four hydrogen-fueled RL10 engines. Credit: NASA

NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman announced sweeping changes to the Artemis program on Friday morning, including an increased cadence of missions and cancellation of an expensive rocket stage.

The upheaval comes as NASA has struggled to fuel the massive Space Launch System rocket for the upcoming Artemis II lunar mission, and Isaacman has sought to revitalize an agency that has moved at a glacial pace on its deep space programs. There is ever-increasing concern that, absent a shake-up, China’s rising space program will land humans on the Moon before NASA can return there this decade with Artemis.

“NASA must standardize its approach, increase flight rate safely, and execute on the president’s national space policy,” Isaacman said. “With credible competition from our greatest geopolitical adversary increasing by the day, we need to move faster, eliminate delays, and achieve our objectives.”

Shaking things up

The announced changes to the Artemis program include:

  • Cancellation of the Exploration Upper Stage and Block IB upgrade for SLS rocket
  • Artemis II and Artemis III missions will use the SLS rocket with existing upper stage
  • Artemis IV, V (and any additional missions, should there be) will use a “standardized” upper stage
  • Artemis III will no longer land on the Moon; rather Orion will launch on SLS and dock with Starship and/or Blue Moon landers in low-Earth orbit
  • Artemis IV is now the first lunar landing mission
  • NASA will seek to fly Artemis missions annually, starting with Artemis III in “mid” 2027, followed by at least one lunar landing in 2028
  • NASA is working with SpaceX and Blue Origin to accelerate their development of commercial lunar landers for Artemis IV and beyond

At the core of Isaacman’s concerns is the low flight rate of the SLS rocket and Artemis missions. During past exploration missions, from Mercury through Gemini, Apollo, and the Space Shuttle program, NASA has launched humans on average about once every three months. It has been nearly 3.5 years since Artemis I launched.

“This is just not the right pathway forward,” Isaacman said.

A senior NASA official, speaking on background to Ars, noted that the space agency has experienced hydrogen and helium leaks during both the Artemis I and Artemis II pre-launch preparations, and these problems have led to monthslong delays in launch.

“If I recall, the timing between Apollo 7 and 8 was nine weeks,” the official said. “Launching SLS every three and a half years or so is not a recipe for success. Certainly, making each one of them a work of art with some major configuration change is also not helpful in the process, and we’re clearly seeing the results of it, right?”

The goal, therefore, is to standardize the SLS rocket into a single configuration to make it as reliable as possible and to launch it as frequently as every 10 months. NASA will fly the SLS vehicle until there are commercial alternatives to launch crew to the Moon, perhaps through Artemis V as Congress has mandated, or perhaps even a little longer.

Is everyone on board?

The NASA official said all of the agency’s key contractors are on board with the change, and senior leaders in Congress have been briefed on the proposed changes.

The biggest opposition to these proposals would seemingly come from Boeing, which is the prime contractor for the Exploration Upper Stage, a contract worth billions of dollars to develop a more powerful rocket that was due to launch for the first time later this decade. However, in a NASA news release, Boeing appeared to offer at least some support for the revised plans.

“Boeing is a proud partner to the Artemis mission and our team is honored to contribute to NASA’s vision for American space leadership,” said Steve Parker, Boeing Defense, Space & Security president and CEO, in the news release. “The SLS core stage remains the world’s most powerful rocket stage, and the only one that can carry American astronauts directly to the moon and beyond in a single launch. As NASA lays out an accelerated launch schedule, our workforce and supply chain are prepared to meet the increased production needs.”

Solid reasons for changing Artemis III

NASA’s new approach to Artemis reflects a return to the philosophy of the Apollo program. During the late 1960s, the space agency flew a series of preparatory crewed missions before the Apollo 11 lunar landing. These included Apollo 7 (a low-Earth orbit test of the Apollo spacecraft), Apollo 8 (a lunar orbiting mission), Apollo 9 (a low-Earth orbit rendezvous with the lunar lander), and Apollo 10 (a test of the lunar lander descending to the Moon, without touching down).

With its previous Artemis template, NASA skipped the steps taken by Apollo 7, 9, and 10. In the view of many industry officials, this leap from Artemis II—a crewed lunar flyby of the Moon testing only the SLS rocket and Orion spacecraft—to Artemis III and a full-on lunar landing was enormous and risky.

The new approach will, in NASA parlance, “buy down” some of the risk for a 21st-century lunar landing, including performance and handling of a lunar lander, rendezvous and docking, communications, spacesuit performance, and more.

It will also increase the challenges for NASA. In particular, the timeline to bring the Orion spacecraft to readiness for a mid-2027 launch will need to be accelerated, and efforts to integrate that vehicle with one or both lander providers will need serious attention.

For the Artemis IV lunar landing mission, NASA will also need to human-rate a new upper stage for the SLS rocket. The vehicle currently uses a modified Delta IV upper stage manufactured by United Launch Alliance. But that rocket production line is closed, and NASA only has two more of these stages. With the cancellation of the Exploration Upper Stage, NASA will now procure a new stage commercially. NASA officials only said they will seek a “standardized” upper stage. As Ars has previously reported, the most likely replacement would be the Centaur V upper stage currently flying on Vulcan rockets.

What of the Lunar Gateway?

Friday’s announcement—which, for the space community, is the equivalent of a major earthquake—left some key details unaddressed. For example, NASA has been developing a larger launch tower to support the Block 1B version of the SLS rocket, with its more powerful upper stage. Development of this tower, finally underway, has been a clown show, with project costs ballooning from an initial estimate of $383 million to $1.8 billion, and delays stacked on delays. Will this tower be scrapped or repurposed?

Isaacman and other NASA officials were also mum on the Lunar Gateway, a proposed space station in a high orbit around the Moon. Key elements of this space station are under construction. However, cancellation of the Exploration Upper Stage raises questions about its future. The main purpose of the Block 1B version of SLS was to launch heavier payloads, most notably elements of the Gateway along with Orion.

“The whole Gateway-Moon base conversation is not for today,” the senior NASA official said. “We, I can assure you, will talk about the Moon base in the weeks ahead. I would just not overly read into this, because we had manifested some Gateway modules on Falcon Heavy already. The implications of standardizing SLS and increasing launch rate are about the ability to return to the Moon. I don’t think we necessarily have to speculate too much on what the other downstream implications are.”

The Gateway program office is based at Johnson Space Center in Houston, where the lunar station is viewed as a successor to the International Space Station in terms of flight operations.

Key politicians, such as Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, have been supportive of this new station. But during some recent congressional hearings, Cruz has indicated he is open to a lunar space station or an outpost on the lunar surface. He just wants to be sure NASA has an enduring presence on or near the Moon. One industry source said Isaacman could be laying the groundwork to replace the Gateway Program with a Moon Base program office in Houston. It is unclear how much of a political battle this would ultimately be.

Some of this has been well-predicted

Although the changes outlined by NASA on Friday are sweeping, they are not completely out of the blue.

In April 2024, Ars reported that some senior NASA officials were considering an Earth-orbit rendezvous between Orion and Starship as a means to buy down risk for a lunar landing. NASA ultimately punted on the idea before it was revived by Isaacman this month.

Additionally, in October 2024, Ars offered a guide to saving the “floundering” Artemis program by canceling the Block 1B upgrade for the SLS rocket, replacing its upper stage with a Centaur V, and canceling the Lunar Gateway. This would free up an estimated $2 billion annually to focus on accelerating a lunar landing, the publication estimated.

That may be the very course the space agency has embarked upon today.

Photo of Eric Berger

Eric Berger is the senior space editor at Ars Technica, covering everything from astronomy to private space to NASA policy, and author of two books: Liftoff, about the rise of SpaceX; and Reentry, on the development of the Falcon 9 rocket and Dragon. A certified meteorologist, Eric lives in Houston.

NASA shakes up its Artemis program to speed up lunar return Read More »

nasa-shakes-up-its-artemis-program-to-speed-up-lunar-return

NASA shakes up its Artemis program to speed up lunar return


“Launching SLS every three and a half years or so is not a recipe for success.”

Artist’s illustration of the Boeing-developed Exploration Upper Stage, with four hydrogen-fueled RL10 engines. Credit: NASA

NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman announced sweeping changes to the Artemis program on Friday morning, including an increased cadence of missions and cancellation of an expensive rocket stage.

The upheaval comes as NASA has struggled to fuel the massive Space Launch System rocket for the upcoming Artemis II lunar mission, and Isaacman has sought to revitalize an agency that has moved at a glacial pace on its deep space programs. There is ever-increasing concern that, absent a shake-up, China’s rising space program will land humans on the Moon before NASA can return there this decade with Artemis.

“NASA must standardize its approach, increase flight rate safely, and execute on the president’s national space policy,” Isaacman said. “With credible competition from our greatest geopolitical adversary increasing by the day, we need to move faster, eliminate delays, and achieve our objectives.”

Shaking things up

The announced changes to the Artemis program include:

  • Cancellation of the Exploration Upper Stage and Block IB upgrade for SLS rocket
  • Artemis II and Artemis III missions will use the SLS rocket with existing upper stage
  • Artemis IV, V (and any additional missions, should there be) will use a “standardized” upper stage
  • Artemis III will no longer land on the Moon; rather Orion will launch on SLS and dock with Starship and/or Blue Moon landers in low-Earth orbit
  • Artemis IV is now the first lunar landing mission
  • NASA will seek to fly Artemis missions annually, starting with Artemis III in “mid” 2027, followed by at least one lunar landing in 2028
  • NASA is working with SpaceX and Blue Origin to accelerate their development of commercial lunar landers for Artemis IV and beyond

At the core of Isaacman’s concerns is the low flight rate of the SLS rocket and Artemis missions. During past exploration missions, from Mercury through Gemini, Apollo, and the Space Shuttle program, NASA has launched humans on average about once every three months. It has been nearly 3.5 years since Artemis I launched.

“This is just not the right pathway forward,” Isaacman said.

A senior NASA official, speaking on background to Ars, noted that the space agency has experienced hydrogen and helium leaks during both the Artemis I and Artemis II pre-launch preparations, and these problems have led to monthslong delays in launch.

“If I recall, the timing between Apollo 7 and 8 was nine weeks,” the official said. “Launching SLS every three and a half years or so is not a recipe for success. Certainly, making each one of them a work of art with some major configuration change is also not helpful in the process, and we’re clearly seeing the results of it, right?”

The goal, therefore, is to standardize the SLS rocket into a single configuration to make it as reliable as possible and to launch it as frequently as every 10 months. NASA will fly the SLS vehicle until there are commercial alternatives to launch crew to the Moon, perhaps through Artemis V as Congress has mandated, or perhaps even a little longer.

Is everyone on board?

The NASA official said all of the agency’s key contractors are on board with the change, and senior leaders in Congress have been briefed on the proposed changes.

The biggest opposition to these proposals would seemingly come from Boeing, which is the prime contractor for the Exploration Upper Stage, a contract worth billions of dollars to develop a more powerful rocket that was due to launch for the first time later this decade. However, in a NASA news release, Boeing appeared to offer at least some support for the revised plans.

“Boeing is a proud partner to the Artemis mission and our team is honored to contribute to NASA’s vision for American space leadership,” said Steve Parker, Boeing Defense, Space & Security president and CEO, in the news release. “The SLS core stage remains the world’s most powerful rocket stage, and the only one that can carry American astronauts directly to the moon and beyond in a single launch. As NASA lays out an accelerated launch schedule, our workforce and supply chain are prepared to meet the increased production needs.”

Solid reasons for changing Artemis III

NASA’s new approach to Artemis reflects a return to the philosophy of the Apollo program. During the late 1960s, the space agency flew a series of preparatory crewed missions before the Apollo 11 lunar landing. These included Apollo 7 (a low-Earth orbit test of the Apollo spacecraft), Apollo 8 (a lunar orbiting mission), Apollo 9 (a low-Earth orbit rendezvous with the lunar lander), and Apollo 10 (a test of the lunar lander descending to the Moon, without touching down).

With its previous Artemis template, NASA skipped the steps taken by Apollo 7, 9, and 10. In the view of many industry officials, this leap from Artemis II—a crewed lunar flyby of the Moon testing only the SLS rocket and Orion spacecraft—to Artemis III and a full-on lunar landing was enormous and risky.

The new approach will, in NASA parlance, “buy down” some of the risk for a 21st-century lunar landing, including performance and handling of a lunar lander, rendezvous and docking, communications, spacesuit performance, and more.

It will also increase the challenges for NASA. In particular, the timeline to bring the Orion spacecraft to readiness for a mid-2027 launch will need to be accelerated, and efforts to integrate that vehicle with one or both lander providers will need serious attention.

For the Artemis IV lunar landing mission, NASA will also need to human-rate a new upper stage for the SLS rocket. The vehicle currently uses a modified Delta IV upper stage manufactured by United Launch Alliance. But that rocket production line is closed, and NASA only has two more of these stages. With the cancellation of the Exploration Upper Stage, NASA will now procure a new stage commercially. NASA officials only said they will seek a “standardized” upper stage. As Ars has previously reported, the most likely replacement would be the Centaur V upper stage currently flying on Vulcan rockets.

What of the Lunar Gateway?

Friday’s announcement—which, for the space community, is the equivalent of a major earthquake—left some key details unaddressed. For example, NASA has been developing a larger launch tower to support the Block 1B version of the SLS rocket, with its more powerful upper stage. Development of this tower, finally underway, has been a clown show, with project costs ballooning from an initial estimate of $383 million to $1.8 billion, and delays stacked on delays. Will this tower be scrapped or repurposed?

Isaacman and other NASA officials were also mum on the Lunar Gateway, a proposed space station in a high orbit around the Moon. Key elements of this space station are under construction. However, cancellation of the Exploration Upper Stage raises questions about its future. The main purpose of the Block 1B version of SLS was to launch heavier payloads, most notably elements of the Gateway along with Orion.

“The whole Gateway-Moon base conversation is not for today,” the senior NASA official said. “We, I can assure you, will talk about the Moon base in the weeks ahead. I would just not overly read into this, because we had manifested some Gateway modules on Falcon Heavy already. The implications of standardizing SLS and increasing launch rate are about the ability to return to the Moon. I don’t think we necessarily have to speculate too much on what the other downstream implications are.”

The Gateway program office is based at Johnson Space Center in Houston, where the lunar station is viewed as a successor to the International Space Station in terms of flight operations.

Key politicians, such as Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, have been supportive of this new station. But during some recent congressional hearings, Cruz has indicated he is open to a lunar space station or an outpost on the lunar surface. He just wants to be sure NASA has an enduring presence on or near the Moon. One industry source said Isaacman could be laying the groundwork to replace the Gateway Program with a Moon Base program office in Houston. It is unclear how much of a political battle this would ultimately be.

Some of this has been well-predicted

Although the changes outlined by NASA on Friday are sweeping, they are not completely out of the blue.

In April 2024, Ars reported that some senior NASA officials were considering an Earth-orbit rendezvous between Orion and Starship as a means to buy down risk for a lunar landing. NASA ultimately punted on the idea before it was revived by Isaacman this month.

Additionally, in October 2024, Ars offered a guide to saving the “floundering” Artemis program by canceling the Block 1B upgrade for the SLS rocket, replacing its upper stage with a Centaur V, and canceling the Lunar Gateway. This would free up an estimated $2 billion annually to focus on accelerating a lunar landing, the publication estimated.

That may be the very course the space agency has embarked upon today.

Photo of Eric Berger

Eric Berger is the senior space editor at Ars Technica, covering everything from astronomy to private space to NASA policy, and author of two books: Liftoff, about the rise of SpaceX; and Reentry, on the development of the Falcon 9 rocket and Dragon. A certified meteorologist, Eric lives in Houston.

NASA shakes up its Artemis program to speed up lunar return Read More »

nasa-chief-classifies-starliner-flight-as-“type-a”-mishap,-says-agency-made-mistakes

NASA chief classifies Starliner flight as “Type A” mishap, says agency made mistakes

Still, after astronauts Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams eventually docked at the station, Boeing officials declared success. “We accomplished a lot, and really more than expected,” said Mark Nappi, vice president and manager of Boeing’s Commercial Crew Program, during a post-docking news conference. “We just had an outstanding day.”

Over the subsequent weeks of the summer of 2024, NASA mostly backed Boeing, saying that its primary option was bringing the crew home on Starliner.

Finally, by early August, NASA publicly wavered and admitted that Wilmore and Williams might return on a SpaceX Crew Dragon spacecraft. Yet Boeing remained steadfast. On a Boeing website called “Starliner Updates” that has since gone offline, as late as August 2, 2024, the company was declaring that its “confidence remains high” in Starliner’s return with crew (see archive).

It was, in fact, not outstanding

However, on August 24, NASA made it official and decided that Wilmore and Williams would not fly back on Starliner. Instead, the crew would come home on a Crew Dragon. Wilmore and Williams safely eventually returned to Earth in March 2025 as part of the Crew 9 mission.

The true danger the astronauts faced on board Starliner was not publicly revealed until after they landed and flew back to Houston. In an interview with Ars, Wilmore described the tense minutes when he had to take control of Starliner as its thrusters began to fail, one after the other.

Essentially, Wilmore could not fully control Starliner any longer. But simply abandoning the docking attempt was not a palatable solution. Just as the thrusters were needed to control the vehicle during the docking process, they were also necessary to position Starliner for its deorbit burn and reentry to Earth’s atmosphere. So Wilmore had to contemplate whether it was riskier to approach the space station or try to fly back to Earth.

“I don’t know that we can come back to Earth at that point,” he said. “I don’t know if we can. And matter of fact, I’m thinking we probably can’t. So there we are, loss of 6DOF control, four aft thrusters down, and I’m visualizing orbital mechanics. The space station is nose down. So we’re not exactly level with the station, but below it. If you’re below the station, you’re moving faster. That’s orbital mechanics. It’s going to make you move away from the station. So I’m doing all of this in my mind. I don’t know what control I have. What if I lose another thruster? What if we lose comm? What am I going to do?”

One thing that has surprised outside observers since publication of Wilmore’s harrowing experience is how NASA, knowing all of this, could have seriously entertained bringing the crew home on Starliner.

NASA chief classifies Starliner flight as “Type A” mishap, says agency made mistakes Read More »

us-spy-satellite-agency-declassifies-high-flying-cold-war-listening-post

US spy satellite agency declassifies high-flying Cold War listening post

The National Reconnaissance Office, the agency overseeing the US government’s fleet of spy satellites, has declassified a decades-old program used to eavesdrop on the Soviet Union’s military communication signals.

The program was codenamed Jumpseat, and its existence was already public knowledge through leaks and contemporary media reports. What’s new is the NRO’s description of the program’s purpose, development, and pictures of the satellites themselves.

In a statement, the NRO called Jumpseat “the United States’ first-generation, highly elliptical orbit (HEO) signals-collection satellite.”

Scooping up signals

Eight Jumpseat satellites launched from 1971 through 1987, when the US government considered the very existence of the National Reconnaissance Office a state secret. Jumpseat satellites operated until 2006. Their core mission was “monitoring adversarial offensive and defensive weapon system development,” the NRO said. “Jumpseat collected electronic emissions and signals, communication intelligence, as well as foreign instrumentation intelligence.”

Data intercepted by the Jumpseat satellites flowed to the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, and “other national security elements,” the NRO said.

The Soviet Union was the primary target for Jumpseat intelligence collections. The satellites flew in highly elliptical orbits ranging from a few hundred miles up to 24,000 miles (39,000 kilometers) above the Earth. The satellites’ flight paths were angled such that they reached apogee, the highest point of their orbits, over the far northern hemisphere. Satellites travel slowest at apogee, so the Jumpseat spacecraft loitered high over the Arctic, Russia, Canada, and Greenland for most of the 12 hours it took them to complete a loop around the Earth.

This trajectory gave the Jumpseat satellites persistent coverage over the Arctic and the Soviet Union, which first realized the utility of such an orbit. The Soviet government began launching communication and early-warning satellites into the same type of orbit a few years before the first Jumpseat mission launched in 1971. The Soviets called the orbit Molniya, the Russian word for lightning.

A Jumpseat satellite before launch.

Credit: National Reconnaissance Office

A Jumpseat satellite before launch. Credit: National Reconnaissance Office

The name Jumpseat was first revealed in a 1986 book by the investigative journalist Seymour Hersh on the Soviet Union’s 1983 shoot-down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007. Hersh wrote that the Jumpseat satellites could “intercept all kinds of communications,” including voice messages between Soviet ground personnel and pilots.

US spy satellite agency declassifies high-flying Cold War listening post Read More »

in-a-surprise-announcement,-tory-bruno-is-out-as-ceo-of-united-launch-alliance

In a surprise announcement, Tory Bruno is out as CEO of United Launch Alliance

The retirement of the Atlas V and Delta IV led to a period of downsizing for United Launch Alliance, with layoffs and facility closures in Florida, California, Alabama, Colorado, and Texas. In a further sign of ULA’s troubles, SpaceX won a majority of US military launch contracts for the first time last year.

Bruno, 64, served as a genial public face for ULA amid the company’s difficult times. He routinely engaged with space enthusiasts on social media, fielded questions from reporters, and even started a podcast. Bruno’s friendly and accessible demeanor was unusual among industry leaders, especially those with ties to large legacy defense contractors.

ULA is a 50-50 joint venture between Boeing and Lockheed Martin, which merged their rocket divisions in 2006. Bruno’s plans did not always enjoy full support from ULA’s corporate owners. For example, Boeing and Lockheed initially only approved tranches of funding for developing the new Vulcan rocket on a quarterly basis. Beginning before Bruno’s arrival and extending into his tenure as CEO, ULA’s owners slow-walked development of an advanced upper stage that might have become a useful centerpiece for an innovative in-space transport and refueling infrastructure.

There were also rumors in recent years of an impending sale of ULA by Boeing and Lockheed Martin, but nothing has materialized so far.

The third flight of the Vulcan rocket lifted off from Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida, on August 12, 2025. Credit: United Launch Alliance

A statement from the co-chairs of ULA’s board, Robert Lightfoot of Lockheed Martin and Kay Sears of Boeing, did not identify a reason for Bruno’s resignation, other than saying he is stepping down “to pursue another opportunity.”

“We are grateful for Tory’s service to ULA and the country, and we thank him for his leadership,” the board chairs said in a statement.

John Elbon, ULA’s chief operating officer, will take over as interim CEO effective immediately, the company said.

“We have the greatest confidence in John to continue strengthening ULA’s momentum while the board proceeds with finding the next leader of ULA,” the company said. “Together with Mark Peller, the new COO, John’s career in aerospace and his launch expertise is an asset for ULA and its customers, especially for achieving key upcoming Vulcan milestones.”

In a post on X, Bruno thanked ULA’s owners for the opportunity to lead the company. “It has been a great privilege to lead ULA through its transformation and to bring Vulcan into service,” he wrote. “My work here is now complete and I will be cheering ULA on.”

In a surprise announcement, Tory Bruno is out as CEO of United Launch Alliance Read More »

safety-panel-says-nasa-should-have-taken-starliner-incident-more-seriously

Safety panel says NASA should have taken Starliner incident more seriously

Invoking the designation also ensures an independent investigation detached from the teams involved in the incident itself, according to retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Susan Helms, chair of the safety panel. “We just, I think, are advocates of safety investigation best practices, and that clearly is one of the top best practices,” Helms said.

Another member of the safety panel, Mark Sirangelo, said NASA should formally declare mishaps and close calls as soon as possible. “It allows for the investigative team to be starting to be formed a lot sooner, which makes them more effective and makes the results quicker for everyone,” Sirangelo said.

In the case of last year’s Starliner test flight, NASA’s decision not to declare a mishap or close call created confusion within the agency, safety officials said.

A few weeks into the Starliner test flight last year, the manager of NASA’s Commercial Crew Program, Steve Stich, told reporters the agency’s plan was “to continue to return [the astronauts] on Starliner and return them home at the right time.” Mark Nappi, then Boeing’s Starliner program manager, regularly appeared to downplay the seriousness of the thruster issues during press conferences throughout Starliner’s nearly three-month mission.

“Specifically, there’s a significant difference, philosophically, between we will work toward proving the Starliner is safe for crew return, versus a philosophy of Starliner is no-go for return, and the primary path is on an alternate vehicle, such as Dragon or Soyuz, unless and until we learn how to ensure the on-orbit failures won’t recur on entry with the Starliner,” Precourt said.

“The latter would have been the more appropriate direction,” he said. “However, there were many stakeholders that believed the direction was the former approach. This ambiguity continued throughout the summer months, while engineers and managers pursued multiple test protocols in the Starliner propulsion systems, undoubtedly affecting the workforce.”

After months of testing and analysis, NASA officials were unsure if the thruster problems would recur on Starliner’s flight home. They decided in August 2024 to return the spacecraft to the ground without the astronauts, and the capsule safely landed in New Mexico the following month. The next Starliner flight will carry only cargo to the ISS.

The safety panel recommended that NASA review its criteria and processes to ensure the language is “unambiguous” in requiring the agency to declare an in-flight mishap or a high-visibility close call for any event involving NASA personnel “that leads to an impact on crew or spacecraft safety.”

Safety panel says NASA should have taken Starliner incident more seriously Read More »

nasa-rewraps-boeing-starliner-astrovan-ii-for-artemis-ii-ride-to-launch-pad

NASA rewraps Boeing Starliner Astrovan II for Artemis II ride to launch pad

Artemis II, meet Astrovan II.

NASA’s first astronauts who will fly by the moon in more than 50 years participated in a practice launch countdown on Saturday, December 20, including taking their first trip on a transport vehicle steeped in almost the entire span of US space history—from Apollo through to the ongoing commercial crew program.

Three men and a woman wearing bright orange pressure suits pose for a photo next to a motor coach.

Artemis II astronauts (from right to left) Reid Wiseman, Victor Glover, Christina Koch, and Jeremy Hansen pose for photographs before boarding the Astrovan II crew transport vehicle for a ride to their rocket during a rehearsal of their launch-day activities at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida on Saturday, Dec. 20, 2025. Credit: NASA/Aubrey Gemignani

Artemis II commander Reid Wiseman, pilot Victor Glover, and mission specialist Christina Koch (all with NASA) and mission specialist Jeremy Hansen, an astronaut with the Canadian Space Agency, began the rehearsal at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida, proceeding as they will when they are ready to fly next year (the Artemis II launch is slated for no earlier than the first week of February and no later than April 2026).

Parked outside of their crew quarters and suit-up room was their ride to their rocket, “Astrovan II,” a modified Airstream motorhome. The almost 25-foot-long (8-meter) crew transport vehicle (CTV) was custom-wrapped with graphics depicting the moon, the Artemis II mission patch, and program insignia.

From Canoo to coach

Airstream’s Atlas Touring Coach, though, was not originally planned as NASA’s Artemis CTV. In July 2023, NASA took delivery of three fully electric vans from Canoo Technologies after the company, a startup based in Torrance, California, was awarded the contract the year before. At the time, NASA touted its selection as focusing on the “crews’ safety and comfort on the way to the [launch] pad.”

Three vans with rounded corners are parked side by side in front of a large building and an overcast sky.

The three Canoo Technologies’ specially designed, fully-electric, environmentally friendly crew transportation vehicles for Artemis missions arrived at Kennedy Space Center on July 11, 2023. The company now bankrupt, the CTVs will serve as a backup to the Astrovan II. Credit: NASA/Isaac Watson

Six months later, Canoo filed for bankruptcy, and NASA ceased active use of the electric vans, citing a lack of support for its mission requirements. Instead, the agency turned to another of its commercial partners, Boeing, which had its own CTV but no astronauts at present to use it.

NASA rewraps Boeing Starliner Astrovan II for Artemis II ride to launch pad Read More »

it’s-official:-boeing’s-next-flight-of-starliner-will-be-allowed-to-carry-cargo-only

It’s official: Boeing’s next flight of Starliner will be allowed to carry cargo only

The US space agency ended months of speculation about the next flight of Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft, confirming Monday that the vehicle will carry only cargo to the International Space Station.

NASA and Boeing are now targeting no earlier than April 2026 to fly the uncrewed Starliner-1 mission, the space agency said. Launching by next April will require completion of rigorous test, certification, and mission readiness activities, NASA added in a statement.

“NASA and Boeing are continuing to rigorously test the Starliner propulsion system in preparation for two potential flights next year,” said Steve Stich, manager of NASA’s Commercial Crew Program, in a statement.

Reducing crewed missions

NASA also said it has reached an agreement with Boeing to modify the Commercial Crew contract, signed in 2014, that called for six crewed flights to the space station following certification of the spacecraft. Now the plan is to fly Starliner-1 carrying cargo, and then up to three additional missions before the space station is retired.

“This modification allows NASA and Boeing to focus on safely certifying the system in 2026, execute Starliner’s first crew rotation when ready, and align our ongoing flight planning for future Starliner missions based on station’s operational needs through 2030,” Stich said.

SpaceX and Boeing were both awarded contracts in 2014 to develop crewed spacecraft and fly six operational missions to the space station. SpaceX, with its Crew Dragon vehicle, flew a successful crew test flight in mid-2020 and its first operational mission before the end of that year. Most recently, the Crew-11 mission launched in August, with Crew-12 presently scheduled for February 15.

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US military’s X-37B spaceplane stays relevant with launch of another mission

“Quantum inertial sensors are not only scientifically intriguing, but they also have direct defense applications,” said Lt. Col. Nicholas Estep, an Air Force engineer who manages the DIU’s emerging technology portfolio. “If we can field devices that provide a leap in sensitivity and precision for observing platform motion over what is available today, then there’s an opportunity for strategic gains across the DoD.”

Teaching an old dog new tricks

The Pentagon’s twin X-37Bs have logged more than 4,200 days in orbit, equivalent to about 11-and-a-half years. The spaceplanes have flown in secrecy for nearly all of that time.

The most recent flight, Mission 7, ended in March with a runway landing at Vandenberg after a mission of more than 14 months that carried the spaceplane higher than ever before, all the way to an altitude approaching 25,000 miles (40,000 kilometers). The high-altitude elliptical orbit required a boost on a Falcon Heavy rocket.

In the final phase of the mission, ground controllers commanded the X-37B to gently dip into the atmosphere to demonstrate the spacecraft could use “aerobraking” maneuvers to bring its orbit closer to Earth in preparation for reentry.

An X-37B spaceplane is ready for encapsulation inside the Falcon 9 rocket’s payload fairing. Credit: US Space Force

Now, on Mission 8, the spaceplane heads back to low-Earth orbit hosting quantum navigation and laser communications experiments. Few people, if any, envisioned these kinds of missions flying on the X-37B when it first soared to space 15 years ago. At that time, quantum sensing was confined to the lab, and the first laser communication demonstrations in space were barely underway. SpaceX hadn’t revealed its plans for the Falcon Heavy rocket, which the X-37B needed to get to its higher orbit on the last mission.

The laser communications experiments on this flight will involve optical inter-satellite links with “proliferated commercial satellite networks in low-Earth orbit,” the Space Force said. This is likely a reference to SpaceX’s Starlink or Starshield broadband satellites. Laser links enable faster transmission of data, while offering more security against eavesdropping or intercepts.

Gen. Chance Saltzman, the Space Force’s chief of space operations, said in a statement that the laser communications experiment “will mark an important step in the US Space Force’s ability to leverage proliferated space networks as part of a diversified and redundant space architectures. In so doing, it will strengthen the resilience, reliability, adaptability and data transport speeds of our satellite communications architecture.”

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Lawmakers writing NASA’s budget want a cheaper upper stage for the SLS rocket


Eliminating the Block 1B upgrade now would save NASA at least $500 million per year.

Artist’s illustration of the Boeing-developed Exploration Upper Stage, with four hydrogen-fueled RL10 engines. Credit: NASA

Not surprisingly, Congress is pushing back against the Trump administration’s proposal to cancel the Space Launch System, the behemoth rocket NASA has developed to propel astronauts back to the Moon.

Spending bills making their way through both houses of Congress reject the White House’s plan to wind down the SLS rocket after two more launches, but the text of a draft budget recently released by the House Appropriations Committee suggests an openness to making some major changes to the program.

The next SLS flight, called Artemis II, is scheduled to lift off early next year to send a crew of four astronauts around the far side of the Moon. Artemis III will follow a few years later on a mission to attempt a crew lunar landing at the Moon’s south pole. These missions follow Artemis I, a successful unpiloted test flight in 2022.

After Artemis III, the official policy of the Trump administration is to terminate the SLS program, along with the Orion crew capsule designed to launch on top of the rocket. The White House also proposed canceling NASA’s Gateway, a mini-space station to be placed in orbit around the Moon. NASA would instead procure commercial launches and commercial spacecraft to ferry astronauts between the Earth and the Moon, while focusing the agency’s long-term gaze toward Mars.

CYA EUS?

House and Senate appropriations bills would preserve SLS, Orion, and the Gateway. However, the House version of NASA’s budget has an interesting paragraph directing NASA to explore cheaper, faster options for a new SLS upper stage.

NASA has tasked Boeing, which also builds SLS core stages, to develop an Exploration Upper Stage for debut on the Artemis IV mission, the fourth flight of the Space Launch System. This new upper stage would have large propellant tanks and carry four engines instead of the single engine used on the rocket’s interim upper stage, which NASA is using for the first three SLS flights.

The House version of NASA’s fiscal year 2026 budget raises questions about the long-term future of the Exploration Upper Stage. In one section of the bill, House lawmakers would direct NASA to “evaluate alternatives to the current Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) design for SLS.” The committee members wrote the evaluation should focus on reducing development and production costs, shortening the schedule, and maintaining the SLS rocket’s lift capability.

“NASA should also evaluate how alternative designs could support the long-term evolution of SLS and broader exploration goals beyond low-Earth orbit,” the lawmakers wrote. “NASA is directed to assess various propulsion systems, stage configurations, infrastructure compatibility, commercial and international collaboration opportunities, and the cost and schedule impacts of each alternative.”

The SLS rocket is expensive, projected to cost at least $2.5 billion per launch, not counting development costs or expenses related to the Orion spacecraft and the ground systems required to launch it at Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Those figures bring the total cost of an Artemis mission using SLS and Orion to more than $4 billion, according to NASA’s inspector general.

NASA’s Block 1B version of the SLS rocket will be substantially larger than Block 1. Credit: NASA

The EUS is likewise an expensive undertaking. Last year, NASA’s inspector general reported that the new upper stage’s development costs had ballooned from $962 million to $2.8 billion, and the Boeing-led project had been delayed more than six years. The version of the SLS rocket with the EUS, known as Block 1B, is supposed to deliver a 40 percent increase in performance over the Block 1 configuration used on the first three Space Launch System flights. Overall, NASA’s inspector general projected Block 1B’s development costs to total $5.7 billion.

Eliminating the Block 1B upgrade now would save NASA at least $500 million per year, and perhaps more if NASA could also end work on a costly mobile launch tower specifically designed to support SLS Block 1B missions.

NASA can’t go back to the interim upper stage, which is based on the design of the upper stage that flew on United Launch Alliance’s (ULA’s) now-retired Delta IV Heavy rocket. ULA has shut down its Delta production line, so there’s no way to build any more. What ULA does have is a new high-energy upper stage called Centaur V. This upper stage is sized for ULA’s new Vulcan rocket, with more capability than the interim upper stage but with lower performance than the larger EUS.

A season of compromise, maybe

Ars’ Eric Berger wrote last year about the possibility of flying the Centaur V upper stage on SLS missions.

Incorporating the Centaur V wouldn’t maintain the SLS rocket’s lift capability, as the House committee calls for in its appropriations bill. The primary reason for improving the rocket’s performance is to give SLS Block 1B enough oomph to carry “co-manifested” payloads, meaning it can launch an Orion crew capsule and equipment for NASA’s Gateway lunar space station on a single flight. The lunar Gateway is also teed up for cancellation in Trump’s budget proposal, but both congressional appropriations bills would save it, too. If the Gateway escapes cancellation, there are ways to launch its modules on commercial rockets.

Blue Origin also has an upper stage that could conceivably fly on the Space Launch System. But the second stage for Blue Origin’s New Glenn rocket would be a more challenging match for SLS for several reasons, chiefly its 7-meter (23-foot) diameter—too wide to be a drop-in replacement for the interim upper stage used on Block 1. ULA’s Centaur V is much closer in size to the existing upper stage.

The House budget bill has passed a key subcommittee vote but won’t receive a vote from the full appropriations committee until after Congress’s August recess. A markup of the bill by the House Appropriations Committee scheduled for Thursday was postponed after Speaker Mike Johnson announced an early start to the recess this week.

Ars reported last week on the broad strokes of how the House and Senate appropriations bills would affect NASA. Since then, members of the House Appropriations Committee released the text of the report attached to their version of the NASA budget. The report, which includes the paragraph on the Exploration Upper Stage, provides policy guidance and more detailed direction on where NASA should spend its money.

The House’s draft budget includes $2.5 billion for the Space Launch System, close to this year’s funding level and $500 million more than the Trump administration’s request for the next fiscal year, which begins October 1. The budget would continue development of SLS Block 1B and the Exploration Upper Stage while NASA completes a six-month study of alternatives.

The report attached to the Senate appropriations bill for NASA has no specific instructions regarding the Exploration Upper Stage. But like the House bill, the Senate’s draft budget directs NASA to continue ordering spares and long-lead parts for SLS and Orion missions beyond Artemis III. Both versions of the NASA budget require the agency to continue with SLS and Orion until a suitable commercial, human-rated rocket and crew vehicle are proven ready for service.

In a further indication of Congress’ position on the SLS and Orion programs, lawmakers set aside more than $4 billion for the procurement of SLS rockets for the Artemis IV and Artemis V rockets in the reconciliation bill signed into law by President Donald Trump earlier this month.

Congress must pass a series of federal appropriations bills by October 1, when funding for the current fiscal year runs out. If Congress doesn’t act by then, it could pass a continuing resolution to maintain funding at levels close to this year’s budget or face a government shutdown.

Lawmakers will reconvene in Washington, DC, in early September in hopes of finishing work on the fiscal year 2026 budget. The section of the budget that includes NASA still must go through a markup hearing by the House Appropriations Committee and pass floor votes in the House and Senate. Then the two chambers will have to come to a compromise on the differences in their appropriations bill. Only then can the budget be put to another vote in each chamber and go to the White House for Trump’s signature.

Photo of Stephen Clark

Stephen Clark is a space reporter at Ars Technica, covering private space companies and the world’s space agencies. Stephen writes about the nexus of technology, science, policy, and business on and off the planet.

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The ISS is nearing retirement, so why is NASA still gung-ho about Starliner?


NASA is doing all it can to ensure Boeing doesn’t abandon the Starliner program.

Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft atop a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket before a test flight in 2019. Credit: NASA/Joel Kowsky

Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft atop a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket before a test flight in 2019. Credit: NASA/Joel Kowsky

After so many delays, difficulties, and disappointments, you might be inclined to think that NASA wants to wash its hands of Boeing’s troubled Starliner spacecraft.

But that’s not the case.

The manager of NASA’s commercial crew program, Steve Stich, told reporters Thursday that Boeing and its propulsion supplier, Aerojet Rocketdyne, are moving forward with several changes to the Starliner spacecraft to resolve problems that bedeviled a test flight to the International Space Station (ISS) last year. These changes include new seals to plug helium leaks and thermal shunts and barriers to keep the spacecraft’s thrusters from overheating.

Boeing, now more than $2 billion in the hole to pay for all Starliner’s delays, is still more than a year away from executing on its multibillion-dollar NASA contract and beginning crew rotation flights to the ISS. But NASA officials say Boeing remains committed to Starliner.

“We really are working toward a flight as soon as early next year with Starliner, and then ultimately, our goal is to get into crew rotation flights with Starliner,” Stich said. “And those would start no earlier than the second crew rotation slot at the end of next year.”

That would be 11 years after Boeing officials anticipated the spacecraft would enter operational service for NASA when they announced the Starliner program in 2010.

Decision point

The next Starliner flight will probably transport only cargo to the ISS, not astronauts. But NASA hasn’t made any final decisions on the matter. The agency has enough crew rotation missions booked to fly on SpaceX’s Dragon spacecraft to cover the space station’s needs until well into 2027 or 2028.

“I think there are a lot of advantages, I would say, to fly the cargo flight first,” Stich said. “If we really look at the history of Starliner and Dragon, I think Dragon benefited a lot from having earlier [cargo] flights before the crew contract was let for the space station.”

One drawback of flying a Starliner cargo mission is that it will use up one of United Launch Alliance’s remaining Atlas V rockets currently earmarked for a future Starliner crew launch. That means Boeing would have to turn to another rocket to accomplish its full contract with NASA, which covers up to six crew missions.

While Boeing says Starliner can launch on several different rockets, the difficulty of adapting the spacecraft to a new launch vehicle, such as ULA’s Vulcan, shouldn’t be overlooked. Early in Starliner’s development, Boeing and ULA had to overcome an issue with unexpected aerodynamic loads discovered during wind tunnel testing. This prompted engineers to design an aerodynamic extension, or skirt, to go underneath the Starliner spacecraft on top of its Atlas V launcher.

Starliner has suffered delays from the beginning. A NASA budget crunch in the early 2010s pushed back the program about two years, but the rest of the schedule slips have largely fallen on Boeing’s shoulders. The setbacks included a fuel leak and fire during a critical ground test, parachute problems, a redesign to accommodate unanticipated aerodynamic forces, and a computer timing error that cut short Starliner’s first attempt to reach the space station in 2019.

This all culminated in the program’s first test flight with astronauts last summer. But after running into helium leaks and overheating thrusters, the mission ended with Starliner returning to Earth empty, while the spacecraft’s two crew members remained on the International Space Station until they could come home on a SpaceX Dragon spacecraft this year.

The outcome was a stinging disappointment for Boeing. Going into last year’s crew test flight, Boeing appeared to be on the cusp of joining SpaceX and finally earning revenue as one of NASA’s certified crew transportation providers for the ISS.

For several months, Boeing officials were strikingly silent on Starliner’s future. The company declined to release any statements on their long-term commitment to the program, and a Boeing program manager unexpectedly withdrew from a NASA press conference marking the end of the Starliner test flight last September.

Kelly Ortberg, Boeing’s president and CEO, testifies before the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee on April 2, 2025, in Washington, DC. Credit: Win McNamee/Getty Images

But that has changed in the last few months. Kelly Ortberg, who took over as Boeing’s CEO last year, told CNBC in April that the company planned “more missions on Starliner” and said work to overcome the thruster issues the spacecraft encountered last year is “pretty straightforward.”

“We know what the problems were, and we’re making corrective actions,” Ortberg said. “So, we hope to do a few more flights here in the coming years.”

Task and purpose

NASA officials remain eager for Starliner to begin these regular crew rotation flights, even as its sole destination, the ISS, enters its sunset years. NASA and its international partners plan to decommission and scuttle the space station in 2030 and 2031, more than 30 years after the launch of the lab’s first module.

NASA’s desire to bring Starliner online has nothing to do with any performance issues with SpaceX, the agency’s other commercial crew provider. SpaceX has met or exceeded all of NASA’s expectations in 11 long-duration flights to the ISS with its Dragon spacecraft. Since its first crew flight in 2020, SpaceX has established a reliable cadence with Dragon missions serving NASA and private customers.

However, there are some questions about SpaceX’s long-term plans for the Dragon program, and those concerns didn’t suddenly spring up last month, when SpaceX founder and chief executive Elon Musk suggested on X that SpaceX would “immediately” begin winding down the Dragon program. The suggestion came as Musk and President Donald Trump exchanged threats and insults on social media amid a feud as the one-time political allies had a dramatic falling out months into Trump’s second term in the White House.

In a subsequent post on X, Musk quickly went back on his threat to soon end the Dragon program. SpaceX officials participating in NASA press conferences in the last few weeks have emphasized the company’s dedication to human spaceflight without specifically mentioning Dragon. SpaceX’s fifth and final human-rated Dragon capsule debuted last month on its first flight to the ISS.

“I would say we’re pretty committed to the space business,” said Bill Gerstenmaier, SpaceX’s vice president of build and flight reliability. “We’re committed to flying humans in space and doing it safely.”

There’s a kernel of truth behind Musk’s threat to decommission Dragon. Musk has long had an appetite to move on from the Dragon program and pivot more of SpaceX’s resources to Starship, the company’s massive next-generation rocket. Starship is envisioned by SpaceX as an eventual replacement for Dragon and the Falcon 9 launcher.

A high-resolution commercial Earth-imaging satellite owned by Maxar captured this view of the International Space Station on June 7, 2024, with Boeing’s Starliner capsule docked at the lab’s forward port (lower right). Credit: Satellite image (c) 2024 Maxar Technologies

NASA hopes commercial space stations can take over for the ISS after its retirement, but there’s no guarantee SpaceX will still be flying Dragon in the 2030s. This injects some uncertainty into plans for commercial space stations.

One possible scenario is that, sometime in the 2030s, the only options for transporting people to and from commercial space stations in low-Earth orbit could be Starliner and Starship. We’ll discuss the rationale for this scenario later in this story.

While the cost of a seat on SpaceX’s Dragon is well known, there’s low confidence in the price of a ticket to low-Earth orbit on Starliner or Starship. What’s more, some of the commercial outposts may be incompatible with Starship because of its enormous mass, which could overcome the ability of a relatively modest space station to control its orientation. NASA identified this as an issue with its Gateway mini-space station in development to fly in orbit around the Moon.

It’s impossible to predict when SpaceX will pull the plug on Dragon. The same goes with Boeing and Starliner. But NASA and other customers are interested in buying more Dragon flights.

If SpaceX can prove Starship is safe enough to launch and land with people onboard, Dragon’s days will be numbered. But Starship is likely at least several years from being human-rated for flights to and from low-Earth orbit. NASA’s contract with SpaceX to develop a version of Starship to land astronauts on the Moon won’t require the ship to be certified for launches and landings on Earth. In some ways, that’s a more onerous challenge than the Moon mission because of the perils of reentering Earth’s atmosphere, which Starship won’t need to endure for a lunar landing, and the ship’s lack of a launch abort system.

Once operational, Starship is designed to carry significantly more cargo and people than Falcon 9 and Dragon, but it’s anyone’s guess when it might be ready for crew missions. Until then, if SpaceX wants to have an operational human spaceflight program, it’s Dragon or bust.

For the International Space Station, it’s also Dragon or bust, at least until Boeing gets going. SpaceX’s capsules are the only US vehicles certified to fly to space with NASA astronauts, and any more US government payments to Russia to launch Americans on Soyuz missions would be politically unpalatable.

From the start of the commercial crew program, NASA sought two contractors providing their own means of flying to and from the ISS. The main argument for this “dissimilar redundancy” was to ensure NASA could still access the space station in the event of a launch failure or some other technical problem. The same argument could be made now that NASA needs two options to avoid being at the whim of one company’s decisions.

Stretching out

All of this is unfolding as the Trump administration seeks to slash funding for the International Space Station, cut back on the lab’s research program, and transition to “minimal safe operations” for the final few years of its life. Essentially, the space station would limp to the finish line, perhaps with a smaller crew than the seven-person staff living and working in it today.

At the end of this month, SpaceX is scheduled to launch the Crew-11 mission—the 12th Dragon crew mission for NASA and the 11th fully operational crew ferry flight to the ISS. Two Americans, one Japanese astronaut, and a Russian cosmonaut will ride to the station for a stay of at least six months.

NASA’s existing contract with SpaceX covers four more long-duration flights to the space station with Dragon, including the mission set to go on July 31.

One way NASA can save money in the space station’s budget is by simply flying fewer missions. Stich said Thursday that NASA is working with SpaceX to extend the Dragon spacecraft’s mission duration limit from seven months to eight months. The recertification of Dragon for a longer mission could be finished later this year, allowing NASA to extend Crew-11’s stay at the ISS if needed. Over time, longer stays mean fewer crew rotation missions.

“We can extend the mission in real-time as needed as we better understand… the appropriations process and what that means relative to the overall station manifest,” Stich said.

Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft backs away from the International Space Station on September 6, 2024, without its crew. Credit: NASA

Boeing’s fixed-price contract with NASA originally covered an unpiloted test flight of Starliner, a demonstration flight with astronauts, and then up to six operational missions delivering crews to the ISS. But NASA has only given Boeing the “Authority To Proceed” for three of its six potential operational Starliner missions. This milestone, known as ATP, is a decision point in contracting lingo where the customer—in this case, NASA—places a firm order for a deliverable. NASA has previously said it awards these task orders about two to three years prior to a mission’s launch.

If NASA opts to go to eight-month missions on the ISS with Dragon and Starliner, the agency’s firm orders for three Boeing missions and four more SpaceX crew flights would cover the agency’s needs into early 2030, not long before the final crew will depart the space station.

Stich said NASA officials are examining their options. These include whether NASA should book more crew missions with SpaceX, authorize Boeing to prepare for additional Starliner flights beyond the first three, or order no more flights at all.

“As we better understand the budget and better understand what’s in front of us, we’re working through that,” Stich said. “It’s really too early to speculate how many flights we’ll fly with each provider, SpaceX and Boeing.”

Planning for the 2030s

NASA officials also have an eye for what happens after 2030. The agency has partnered with commercial teams led by Axiom, Blue Origin, and Voyager Technologies on plans for privately owned space stations in low-Earth orbit to replace some of the research capabilities lost with the end of the ISS program.

The conventional wisdom goes that these new orbiting outposts will be less expensive to operate than the ISS, making them more attractive to commercial clients, ranging from pharmaceutical research and in-space manufacturing firms to thrill-seeking private space tourists. NASA, which seeks to maintain a human presence in low-Earth orbit as it turns toward the Moon and Mars, will initially be an anchor customer until the space stations build up more commercial demand.

These new space stations will need a way to receive cargo and visitors. NASA wants to preserve the existing commercial cargo and crew transport systems so they’re available for commercial space stations in the 2030s. Stich said NASA is looking at transferring the rights for any of the agency’s commercial crew missions that don’t fly to ISS over to the commercial space stations. Among NASA’s two commercial crew providers, it currently looks more likely that Boeing’s contract will have unused capacity than SpaceX’s when the ISS program ends.

This is a sweetener NASA could offer to its stable of private space station developers as they face other hurdles in getting their hardware off the ground. It’s unclear whether a business case exists to justify the expense of building and operating a commercial outpost in orbit or if the research and manufacturing customers that could use a private space station might find a cheaper option in robotic flying laboratories, such as those being developed by Varda Space Industries.

A rendering of Voyager’s Starlab space station. Credit: Voyager Space

NASA’s policies haven’t helped matters. Analysts say NASA’s financial support for private space station developers has lagged, and the agency’s fickle decision-making on when to retire the International Space Station has made private fundraising more difficult. It’s not a business for the faint-hearted. For example, Axiom has gone through several rounds of layoffs in the last year.

The White House’s budget request for fiscal year 2026 proposes a 25 percent cut to NASA’s overall budget, but the funding line for commercial space stations is an area marked for an increase. Still, there’s a decent chance that none of the proposed commercial outposts will be flying when the ISS crashes back to Earth. In that event, China would be the owner and operator of the only space station in orbit.

At least at first, transportation costs will be the largest expense for any company that builds and operates a privately owned space station. It costs NASA about 40 percent more each year to ferry astronauts and supplies to and from the ISS than it does to operate the space station. For a smaller commercial outpost with reduced operating costs, the gap will likely be even wider.

If Boeing can right the ship with Starliner and NASA offers a few prepaid crew missions to private space station developers, the money saved could help close someone’s business case and hasten the launch of a new era in commercial spaceflight.

Photo of Stephen Clark

Stephen Clark is a space reporter at Ars Technica, covering private space companies and the world’s space agencies. Stephen writes about the nexus of technology, science, policy, and business on and off the planet.

The ISS is nearing retirement, so why is NASA still gung-ho about Starliner? Read More »