Author name: Paul Patrick

magneto,-xavier-reunite-in-new-avengers:-doomsday-teaser

Magneto, Xavier reunite in new Avengers: Doomsday teaser

Marvel Studios continues to dribble out brief teasers promoting Avengers: Doomsday, which is slated for a December 2026 release—first playing in cinemas prior to Avatar: Fire and Ash screenings before becoming publicly available.

We reported previously on the first, which featured Steve Rogers (Chris Evans), the former Captain America. Over the holidays, a second teaser highlighting Chris Hemsworth’s Thor was released. Both are familiar faces in the MCU, but we now have a third teaser that brings in some new players. No, not Robert Downey Jr.’s Doctor Doom as rumored. Instead, we’ve got Magneto (Ian McKellen), Charles Xavier (Patrick Stewart), and Cyclops (James Marsden) from the X-Men franchise.

The film takes place 14 months after the events of this year’s Thunderbolts*. In addition to Thor, we have the new Captain America (Anthony Mackie), Bucky Barnes (Sebastian Stan), Ant-Man (Paul Rudd), Falcon (Danny Ramirez), and Loki (Tom Hiddleston). Then there’s the Wakandan contingent: Shuri as the new Black Panther (Letitia Wright), M’Baku (Winston Duke), and Namor (Tenoch Huerta Mejia).

Naturally, the Thunderbolts(aka New Avengers) will appear: John Walker/US Agent (Wyatt Russell), Yelena Belova (Florence Pugh), Bob/Sentry (Lewis Pullman), Red Guardian (David Harbour), and Ghost (Hannah John-Kamen). So will the Fantastic Four: Reed Richards (Pedro Pascal), Sue Storm (Vanessa Kirby), Ben Grimm (Ebon Moss-Bachrach), and Johnny Storm (Joseph Quinn). From the X-Men franchise, Xavier, Magneto, and Cyclops will be joined by Beast (Kelsey Grammer), Mystique (Rebecca Romijn), and Nightcrawler (Alan Cumming).

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fertility-roundup-#6:-the-art-of-more-dakka

Fertility Roundup #6: The Art of More Dakka

The central message of the fertility roundups has always been that we have a choice.

If we do want to raise fertility, we can do that. People respond to incentives. That means money, especially if paid up front, and it also means time, lifestyle and respect.

If we do it purely with cash, it would be expensive, but a well-designed version of this would still be net profitable to the state. On the order of $300k per additional live birth would get this done in the United States, depending on how you structure it. This is not money spent, it is money transferred, and it helps the kids quite a lot.

If we do it by dealing with the Revolution of Rising Requirements, by providing non-cash advantages or changing the culture, that’s a more complex intervention, but we have options that let us do far better.

Those who disagree have tried almost nothing, and are all out of ideas.

Alex Strudwick Young: Today parents can, for the first time, access polygenic embryo testing for IQ and many diseases through a routine test (PGT-A) done worldwide and in 60% of US IVF cycles.

… In many jurisdictions you have a legal right to your PGT-A data under regulations such as HIPAA in the USA and GDPR in the EU.

Herasight has a lot of experience dealing with these bureaucratic processes and gatekeepers. Contact us for help.

Couples with PGT-A data can now access Herasight’s polygenic predictors for IQ and many diseases, including the most powerful predictors for Alzheimer’s, schizophrenia, and cancers.

Selection on our IQ predictor, CogPGT, can boost offspring IQ by up to 9 points.

Selection will be awesome, it is crazy that we are trying to slow it down rather than encourage it. Yes, this was predictable and we know why people do it, that doesn’t make it not crazy.

Saying ‘up to 9 points’ is weasel wording, but it seems plausible to me to see ~10 IQ point average bumps from selection even at current tech levels.

Random responses in a Facebook surrogacy group after giving birth are reported to be highly positive, link goes to fully unselected comments.

This aligns with everything I know about such things. You should absolutely presume that surrogacy is a win-win-win deal for everyone involved, so long as neither adult party is out to intentionally abuse the other.

Trump’s executive order tasks the Assistant for Domestic Policy to create recommendations for protecting IVF access and reducing out-of-pocket and health plan costs for IVF. This is an excellent, highly cost-effective thing to do. IVF often doesn’t happen because of lack of capital. The best way to subsidize children is out of the gate at birth, but the even better way is to make it cheaper to try. That also removes worries about distortions or adverse selection from big cash payments.

The hope is that in the future, we will be able to take IVF to the next level. We have the technologies in sight to do at least the first two steps within 5-10 years, and there are projects aiming at the next two in that time frame as well:

Brian Armstrong: The IVF clinic of the future will combine a handful of technologies (the Gattaca stack):

1. In vitro gametogenesis (IvG) – make eggs from skin or blood cells (much less invasive)

2. Preimplantation genetic testing (PGT) – choose the embryo that best matches what you want, ideally from thousands or more (see #1)

3. Embryo editing – make further edits for disease prevention, or enhancement

4. Artificial Wombs – removes the risk/burden of pregnancy

Lots of work to get there, but this may help with the decline in birth rates. And it would start to accelerate evolution (which, by natural selection, is a very slow process, and only optimizes for survival and replication).

Amanda Askell: It’s bizarre when relatively techno-utopian people are asked about how to solve declining fertility and instead of talking about artificial wombs, extended fertility spans, AI-assisted childcare, UBI, etc. they’re suddenly like “well we just need to return to the 50s”.

Peter Wildeford: We are so close to technologies that make life better for so many people.

If AI doesn’t fully upend the game board and we fail to make at least the first three happen and probably all four, it will be a policy choice. It will mean humanity has chosen not to better itself and its experience, instead choosing to go quietly into the night. We need to not allow this.

I do understand why one would worry about making IVF Plan A rather than Plan B. But that’s largely because right now the technology, given what our laws allow, is not good enough to be a clear Plan A for most people. That will change.

Noor Siddiqui: When I was in elementary school, my mom started going blind. Retinitis pigmentosa. No family history. No treatments. No cure.

I got lucky. She didn’t. It led me to build @OrchidInc so my baby —and everyone else’s—gets to win the genetic lottery—avoid blindness— and hundreds of severe genetic diseases.

Today, the New York Times covered the tech we’ve spent years building:

Whole genome embryo screening for *hundredsof diseases.

Not in theory. Not in mice. In humans. In IVF centers. Right now.

If you could prevent your child from going blind — would you? From getting pediatric cancer at 5? From heart defects? Schizophrenia at 22? From living a life radically altered by pure genetic bad luck?

This is a choice parents are now able to make.

Sex is for fun. Embryo screening is for babies.

I said that in a video.

People freaked out.

But it’s true. And it will only get more true as the tech improves.

We screen for what matters. And nothing matters more than health.

Genomics is moving fast and society is scrambling to catch up. But make no mistake: In 10 years, not screening your embryos will feel like not buckling your seatbelt.

Sarah Constantin: IVF is wonderful and so is embryo screening, but I’m leery of using IVF instead of “the old-fashioned way” when you don’t have a medical reason (like infertility or carrying a genetic disease.)

Why?

IVF still has a high failure rate (though it’s getting better). And it requires hormone treatments. Basically every woman I know who went through IVF and/or egg freezing had a nasty mood reaction to the hormones. Worth it for some — but not for everyone.

Right now you should definitely be wary of using IVF as plan A. The screening benefits are not that strong yet, and it is expensive and painful and time consuming and unfun. So yes, worth it for some, but not for everyone.

In 10 years, if the technology develops in good ways, it should be a clear Plan A, at least in wealthy countries. Even if selection is purely to avoid negative health conditions the cost-benefit analysis will be overwhelming.

Pop Tingz: For the first time in U.S. history, more women over 40 are giving birth than teenagers.

eva: anyone who wants the birth rate to go back up is going to have to get involved or loudly support scientific research to allow women over 40 who still want to be mothers, that’s the way forward

Zac Hill: A huge tell is how every group wants their opponents to solve problems socially, conveniently nudging society towards their preferred vision, when in fact the solution to almost all existential challenges is typically technological-institutional.

Why not both is usually the correct response. Technological solutions are great, and advancing them or getting rid of bottlenecks, especially regulatory and ‘medical ethics’ or approval bottlenecks, is a big game, up to and including artificial wombs and the creation of embryos from arbitrary cells. But culture and social (and institutional) questions matter a ton as well.

The stupid form of the mistake is saying ‘why don’t you all agree, without any change in institutions or incentives,’ to do some good thing [X]. We can agree that this approach mostly doesn’t work, but that’s why you change the institutions and incentives, in ways that among other things shift culture. And to do that, you often want to create cultural desire for change first.

In the context of fertility, Dakka is my term for Paying Parents Money.

Senator Howley proposes bumping the child tax credit from $2k to $5k. That would certainly help. It would be starting to be a substantial fraction of what kids cost (at least if you are living in a cheap area on a low budget). As usual, you’d actually do better if you paid up front, but that’s a harder sell politically, so here we are.

Colin Wright asks for Dakka.

Here’s some deeply silly supposed Dakka (and yes he was called a Nazi for it):

Ken Klippenstein: Trump’s Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy just sent out a memo directing staff to “give preference to communities with marriage and birth rates higher than the national average.”

This is how that would distribute funds:

This definitely wouldn’t ‘work’ to raise fertility, because the incentives here are all way too diffused from the decision making on having kids, and there isn’t a long term reward here to get communities to alter policies even if they could. It’s just weird.

David Holz pulls out More Dakka for real.

David Holz: crazy question… how many kids would you be willing to have in exchange for paying zero taxes?

It’s not as easy as he makes it out to be, because you can only use this gun once. So if you say ‘you need to have 5 kids’ you lose the people who would have 3, and the people who would have had 10 only have 5, and not everyone who wants to hit 5 gets to hit 5, plans don’t always work out, liquidity will be a big issue since the tax exemption only hits later and biology is not always kind.

So even if we decided it was worthwhile, it definitely isn’t that easy. And this is a rather inefficient way to get where you want to go. But yes, it shows that at the limit, 73% of people answered they can absolutely be bribed. Usually people overestimate their responses, but it’s still striking.

A lot of the problem, in practice, has been everyone’s aversion to things that someone might call ‘eugenics’ or that impact some groups more than others.

People don’t want to use incentives that mostly work on poor people. They also recoil in horror if you suggest shaping the incentives so they work equally well or better for rich people. That rules out all of the possible incentives.

As usual, we’ve tried almost nothing, and we’re all out of ideas.

Scott Greer: To hammer home a point, government policy likely can’t reverse declining marriage rates.

Robin Hanson: There are in fact larger dollar amounts than $14K.

Patrick McKenzie: As, for example, thoroughly understood by governments when the behavior change they want to incentivize is “Please work for us for a year.”

Americans often face a dramatic marriage penalty, that can be much bigger than this. The cost of divorce, or marrying the wrong person, is very high.

A one time $14,000 transfer is not all that much. For many, it won’t even cover the wedding! It is certainly a good start, but you’ll need More Dakka to get people to marry for real that much more often.

If you don’t think people will marry for money? Most of us know people who have married for health insurance. A marriage is whatever the people involved make of it. The worry with subsidizing marriage, especially with a lump sum, is that marriages are easy to fake, and the marginal financially motivated marriage doesn’t give you what you want.

Whereas children are extremely difficult to fake, they either exist or they don’t.

Thus, you want to ensure marriage isn’t penalized, but you can’t reward it that much unless you also condition on children, which risks prolonging deeply awful marriages.

Peter Eduardo in WaPo similarly warned that ‘no motherhood medal or baby bonus will fix what economic modernization broke,’ saying even well-conceived policies have ‘mostly failed’ to lift fertility ‘for good’ but that is the wrong counterfactual, as usual the evidence that nothing works is that you tried nothing much and you’re all out of ideas. Or that because differences in subsidies don’t explain most differences in fertility, subsidies must not matter. That’s not how it works.

Lyman Store responds.

Ansel Lindner: Spending 100% GDP per capita for a 20% increase is “working”? How is that mathematically sustainable?

US TFR 1.6 x 1.2 = 1.92

100% GDP per capita =~$80,000 per child

3.7 million × $80,000 = $296 billion/year

10% of GDP to not reach replacement? Still gets worse every year.

Lyman Stone: No, a present discounted value of 100% of GDP per capita. Not $80,000 in annual payments to family per kid, $80,000 in present discounted value of future annual payments. Assuming an 18-year child payment, that’s annual payments of about $6,000 more per kid.

That’s $80k for a 20% growth in fertility, which comes out to $400k in transfers per marginal child born. That’s modestly higher than my prior estimate of roughly $300k. The difference can be accounted for by the fact that this would be paid out over 18 years, whereas up front payments have much larger effects.

So yes, I think this is the price tag, which scales roughly with GDP, and note that there is minimal deadweight loss or overall loss of wealth here.

I do think we can get far more efficient mileage out of other changes first, that reduce the burdens and risks on parents, raise their status and make having children more appealing. But yes, we can absolutely solve this problem primarily with money.

Talking price a bit, Anthony is definitely not correct at $5k but at $50k? Yes.

Anthony Pompliano: If the government is handing out $5,000 bonuses to moms who have a baby, we are going to see a baby boom unlike anything America has ever seen.

Michael Anotnelli: I’m gonna need you to break your streak of absolutely awful takes. You’re ice cold bro.

James Surowiecki: No one who has kids would ever think that $5000 is going to make a difference to the decision to have a child or not.

Jason Bell: I’m reminded of @ATabarrok’s response when a free Krispy Kreme donut spurred people to get vaccinated: “there’s always someone at the margin”

My math says that a $50k baby bonus would result in about a 20% boost to fertility as a primary effect, and I would predict a secondary cultural wave that increases that further, so I would guess we’d sustainably get something like 30%, moving from 1.63 to 2.1, landing us at replacement level. That’s what it takes.

Robin Hanson proposes More Dakka in the form of part of children’s tax payments, because it would align incentives. But this is a rather terrible proposal, for two classes of reason.

First, the parents will come under a ton of pressure to refund those payments. What kind of parent are you if you are taxing your children? The contract is not stable.

Second, there’s a time mismatch. You are investing in children now in order to collect big payments down the line starting in 20 years. But the parents will have a liquidity issue, they need the money now, to raise the children, and expect to be much wealthier in the future already.

Robin’s answer no doubt is that the parents can sell those tax claims to others, but that’s just not going to fly culturally even beyond how much the rest wouldn’t fly, and even if it did we run into major adverse selection issues.

Third, people will find the whole thing to be an abomination on so many levels. It would be a supremely heavy lift compared to what you would get in return.

You would think that it would do this. We all assume they would do this. One of the objections to fixed payments for parents is that this could result mainly in poor people having more kids, since you would assume richer parents would respond a lot less.

Lyman Stone checked the data. The results in practice are not what we assumed?

I don’t think this would hold if you scaled the amounts, but also I’m surprised by the result in the first place?

Lyman Stone: So I went back through all those studies to check and see if they reported heterogeneity tests. Spoiler: many did. In total, from 60 initial intervention estimates, I was able to find 23 estimates of effects specifically on low-income people, and 24 for middle/high.

So we use that standard cost estimate from my study in May, and we apply it symmetrically to lower- and higher-income treated groups alike? This is basically saying “For a fixed budgetary spend, which group boosts fertility more?”

There’s basically no difference: if you give a middle/high earner $3,000 to have a kid, their odds of having a kid rise by essentially the identical amount as if you give a low earner $3,000 to have a kid.

A lot of people have this mental model where effects should always scale with income, but this is obviously wrong for a lot of effect types! If I give somebody a $10 hamburger voucher, poor people will not by 4x as many hamburgers even though it’s 4x the share of their income.

The reason is that it is a voucher for hamburgers and the price of hamburgers is relatively fixed with respect to income. Sure rich people may go to a bougier place and poor people a cheaper one, but by and large most people are going to purchase pretty similar hamburgers.

Despite the cultural narratives purporting to tell you there are absolutely massive class differences in parenting, the actual fact of the matter is the economic costs associated with how people would prefer to parent are actually not that variable across most of the income spectrum.

There are obvious exceptions. Private schools, extra space and hired help are obvious ways in which richer people will spend a lot more money. Despite this, the differences are not that vast, and we get this very interesting result.

Ben Podgursky: It’s frustrating that collapsing birthrates are treated as unfixable when the reality is that we could largely fix it if we treated it like treat healthcare — a problem, but something we can spend real money to fix.

We spend ~$150,000 per cancer patient. Why less for a child?

I’m unhappy about US taxes today because it goes straight into badly structured entitlement giveaways for old people. If you raised my taxes to 60% to pay for a subsidy that made it nearly free to raise a child age 0-18, I would be happy to pay it.

The more I run these numbers the more upset I get. We could straight up give $150,000 cash for each child and it would only cost 1.6% of GDP, not even twice what we spend to treat cancer. Medicare is 3.7% of GDP.

Lyman Stone: Right???? People see these price tags and they just simply do not realize what gobsmacking sums we spend on old people.

The average worker (+their employer) paid $15-20,000 last year to provide subsidies and healthcare to retirees, valued at about $20-$50k/yr per retiree.

But we surely couldn’t do $10k/year for a kid! That would be craaaaazy!

We could, in many school districts we already do in other ways, and we would be redistributing the money and wealth and purchasing power, not destroying it.

If my calculations are correct, paying out the $150k would not only effectively lift almost all children out of poverty, it would raise the fertility rate to well above replacement.

In the long term, this would make the debt more sustainable rather than less, even if we did it purely with borrowed money.

If Lyman Stone’s model is correct, that a 4% present-value benefit yields a ~1% TFR increase, then if we gave parents benefits with an NPV (net present value) of $150k, that would be about 181% of GDP, so a 45% boost, which is a similar result of a TFR of 2.4, which would be enough buffer to cover substantial decreases from other sources.

We could also supplement that with cultural and other changes, and get that result vastly cheaper.

Also note that what matters is the net difference, so if you are taxing those without children to pay for the benefit, the benefit can be smaller and still fully work.

As always, how you do it matters too. The more up front and locked-in and salient the payment, the more impact it will have. We are not doing a good job with this.

In some senses obviously this is a lot of money, but in context I think this is not actually a lot of money, and again it pays for itself over time.

Marko Jukic: If a tech CEO revealed he could manufacture self-replicating fully autonomous universally adaptable humaniform AGIs that stayed in good working condition for ~60 years for $450k each, he would be hailed as a hero and the U.S. government would order $10 trillion worth of them.

At $450k per child, we could double the U.S. birth rate and reach well above replacement fertility for the price of just $1.6 trillion. That is just 23% of annual federal spending and less than Social Security + Medicare. It’s literally a steal!

Boomers just hate children and believe as a matter of selfish dogmatic faith they should not only cost $0 and raise themselves, but actually pay Boomers for the privilege of being born. There is no other explanation for this plain economic irrationality.

This doesn’t fail because we can’t do it. It fails because we don’t want to do it.

As stated this is of course rather silly but Zac Hill nails it.

John Arnold: Convinced the one and only way to increase the birth rate in the US is a federal cap on hours per week allowed for organized youth sports. That’s the binding constraint.

Cam Hardaway: This is so good… I’m with you. We traipse our 4 sons all over the place playing youth sports.

Zac Hill: The thrust of this is prolly directionally accurate tbh.

What if the cap was only on family presence or participation in youth sports?

I don’t fully understand how parents were convinced to devote so many hours and dollars for organized youth sports, but the combination of pressure to do the sports and the ways they impose time costs on parents is by all reports really nasty.

Youth sports are a good thing if you can free the parents from these burdens.

This is a special case of the Revolution of Rising Requirements. The problem is not the sports, or even that they are organized. The problem is the supervision, and perhaps the associated fees that go to various luxury features.

We found something that looks like it works even better than Give Parents Money.

Instead, what if we Give Prospective Parents Housing?

The situation they’re studying is a house lottery rather than a benefit program, which is a little weird. As I understand it, the lottery has everyone paying the same fixed amount from the start into the pool, then every month at least one person gets money from that pool to go buy a house outright. So it’s a weird forced saving program, where you get the house at an uncertain random point.

Which gives us an RCT.

Dimas Fazio, Tarun Ramadorai, Janis Skrastins and Bernardus Doornik:

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of access to housing on fertility rates using random variation from housing credit lotteries in Brazil.

We find that obtaining housing increases the average probability of having a child by 3.8% and the number of children by 3.2%. For 20-25-year-olds, the corresponding effects are 32% and 33%, with no increase in fertility for people above age 40. The lifetime fertility increase for a 20-year old is twice as large from obtaining housing immediately relative to obtaining it at age 30.

The increase in fertility is stronger for households in areas with lower quality housing, greater rental expenses relative to income, and those with lower household income and lower female income share. These results suggest that alleviating housing credit and physical space constraints can significantly increase fertility.

This downplays the effect on 20-25 year olds:

More importantly, we find that the effects of housing credit are far stronger for 20 to 25 year-olds in their peak child-bearing years, who exhibit a 32 percent increase in the probability of child-bearing and a 33 percent increase in the number of children relative to the base-rate.

Our estimates reveal that for an individual who wishes to obtain housing between ages 20-24 but obtains it ten years later (30-34), total lifetime fertility is half that from receiving housing access immediately upon joining.

Directionally none of this was in doubt. The question is efficiency of the transfer.

The value of the house was $87,000. Looking at some charts, that was roughly the media house price in Brazil at that time, so let’s assume to get the same effect you need to enable buying roughly the median house.

In America today, the median house price is about $420,000.

Suppose we had a rule that any married couple between the ages of 20 and 25 could request make a one-time request from the Federal government, usable only to go buy a house anywhere in America with a size minimum. They would then have to pay off the mortgage, so the effective subsidy was identical to the Brazil program relative to the cost of housing. If the couple pays off the mortgage, they keep the house at the end. If not the bank sells the house and gives the government the proceeds.

The base financial cost of this program is $130k for the subsidy (assuming a 3.5% NPV discount rate), plus some extra for adverse selection, administration and fraud. Claude thinks maybe $170k all-in.

The couple gets the house right away, and their mortgage payments would be substantially lower than typical rent payments on a matching property. They get housing security, and eliminate marginal cost of housing when having children, have a huge future wealth effect, and net save on cash flow versus renting.

In terms of politics, the exact age range thing makes things tricky, but ‘first time home buyer subsidy’ is already a big Democratic platform thing. Seems super doable relative to other proposals on fertility. This is just… a lot bigger than the existing proposed housing subsidies, and better structured.

Remember what happened in Brazil? The lifetime fertility rate roughly doubled between the winners versus the losers. Participants probably start out with higher than average fertility because they paired up young, and let’s not consider various other positive splash-on effects from cultural shifts and convincing people to marry earlier that might also be very large. And there are various other ways we can do better – this isn’t meant to be the actual form of the proposal, yet.

The flip side is that losing the lottery probably is very bad for fertility versus baseline, so this is likely an overestimation in that way, if you can’t give this to everyone. And the participants in the study typically had informal (but lucrative) employment, which could change things in other ways. Both could lead to this being a large overestimate.

The biggest downside, other than potentially hurting people’s mobility, is presumably that this raises housing prices, and yes that is a cost not a benefit. We would very much need to build more housing, especially 3+ bedroom family housing. But it is a benefit to existing homeowners, so you could perhaps pair this rather aggressive YIMBY changes, for a win-win. Imagine if the subsidy only applied to areas that successfully built enough 3+ bedroom housing, and of course people in areas that miss out could move to areas that didn’t miss.

Our previous estimate of the typical cost-per-birth from subsidies in America is $270k. Here, if we get 100% of the effect in the Brazil study, it would be $100k, and you can increase the cost as you discount the efficiency from there, with the transfer having other positive knock-on effects.

If you really wanted to supercharge the effectiveness and efficiency of this program, of course, you could offer it only for couples with at least one child, especially if the chances of winning the lottery were high once a couple was eligible.

You also get a ton of other benefits. It’s all crazy enough to work.

We also have a job market paper from Benjamin Couillard as an observational study. It finds the Housing Theory of Half Of Everything, in this case.

Housing choice estimates confirm a Becker quantity-quality model’s predictions: large families are more cost-sensitive, and so rising housing costs disincentivize fertility.

To study the causal effect of rising housing costs on fertility, I vary them directly within the model, finding that rising costs since 1990 are responsible for 11% fewer children, 51% of the total fertility rate decline between the 2000s and 2010s, and 7 percentage points fewer young families in the 2010s. Policy counterfactuals indicate that a supply shift for large units generates 2.3 times more births than an equal-cost shift for small units: family-friendly housing is the more important policy lever.

That strongly points to a cost burden explanation of fertility declines. If half the decline is rising housing costs, then if you add in other new requirements on families, especially in terms of child supervision, you can plausibly explain most of the decline, or perhaps more than all of it.

The problem with trying to fix this via traditional YIMBY approaches is that creating lots of smaller housing units doesn’t provide the multi-bedroom housing large families need. The response to this is that a lowering tide lowers all boats. If you create more smaller units, then that reduces rent on smaller units and demand for larger units, so larger units drop in price. You can also combine multiple smaller units.

There is still a risk that if you ‘lock people into’ smaller units, especially if they buy them, that this can be quite bad for fertility. It would be reasonable to try and encourage those in smaller units to mostly rent.

The better solution than that is to directly build more larger units. Some YIMBY policies are directly about smaller units, but most are about building more square feet of housing on the same amount of land, or the same house on less land.

The best solution is to differentially support larger apartments and houses, giving them various cost benefits, on top of allowing smaller units for 1-2 person households.

There is no conflict here. A 22 year old out of college that only wants an SRO or a small studio apartment should get to save money, while saving that extra room for a family that needs it.

The other part of the problem is Rising Expectations. Houses and apartments are much bigger not only because they are required to be but because people demand it. Couples looking at having children will insist upon a lot more house than they did in the past. Ideally they would relax this requirement a bit, but whether or not they do we can make it a lot easier to afford whatever they do eventually end up with.

I strongly endorse this proposal, the rest of the thread’s proposals are good too.

Kelsey Piper: Every part of every American city should pass the toddler test: you feel safe walking through it with two toddlers who will try to eat cigarette butts and needles if there are any around to be eaten. If you have to use the subway, the elevators work and fit the stroller.

Here’s some great news, all you have to do to raise births is… make people happy?

Hopefully we wanted to do that anyway.

Cartoons Hate Her!: Why have people decided the birth rate is some kind of proxy for overall happiness? Do you think people procreate specifically bc they’re happy? Which country do you think is happiest rn?

Lyman Stone: Actually yes, the BEST predictor of fertility is “Do you intend to have children in the next year?” The second-best is a vector of marital and contraceptive status.

But 3rd best is just asking people “How happy are you?”

Live birth odds scale pseudo-linearly with happiness!

And it’s additive! If you do a model of Intentions + Marital Status + Contraceptive Status + Happiness, each one matters separately and together!

There’s also a pretty straightforward interaction term between Marital Status and Contraceptive Status.

If you’re holding roughly constant the general wealth and education levels, then yeah. Your goal is in large part to make people happy, and also make them married and get them into relationships, which also tends to make people happy.

New paper claims that while China’s One Child Policy initially had very little impact on fertility, that was because at first it was not enforced. When the ‘One Vote Veto’ policy caused it to actually be enforced in the early 1990s, then it had a big impact, accounting for 46% of China’s fertility decline that decade. I’m not going to dive into the data but that explanation makes sense to me.

Tariffs are making things more expensive for parents.

Jay Carraway: The Wirecutter’s top car seat is $230 up from $160 earlier this year. Some of the most popular strollers have gone up 20-30%. The thing where Trump just randomly waived a wand and raised the price of a bunch of stuff on parents seems pretty unreported by the media.

The media had absolutely reported that tariffs occurred as like a factual thing that happened. But the equivalent “Democrat did this” version would be human interest story after human interest story. And Trump directly did this! Unlike 2022 inflation.

These extra costs plunge families into financial problems and poverty, and will absolutely filter down into fertility decisions as prospective parents see them and adjust. Indeed, expect these changes to have oversized impact, as they are the kind of prices that are most salient.

Dakka can come in many forms. Honor is often the most efficient and effective.

Robin Hanson: How could we supercharge Mother’s Day, to make it a much bigger deal, in order to raise the status of Mothers?

Benjamin Hoffman: Every year on Mothers’ Day, we do a land reform where plots are allocated to women on the basis of # children (maybe w diminishing marginal returns).

Mothers vote on the national budget on Mothers Day, with legit authority to freeze govt operations until there’s a proposal they approve.

Legal penalties for falsely claiming to be a mother (analogous to falsely claiming to be a physician), involving public humiliation on Mothers’ Day (e.g. stockading, tarring & feathering).

The Purge but only for mothers.

Thomas Drach: Monday off.

If you were in charge of making motherhood high status again, where would you start?

Katherine Boyle: You can change the status of something very quickly. Cringe can become cool in years, not decades. We’ve had a generation of women who were repeatedly told that motherhood is low status. We’re now seeing the culture turn hard on this, and it will continue to accelerate.

Made in Cosmos: If you were in charge of making motherhood high status again, where would you start?

This is a great question, but it starts in daily life. Here’s some super easy things states and companies could do to honor families.

  1. All airlines, TSA lines, and other forms of travel should allow families to board first, before priority and first class. Family lanes should be required.

  2. Carpool lanes on highways renamed family lanes. Florida should do this asap. @GovRonDeSantis

  3. every parking lot should be required by law to have family reserved parking, just like handicapped parking, for the safety of mothers and children.

  4. Family lanes at all stores for ease of checkout.

  5. Reserved seating for families at churches, houses of worship and other community spaces where children should be encouraged to go.

In short, society should beat us over the head that families take priority above class, work and other forms of identity or protected groups, because family is the backbone of our civilization.

The federal government should do a commission on the state of the American family, and make many recommendations to encourage businesses and communities to prioritize the family in daily life.

These changes aren’t hard, and there are many more ideas to make reality.

This is some lame-ass stuff right there. We can surely do way better than that.

Basic cringe stuff works. At every Mets game we stop to honor a veteran. You can honor a mother too, and do other similar things.

I do think status in part goes hand in hand with the financial aspects. Offering good financial supports in various ways would do a lot, including in provision of health insurance. But that’s not the question here.

Various legal protections would similarly be good but I don’t think it does much.

Offering more community spaces and activities for kids would help. As would making it not allowed to bar kids from various activities or locations, and not okay to require kids to be on absurd standards of behavior in public spaces – if they’re not physically bothering you, it’s almost entirely not your problem.

Media representations matter a lot, and could be targeted in various ways. In particular, we need to develop cultural norms of frowning on those who disdain having children, and also put large families into media more often – right now there are never more children than are strictly needed for the plot.

There’s a toxic anti-child, anti-mother culture among much of the left, that feeds on itself, and does things like equate a desire for children with literal Nazis.

But the most important thing, I think, is lifestyle, childcare requirements and expectation setting about what is required to be a ‘good mother’ or to avoid potential legal hassles.

Motherhood is low status in large part because it is associated with these absurd supervision requirements. If we Let Kids be Kids, the way we used to in let’s say the 1980s let alone the 1950s, in a world that is now vastly safer and where you can give the kid a phone with GPS, I think that gets us a huge portion of the way there.

Which is another way of saying that, media portrayals and honors aside, mostly I think the way you raise the status of mothers is to… actually make their lives better.

Things are not going great, monthly fertility rate fell to 1.25 in March 2025.

Nikita Sokolsky: Just as with the previous Hungarian policy that applied to families with 4+ kids, the tax exemption is incorrectly reported and its scope is exaggerated.

Nikita was talking back at the beginning of 2025. They have now passed the new rules.

As I understand the final version:

  1. If a mother has 3+ kids she is permanently immune to the 15% income tax.

  2. If a mother has 2+ kids she gets it phased in over time as a function of her current age (for 2026 it’s under 40) but by 2030 everyone gets this too.

  3. Increases in the monthly tax-base allowance that reduces taxable income, which can be applied to the father’s income, and which scales with family size. So one childs gets 100k HUF (~$300) per month, whereas for 3+ children it’s 330k HUF per child per month, so about $3000 per month.

Adopted kids can count, which could lead to some very extreme incentive effects.

It has always been a rather insane policy implementation to say that a mother pays no income tax, while her spouse pays income tax. You’re producing a gigantic distortion, where you’re pushing the mother to work and the father to stay home, what?

The obvious reason is that you can’t verify who the father is and you otherwise open up the system to tax dodges by the wealthy, but you have to be able to patch that – you could require a marriage that predates the children, and perhaps cap the father’s immunity at some very high income threshold.

The obvious simple solution is to use a fixed absolute subsidy, rather than a reduction in income taxes, because you don’t actually want to supercharge the incentive for market work onto mothers in particular.

I would expect a substantial increase in fertility if this passes, but not as much as if it was designed better, or if it was more expansive as is often reported. I’d expect the expanded tax credit to be doing the far more efficient work here, I would have said expand the credit and perhaps scale it higher for larger families, and leave the income tax rates alone or find a way to lower them in general.

I would also expect some unfortunate secondary effects, with the huge tax push towards stay-at-home fathers or full time hired caregivers.

Tim Carney investigates Hungary’s problem, and finds the same issue, that the current policy is nominally pro-natal but it’s also a work subsidy for mothers in particular, and they also make the classic housing mistake of subsidizing demand rather than addressing supply.

Lyman Stone talks with Arnold Kling.

Bryan Caplan offers a report. He has great things to say about the attendees and speakers in general, not as nice things to say about the chosen lineup of speakers on opening night, which matters. And he regrets that the group was sufficiently right-wing that it likely will drive potential left-wing attendees further away, making the problem worse.

Technically when renting or selling housing you’re not allowed to discriminate against families with children, so of course everyone who still wants to discriminate anyway responds by doing it in ways that get tolerated, like giving directions to make a left at Wally’s Liquor and if you see Tiny Tim’s Titty Club you’ve gone too far.

I don’t know how widespread such discrimination is even when renting. I suppose families in some ways are more trouble, although in others they are more reliable.

Sam Altman: i can’t think of a non-cliche way to say this, but everyone who says having a kid is the best thing in the world is both correct and still somehow understating it.

Good news it seems many single men actually do still want to have large families, as in 5-10 children, and yes as the post says this is a good thing to want and quite the call to self improvement to make this possible. The fault is in our society for making the logistics of this idea seem impossible, and also for many people treating ‘I want a lot of kids’ as something toxic or wrong.

Some obvious basic logistics for men if you are indeed going forward and your woman is pregnant, basically planning for the fact that this is going to mess with her head and ensure that you can handle it and how to respond so as to make it through okay, and to be ready with her preferences for giving birth and practicing the route to the hospital and other neat stuff like that.

Arnold Kling offers a vision of intentional communities for young families, where you have to have a child under the age to 10 to move in, the mirror image of ‘senior communities’ where you have to be over 55, with services to help parents like community day-care but distinct households as per usual.

This seems like an obviously good idea. Parents of young kids benefit from being around other parents of young kids and from the establishment of child-friendly norms. As usual, People Don’t Do Things, but you love to see it, the same way I previously discussed.

This doesn’t have to be some huge production. A large friend group should work wonders.

Phil Levin: I reckon that living near 20+ friends has doubled the fertility rate of our friend group.

•Some had kids who wouldn’t have

•Some had more kids than planned (inc. us)

•Some had kids earlier

[Shilling for the “housing theory of fertility”]

12 kids born so far in the group — all under the age of 4.

Turner Novak: Have Babies Near Friends.

Phil Levin: Also: have friends near babies.

This is how they did it, and assembled an 18-person compound in Oakland.

It is weird that Apple releasing an ad that basically says having a daughter is good and so buy Apple’s new AirPods now with hearing aids causes statements like this and that statement gets 7 million views (you can watch at the link):

Benny Johnson: I’m stunned. Apple just released the single greatest pro-parenting ad in the history of American advertising.

The pro-family cultural revolution is here.

Watch. Try not to cry…

I mean, great ad, but yeah, this really shouldn’t be news, this should be Tuesday.

What (some) girls are chatting about in the corner at a baby shower.

Discussion about this post

Fertility Roundup #6: The Art of More Dakka Read More »

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Under anti-vaccine RFK Jr., CDC slashes childhood vaccine schedule

Under anti-vaccine Health Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr., federal health officials on Monday announced a sweeping and unprecedented overhaul of federal vaccine recommendations, abruptly paring down recommended immunizations for children from 17 to 11.

Officials claimed the rationale for the change was to align US vaccine recommendations more closely with those of other high-income countries, namely Denmark, a small, far less diverse country of around 6 million people (smaller than the population of New York City) that has universal health care. The officials also claim the change is necessary to address the decline in public trust in vaccinations, which has been driven by anti-vaccine activists, including Kennedy.

“This decision protects children, respects families, and rebuilds trust in public health,” Kennedy said in a statement.

Health experts disagree. “Kennedy’s decision will harm and kill children, like all of his anti-vaccination decisions will,” virologist James Alwine, who works with the organization Defend Public Health, said in a statement.

The American Academy of Pediatrics, a vocal critic of Kennedy, blasted the changes, saying “to arbitrarily stop recommending numerous routine childhood immunizations is dangerous and unnecessary,” AAP President Andrew Racine said. “The United States is not Denmark,” he added.

Under the new federal recommendations, universally recommended immunizations are pared down to these 11 diseases: measles, mumps, rubella, polio, pertussis (whooping cough), tetanus, diphtheria, Haemophilus influenzae type B (Hib), pneumococcal disease, human papillomavirus (HPV), and varicella (chickenpox).

Under anti-vaccine RFK Jr., CDC slashes childhood vaccine schedule Read More »

dos-capital

Dos Capital

This week, Philip Trammell and Dwarkesh Patel wrote Capital in the 22nd Century.

One of my goals for Q1 2026 is to write unified explainer posts for all the standard economic debates around potential AI futures in a systematic fashion. These debates tend to repeatedly cover the same points, and those making economic arguments continuously assume you must be misunderstanding elementary economic principles, or failing to apply them for no good reason. Key assumptions are often unstated and even unrealized, and also false or even absurd. Reference posts are needed.

That will take longer, so instead this post covers the specific discussions and questions around the post by Trammell and Patel. My goal is to both meet that post on its own terms, and also point out the central ways its own terms are absurd, and the often implicit assumptions they make that are unlikely to hold.

They affirm, as do I, that Piketty was centrally wrong about capital accumulation in the past, for many well understood reasons, many of which they lay out.

They then posit that Piketty could have been unintentionally describing our AI future.

As in, IF, as they say they expect is likely:

  1. AI is used to ‘lock in a more stable world’ where wealth is passed to descendants.

  2. There are high returns on capital, with de facto increasing returns to scale due to superior availability of investment opportunities.

  3. AI and robots become true substitutes for all labor.

  4. (Implicit) This universe continues to support humanity and allows us to thrive.

  5. (Implicit) The humans continue to be the primary holders of capital.

  6. (Implicit) The humans are able to control their decisions and make essentially rational investment decisions in a world in which their minds are overmatched.

  7. We indefinitely do not do a lot of progressive redistribution.

  8. (Implicit) Private property claims are indefinitely respected at unlimited scale.

THEN:

  1. Inequality grows without bound, the Gini coefficient approaches 1.

  2. Those who invest wisely, with eyes towards maximizing long term returns, end up with increasingly large shares of wealth.

  3. As in, they end up owning galaxies.

Patel and Trammell: But once robots and computers are capable enough that labor is no longer a bottleneck, we will be in the second scenario. The robots will stay useful even as they multiply, and the share of total income paid to robot-owners will rise to 1. (This would be the “Jevons paradox”.)​

Later on, to make the discussions make sense, we need to add:

  1. There is a functioning human government that can impose taxes, including on capital, in ways that end up actually getting paid.

  2. (Unclear) This government involves some form of Democratic control?

If you include the implicit assumptions?

Then yes. Very, very obviously yes. This is basic math.

In this scenario, sufficiently capable AIs and robots are multiplying without limit and are perfect substitutes for human labor.

Perhaps ‘what about the distribution of wealth among humans’ is the wrong question?

I notice I have much more important questions about such worlds where the share of profits that goes to some combination AI, robots and capital rises to all of it.

Why should the implicit assumptions hold? Why should we presume humans retain primary or all ownership of capital over time? Why should we assume humans are able to retain control over this future and make meaningful decisions? Why should we assume the humans remain able to even physically survive let alone thrive?

Note especially the assumption that AIs don’t end up with substantial private property. The best returns on capital in such worlds would obviously go to ‘the AIs that are, directly or indirectly, instructed to do that.’ So if AI is allowed to own capital, the AIs end up with control over all the capital, and the robots, and everything else. It’s funny to me that they consider charitable trusts as a potential growing source of capital, but not the AIs.

Even if we assumed all of that, why should we assume that private property rights would be indefinitely respected at limitless scale, on the level of owning galaxies? Why should we even expect property rights to be long term respected under normal conditions, here on Earth? Especially in a post calling for aggressive taxation on wealth, which is kind of the central ‘nice’ case of not respecting private property.

Expecting current private property rights to indefinitely survive into the transformational superintelligence age seems, frankly, rather unwise?

Eliezer Yudkowsky: ​What is with this huge, bizarre, and unflagged presumption that property rights, as assigned by human legal systems, are inviolable laws of physics? That ASIs remotely care? You might as well write “I OWN YOU” on an index card in crayon, and wave it at the sea.

Oliver Habryka: I really don’t get where this presumption that property ownership is a robust category against changes of this magnitude. It certainly hasn’t been historically!

Jan Kulveit: Cope level 1: My labour will always be valuable!

Cope level 2: That’s naive. My AGI companies stock will always be valuable, may be worth galaxies! We may need to solve some hard problems with inequality between humans, but private property will always be sacred and human.

Then, if property rights do hold, did we give AIs property rights, as Guive Assadi suggests (and as others have suggested) we should do to give them a ‘stake in the legal system’ or simply for functional purposes? If not, that makes it very difficult for AIs to operate and transact, or for our system of property rights to remain functional. If we do, then the AIs end up with all the capital, even if human property rights remain respected. It also seems right to at some point, if the humans are not losing their wealth fast enough, to expect AIs coordinating to expropriate human property rights while respecting AI property rights, as has happened commonly throughout the history of property rights when otherwise disempowered groups had a large percentage of wealth.

The hidden ‘libertarian human essentialist’ assumptions continue. For example, who are these ‘descendants’ and what are the ‘inheritances’? In these worlds one would expect aging and disease to be solved problems for both humans and AIs.

Such talk and economic analysis often sounds remarkably parallel to this:

The world described here has AIs that are no longer normal technology (while it tries to treat them as normal in other places anyway), it is not remotely at equilibrium, there is no reason to expect its property rights to endorse or to stay meaningful, it would be dominated by its AIs, and it would not long endure.

If humans really are no longer useful, that breaks most of the assumptions and models of traditional econ along with everyone else’s models, and people typically keep assuming actually humans will still be useful for something sufficiently for comparative advantage to rescue us, and can’t actually wrap their heads around it not being true and humans being true zero marginal product workers given costs.

Paul Crowley: A lot of these stories from economics about how people will continue to be valuable make assumptions that don’t apply. If the models can do everything I do, and do it better, and faster, and for less than it costs me to eat, why would someone employ me?

It’s really hard for people to take in the idea of an AI that’s better than any human at *everytask. Many just jump to some idea of an uber-task that they implicitly assume humans are better at. Satya Nadella made exactly this mistake on Dwarkesh.

Dwarkesh Patel: If labor is the bottleneck to all the capital growth. I don’t see why sports and restaurants would bottleneck the Dyson sphere though.​

That’s the thing. If we’re talking about a Dyson sphere world, why are we pretending any of these questions are remotely important or ultimately matter? At some point you have to stop playing with toys.

A lot of this makes more sense if we don’t think it involves Dyson spheres.

Under a long enough time horizon, I do think we can know roughly what the technologies will look like barring the unexpected discovery of new physics, so I’m with Robin Hanson here rather than Andrew Cote, today is not like 1850:

Andrew Cote: This kind of reasoning – that the future of humanity will be rockets, robots, and dyson swarms indefinitely into the future, assumes an epistemological completeness that we already know the future trade-space of all possible technologies.

It is as wrong as it would be to say, in 1850, that in two hundred years any nation that does not have massive coal reserves will be unfathomably impoverished. What could there be besides coal, steel, rail, and steam engines?

Physics is far from complete, we are barely at the beginning of what technology can be, and the most valuable things that can be done in physical reality can only be done by conscious observers, and this gets to the very heart of interpretations of quantum mechanics and physical theory itself.

Robin Hanson: ​No, more likely than not, we are constrained to a 3space-1time space-time where the speed of light is a hard limit on travel/influence, thermodynamics constrains the work we can do, & we roughly know what are the main sources of neg-entropy. We know a lot more than in 1850.

Even in the places were the assumptions aren’t obviously false, or you want to think they’re not obviously false, and also you want to assume various miracles occur such that we dodge outright ruin, certainly there’s no reason to think the future situation will be sufficiently analogous to make these analyses actually make sense?

Daniel Eth: This feels overly confident for advising a world completely transformed. I have no idea if post-AGI we’d be better off taxing wealth vs consumption vs something else. Sure, you can make the Econ 101 argument for taxing consumption, but will the relevant assumptions hold? Who knows.

Seb Krier: I also don’t have particularly good intuitions about what a world with ASI, nanotechnology and Dyson swarms looks like either.

Futurist post-AGI discussions often revolve around thinking at the edge of what’s in principle plausible/likely and extrapolating more and more. This is useful, but the compounding assumptions necessary to support a particular take contain so many moving parts that can individually materially affect a prediction.

It’s good to then unpack and question these, and this creates all sorts of interesting discussions. But what’s often lost in discussions is the uncertainty and fragility of the scaffolding that supports a particular prediction. Some variant of the conjunction fallacy.

Which is why even though I find long term predictions interesting and useful to expand the option space, I rarely find them particularly informative or sufficient to act on decisively now. In practice I feel like we’re basically hill-climbing on a fitness landscape we cannot fully see.

Brian Albrecht: I appreciate Dwarkesh and Philip’s piece. I responded to one tiny part.

But I’ll admit I don’t have a good intuition for what will happen in 1000 years across galaxies. So I think building from the basics seems reasonable.

I don’t even know that ‘wealth’ and ‘consumption’ would be meaningful concepts that look similar to how they look now, among other even bigger questions. I don’t expect ‘the basics’ to hold and I think we have good reasons to expect many of them not to.

Ben Thompson: ​This world also sounds implausible. It seems odd that AI would acquire such fantastic capabilities and yet still be controlled by humans and governed by property laws as commonly understood in 2025. I find the AI doomsday scenario — where this uber-capable AI is no longer controllable by humans — to be more realistic; on the flipside, if we start moving down this path of abundance, I would expect our collective understanding of property rights to shift considerably.

Ultimately all of this, as Tomas Bjartur puts it, imagines an absurd world, assuming away all of the dynamics that matter most. Which still leaves something fun and potentially insightful to argue about, I’m happy to do that, but don’t lose sight of it not being a plausible future world, and taking as a given that all our ‘real’ problems mysteriously turn out fine despite us having no way to even plausibly describe what that would look like, let alone any idea how to chart a path towards making it happen.

Thus from this point on, this post accepts the premises listed above, ad argumento.

I don’t think that world actually makes a lot of sense on reflection, as an actual world. Even if all associated technical and technological problems are solved, including but not limited to all senses of AI alignment, I do not see a path arriving at this outcome.

I also have lots of problems with parts the economic baseline case under this scenario.

The discussion is still worth having, but one needs to understand all this up front.

It’s even worth having that discussion even if the economists are mostly rather dense and smg and trotting out their standard toolbox as if nothing else ever applies to anything. I agree with Yo Shavit that it is good that this and other writing and talks from Dwarkesh Patel are generating serious economic engagement at all.

If meaningful democratic human control over capital persisted in a world trending towards extreme levels of inequality, I would expect to see massive wealth redistribution, including taxes on or confiscation of extreme concentrations of wealth.

If meaningful democratic control didn’t persist, then I would expect the future to be determined by whatever forces had assumed de facto control. By default I would presume this would be ‘the AIs,’ but the same applies if some limited human group managed to retain control, including over the AIs, despite superintelligence. Then it would be up to that limited group what happened after that. My expectation would be that most such groups would do some redistribution, but not attempt to prevent the Gini coefficient going to ~1, and they would want to retain control.

Jan Kelveit’s pushback here seems good. In this scenario, human share of capital will go to zero, our share of useful capability for violence will also go to zero, the use of threats as leverage won’t work and will go to zero, and our control over the state will follow. Harvey Lederman also points out related key flaws.

As Nikola Jurkovic notes, if superintelligence shows up and if we presume we get to a future with tons of capital and real wealth but human labor loses market value, and if humans are still alive and in control over what to do with the atoms (big ifs), then as he points out we fundamentally are going to either do charity for those who don’t have capital, or those people perish.

That charity can take the form of government redistribution, and one hopes that we do some amount of this, but once those people have no leverage it is charity. It could also take the form of private charity, as ‘the bill’ here will not be so large compared to total wealth.

It is not obvious that we would.

Inequality of wealth is not inherently a problem. Why should we care that one man has a million dollars and a nice apartment, while another has the Andromeda galaxy?What exactly are you going to do with the Andromeda galaxy?

A metastudy in Nature released last week concluded that economic inequality does not equate to poor well-being or mental health.

I also agree with Paul Novosad that it seems like our appetite for a circle of concern and generous welfare state is going down, not up. I’d like to hope that this is mostly about people feeling they themselves don’t have enough, and this would reverse if we had true abundance, but I’d predict only up to a point, no we’re not going to demand something resembling equality and I don’t think anyone needs a story to justify it.

Dwarkesh’s addendum that people are misunderstanding him, and emphasizing the inequality is inherently the problem, makes me even more confused. It seems like, yes, he is saying that wealth levels get locked in by early investment choices, and then that it is ‘hard to justify’ high levels of ‘inequality’ and that even if you can make 10 million a year in real income in the post-abundance future Larry Page’s heirs owning galaxies is not okay.

I say, actually, yes that’s perfectly okay, provided there is stable political economy and we’ve solved the other concerns so you can enjoy that 10 million a year in peace. The idea that there is a basic unit, physical human minds, that all have rights to roughly equal wealth, whereas the more capable AI minds and other entities don’t, and anything else is unacceptable? That doesn’t actually make a lot of sense, even if you accept the entire premise.

Tom Holden’s pushback is that we only care about consumption inequality, not wealth inequality, and when capital is the only input taking capital hurts investment, so what you really want is a consumption tax.

Similar thinking causes Brian Albrecht to say ‘redistribution doesn’t help’ when the thing that’s trying to be ‘helped’ is inequality. Of course redistribution can ‘help’ with that. Whereas I think Brian is presuming what you actually care about is the absolute wealth or consumption level of the workers, which of course can also be ‘helped’ by transfers, so I notice I’m still confused.

But either way, no, that’s not what anyone is asking in this scenario – the pie doth overfloweth, so it’s very easy for a very small tax to create quite a lot of consumption, if you can actually stay in control and enforce that tax.

I agree that in ‘normal’ situations among humans consumption inequality is what matters, and I would go further and say absolute consumption levels are what matters most. You don’t have to care so much about how much others consume so long as you have plenty, although I agree that people often do. I have 1000x what I have now and I don’t age or die, and my loved ones don’t age or die, but other people own galaxies? Sign me the hell up. Do happy dance.

Dwarkesh explicitly disagrees and many humans have made it clear they disagree.

Framing this as ‘consumption’ drags in a lot of assumptions that will break in such worlds even if they are otherwise absurdly normal. We need to question this idea that meaningful use of wealth involves ‘consumption,’ whereas many forms of investment or other such spending are in this sense de facto consumption. Also AIs don’t ‘consume’ is this sense so again this type of strategy only accelerates disempowerment.

The good counter argument is that sufficient wealth soon becomes power.

Paul Graham: ​The rational fear of those who dislike economic inequality is that the rich will convert their economic power into political power: that they’ll tilt elections, or pay bribes for pardons, or buy up the news media to promote their views.

I used to be able to claim that tech billionaires didn’t actually do this — that they just wanted to refine their gadgets. But unfortunately in the current administration we’ve seen all three.

It’s still rare for tech billionaires to do this. Most do just want to refine their gadgets. That habit is what made them billionaires. But unfortunately I can no longer say that they all do.

I don’t think the inequality being ‘hard to justify’ is important. I do think ‘humans, often correctly, beware inequality because it leads to power’ is important.

Garry Tan’s pushback of ‘whoa Dwarkesh, open markets are way better than redistribution’ and all the standard anti-redistribution rhetoric and faith that competition means everyone wins, a pure blind faith in markets to deliver all of us from everything and the only thing we have to fear is government regulations and taxes and redistribution, attacking Dwarkesh for daring to suggest redistribution could ever help with anything, is a maximally terrible response.

Not only is it suicidal in the face of the problems Dwarkesh is ignoring, it is also very literally suicidal in the face of labor income dropping to zero. Yes, prices fall and quality rises, and then anyone without enough capital starves anyway. Free markets don’t automagically solve everything. Mostly free markets are mostly the best solutions to most problems. There’s a difference.

You can decide that ‘inequality’ is not in and of itself a problem. You do still need to do some amount of ‘non-market’ redistribution if you want humans whose labor is not valuable to survive other than off capital, because otherwise they won’t. Maybe Garry Tan is fine with that if it boosts the growth rate. I’m not fine with it. The good news is that in this scenario we will be supremely wealthy, so a very small tax regime will enable all existing humans to live indefinitely in material wealth we cannot dream of.

Okay, suppose we do want to address the ‘inequality’ problem. What are our options?

Their first proposed solution are large inheritance taxes. As noted above, I would not expect these ultra wealthy people or AIs to die, so I don’t expect there to be inheritances to tax. If we lean harder into ‘premise!’ and ignore that issue, then I agree that applying taxes on death rather than continuously has some incentive advantages but also it introduces an insane level of distorted incentives if you tried to make this revenue source actually matter versus straight wealth taxes.

The proposed secondary solution of a straight up large wealth tax is justified by ‘the robots will work just as hard no matter the tax rate,’ to argue that this won’t do too much economic damage, but to the extent they are minds or minds are choosing the robot behaviors this simply is not effectively true, as most economists will tell you. They might work as hard, but they won’t work in the same ways towards the same ends, because either humans or AIs will be directing what the robots do and the optimization targets have changed. Communist utopia is still communist utopia, it’s weird to see it snuck in here as if it isn’t what it is.

The tertiary solution, a minimum ‘spending’ requirement, starts to get weird quickly if you try to pin it down. What is spending? What is consumption? This would presumably be massively destructive, causing massive wasteful consumption, on the level of ‘destroying a large portion of the available mass-energy in the lightcone for no effect.’ It’s a cool new thing to think about. Ultimately I don’t think it works, due to mismatched conceptual assumptions.

They also suggest taxing ‘natural resources.’ In a galactic scenario this seems like an incoherent proposal when applied to very large concentrations of wealth, not functionally different than straight up taxing wealth. If it is confined to Earth, then you can get some mileage out of this, but that’s solving your efficient government revenue problems, not your inequality problems. Do totally do it anyway.

The real barriers to implementing massive redistribution are ‘can the sources of power choose to do that?’ and ‘are we willing to take the massive associated hits to growth?’

The good news for the communist utopia solution (aka the wealth tax) is that it would be quite doable to implement it on a planetary scale, or in ‘AI as normal technology’ near term worlds, if the main sources of power wanted to do that. Capital controls are a thing, as is imposing your will on less powerful jurisdictions. ‘Capital’ is not magic.

The problem on a planetary scale is that the main sources of real power are unlikely to be the democratic electorate, once that electorate no longer is a source of either economic or military power. If the major world powers (or unified world government) want something, and remain the major world powers, they get it.

When you’re going into the far future and talking about owning galaxies, you then have some rather large ‘laws of physics’ problems with enforcement? How are you going to collect or enforce a tax on a galaxy? What would it even mean to tax it? In what sense do they ‘own’ the galaxy?

A universe with only speed-of-light travel, where meaningful transfers require massive expenditures of energy, and essentially solved technological possibilities, functions very, very differently in many ways. I don’t think they’re being thought through. If you’re living in a science fiction story for real, best believe in them.

As Tyler Cowen noted in his response to Dwarkesh, there are those who want to implement wealth taxes a lot sooner than when AI sends human labor income to zero.

As in, they want to implement it now, including now in California, where there is a serious proposal for a wealth tax, including on unrealized capital gains, including illiquid ones in startups as assessed by the state.

That would be supremely, totally, grade-A stupid and destructive if implemented, on the level of ‘no actually this would destroy San Francisco as the tech capital.’

Tech and venture capital like to talk the big cheap talk about how every little slight is going to cause massive capital flight, and how everything cool will happen in Austin and Miami instead of San Francisco and New York Real Soon Now because Socialism. Mostly this is cheap talk. They are mostly bluffing. The considerations matter on the margin, but not enough to give up the network effects or actually move.

They said SB 1047 would ‘destroy California’s AI industry’ when its practical effect would have been precisely zero. Many are saying similar things about Mamdani, who could cause real problems for New York City in this fashion, but chances are he won’t. And so on, there’s always something, usually many somethings.

So there is most definitely a ‘boy who cried wolf’ problem, but no, seriously, wolf.

I believe it would be a 100% full wolf even if you could pay in kind with illiquid assets, or otherwise have a workaround. It would still be obviously unworkable including due to flight. Without a workaround for illiquid assets, this isn’t even a question, the ecosystem is forced to flee overnight.

Looking at historical examples, a good rule of thumb is:

  1. High taxes on realized capital gains or high incomes do drive people away, but if you offer sufficient value most of them suck it up and stay anyway. There is a lot of room, especially nationally, to ensure billionaires get taxed on their income.

  2. Wealth taxes are different. Impacted people flee and take their capital with them.

The good news is California Governor Gavin Newsom is opposed, but this Manifold market still gives the proposed ‘2026 Billionaires Tax Act’ a 19% chance of collecting over a billion in revenue. That’s probably too high, but even if it’s more like 10%, that’s only the first attempts, and that’s high enough to have a major chilling effect already.

To be fair to Tyler Cowen, his analysis assumes a far more near term, very much like today scenario rather than Dyson spheres and galaxies, and if you assume AI is having sufficiently minor impact and things don’t change much, then his statements, and his treating the future world as ours in a trenchcoat, makes a lot more sense.

Tyler Cowen offered more of the ‘assume everything important doesn’t matter and then apply traditional economic principles to the situation’ analysis, try to point to equations that suggest real wages could go up in worlds where labor doesn’t usefully accomplish anything, and look at places humans would look to increase consumption so you can tax health care spending or quality home locations to pay for your redistribution, as if this future world is ours in a trenchcoat.

Similarly, here Garett Jones claims (in a not directly related post) that if there is astronomical growth in ‘capital’ (read: AI) such that it’s ‘unpriced like air’, and labor and capital are perfect substitutes, then capital share of profits would be zero. Except, unless I and Claude are missing something rather obvious, that makes the price of labor zero. So what in the world?

That leaves the other scenario, which he also lists, where labor and ‘capital’ are perfect complements, as in you assume human labor is mysteriously uniquely valuable and rule of law and general conditions and private property hold, in which case by construction yes labor does fine, as you’ve assumed your conclusion. That’s not the scenario being considered by the OP, indeed the OP directly assumes the opposite.

No, do not assume the returns stay with capital, but why are you assuming returns stay with humans at all? Why would you think that most consumption is going to human consumption of ordinary goods like housing and healthcare? There are so many levels of scenario absurdity at play. I’d also note that Cowen’s ideas all involve taxing humans in ways that do not tax AIs, accelerating our disempowerment.

As another example of economic toolbox response we have Brian Albrecht here usefully trotting out supply and demand to engage with these questions, to ask whether we can effectively tax capital which depends on capital supply elasticity and so on, talking about substituting capital and labor, except the whole point is that labor (if we presume AI is of the form ‘capital’ rather than labor, and that the only two relevant forms of production are capital and labor, which smuggles in quite a lot of additional assumptions I expect to likely become false in ways I doubt Brian is realizing) is now irrelevant and strictly dominated by capital. I would ask, why are we asking about the rate of ‘capital substitution for labor’ in a world in which capital has fully replaced labor?

So this style engagement is great compared to not engaging, but on another level also completely misses the point? When they get to talking downthread it seems like the point is missed even more, with statements like ‘capital never gets to share of 1 because of depreciation, you get finite K*.’ I’m sorry, what? The forest has been lost, models are being applied to scenarios where they don’t make sense.

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OpenAI reorganizes some teams to build audio-based AI hardware products

OpenAI, the company that developed the models and products associated with ChatGPT, plans to announce a new audio language model in the first quarter of 2026, and that model will be an intentional step along the way to an audio-based physical hardware device, according to a report in The Information.

Citing a variety of sources familiar with the plans, including both current and former employees, The Information claims that OpenAI has taken efforts to combine multiple teams across engineering, product, and research under one initiative focused on improving audio models, which researchers in the company believe lag behind the models used for written text in terms of both accuracy and speed.

They have also seen that relatively few ChatGPT users opt to use the voice interface, with most people preferring the text one. The hope may be that substantially improving the audio models could shift user behavior toward voice interfaces, allowing the models and products to be deployed in a wider range of devices, such as in cars.

OpenAI plans to release a family of physical devices in the coming years, starting with an audio-focused one. People inside the company have discussed a variety of forms for future devices, including smart speakers and glasses, but the emphasis across the line is on audio interfaces rather than screen-based ones.

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Final reminder: Donate to win swag in our annual Charity Drive sweepstakes

How it works

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Once that’s done, it’s time to register your entry in our sweepstakes. Just grab a digital copy of your receipt (a forwarded email, a screenshot, or simply a cut-and-paste of the text) and send it to [email protected] with your name, postal address, daytime telephone number, and email address by 11: 59 pm ET Friday, January 2, 2026. (One entry per person, and each person can only win up to one prize. US residents only. NO PURCHASE NECESSARY. See Official Rules for more information, including how to enter without making a donation. Also, refer to the Ars Technica privacy policy (https://www.condenast.com/privacy-policy).

We’ll then contact the winners and have them choose their prize by January 31, 2026 (choosing takes place in the order the winners are drawn). Good luck!

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“streaming-stops-feeling-infinite”:-what-subscribers-can-expect-in-2026

“Streaming stops feeling infinite”: What subscribers can expect in 2026


Spoiler: expect higher prices

Streaming may get a little worse before it gets better.

We’re far from streaming’s original promise: instant access to beloved and undiscovered titles without the burden of ads, bundled services, or price gouging that have long been associated with cable.

Still, every year we get more dependent on streaming for entertainment. Despite streaming services’ flaws, many of us are bound to keep subscribing to at least one service next year. Here’s what we can expect in 2026 and beyond.

Subscription prices keep rising, but perhaps not as expected

There’s virtually no hope of streaming subscription prices plateauing in 2026. Streaming companies continue to face challenges as content production and licensing costs rise, and it’s often easier to get current customers to pay slightly more than to acquire new subscribers. Meanwhile, many streaming companies are still struggling with profitability and revenue after spending years focusing on winning subscribers with content.

“We see many services are only now aligning content spend with realistic lifetime value per subscriber,” Christofer Hamilton, industry insights manager at streaming analyst Parrot Analytics, told Ars.

Companies may get more creative with how they frame higher costs to subscribers, however. People who pay extra to stream without ads are the most likely to see price bumps as streaming companies continue pushing customers toward ad-based tiers.

Charging more for “premium” features—such as 4K streaming, simultaneous streams, or offline downloads—offers another way for streaming companies to boost revenue without implementing broad price hikes that risk provoking customer outrage. Subscribers can expect streaming prices to get “more menu-like next year,” said Michael Goodman, director of entertainment research at Parks Associates, a research firm focusing on IoT, consumer electronics, and entertainment.

When will the price hikes stop?

If streaming prices won’t stop rising next year, when will they?

Ultimately, it may be up to subscribers to vote with their dollars by canceling subscriptions or opting for cheaper or free alternatives, such as FAST (free ad-supported streaming television) channels with linear programming.

As Goodman put it, “Until we see net adds stall or decline as a result of price hikes, services have no incentive to stop raising prices.”

Some experts doubt that streaming services will ever willingly stop increasing prices. Bill Yousman, professor and director of the Media Literacy and Digital Culture graduate program at Sacred Heart University, sees precedent for this in cable companies.

“If the big streaming companies had their way, there would be no limit to their price hikes. We have already seen this with the cable monopolies and their disregard for consumer dissatisfaction,” he said.

Yousman believes that prices will only “be brought under control if there is some type of government regulation,” but he noted that’s unlikely under the Trump administration.

To date, US lawmakers haven’t shown interest in halting the steady rise of streaming prices. Most lawmakers who have sought to regulate the industry have focused on industry consolidation. There has been some effort from lawmakers to rein in streaming price hikes, though, especially through proposed federal legislation dubbed the Price Gouging Prevention Act.

Streaming services lean deeper into cable-like bundles

Companies will look to leverage subscribers’ frustration with pricing by being more aggressive about bundling third-party services like traditional pay TV, Internet, and cell phone service with streaming subscriptions. The idea is that people are less likely to cancel a streaming subscription if it’s tied to a different subscription (including another streaming subscription). The strategy echoes the days of cable, when some people kept unused landlines just to save money on cable channels or Internet service.

“For subscribers, 2026 is the year streaming stops feeling infinite and starts feeling more like premium cable used to: fewer apps, clearer bundles, and higher expectations for each service they pay for,” Parrot’s Hamilton said.

Thanks to traditional pay TV providers, bundles have a bad connotation among people looking to save money and simplify their subscriptions. But bundling doesn’t always have to be a bad thing, as Yousman explains:

If the companies wanted to really be responsive to consumers, they would let them design their own packages rather than having to choose options that may or may not include all the services they want. What works against this, of course, is the demand for ever-increasing profits at all times.

Should a sale of Warner Bros. Discovery’s (WBD’s) HBO Max be completed (late) next year, subscribers will face more pressure to bundle their streaming subscriptions.

“When dominant platforms like Netflix or Paramount absorb major content players, it accelerates the erosion of streaming’s original promise: freedom from monopolistic bundles,” Vikrant Mathur, co-founder of streaming technology provider Future Today, said.

Netflix and Paramount duke it out over Warner Bros.

WBD announced plans this month to sell its streaming and movie studios business to Netflix for an equity value of $72 billion, or an approximate total enterprise value of $82.7 billion. Paramount Skydance, however, quickly swooped in with a hostile takeover bid for all of WBD, including its cable channels, for $108.4 billion. A WBD shareholder vote will occur in spring or early summer, chairman Samuel Di Piazza told CNBC. By the end of 2026, we should have a clearer understanding of the future of HBO Max, as well as Netflix and Paramount+.

Any acquisition will be subject to regulatory scrutiny, causing more uncertainty for subscribers. If Netflix buys HBO Max, users of both services can expect higher prices due to reduced competition and the extensive amount of content and number of big-budget franchises (including Harry Potter and DC Comics) expected to unite under one platform.

“If Netflix gets [HBO Max] and the WB studios, HBO Max subscribers are more likely to see a smoother transition, strong ongoing investment in premium content, and simpler app/billing integration,” Parks Associates’ Goodman said.

But while the potential merger is worth watching, subscribers are unlikely to truly feel the impact of HBO Max potentially changing ownership until after 2026.

“Producing a show is a yearslong process, so the content that was already slated to air isn’t going to disappear, and the new content acquired through the WB library won’t be available until the merger is approved and closes,” Tre Lovell, attorney and owner of Los Angeles entertainment law firm The Lovell Firm, explained.

Content starts getting less bold

Looking beyond 2026, a sale of part or all of WBD would likely open the door for more streaming acquisitions. That could eventually benefit customers by making it easier to find content to watch with fewer subscriptions. But merged companies are also less likely to take risks on unique and diverse content.

Analysts I spoke with pointed to fewer niche and mid-tier original shows and movies and more show cancellations if either Netflix or Paramount buys HBO Max. Either buyer would probably focus more on the already-successful franchises that WB owns, such as Game of Thrones, Batman, and Superman.

“Big combined libraries push companies to double down on proven IP because it travels, merchandises, and reduces marketing risk,” said Robert Rosenberg, a partner at the New York law firm Moses Singer focusing on intellectual property, entertainment, technology, and data law.

Rosenberg also expects to see a “tilt toward” live events, sports, and unscripted content “for retention” if HBO Max sells.

In the shorter term, Rory Gooderick, research manager at analyst firm Ampere Analysis, predicted that WBD will be “cautious when greenlighting new large-scale projects until” the acquisition is finalized.

Beyond the potential HBO Max sale, more merger activity could lead to streaming services straying from their original selling point of offering bolder, quirkier content.

As the industry consolidates, “sticky content,” like procedurals, reality shows, and “comfort TV that drives long viewing sessions,” will take priority among mainstream, subscription-based streaming services, especially as they put more emphasis on ad-tier subscriptions, Goodman predicted.

A more stable future?

The new year will be formative for streaming and yield lasting impacts for subscribers. We’ve discussed numerous negative implications, but there could be a silver lining. While we may see more turbulence, hopefully, we’ll also start to see a road toward more stable streaming options.

Streaming subscribers can’t directly stop mergers or price hikes or control streaming libraries. But with services like Netflix and Disney+ focusing on becoming one-stop shops with massive libraries, there’s an opportunity for other services to hone their specialties and stand out by providing offbeat, unexpected, and rare content at more affordable prices.

As the landscape settles, streamers should be mindful of the importance of variety to subscribers. According to Bill Michels, chief product officer at Gracenote, Nielsen’s content data business unit:

There will be some consolidation. But the [connected TV] landscape, inclusive of FAST and [direct-to-consumer] channels, provides more than ample video variety for viewers, so the biggest challenge will be connecting content with the right audience. Audience engagement depends on good content. Audience retention depends on making sure audiences are never without something to watch.

Photo of Scharon Harding

Scharon is a Senior Technology Reporter at Ars Technica writing news, reviews, and analysis on consumer gadgets and services. She’s been reporting on technology for over 10 years, with bylines at Tom’s Hardware, Channelnomics, and CRN UK.

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2025-year-in-review

2025 Year in Review

It’s that time. It’s been a hell of a year.

At the start we barely had reasoning models. Now we have Claude Code and Opus 4.5.

I don’t code. Yet now I cause code to exist whenever something about a website annoys me, or when I get that programmer’s realization that there’s something I am planning on doing at least three times. Because why not?

The progress has simultaneously been mind bogglingly impressive and fast. But a lot of people don’t see it that way, because progress has been incremental, and because we were reasonably expecting to often get even more than this.

The public conversation and debate, even more than before, was full of false narratives and active attempts to make the situation worse. The same goes for attempts to shape Federal policy towards AI, and OpenAI’s conversion into a for-profit.

It’s been, as they say, one battle after another, with many wins, many setbacks and a lot of things in between.

This includes the key developments in AI, and also other blog posts from the year that I consider memorable looking back.

This is only our corner of the world’s Year in Review, not one in general, thus things like Liberation Day are happening in the background and go undiscussed.

The confusions started in January, as we prepared for Trump to take office.

OpenAI had just given us o1-preview, the first reasoning model.

At the tail end of 2024, DeepSeek released v3, or The Six Million Dollar Model. This was a big advancement in open source and Chinese model capabilities, and showed that they were not as far behind as we thought they were, and also that damn good models could be trained on the cheap. Not as cheap as the headline number, since the six million was only direct costs of the final run, but still pretty cheap.

Then a few weeks later, DeepSeek gave us r1, a reasoning model based on v3. They wrapped this up into a nice clean free app experience, which included the first time most people could see a reasoning model’s chain of thought – Gemini Flash Thinking offered this too but almost no one knew about that or cared. This showed that the ‘secret sauce’ of building a reasoning model was not so difficult to copy, and the marginal costs of doing so were low.

DeepSeek shot to the top of the App store, and the world completely lost its mind. The stock market mini-crashed. People talked about how China had ‘caught up’ to America, or this meant inference would be so cheap no one would need Nvidia chips (as consumers rushed out to buy Nvidia chips to run DeepSeek r1), or how it would destroy margins and drive American AI out of business. I had to warn people, many times, with the classic advice: Don’t Panic, and I went on Odd Lots to discuss it all.

Collectively this was called The DeepSeek Moment.

White House rhetoric talked about how this meant we were in a ‘race’ with China, so of course any other considerations than ‘winning’ must be thrown out the window.

With time, those paying attention realized all of that was overblown. DeepSeek was impressive as a lab, and v3 and r1 were excellent models, but still on the order of eight months behind OpenAI, Anthropic and Google. We had been comparing the relatively best features of r1 on their own, and then using that to project into the future, which flat out did not happen. This happened at a crucial inflection point, right when reasoning models had started, which was when a tiny amount of compute could go a maximally long way.

Later on, r1-0528 did not have a moment, nor did DeepSeek 3.1 or DeepSeek 3.2.

Google started out the month introducing us to Deep Research, a new product form that would be copied by OpenAI, allowing the AI to take time to prepare a report. At the time, this was super impressive. It definitely has its uses, even if the timing is awkward and you have to push past the tendency to pad reports with a lot of slop.

A new paper on The Risk of Gradual Disempowerment From AI improved the debate by highlighting a central way that humans end up not being in charge. There doesn’t need to be some ‘AI coup’ or battle, the AIs will by default end up with more and more resources and power unless something stops this from happening. One day we wake up and realize we are not in control. Another day after that we don’t wake up.

OpenAI declared that its primary alignment strategy would be Deliberative Alignment, so I analyzed that approach. I think it is helpful, but not a central solution.

The Administration made its AI feelings clear at The Paris AI Anti-Safety Summit. Previous summits had been efforts to lay foundation for international cooperation, with serious discussions of existential risks, in particular with The Bletchley Declaration. That was clearly over, transformed into a disdain for the idea that sufficiently advanced AI could be existentially dangerous, and Vance giving a speech demanding suicidal accelerationism and warning against attempts to not die.

The year would play out in similar fashion. We had some modest success in California and New York, but the White House would, under the influence of David Sacks, become an active force for interference with efforts to not die, and later even to beat China. They would do some pro-America things along the way, but also things that actively interfered with our competitiveness.

I introduced a key new concept handle which I call Levels of Friction. Different actions are variously harder or easier, from both practical and legal perspectives, to do. They range from Level 0 (defaults or requirements), to Level 1 (legal and ubiquitous and easy), Level 2 (safe but annoying), Level 3 (actively tricky or risky), Level 4 (actually seriously illegal) up to Level 5 (we really care about stopping you). Instead of thinking of a boolean of legal-illegal or possible-impossible, it is often more enlightening to consider moving between levels.

AI is going to move a lot of things to lower levels of friction. That is by default bad, but frictions can be load bearing, such as with job applications or limiting antisocial behaviors. It protects the commons. We will have to adjust quite a lot of things once key frictions are removed from the system.

February was the peak of ‘could Grok be a thing?’ It turned out not to be a thing. In other model news we got Claude 3.7.

We also got our first introduction to Emergent Misalignment, the idea that training the AI to do bad things associated with evil could lead it to generalize into thinking of itself as trope-style evil and doing a wide range of trope-style evil things.

A non-AI highlight was my piece on elementary education, School Is Hell.

GPT-4.5 was OpenAI’s attempt to give us a large and slow model. It did some cool things, and there are people that really liked it, but mostly it wasn’t worthwhile.

A big part of AI coverage is getting confident in dismissing hype. A great example of this was my coverage of The Manus Marketing Madness. Now that they’ve unceremoniously sold out to Meta, it’s easy to forget that a lot of people were hyping Manus as The Next Big Thing, as well as the next reason we would Lose To China.

I warned against using The Most Forbidden Technique, which is where you use interpretability to train on intermediate outputs, to teach it to think the thoughts you want it to think, thus teaching the AI to, like humans before it, hide its thinking.

Image generation had its first big moment, when the 4o image generator came online and everyone went Studio Ghibli crazy, taking advantage of both the advancement in quality and willingness to mimic styles.

Gemini 2.5 Pro came out, which I called the new state of the art. I think this was correct at the time, but later versions of Gemini 2.5 Pro were actively worse, and soon OpenAI would be back out ahead.

AI 2027 provided an illustrative scenario that presented a best guess as to what was likely to happen, with an alternative scenario option where things turn out well because a bold decision is made to slow down at a key moment. Scott Alexander and Daniel Kokotajlo explained the details on the Dwarkesh podcast, and I covered various responses.

Llama 4 was released, and turned out to be a total dud. Meta has been silent since in terms of topline AI products, while spending hundreds of millions on individual pay packages to try and gather the talent to get back in the game. It is a good thing Meta is struggling, given its bizarrely dystopian AI vision it is willing to give in public.

o3 put OpenAI firmly back out in front in reasoning, with excellent tool use, but was rapidly exposed as a Lying Liar that lies a lot.

OpenAI had other problems with GPT-4o. It was always an absurd sycophant that could get some of its users into trouble, but updates made around this time made it even more of an absurd sycophant, forcing a reversion to a previous build. I would later offer a postmortem.

OpenAI claimed that their conversion to a for-profit, which as announced then would clearly have been one the biggest thefts in human history, would leave the non-profit in control.

The White House had from the beginning made a huge deal out of how Just Awful the Biden diffusion rules were, just like it talks about everything Biden did, but it initially acted generally wisely on chip diffusion and export controls, including on the H20.

Alas, over time David Sacks got more control over their narrative and increasingly started spouting Obvious Nonsense About AI Diffusion, literally claiming that ‘beating China’ means maximizing Nvidia’s share of chip sales, and warning that China would step in with non-existent and otherwise greatly inferior AI chips to build its own ‘AI tech stack’ if we didn’t sell massive compute to partners with questionable loyalties. Initially this rhetoric and action was confined to sales to parties like UAE and KSA, where a case can be made if the deals and safeguards are good, and details matter. Later this would extend to trying to sell chips to China directly.

OpenAI released Codex to compete with Claude Code. Claude Code was such a stealth release, initially a side project of one employee, that it took a while to notice something was happening, and even longer for me to finally give it a try. Nowadays Claude Code might be most of my AI token usage.

Claude 4 put Anthropic back in the game.

I offered thoughts on those who use AI to cheat, especially in education.

Veo 3 gave Google the lead in video generation.

I wrote my first ‘Letting Kids Be Kids,’ I would later write another in December.

Dating Roundup #6 proved popular, and #7 did solidly too. I just put out #8 and #9.

I did an analysis of New York’s proposed RAISE Act, by Alex Bores who is now running for Congress. I concluded it was an excellent bill. It would later pass, although in somewhat weakened form because of Governor Hochul’s changes.

OpenAI and in particular Sam Altman continued to try and sell us on the concept of a Gentle Singularity, that AIs would become superintelligent and your life wouldn’t much change. This is of course Obvious Nonsense. Your life might become great, or it might end, or it might get into High Weirdness, but it won’t stay the same.

o3 Pro came out, and was very strong and not the lying liar that normal o3 was.

I came out with my (hopefully annual from here on in) blog recommendations.

The first attempt to pass a federal moratorium on AI regulation, as in tell the states they aren’t allowed to regulate AI because that should be federal while also not regulating AI at the federal level, came dangerously close to passing as part of the BBB. It was ultimately stripped out 99-1 once the tide had turned.

Congress had one of its finer hearings, where they asked good questions about AI.

Grok ran into trouble. No, Grok, No. Do not call yourself MechaHitler. Or worse.

Kimi K2 was an unusually impressive new open Chinese model. We would later get Kimi K2 Thinking in November.

Google and OpenAI got IMO Gold.

AI companions were getting a lot of attention, which has since died down. This will be a big thing at some point, and for some it is a very real thing, but for now it isn’t good enough to hold most people’s interest. I followed up again in August.

The big hyped release of the year was of course GPT-5. This would be their big moment to unify all their crazy model variations and names, and create one model to rule them all, with a router to think longer if and only if that was worthwhile. There were approaching death stars and we saw a variety of assertive valueposting. It was the big version number jump, and people expected a lot.

GPT-5 was a good model, I found it to be a clear upgrade, but it very much did not live up to the hype. Many even strongly wanted to keep GPT-4o for its far friendlier and more empathic attitude, or some would say its sycophancy – the very features that make GPT-4o not a great thing for many users are alas the reasons users often like it so much. I covered the basic facts and model card, then outside reactions and finally created a synthesis.

Unfortunately, the model OpenAI chose to call GPT-5 being a disappointing release gave so many people, up to and including David Sacks and Sriram Krishnan at the White House, the wrong idea. There is a constant demand for data points that say AI won’t advance much, that scaling is dead, that it will all be a normal technology and you don’t have to worry about AGI. Washington seems to have come away from the GPT-5 release with this message, and it plausibly did great harm in numerous ways, including to our export controls.

I tried to push directly back against this, pointing out that AI was continuing to make rapid progress, both around GPT-5 and various other misleading data points, especially the no-good, very-bad ‘MIT study.’ I followed up by pointing out that Yes, AI Continues To Make Rapid Progress, Including Towards AGI.

I noticed I was deeply confused about AI consciousness, along with everyone else. I still am, except now I’m more confused at a better, more advanced level. These questions are coming up more and more now, and I expect that to continue.

It’s so funny to have half of people debating AI consciousness, while the other half thinks AI is not making any progress.

I offered my advice around flying.

Are the AIs starting to take our jobs? Not in general, but for entry level jobs? Kinda.

I reviewed If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies. There were a few weeks where this inspired a lot of discussion, much of it remarkably good.

The month ended with Anthropic reclaiming its role as my daily driver thanks to Claude Sonnet 4.5.

There was more on AI craziness, then later in November we would see additional lawsuits against OpenAI related to suicides.

OpenAI meanwhile decided to release Sora and The Big Bright Screen Slop Machine, attempting to turn its good short video generator into a dystopian social network. I said the comparables were Google+ and Clubhouse. Call looks good.

I got to go to The Curve, which was an excellent conference.

One of the consequences of the GPT-5 release was more people talked about AI as potentially being in a bubble. I do not agree, other than in the nominal ‘number might go down’ sense. Number might go down, if not number needs to go up.

OpenAI completed its trio of overhyped releases with the Atlas browser. This jaded people sufficiently that when GPT-5.1 and GPT-5.2 later came out, people gave them remarkably little focus.

Andrej Karpathy went on Dwarkesh Patel and cautioned us not to get overexcited.

The biggest advantage America has over China is its access to vastly more compute. This is thanks in large part to our export controls. Alas, David Sacks it the AI Czar, acts like a de facto Nvidia lobbyist, and is trying to make us give that edge away.

Emboldened by prior success in getting authorization for H20 sales, Nvidia and David Sacks made their move, and came (based on what I know) remarkably close to getting America to commit quite a lot of civilizational suicide and sell B30A chips to China, essentially giving them close to chip parity. This would have been a completely insane move, and we should be thankful a combination of key people stepped up and prevented this from happening.

Unfortunately, although far less unfortunately than if we’d sold B30As, they then regrouped and in December would successfully push, despite it being obviously unwise and unpopular, for us to sell H200s to China. The Chinese are making a show of not wanting them so much, but it’s a show, and our edge has been substantially eroded. The logic behind this seems to have been nominally based in part on a prediction that Huawei can scale chip production far faster than credible predictions say, as in being off by an order of magnitude or more.

OpenAI finished its conversion to a for-profit, completing what I believe is arguably the second largest theft in human history behind the Russian oligarchs of the 1990s. The final terms came as the result of negotiations with the District Attorneys of Delaware and California, and they did extract a lot of highly meaningful concessions, both in terms of compensation and also in helping retain meaningful control and oversight over OpenAI. This could have gone so much worse. But as I said, that’s like a mugger demanded your money, and they got talked down to only taking half your money, then they claim they ‘recapitalized you.’ You’re still out half of your money.

We got what may be the final key revelations of what I call OpenAI’s Battle of the Board where the board attempted to fire Sam Altman, as we got Ilya Sustkever’s testimony about what happened. We now know that this was driven by Ilya Sutskever and Mira Murati, and was motivated by ordinary business concerns, centrally Sam Altman’s lying and mistreatment of employees.

I offered my 2025 edition of The Big Nonprofits Post, for those looking to donate, and would later share an update from my nonprofit, Balsa Research.

The year would finish with a flurry of new model releases.

OpenAI started us off with GPT-5.1, a modest upgrade that follows custom instructions well and often glazes the user, and then followed it up with GPT-5.1-Codex-Max, which was a substantial boost in coding power in particular.

Google gave us Gemini 3 Pro, a vast intelligence with no spine and also severe alignment issues and mental problems. It’s a great model, and was clearly now the best at a variety of uses, especially raw intelligence, or a teacher or whom you had questions with known answers that you would ask an autist.

Anthropic then gave us the big one, Claude Opus 4.5, which is for now the clear best model available, and remains my daily driver, both for chat and also in Claude Code.

Claude Opus 4.5 felt like a large practical leap, some like Dean Ball going so far as to call it AGI. I don’t agree but I understand where they are coming from.

I went to San Francisco for the Solstice, and wrote Little Echo.

I did the annual movie review.

We learned even more reasons to beware reward mismatches in RL.

OpenAI upgraded again to GPT-5.2, which I evaluated as Frontier Only For The Frontier. Its impressive benchmarks do not reflect its capabilities, and people reacted with fatigue after too many disappointing OpenAI model releases. It’s not an especially ‘fun’ model to interact with, nor is it especially fast, and it currently occupies a sweet spot only for tasks where you need a lot of raw thinking capability and are looking for ‘just the facts’ and cold analysis, and potentially for coding where everyone serious should try various models to see what works best for their tasks.

I offered a sequence of posts on why median wages are up, economists keep saying times are solid, yet young people keep saying things suck. Those complaining often say false things and use statistics wrong, but if so many people think things suck, then you know there’s a problem. I looked into cost changes over time, and when were various things the best. Finally, I presented my thesis, which was that this was due to the Revolution of Rising Expectations and the Revolution of Rising Requirements. Our expectations and comparison points are supremely high, as are the things we legally require of those looking to raise families.

AI is going gangbusters. The news about it is accelerating, not slowing down. It’s going to increasingly impact our lives and be the topic of conversation. The model releases will come fast and furious. The agents will make big leaps in 2026, and not only for coding. It will likely be a major topic in the midterm elections. I don’t expect full High Weirdness in 2026, but you can’t fully rule it out.

Blog growth, in terms of views, stagnated this year. That’s disappointing, as previously I had experienced strong growth, and I likely need to explore additional ways to get the word out. But ‘number go up’ was never the ultimate goal and I am confident that I am directly reaching quite a lot of the people I care about reaching. I do intend to send out a user survey some time in the near future.

One big personal goal for 2026 is to do more coding and evergreen posting, going deeper into questions that matter or that I get curious about, and being better about organizing my thoughts, and to focus less on ephemeral items and news, and to finally get a handle on organizing what I do have to better create longer term resources. I am fully aware that almost all views happen within a few days of posting, but that doesn’t need to dictate anything, and there are some basic things where I could build permanent resources much better than I’ve been doing.

The other big goal is to focus on what matters, including the fights and debates that matter, making sure to do that in a way that adds to permanent resources and not let important things end up buried. I have to do better triage, especially in letting relatively unimportant matters drop. I intend to publish fewer words on the blog in 2026, and with that to become more willing to skip days. I know the amount of content can be overwhelming.

One thing that got lost in the shuffle this year, and illustrates the problem, was my planned review of Open Socrates. It’s a book warning you not to live your life 15 minutes at a time, and I didn’t finish my response because life kept throwing too much stuff at me. Well, that’s kind of the worst possible excuse not to finish that, isn’t it? Even if because of the delay I ultimately have to reread a lot of the book.

I also have a bunch of projects I’d love to try. We’ll see how that goes. But also movies to watch, and games to play, and people to see, and fun to be had. Life beckons.

And you know what? Life is pretty awesome. Other people sing Ald Lang Syne. I go to the Secular Solstice. My personal tradition, at year’s end, is something else entirely.

Happy New Year, everyone.

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The science of how (and when) we decide to speak out—or self-censor

The US has adopted more of a middle ground approach, essentially letting private companies decide what they wanted to do. Daymude and his co-authors wanted to investigate these markedly different approaches. So they developed a computational agent-based simulation that modeled how individuals navigate between wanting to express dissent versus fear of punishment. The model also incorporates how an authority adjusts its surveillance and its policies to minimize dissent at the lowest possible cost of enforcement.

“It’s not some kind of learning theory thing,” said Daymude. “And it’s not rooted in empirical statistics. We didn’t go out and ask 1000 people, ‘What would you do if faced with this situation? Would you dissent or self-censor?’ and then build that data into the model. Our model allows us to embed some assumptions about how we think people behave broadly, but then lets us explore parameters. What happens if you’re more or less bold? What happens if punishments are more or less severe? An authority is more or less tolerant? And we can make predictions based on our fundamental assumptions about what’s going to happen.”

Let one hundred flowers bloom

According to their model, the most extreme case is an authoritarian government that adopts a draconian punishment strategy, which effectively represses all dissent in the general population. “Everyone’s best strategic choice is just to say nothing at this point,” said Daymude. “So why doesn’t every authoritarian government on the planet just do this?” That led them to look more closely at the dynamics. “Maybe authoritarians start out somewhat moderate,” he said. “Maybe the only way they’re allowed to get to that extreme endpoint is through small changes over time.”

Daymude points to China’s Hundred Flowers Campaign in the 1950s as an illustrative case. Here, Chairman Mao Zedong initially encouraged open critiques of his government before abruptly cracking down aggressively when dissent got out of hand. The model showed that in such a case, dissenters’ self-censorship gradually increased, culminating in near-total compliance over time.

But there’s a catch. “The opposite of the Hundred Flowers is if the population is sufficiently bold, this strategy doesn’t work,” said Daymude. “The authoritarian can’t find the pathway to become fully draconian. People just stubbornly keep dissenting. So every time it tries to ramp up severity, it’s on the hook for it every time because people are still out there, they’re still dissenting. They’re saying, ‘Catch us if you dare.’”

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Lawsuit over Trump rejecting medical research grants is settled

The case regarding cancelled grants moved relatively quickly. By June, a District Court judge declared that the federal policy “represents racial discrimination” and issued a preliminary order that would have seen all the cancelled grants restored. In his written opinion, Judge William Young noted that the government had issued its directives blocking DEI support without even bothering to define what DEI is, making the entire policy arbitrary and capricious, and thus in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. He voided the policy, and ordered the funding restored.

His decision eventually ended up before the Supreme Court, which issued a ruling in which a fragmented majority agreed on only a single issue: Judge Young’s District Court was the wrong venue to hash out issues of government-provided money. Thus, restoring the money from the cancelled grants would have to be handled via a separate case filed in a different court.

Critically, however, this left the other portion of the decision intact. Young’s determination that the government’s anti-DEI, anti-climate, anti-etc. policy was illegal and thus void was upheld.

Restoring reviews

That has considerable consequences for the second part of the initial suit, involving grants that were not yet funded and blocked from any consideration by the Trump Administration policy. With that policy voided, there was no justification for the National Institutes of Health (NIH) failing to have considered the grants when they were submitted. But, in the meantime, deadlines had expired, pools of money had been spent, and in some cases the people who submitted the grants had aged out of the “new investigator” category they were applying under.

The proposed settlement essentially resets the clock on all of this; the blocked grants will be evaluated for funding as if it were still early 2025. “Defendants stipulate and agree that the end of Federal Fiscal Year 2025 does not prevent Defendants from considering and/or awarding any of the Applications,” it states. Even if the Notice of Funding Opportunity has since been withdrawn, the grant applications will be sent off for peer review.

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The top 5 most horrifying and fascinating medical cases of 2025


Florida man makes two appearances on the list.

Credit: Aurich Lawson | Getty Images

There were a lot of horrifying things in the news this year—a lot. But some of it was horrifying in a good way.

Extraordinary medical cases—even the grisly and disturbing ones—offer a reprieve from the onslaught of current events and the stresses of our daily lives. With those remarkable reports, we can marvel at the workings, foibles, and resilience of the human body. They can remind us of the shared indignities from our existence in these mortal meatsacks. We can clear our minds of worry by learning about something we never even knew we should worry about—or by counting our blessings for avoiding so far. And sometimes, the reports are just grotesquely fascinating.

Every year, there’s a new lineup of such curious clinical conditions. There are always some unfortunate souls to mark medical firsts or present ultra-rare cases. There is also an endless stream of humans making poor life choices—and arriving at an emergency department with the results. This year was no different.

The top five medical cases of 2025 were chosen using a blend of editorial judgment and reader interest. There’s a mix of cases stemming from poor life choices and just plain bad luck. Florida man makes two appearances (we’ll let you guess which of the aforementioned categories he fits into). There’s a puzzling, oozing, explosive vomiting, a bioterror bacterial surprise, and, of course, parasitic worms. Best of all, nobody died—a happy ending we could all use as this year draws to a close.

Without further ado …

5. Man eats dubious street food—ends up blowing apart his GI tract

Street food can be among a region’s best culinary offerings. No one can be blamed for partaking. But, it does come with some risks—namely, food poisoning. An unfortunate 59-year-old man fell ill after eating some street food in China. It wouldn’t be a remarkable story if it weren’t for the degree of trauma his ensuing illness created. The man vomited so fiercely that the force his body created to launch the offending substance up and as far away as possible—presumably to another dimension—blew apart his esophagus (the muscular tube that conveys food between the throat and stomach).

Such organ-shattering is called Boerhaave syndrome, which is rare. If it isn’t treated quickly, it has a 60 percent to 100 percent fatality rate. The man, luckily, received care within a few hours of the blast, though his chest was already filling with fluid and his right lung was collapsing. He was rushed to emergency surgery and eventually made a full recovery. However, it required 35 days in the hospital and an additional three months with a feeding tube before his esophagus completely healed. It remains unclear what street food sparked the detonation, but presumably, it is one he won’t eat again.

4. Burning in woman’s legs turned out to be slug parasites migrating to her brain

For days, a 30-year-old woman in New England experienced searing pain that crept up her body, starting with her legs, then moving up her trunk and to her arms. She went to two different emergency departments seeking relief. But doctors at each found no clear explanation for her pain and sent her home with only a recommendation to see her primary doctor. The condition continued to worsen. After waking up in a mental fog, she was taken to Massachusetts General Hospital, where doctors discovered that she was infected with parasitic worms.

The pain and burning sensations the woman had experienced moving up her body was from worm larvae traveling along her peripheral nerves to get to her brain. The parasite behind the infection was the nematode Angiostrongylus cantonensis, also known as rat lungworm. This delightful parasite typically circulates between rats—its primary host—and slugs and snails. Infected rats poop out larvae, which are picked up by slugs and snails. Late-stage larvae develop in the slugs and snails, then move back to rats, who get infected by eating the infected mollusks. Back in the rat, the larvae make their way to the rat’s brain, where they become adults. Then they relocate to the lungs (hence the name) to mate.

Humans accidentally get infected by eating raw vegetables containing or contaminated by infected slugs or snails, or by eating undercooked creatures that eat slugs or snails, such as land crabs, freshwater prawns, or frogs. In the woman’s case, doctors suspected she got infected from eating raw seafood and salads on a recent trip to Hawaii, where the parasite is a known threat. Luckily, the woman was treated for the infection and made a full recovery.

3. Man gets drunk, wakes up with a medical mystery that nearly kills him

It’s not every day a person gets drunk and wakes up with a medical case so enigmatic that a master clinician with an expertise in medical reasoning is called in to help crack it. But a 36-year-old did just that in a case published this year in the New England Journal of Medicine.

The man showed up at the hospital with abdominal pain, a crackling in his lungs, bacteria in his blood, liver abnormalities, an injury in his small intestine, and a blood clot in his right kidney—and no clear idea of how any of those things happened or how they were connected.

In the case report, doctors lay out how they identified all of the aspects of his condition and then how master clinician Gurpreet Dhaliwal of the University of California, San Francisco, unraveled how they fit together.

Providing a fascinating look into diagnostic sleuthing, Dhaliwal reasoned out that it all came down to beers and a toothpick. The man—who had a history of binge drinking—got drunk, ate something, and accidentally swallowed a toothpick, Dhaliwal surmised. While still drunk, the man aspirated some of the food, causing his lung infection. The toothpick, meanwhile, pierced his small intestine near his right kidney, causing the injury and the blood clot. The injury then became infected, causing sepsis and his liver abnormalities.

After Dhaliwal came to his conclusion, medical imaging found the toothpick. After it was removed, the man made a full recovery.

2. Florida man eats feral pig meat, contracts rare biothreat bacteria

I promised Florida man made the list—and of course, he’s near the top. In this case, a Florida man was gifted the bloody meat of a feral pig, which he handled with his bare hands before cooking and eating it. In doing so, he inadvertently exposed himself to a highly infectious bacterium considered a potential bioterror threat. The man developed an insidious infection that lurked in his heart implant and took doctors nearly two years to properly diagnose.

The bacterium at hand is Brucella suis, which typically infects pigs. The bacterium is not particularly deadly, but it can spread by air and only takes a few bacterial cells to cause an infection, making it a good potential weapon. In 1954, B. suis became the first biological agent to be weaponized by the US government as part of its offensive biological warfare program.

Once the man’s infection was finally diagnosed, he was treated with an effective antibiotic regimen to clear it. He also got a new heart implant and made a full recovery. Unfortunately, due to the high infectiousness of the germ, doctors had to reach out to all the man’s previous health care providers and clinical lab workers to warn them of the exposure. Three lab workers were found to have had a high-risk exposure and had to undergo months monitoring and post-exposure prophylaxis.

1. Florida man eats diet of butter, cheese, beef; cholesterol oozes from his body

While that Florida man’s case was … unusual, it mostly stems to some bad luck—who among us hasn’t occasionally forgotten to check our gifted feral pig meat for bioterror threats? By contrast, this year’s top medical case goes to another Florida man, whose life choices are definitely in question.

In January, we shared the case of a Florida man who adopted a daily diet of six to nine pounds of cheese, sticks of butter, and hamburgers that had additional fat incorporated into them. He made the medical literature after eight months, when he showed up to cardiologists with cholesterol literally oozing out of his hands, feet, and elbows.

As the cholesterol was trying to escape his body, it created painless, yellowish nodules filled with lipids. The condition is called xanthoma and most often presents with nodules around the eye.

The cardiologists tested the man’s blood cholesterol levels and found that they exceeded 1,000 mg/dL. For context, the target level of total cholesterol for good cardiovascular health is under 200 mg/dL, while 240 mg/dL or over is considered high.

It’s unclear how things ended up for the man, but at least his doctors did not report that he died—at least not yet. Generally, xanthoma itself is benign; his cholesterol levels, on the other hand, put him at significant risk of cardiovascular disease. Still, he suggested to his doctors that he was pleased with his dairy-heavy diet, which he described as a “carnivore diet.” He claimed he lost weight, had more energy, and improved his “mental clarity.”

With that, we sign off on the medical line-up of 2025 and look forward to what medical horrors 2026 will hold—and what Florida man will do next.

Photo of Beth Mole

Beth is Ars Technica’s Senior Health Reporter. Beth has a Ph.D. in microbiology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and attended the Science Communication program at the University of California, Santa Cruz. She specializes in covering infectious diseases, public health, and microbes.

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Big Tech basically took Trump’s unpredictable trade war lying down


From Apple gifting a gold statue to the US taking a stake in Intel.

Credit: Aurich Lawson | Getty Images

Credit: Aurich Lawson | Getty Images

As the first year of Donald Trump’s chaotic trade war winds down, the tech industry is stuck scratching its head, with no practical way to anticipate what twists and turns to expect in 2026.

Tech companies may have already grown numb to Trump’s unpredictable moves. Back in February, Trump warned Americans to expect “a little pain” after he issued executive orders imposing 10–25 percent tariffs on imports from America’s biggest trading partners, including Canada, China, and Mexico. Immediately, industry associations sounded the alarm, warning that the costs of consumer tech could increase significantly. By April, Trump had ordered tariffs on all US trade partners to correct claimed trade deficits, using odd math that critics suspected came from a chatbot. (Those tariffs bizarrely targeted uninhabited islands that exported nothing and were populated by penguins.)

Costs of tariffs only got higher as the year wore on. But the tech industry has done very little to push back against them. Instead, some of the biggest companies made their own surprising moves after Trump’s trade war put them in deeply uncomfortable positions.

Apple gives Trump a gold statue instead of US-made iPhone

Right from the jump in February, Apple got backed into a corner after Trump threatened a “flat” 60 percent tariff on all Chinese imports, which experts said could have substantially taxed Apple’s business. Moving to appease Trump, Apple promised to invest $500 billion in the US in hopes of avoiding tariffs, but that didn’t take the pressure off for long.

By April, Apple stood by and said nothing as Trump promised the company would make “made in the USA” iPhones. Analysts suggested such a goal was “impossible,” calling the idea “impossible at worst and highly expensive at best.”

Apple’s silence did not spare the company Trump’s scrutiny. The next month, Trump threatened Apple with a 25 percent tariff on any iPhones sold in the US that were not manufactured in America. Experts were baffled by the threat, which appeared to be the first time a US company was threatened directly with tariffs.

Typically, tariffs are imposed on a country or category of goods, like smartphones. It remains unclear if it would even be legal to levy a tariff on an individual company like Apple, but Trump never tested those waters. Instead, Trump stopped demanding the American-made iPhone and withdrew other tariff threats after he was apparently lulled into submission by a gold statue that Apple gifted him in August. The engraved glass disc featured an Apple logo and Tim Cook’s signature above a “Made in USA” stamp, celebrating Donald Trump for his “Apple American Manufacturing Program.”

Trump’s wild deals shake down chipmakers

Around the same time that Trump eased pressure on Apple, he turned his attention to Intel. On social media in August, Trump ordered Intel CEO Lip-Bu Tan to “resign immediately,” claiming he was “highly conflicted.” In response, Tan did not resign but instead met with Trump and struck a deal that gave the US a 10 percent stake in Intel. Online, Trump bragged that he let Tan “keep his job” while hyping the deal—which The New York Times described as one of the “largest government interventions in a US company since the rescue of the auto industry after the 2008 financial crisis.”

But unlike the auto industry, Intel didn’t need the money. And rather than helping an ailing company survive a tough spot, the deal risked disrupting Intel’s finances in ways that spooked shareholders. It was therefore a relief to no one when Intel detailed everything that could go wrong in an SEC filing, including the possible dilution of investors’ stock due to discounting US shares and other risks of dilution, if certain terms of the deal kick in at some point in the future.

The company also warned of potential lawsuits challenging the legality of the deal, which Intel fears could come from third parties, the US government, or foreign governments. Most ominous, Intel admitted there was no way to predict what other risks may come, both in the short-term and long-term.

Of course, Intel wasn’t the only company Trump sought to control, and not every company caved. He tried to strong-arm the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) in September into moving half its chip manufacturing into the US, but TSMC firmly rejected his demand. And in October, when Trump began eyeing stakes in quantum computing firms, several companies were open to negotiating, but with no deals immediately struck, it was hard to ascertain how seriously they were entertaining Trump’s talks.

Trump struck another particularly wild deal the same month as the Intel agreement. That deal found chipmakers Nvidia and AMD agreeing to give 15 percent of revenue to the US from sales to China of advanced computer chips that could be used to fuel frontier AI. By December, Nvidia’s deal only drew more scrutiny, as the chipmaker agreed to give the US an even bigger cut—25 percent—of sales of its second most advanced AI chips, the H200.

Again, experts were confused, noting that export curbs on Nvidia’s H20 chips, for example, were imposed to prevent US technology thefts, maintain US tech dominance, and protect US national security. Those chips are six times less powerful than the H200. To them, it appeared that the Trump administration was taking payments to overlook risks without a clear understanding of how that might give China a leg-up in the AI race. It also did not appear to be legal, since export licenses cannot be sold under existing federal law, but government lawyers have supposedly been researching a new policy that would allow the US to collect the fees.

Trump finally closed TikTok deal

As the end of 2025 nears, the tech company likely sweating Trump’s impulses most may be TikTok owner ByteDance. In October, Trump confirmed that China agreed to a deal that allows the US to take majority ownership of TikTok and license the TikTok algorithm to build a US version of the app.

Trump has been trying to close this deal all year, while ByteDance remained largely quiet. Prior to the start of Trump’s term, the company had expressed resistance to selling TikTok to US owners, and as recently as January, a ByteDance board member floated the idea that Trump could save TikTok without forcing a sale. But China’s approval was needed to proceed with the sale, and near the end of December, ByteDance finally agreed to close the deal, paving the way for Trump’s hand-picked investors to take control in 2026.

It’s unclear how TikTok may change under US control, perhaps shedding users if US owners cave to Trump’s suggestion that he’d like to see the app go “100 percent MAGA” under his hand-picked US owners. It’s possible that the US version of the app could be glitchy, too.

Whether Trump’s deal actually complies with a US law requiring that ByteDance divest control of TikTok or else face a US ban has yet to be seen. Lawmaker scrutiny and possible legal challenges are expected in 2026, likely leaving both TikTok users and ByteDance on the edge of their seats waiting to see how the globally cherished short video app may change.

Trump may owe $1 trillion in tariff refunds

The TikTok deal was once viewed as a meaningful bargaining chip during Trump’s tensest negotiations with China, which has quickly emerged as America’s fiercest rival in the AI race and Trump’s biggest target in his trade war.

But as closing the deal remained elusive for most of the year, analysts suggested that Trump grew “desperate” to end tit-for-tat retaliations that he started, while China appeared more resilient to US curbs than the US was to China’s.

In one obvious example, many Americans’ first tariff pains came when Trump ended a duty-free exemption in February for low-value packages imported from cheap online retailers, like Shein and Temu. Unable to quickly adapt to the policy change, USPS abruptly stopped accepting all inbound packages from Hong Kong and China. After a chaotic 24 hours, USPS started slowly processing parcels again while promising Americans that it would work with customs to “implement an efficient collection mechanism for the new China tariffs to ensure the least disruption to package delivery.”

Trump has several legal tools to impose tariffs, but the most controversial path appears to be his favorite. The Supreme Court is currently weighing whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) grants a US president unilateral authority to impose tariffs.

Seizing this authority, Trump imposed so-called “reciprocal tariffs” at whim, the Consumer Technology Association and the Chamber of Commerce told the Supreme Court in a friend-of-the-court brief in which they urged the justices to end the “perfect storm of uncertainty.”

Unlike other paths that would limit how quickly Trump could shift tariff rates or how high the tariff rate could go, under IEEPA, Trump has imposed tariff rates as high as 125 percent. Deferring to Trump will cost US businesses, CTA and CoC warned. CTA CEO Gary Shapiro estimated that Trump has changed these tariff rates 100 times since his trade war began, affecting $223 billion of US exports.

Meanwhile, one of Trump’s biggest stated goals of his trade war—forcing more manufacturing into the US—is utterly failing, many outlets have reported.

Likely due to US companies seeking more stable supply chains, “reshoring progress is nowhere to be seen,” Fortune reported in November. That month, a dismal Bureau of Labor Statistics released a jobs report that an expert summarized as showing that the “US is losing blue-collar jobs for the first time since the pandemic.”

A month earlier, the nonpartisan policy group the Center for American Progress drew on government labor data to conclude that US employers cut 12,000 manufacturing jobs in August, and payrolls for manufacturing jobs had decreased by 42,000 since April.

As tech companies take tech tariffs on the chin, perhaps out of fears that rattling Trump could impact lucrative government contracts, other US companies have taken Trump to court. Most recently, Costco became one of the biggest corporations to sue Trump to ensure that US businesses get refunded if Trump loses the Supreme Court case, Bloomberg reported. Other recognizable companies like Revlon and Kawasaki have also sued, but small businesses have largely driven opposition to Trump’s tariffs, Bloomberg noted.

Should the Supreme Court side with businesses—analysts predict favorable odds—the US could owe up to $1 trillion in refunds. Dozens of economists told SCOTUS that Trump simply doesn’t understand why having trade deficits with certain countries isn’t a threat to US dominance, pointing out that the US “has been running a persistent surplus in trade in services for decades” precisely because the US “has the dominant technology sector in the world.”

Justices seem skeptical that IEEPA grants Trump the authority, ordinarily reserved for Congress, to impose taxes. However, during oral arguments, Justice Amy Coney Barrett fretted that undoing Trump’s tariffs could be “messy.” Countering that, small businesses have argued that it’s possible for Customs and Border Patrol to set up automatic refunds.

While waiting for the SCOTUS verdict (now expected in January), the CTA ended the year by advising tech companies to keep their receipts in case refunds require requests for tariffs line by line—potentially complicated by tariff rates changing so drastically and so often.

Biggest tariff nightmare may come in 2026

Looking into 2026, tech companies cannot breathe a sigh of relief even if the SCOTUS ruling swings their way, though. Under a separate, legally viable authority, Trump has threatened to impose tariffs on semiconductors and any products containing them, a move the semiconductor industry fears could cost $1 billion.

And if Trump continues imposing tariffs on materials used in popular tech products, the CTA told Ars in September that potential “tariff stacking” could become the industry’s biggest nightmare. Should that occur, US manufacturers could end up double-, triple-, or possibly even quadruple-taxed on products that may contain materials subject to individual tariffs, like semiconductors, polysilicon, or copper.

Predicting tariff costs could become so challenging that companies will have no choice but to raise prices, the CTA warned. That could threaten US tech competitiveness if, possibly over the long term, companies lose significant sales on their most popular products.

For many badly bruised by the first year of tariffs, it’s hard to see how tariffs could ever become a winning strategy for US tech dominance, as Trump has long claimed. And Americans continue to feel more than “a little pain,” as Trump forecasted, causing many to shift their views on the president.

Americans banding together to oppose tariffs could help prevent the worst possible outcomes. With prices already rising on certain goods in the US, the president reversed some tariffs as his approval ratings hit record lows. But so far, Big Tech hasn’t shown much interest in joining the fight, instead throwing money at the problem by making generous donations to things like Trump’s inaugural fund or his ballroom.

A bright light for the tech industry could be the midterm elections, which could pressure Trump to ease off aggressive tariff regimes, but that’s not a given. Trump allies have previously noted that the president typically responds to pushback on tariffs by doubling down. And one of Trump’s on-again-off-again allies, Elon Musk, noted in December in an interview that Trump ignored his warnings that tariffs would drive manufacturing out of the US.

“The president has made it clear he loves tariffs,” Musk said.

Photo of Ashley Belanger

Ashley is a senior policy reporter for Ars Technica, dedicated to tracking social impacts of emerging policies and new technologies. She is a Chicago-based journalist with 20 years of experience.

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