phone unlocking

FCC blasts T-Mobile’s 365-day phone locking, proposes 60-day unlock rule

phone unlocking, Policy, T-Mobile / Mike M. / July 19, 2024

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Citing frustration with mobile carriers enforcing different phone-unlocking policies that are bad for consumers, the Federal Communications Commission is proposing a 60-day unlocking requirement that would apply to all wireless providers.

The industry’s “confusing and disparate cell phone unlocking policies” mean that “some consumers can unlock their phones with relative ease, while others face significant barriers,” Commissioner Geoffrey Starks said at yesterday’s FCC meeting. “It also means certain carriers are subject to mandatory unlocking requirements while others are free to dictate their own. This asymmetry is bad for both consumers and competition.”

The FCC is “proposing a uniform 60-day unlocking policy” so that “consumers can choose the carrier that offers them the best value,” Starks said. Unlocking a phone allows it to be used on a different carrier’s network as long as the phone is compatible.

The FCC approved the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in a 5-0 vote. That begins a public comment period that could lead to a final rulemaking. A draft of the NPRM said the FCC “propose[s] to require all mobile wireless service providers to unlock handsets 60 days after a consumer’s handset is activated with the provider, unless within the 60-day period the service provider determines the handset was purchased through fraud.”

T-Mobile prepaid imposes 365-day lock

FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel said that unlocking requirements have been imposed by the FCC in spectrum auctions and by the Department of Justice as a merger condition, but “restrictions on consumers unlocking their phones have persisted.”

“You bought your phone, you should be able to take it to any provider you want,” Rosenworcel said. “Some providers already operate this way. Others do not. In fact, some have recently increased the time their customers must wait until they can unlock their device by as much as 100 percent.”

Rosenworcel apparently was referring to a prepaid brand offered by T-Mobile. The NPRM draft said that “T-Mobile recently increased its locking period for one of its brands, Metro by T-Mobile, from 180 days to 365 days.” The 365-day rule brought Metro into line with other T-Mobile prepaid phones that already came with the year-long lock. We reached out to T-Mobile and will update this article if it provides a comment.

A merger condition imposed on T-Mobile’s purchase of Sprint merely requires that it unlock prepaid phones within one year. T-Mobile imposes different unlocking policies on prepaid and postpaid phones. For postpaid devices, T-Mobile says it will unlock phones that have been active for at least 40 days, but only if any associated financing or leasing agreement has been paid in full.

Exactly how the FCC’s proposed rules will apply to phones that haven’t been paid off is to be determined. The FCC will “seek comment on how our proposal might affect the incentive and ability of wireless providers to continue offering discounts on handsets, particularly in connection with extended payment plans, and lower prices on plans with minimum term commitments.”

One question asked in the draft NPRM suggests the FCC could require unlocking once a consumer with a device payment plan has made the first payment. The FCC asked:

Alternatively, should we require service providers to unlock handsets after a period shorter or longer than 60 days? For example, should we require all handsets to be unlocked by default upon activation? Or, should we require all handsets to be unlocked after the end of the handset’s return period or after the first payment on the handset has been processed? Would a standardized time period of a certain number of days be easier to implement and enforce than non-standardized time periods based on return periods or billing cycles? What is the minimum amount of time service providers need to protect themselves from handset fraud? Rather than locking handsets, are there other ways service providers can protect themselves from handset fraud that would allow the Commission to prohibit the locking of handsets altogether?

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Cops can force suspect to unlock phone with thumbprint, US court rules

A man holding up his thumb for a thumbprint scan

The US Constitution’s Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination does not prohibit police officers from forcing a suspect to unlock a phone with a thumbprint scan, a federal appeals court ruled yesterday. The ruling does not apply to all cases in which biometrics are used to unlock an electronic device but is a significant decision in an unsettled area of the law.

The US Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit had to grapple with the question of “whether the compelled use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone was testimonial,” the ruling in United States v. Jeremy Travis Payne said. “To date, neither the Supreme Court nor any of our sister circuits have addressed whether the compelled use of a biometric to unlock an electronic device is testimonial.”

A three-judge panel at the 9th Circuit ruled unanimously against Payne, affirming a US District Court’s denial of Payne’s motion to suppress evidence. Payne was a California parolee who was arrested by California Highway Patrol (CHP) after a 2021 traffic stop and charged with possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, fluorofentanyl, and cocaine.

There was a dispute in District Court over whether a CHP officer “forcibly used Payne’s thumb to unlock the phone.” But for the purposes of Payne’s appeal, the government “accepted the defendant’s version of the facts, i.e., ‘that defendant’s thumbprint was compelled.'”

Payne’s Fifth Amendment claim “rests entirely on whether the use of his thumb implicitly related certain facts to officers such that he can avail himself of the privilege against self-incrimination,” the ruling said. Judges rejected his claim, holding “that the compelled use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone (which he had already identified for the officers) required no cognitive exertion, placing it firmly in the same category as a blood draw or fingerprint taken at booking.”

“When Officer Coddington used Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone—which he could have accomplished even if Payne had been unconscious—he did not intrude on the contents of Payne’s mind,” the court also said.

Suspect’s mental process is key

Payne conceded that “the use of biometrics to open an electronic device is akin to providing a physical key to a safe” but argued it is still a testimonial act because it “simultaneously confirm[s] ownership and authentication of its contents,” the court said. “However, Payne was never compelled to acknowledge the existence of any incriminating information. He merely had to provide access to a source of potential information.”

The appeals court cited two Supreme Court rulings in cases involving the US government. In Doe v. United States in 1988, the government compelled a person to sign forms consenting to disclosure of bank records relating to accounts that the government already knew about. The Supreme Court “held that this was not a testimonial production, reasoning that the signing of the forms related no information about existence, control, or authenticity of the records that the bank could ultimately be forced to produce,” the 9th Circuit said.

In United States v. Hubbell in 2000, a subpoena compelled a suspect to produce 13,120 pages of documents and records and respond “to a series of questions that established that those were all of the documents in his custody or control that were responsive to the commands in the subpoena.” The Supreme Court ruled against the government, as the 9th Circuit explained:

The Court held that this act of production was of a fundamentally different kind than that at issue in Doe because it was “unquestionably necessary for respondent to make extensive use of ‘the contents of his own mind’ in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the requests in the subpoena.” The “assembly of those documents was like telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like being forced to surrender the key to a strongbox.” Thus, the dividing line between Doe and Hubbell centers on the mental process involved in a compelled act, and an inquiry into whether that act implicitly communicates the existence, control, or authenticity of potential evidence.